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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis explores the development of the Sino-American imbalance between the mid-
1990s and 2007. Addressing this issue, most mainstream economists have mainly 
concerned themselves with whether it is a natural reflection of cross-country differences in 
underlying ‘market fundamentals’ or an outcome of ‘misguided’ state policies which 
require corrective policy actions. On the other hand, international political economists have 
focused on its implications for inter-state power relations: whether it is a reflection of the 
US’ lasting hegemonic power based on the unique status of the dollar or a symptom of the 
rise of China as a new centre of the global political economy. In distinction to these 
existing views, this thesis focuses on the fundamental social foundation of the Sino-
American global imbalance with the help of an Open Marxist account of capitalist social 
relations, and interprets the phenomenon as a form of the contradictory process of capital 
accumulation mediated by states’ economic policies.  
By analysing the social context of the contradictory rise of China as a surplus-running 
‘factory of the world’ together with the contradictory rise of the US as a debt-ridden 
‘consumption market of the world’ from the mid-1990s, this thesis lays out three 
arguments on the nature of the Sino-American imbalance. First, it is argued that what is 
called ‘misguided’ policies were employed by each state as a governing strategy securing 
reproduction of social relations in the face of an accumulation crisis, and thus the root 
cause of the imbalance was not the policies themselves but the crisis-tendency inherent in 
the capitalist mode of production. Second, this thesis argues that the imbalance was 
managed through de-facto international cooperation between the global centre of 
production (China) and the global centre of circulation (the US) which are mutually 
dependent in sustaining accumulation within their respective territories. Third, this thesis 
maintains that the cooperative relations conducive to sustaining growth in the form of a 
growing bilateral imbalance were fundamentally contradictory relations, helping 
productive forces in China maximize themselves without regard for the limited markets, 
and at the same time allowing credit in the US to expand regardless of the debtors’ ability 
to service the accumulated debts, thus amplifying the possibility of a crisis on the world 
market. Consequently, the Sino-American imbalance was a perverted form of international 
cooperation between China and the US for sustaining accumulation and securing 
reproduction of capitalist social relations.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
One of the most prominent features characterizing the world economy from the mid-1990s 
was a historically unprecedented build-up of external imbalances known as ‘global 
imbalances’. Indeed, on the eve of the global financial crisis of 2007, the sum of 
international current account imbalances amounted to close to 6% of global GDP, 
approximately three times the level that it stood in 19961 (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti 
2009, p.7). As a reflection of the cumulative current account imbalances, from 1996 to 
2006 the world’s total net foreign asset positions had nearly doubled from 5.4% to 10.4% 
of global GDP (Bracke et al 2010, p.1140).  
 
The trend of widening global imbalances during this period was in large part driven by two 
global economic giants: the US and China. Between 2001 and 2006, for instance, the US 
had absorbed more than 90% of the world’s total surplus savings while China had 
surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest net exporter taking more than a quarter of 
the world’s total current account surpluses (Li 2008, pp.78-79). This reflects the persistent 
growth of the US as the centre of global deficit financing of demand, forming a deepening 
bilateral imbalance with China which dramatically transformed itself into the factory of the 
world from the mid-1990s. In that the peculiar evolution of the two economies and their 
cumulative bilateral imbalances played a leading role in forming the widening pattern of 
global imbalances during the period, the global imbalance was in effect the ‘Sino-
American global imbalance’2. This thesis explores the development of the Sino-American 
global imbalance, focusing on its social foundations.  
 
The Sino-American global imbalance has been an issue of intense discussion across the 
disciplines. Among mainstream economists, attention has been focused on whether it is a 
                                         
1It was also double the previous highest level recorded in the mid-1970s (Bracke et al, 2010, 
p.1144). 
2In most of discussions of the issue, indeed, the bilateral imbalance between the US and China has 
been regarded as a prototype of the global imbalance in general. See Eichengreen (2006); Yongding 
(2007), pp. 3-23; Foot and Walter (2011), pp.79-132; Li (2007), Lin et al (2010), Sharma (2010), 
Hung (2009). 
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benign by-product of deepening globalization and thus efforts to reduce it are misguided or 
whether it is a malign effect of misguided policies and rebalancing policies are therefore 
required. On the other hand, international political economists tend to address the question 
as to whether it is a reflection of the US’ persistent structural monetary power or a 
symptom of the hegemonic shift from the US to a new centre of the global economy, China. 
This thesis does not endorse one of the existing views but instead explores the social 
foundations of the Sino-American imbalance with the help of a Marxist perspective. In 
other words, this research aims to explain how the crisis-ridden capitalist social relations of 
production manifested itself in the form of the Sino-American global imbalance. The scope 
of this research is limited to the period until 2007 as the object of study is the development 
of the Sino-American global imbalance, rather than one of its effects: the global economic 
crisis since 2007. 
 
Before touching on the gist of existing approaches and briefly introducing the core 
argument of this thesis, the following section begins by outlining the Sino-American 
imbalance in terms of sheer magnitude in order to illustrate the general trend of the 
imbalance during the period under study.  
 
1. The Sino-American global imbalance in numbers  
 
It is well known fact that the main contributor to the mounting pattern of international 
current account imbalances was the world’s biggest economy: the US, whose current 
account deficits have grown dramatically since the mid-1990s. Figure 1.1 shows that from 
a point close to zero in 1991, the US current account deficit rose to 6.1% of GDP or $811 
billion in 2007, the largest deficit the economy has ever recorded3. Between 1995 and 2007, 
as much as 86% of the world’s total current account deficit was accounted for by the US 
alone (Li, 2008, p.79). As a result of the large and persistent current account deficit, as 
Figure 1.2 indicates, the US net international investment position (the difference between 
the value of US-owned assets abroad and foreign-owned assets in the US) continued 
falling to the point at which net foreign liabilities reached approximately 20% of GDP, 
making the US by far the world's largest net debtor.  
                                         
3 According to Edwards (2005, p.222), since 1971 the US has been the only large industrial 
country running deficits of over 5% of GDP (the tipping point at which adjustments used to follow). 
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Source: U.S. Buerau of Economic Analaysis, National Accounts,  
http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm (accessed October 2012). 
 
Source: U.S. Buerau of Economic Analaysis, International Investment Position,  
http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#iip (accessed 5 May 2010) 
 
Another main pole of the growing global imbalances was China which emerged as a global 
factory during the period between 1990 and 2007. From the mid-1990s, China, the world’s 
fastest expanding economy, and the world’s largest recipient of FDI, was also becoming 
the world’s largest exporter. Indeed, as Figure 1.3 shows, while the share of the US in the 
world export market continued falling, China rapidly enlarged its share and finally 
overtook the US prior to 2007 (Prasad 2005). As a mirror image of the trend, from the 
point of near zero around the mid-1990s China’s current account surplus reached a peak of 
10.1% of GDP or $353 billion in 2007 (see Figure 1.4). Between 2001 and 2007, China 
had become the world’s largest source of surplus savings, contributing approximately one-
quarter of the world’s total current account surpluses (Li, 2008, p.79). As Table 1.1 
indicates, the large and persistent current account surpluses resulted in a massive 
accumulation of official foreign reserves. The level of reserve holdings in 2007 surpassed 
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those of Japan and reached a massive $1.5 trillion, equivalent to 43.7% of GDP, making 
China the world's largest holder of foreign exchange reserves4.  
 
Figure 1.3. World export shares by major exporters between 1997 and 2007 (%) 
Source: WTO, International trade statistics (2011) 
 
Figure 1.4. China's current account between 1990 and 2007 
 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (2007), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/Statisticaldata/AnnualData/ (Accessed August 2012). 
 
Table 1.1. China's Accumulation of Foreign Reserves  
between 1997 and 2007 (billions of dollars) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Gross 
foreign 
reserves 
143.4 
(15.0) 
149.8 
(14.7) 
158.3 
(14.6) 
168.9 
(14.1) 
218.7 
(16.5) 
295.2 
(20.3) 
412.2 
(25.1) 
618.6 
(32.0) 
825.6 
(36.8) 
1,072 
(40.8) 
1,534 
(43.7) 
Change 34.9 6.4 8.5 10.5 49.8 76.5 117.0 206.3 207.0 247.0 461.7 
Note: Figures in parentheses are % of GDP, Source: China Statistical Yearbook (2007) 
                                         
4As of December 2007, China accounted for 23.9% of the world’s foreign exchange reserves (IMF 
International Financial Statistics 2008). 
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One clearly visible factor that made the US and China the two main poles of the global 
imbalance was an ever-deepening bilateral trade imbalance between the two countries. 
Indeed, a large part of the US current account deficit was due to the rapidly growing trade 
imbalance with China, as shown in Table 1.2 Importing five times as much from China as 
the US exported to the country, the trade deficit with China amounted to $256 billion or 
31.7% of the total US trade deficit in 2007 (it was about two-and-a-half times the 
equivalent deficit with Japan, which ranked second). For China, the massive trade surplus 
with the US was the largest source of the total trade surplus, and thus the current account 
surplus. For instance, China’s trade surplus with the US accounted for 62% of China’s 
trade surplus in 2007, which was equivalent to about 5% of China’s GDP in that year. 
 
Table 1.2. US’ trade balance with China between 1986 and 2007 ($ billions) 
 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
Exports 3.1 5.7 7.4 11.7 14.2 19.2 34.7 65.2 
Imports 4.7 11.9 25.7 45.5 71.1 102.3 196.7 321.5 
Balance -1.6 -6.2 -18.3 -33.7 -56.9 -83 -162 -256.3 
Source: U.S. Buerau of Economic Analaysis, Trade in Goods and Services, 
http://www.bea.gov/International/Index.htm (accessed 5 May 2010). 
 
This deepening bilateral trade imbalance was accompanied with a peculiar financial 
relation between the two countries. While the US was the largest purchaser of Chinese 
commodities, China was the largest purchaser of US financial assets. As Figure 1.5 shows, 
a large portion (estimated 60-80%) of China’s foreign exchange reserves was reinvested in 
US-dollar denominated assets (Setser 2007, p.11). The size of purchased US assets was 
large enough to draw attentions; for example, in 2007 the Chinese monetary authority 
purchased about 24% of total long-term Treasury securities and 29% of total long-term 
government agency securities (including debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) 
equivalent to $900 billion (Morrison and Labonte 2008, pp.4-5). These cross-border flows 
of money from China to the US played an important role in raising the value of US 
financial assets, allowing both the government and private sectors to finance an increasing 
amount of spending without a serious financial burden, thereby bringing about a greater 
current account deficit with China. 
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Figure 1.5. China’s Holdings of Foreign Exchange Reserves  
and U.S. Securities: 2002-2007 ($ billions)  
Source: US Department of the Treasury (2009). 
 
In spite of growing concerns about the sustainability of imbalanced growth patterns, the 
mutually-reinforcing bilateral trade-financial relations made it possible for the US and 
China to sustain a debt-financed consumption boom and an export-investment-led growth 
model respectively, enabling them to play the polarized roles of an increasingly dominant 
global consumer on the one side and a global factory on the other side. Based on this 
consideration, the global imbalance that developed from the mid-1990s can be referred to 
as ‘the Sino-American global imbalance’.  
 
Addressing this issue, mainstream economists have mainly concerned themselves with 
whether it is ‘benign’ or ‘malign’, that is, whether it is a natural reflection of cross-country 
differences in underlying ‘market fundamentals’ or an outcome of ‘wrong’ policies and 
related risks which require corrective policy actions. On the other hand, international 
political economists have focused on its implications for inter-state power relations: 
whether it is a reflection of the US’ lasting hegemonic power based on the unique status of 
the dollar or a reflection of the rise of China as a new centre of the global political 
economy. In distinction to these existing views, this thesis aims to explain the fundamental 
social foundations of the Sino-American imbalance with the help of an Open Marxist 
account of capitalist social relations. 
 
2. The Sino-American imbalance in theoretical perspectives 
 
The spectacular development of the Sino-American imbalance has attracted much attention 
from scholars across the disciplines, and there are a variety of views put forward to account 
0
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2000
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US securities
Foreign Exchange 
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for the phenomenon.5 Traditionally, topics related to global imbalances have been a central 
theme in mainstream economics. Among others, Keynesian-inspired economists (Cline 
2005; Rajan 2005; Stiglitz 2006; Eichengreen 2006; Mussa 2007; Krugman 2009; Lardy 
2008; Akyuz 2011) tend to see the phenomenon in relation to the government policies that, 
from their perspectives, have failed or neglected the management of domestic 
macroeconomic balances between aggregate consumption demand and productive capacity. 
Specifically, they point towards the Chinese government’s ‘misguided’ pursuit of crisis-
ridden export-investment-led growth that had long repressed the household sector’s 
disposable income growth, while, on the other hand, criticizing the US government’s 
‘reckless’ employment of exceptionally expansionary monetary-fiscal policies leaving 
excessive debt-financed spending sprees to take its own course for too long. Warning that a 
disorderly adjustment would inevitably follow the ever-growing imbalance, they 
emphasize the necessity of a set of corrective policies coupled with close international 
policy cooperation (i.e. a combination of fiscal policies and exchange rate policies such as 
the Plaza Accord) capable of smoothly realigning the level of national consumption 
demands to productive capacities in each country.  
 
Neoclassical-inspired views (Copper 2004, 2005; Corden 2005, 2007; Ferguson 2005; 
Greenspan 2007; Poole 2004; Feldstein 2008; Valderrama 2008; Caballero 2005), on the 
other hand, give more attention to the benign aspect of the imbalance. They believe it is 
natural or even desirable for countries with different patterns of savings that reflect 
different economic fundamentals (e.g. demographic patterns, the rate of return on capital, 
and maturity of financial systems etc.) to have current account imbalances, for it means 
each rational market participant (either public or private actors) is allowed to seek ‘inter-
temporal utility maximization’ on a global scale. From their perspectives, the large size of 
the Sino-American imbalance was a fruit of integrated global financial markets that had 
made it possible for rational Chinese savers and rational American borrowers to cooperate 
with each other. Distrusting policy suggestions for ‘adjustment’ as an act of sacrificing 
economic rationality, they emphasize the mutual benefits derived from the imbalance, that 
                                         
5For an overview of diverse views on the global imbalances, see Eichengreen (2005, 2010); Iley 
and Lewis (2007); Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009); Teunissen and Akkerman (2006); Bracke et al 
(2010); and Bordo (2005). 
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is, the benefits of Chinese savers acquired from the highly developed, secure, and more 
profitable US financial markets, along with US borrowers’ benefits from cheaper Chinese 
credits with which they could finance either consumption or other profitable financial 
activities overseas.  
 
Meanwhile, the unique and dynamic character of the growing Sino-American imbalance 
has also attracted attention from the field of international political economy (IPE). Among 
others, critical IPE theorists (Strange, 1986, 1987; Kirshner 1995; Cohen 2004, 2006; 
Wade, 2003; Bergsten 1996; Kaelberer 2005; Helleiner 2006; Andrews 2006; Vermeiren, 
2010) find the fundamental cause of global imbalances to be the international monetary 
system itself, rather than in the specific policies or developments of each national economy. 
They point out that the current international monetary system is a kind of non-system in 
which the US, the issuer of de-facto global money, is given a prerogative or what they call 
‘structural monetary power’ capable of financing any expensive self-centred policies by 
exploiting the world’s surplus savings deposited in dollar-assets. They argue that the more 
the US exploits the dollar privilege the more instability occurs in the global financial 
system, which in turn forces other states, in particular poor developing countries, to 
‘voluntarily’ accumulate dollar reserves and thus finance the US deficits, in an attempt to 
insulate their economies from possible financial shocks. From this perspective, the 
growing global imbalance was an outcome of this structural monetary power of the US, or 
the lack of ‘fair’ regulatory mechanisms controlling the US’ external deficits at a global 
level.  
 
On the other hand, agreeing with critical IPE perspectives that the immediate cause of the 
global imbalance was the US’ imperialistic exploitation of the dollar privilege, World 
System theorists (Arrighi 1994, 2005, 2007, 2009; Arrighi and Silver 1999, 2001; Arrighi 
and Zhang 2007; Sugihara 2003; Frank 1998; Amin, 2004, 2005; Wallerstein 2003) take it 
one step further by arguing that the American state’s reliance on its monetary-financial 
power is a reflection of declining economic power in production, and thereby declining US 
hegemony. They see the growing US external deficits as an outcome of the state’s efforts 
to maintain its central status in the global political economy without a corresponding 
material capability. They also argue that the declining US hegemonic power has been 
9 
 
 
 
accompanied with a rising new centre of global production: China, a pioneer of what they 
call a ‘non-capitalist market economy’. They expect, in the long run, China’s rise as a new 
centre of the global economy and the emergence of the ‘Beijing Consensus’ to replace the 
Washington Consensus that will provide system-level solutions to the system-level 
problems left behind by American hegemony. 6  Consequently, for them, the Chino-
American global imbalance was one of the by-products or symptoms of this historical 
process of hegemonic shift.    
 
It is undeniable that from Keynesian-inspired views to the world-system theory each 
approach made considerable advances in the analytical understanding of the Sino-
American global imbalance. Despite their insights, however, each of existing approaches 
focuses only on specific aspects of the phenomena they have selected in the first place; 
none of them, it is argued here, analyses the social foundation of the imbalance.  
For instance, Keynesian-inspired perspectives are open to criticism that they disregard the 
socio-economic context that made such ‘problematic’ policies unavoidable or even rational 
options. Indeed, it can be argued that both the Chinese and US policymakers adopted the 
imbalance-inducing policies in order to keep the economy from an imminent risk of 
recession, rising unemployment, and social unrest. Likewise, it can be seen that 
rebalancing policies were not actively employed because such policies were expected to 
entail a crisis rather than prevent it. In this sense, emphasising ‘appropriate’ policies for a 
stable balanced growth without exploring the underlying causes of the imbalance can be 
criticized for being naïve and normative. The weakness of Keynesian views is shared by 
neoclassical perspectives, which disregard the socio-political context built by states that 
rendered the specific individual economic decisions rational. Individual rationality aimed 
at inter-temporal utility optimization should be seen as socially-organized collective action 
rather than the spontaneous actions of walking calculators. For example, Chinese low-
incomers were socially forced to consume less in favour of savings rather than voluntarily 
partaking in utility maximization activities. Also, these approaches focus only on some 
                                         
6On the rise of China and its implications for the world system, there is no consensus among World 
System theorists. While Arrighi and his collaborators see the emergence of China as the rise of an 
alternative to the existing US-led world system, others including Wallerstein and Li argue that the 
growth of China (and India) represents that the capitalist world system has reached the terminal 
stage of development. For the latter perspective see Li (2008).   
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beneficial aspects of the cross-border relations of savers and borrowers; no attempt is made 
to explain why such individual rational decisions brought about the increasingly manifest 
irrational outcomes such as excessive under-consumption in China and excessive over-
borrowing in the US.  
 
In the case of critical IPE views, they tend to overlook an important aspect of the global 
imbalance: the issues of relative industrial competitiveness. By leaving the question of 
production relations behind, they fail to see that behind the strong purchasing power of 
dollars that has been ‘structurally’ sustained is the declining competitiveness of the US-
based producers in world export markets. Indeed, this was one of the factors that triggered 
dollar crises (e.g. crises of 1977-9, 1987, 1992-3 etc.), which in turn made the US (that is 
supposed to be free from external constraints, according to critical IPE’s explanations) 
dependent upon foreign creditors including China. Lastly, views based on World System 
theories overlook the fact that despite the different forms of development the US and China, 
as a moment of the same global circuit of capital, have been dependent upon each other in 
terms of their own domestic stability and prosperity. In particular, they tend to wrongly 
regard China (whose development path is characterized by the ‘strong state’ vis-à-vis the 
market) as a state existing independent from the capitalist world market including the US. 
This perception does not correspond to the reality that China’s growth as a global factory is 
conditioned on the growth of the US as a global consumer for the commodities made in 
China.  
 
In sum, while existing approaches are not without merit, their explanatory utility remains 
confined within their narrowly fragmented analytical frames. It seems that a 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon is only possible by putting these frames 
together in a mosaic fashion despite the contending views being in contradiction with one 
another on many issues. This thesis argues that all the above mentioned perspectives fail to 
put the social context into the question and that doing so is fundamental to understanding 
the Sino-American imbalance in a comprehensive manner.  
 
Instead of endorsing one of the existing positions, thus, this thesis sets to explore the 
underlying social foundation of the Sino-American imbalance by means of an Open 
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Marxist account of the capitalist social relations, focusing on the crisis-ridden character of 
capitalist accumulation. Exploring the social context, it will be argued that the Sino-
American imbalance was a perverted form of international cooperation between China as 
the workshop of the world and the US as the centre of global deficit financing of demand. 
This cooperation was the unintended consequence of the attempts by China and the US to 
secure their respective domestic reproduction of social relations in the face of an 
accumulation crisis and social strife. Finally, it will be argued that these attempts at 
domestic crisis management did not overcome, rather ended up intensifying, the crisis-
ridden character of capitalist accumulation. 
 
3. Conceptual foundations of thesis  
 
This thesis argues that the weakness of the existing approaches principally derive from 
their restricted methodologies or their conceptual foundations, in that they take the separate 
and atomised units of society as their starting point and then attempt to look for the 
external relations between them, rather than beginning with a study of society itself from 
which different constituent parts are derived (Burnham 2010, p.31). In other words, the 
existing views are treating particular categories of social organization such as the state, the 
market, or a group of individuals in a-historical and taken-for-granted manner and then see 
only empirical collisions between them, as if each of them exists with its own law of 
development autonomous and independent from the underlying social relations (e.g. the 
state as an external balancer of the economy, the market as a tool for utility maximization, 
the world market as an arena of interstate political struggles). It is no wonder, based on 
such a fantastic notion of the state or the market, they cannot advance “beyond a 
superficial form of naïve positivism in which externally related factors are brought 
haphazardly together in the fashion of popular journalism” (Burnham 2010, p.27). In 
Marx’s words, their analyses end up dealing with “only the direct form of manifestation of 
relations that is reflected in [people’s] brains and not their inner connection” (Marx 1981, 
p.307). 
 
In this regard, the Marxist, or more specifically, the ‘Open Marxist’ tradition, provides a 
more illuminating methodology. The analytical depth of an open Marxist analysis derives 
from its distinction between the apparent form and the essence of social reality. It is 
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understood that the essence of social reality lies in the specific way in which human labour 
power is organized in the process of social production, while it exists in the form of 
apparently disparate and independent but mutually complementary components. According 
to Marx (1978, p. 828), “the process of capitalist production gives rise to formations, in 
which the vein of internal connections is increasingly lost, the production relations are 
rendered independent of one another and the component values become ossified into forms 
independent of one another”. Thus, instead of taking the existence of various social forms 
as established ‘facts’ and then focusing on its functions, a social study needs to first raise a 
question why social productive practice has assumed that particular form;7 what is the 
social origin or the raison d’êre of such forms that lie in the capitalist mode of producing 
subsistence. By analysing a social event in the context of capitalist social relations (the all-
pervasive and determining political economic context), this approach can conceptualize its 
social meaning: the social basis of its existence, advancing beyond a pure empirical and 
fragmented assessment. As Clarke (1978, p.42) put it, “it is the concept of class relations as 
being analytically prior to the political, economic and ideological forms taken by those 
relations (even though class relations have no existence independently of those forms) that 
makes it possible for a Marxist analysis to conceptualise the complexity of the relations 
between the economic and the political, and their interconnections as complementary 
forms of the fundamental class relation, without abandoning the theory for a pragmatic 
pluralism”. 
 
Consequently, this thesis argues that an analysis of the global imbalances should be based 
on an understanding of the capitalist social relations of production, that is, the process of 
capital accumulation which manifests itself as various patterns of state, market, finance, or 
interstate relations. In other words, this thesis explores how the process of class struggles 
had come to form the complex phenomena of the global imbalances through phenomena 
including specific state policies, a pattern of market transactions, geographically and 
sectorally uneven development, expansion of finance linking the world, and conflicts and 
cooperation bewteen states on the world market.  
 
                                         
7See Marx, Capital, vol.1. pp. 173-74. 
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4. Core argument of thesis  
 
Marx’s theory of capital accumulation elucidates the contradiction inherent in the capitalist 
social relations of production. In capitalist society, exploitative class relations of 
production take place in the form of value relations between commodities on the market, 
which drives all capital, in an attempt to reproduce itself, to maximize the productive 
forces of labour by constantly reinvesting surplus value in the means of production, thus 
throwing an increasing mass of commodities onto the market without regard for the 
demand for them as use-values. It follows that the tendency towards overproduction of 
commodities and overaccumulation of capital is inherent in the very capitalist mode of 
production itself. The tendency is expressed as a dynamic of economic growth on the one 
hand, and an increasing necessity of a crisis eliminating the growing stock of unsold 
commodities and unprofitable means of production on the other. In other words, as 
accumulation proceeds, “the development of the social productive power turns into an 
obstacle to capital, or, what is the same, the capitalist relations of production become 
obstacles to the further development of the productive power of social labour” (Marx, 1953, 
p.635, quoted by Mattick 1969, p.55). Meanwhile, in line with the growing necessity of 
crisis, the capitalist state seeks to sustain accumulation within their territories by means of 
various forms of economic policies helping capitals to overcome a barrier to further 
accumulation. By expanding the mass of capital beyond what could otherwise be sustained, 
however, the very ‘success’ of any state policies ends up reinforcing, rather than 
countering, the tendency to overacumulation and crisis on a global scale.8 This thesis will 
interpret the development of the Sino-American global imbalance as a form of this 
contradictory process of capital accumulation mediated by states’ economic policies.  
 
Based on the findings of detailed analyses of the contradictory rise of China as a surplus-
running ‘factory of the world’ together with the contradictory rise of the US as a debt-
ridden ‘consumption market of the world’ from the mid-1990s, this thesis explores three 
questions related to the Sino-American imbalance: why the imbalance was promoted by 
                                         
8 Of course, it does not mean that state policies are meaningless and have no impact on the 
accumulation process. Although capitalist states’ interventions cannot deal with the underlying 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, they can significantly affect the specific forms 
in which the contradiction is manifested (Clarke 1988, p.83-84). 
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the states, how it was sustained by the states, and what contradictions it involved, and the 
answers can be briefly summarized as follows. First, by examining the socio-economic 
context around the late-1980s and early 1990s, this thesis asserts that the policies inducing 
imbalanced economic growth were each state’s response to a crisis of accumulation and 
social reproduction. In the case of China, the radical market-oriented reform policies were 
actively employed from the early 1990s as a governing strategy for reproducing class 
relations in the face of the increasingly obvious failure of the so-called state capitalism 
represented by the secular decline of productivity and increasing social unrest. In the case 
of the US, the policy combination of a strong dollar and low interest rates from 1995 was 
an unavoidable reaction to the ever-worsening recession sustained since the late 1980’s 
stock market crash as well as an impending capital flight owing to the secular decline of 
dollars and the crisis in Japan, the biggest US asset holder. 
 
While both economies were successfully pulled out of the doldrums with rapid imbalanced 
growth, it was almost impossible for the states to employ ‘rebalancing’ measures such as 
income redistribution policies boosting domestic consumption demands in China and 
contractionary policies coupled with devaluation of dollars repressing consumption booms 
in the US because such policies would inevitably require a substantial devaluation of 
capital so far accumulated. In other words, in China, it meant a rising cost of exploitation 
eroding the value of productive capital in export sectors which was the source of national 
income itself, while in the US it meant a rising debt service burden eroding the value of 
credit-sustained assets upon which the economy as a whole was reliant. It was in this 
context that both states developed and adhered to imbalanced growth in spite of the 
growing instability involved in the imbalance.          
 
Second, this thesis argues that the imbalanced growth patterns were managed in the form 
of international cooperation. In fact, the imbalanced economic growth of China following 
the reform process would have been impossible at the outset without the US’ booming 
markets and the influx of FDI from the US, offsetting the deflationary pressure in China. 
Likewise, the imbalanced growth of the US led by the consumption boom from the mid-
1990s would have been impossible in the first place without the rise of China sending 
cheap credits as well as cheap commodities, thus countering the inflationary pressure in the 
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US. The de-facto cooperation between China and the US in sustaining accumulation 
became especially prominent from 2000 when the bursting of the US stock market bubble 
brought about the possibility of a sweeping crisis. At the time, the US monetary authority 
had to implement two incompatible tasks at the same time: on the one hand, it had to react 
to the recession with exceptionally expansionary policies, while on the other hand it had to 
defend the dollar from the growing speculative outflows of funds from US markets. 
Meanwhile, China was also affected by growing fallout from the crisis: while an abrupt 
reduction of demands in export markets dealt a blow to the growth engine of the economy, 
the influx of speculative capital (so-called ‘hot money’) was putting upward pressure on 
the renminbi either in nominal or real terms which, if realized, would have further 
dampened the profitability of export sectors.  
 
The crisis overshadowing both countries at the time was managed and finally overcome 
through a specific form of cooperative financial policies. On the side of China, the 
monetary authority, as a reaction to the speculative pressure on the currency, embarked on 
the famous double intervention policies on a large scale: massive purchase of dollars in the 
foreign exchange market coupled with a drastic sterilization operation in domestic bond 
markets, while the costs of such intervention were in effect passed onto the low-income 
working population in the form of negative real interest rates on savings. On the side of the 
US, the government with the help of Wall Street accelerated the development of mortgage 
financial markets, which came to play the role of efficient vehicle channelling the massive 
amount of Chinese dollars into American housing assets. While the inflow of Chinese 
funds supported the value of dollars and housing assets, the low-income US households 
were rendered wealthier on paper and thus were capable of incurring more debts for 
sustaining existing levels of living standards (i.e. consuming more Chinese commodities). 
Consequently, the core of the cooperative operation was transferring surplus capital from 
China to the US through the unintended but concerted financial manipulations by the two 
states. As a result of the cooperation over the recycling of surplus capital, the export-
investment led growth in China and the consumption-led growth in the US were both 
successfully put back on track deepening the existing imbalance further and further.   
 
Third, this thesis maintains that the imbalanced growth was a contradictory process of 
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capital accumulation, reinforcing the barrier to further accumulation. Indeed, the brake on 
rapid growth based on the Sino-American imbalance was a product of the growth itself 
rather than some external factors. In China, while a certain level of surplus-profit (i.e. the 
difference between costs of production in China and selling prices in the world market) 
were secured, the brisk reinvestment of earned profits coupled with the huge influx of FDI 
continued boosting economic growth. But as the productive capacity was expanding 
without regard for the limited demand in the world market, the unlimited growth of 
productive forces was accompanied by a downward tendency of prices and profit rates. 
Ironically, rather than balancing between supply and demand, individual capital responded 
to such pressures by further lowering costs of production and throwing bigger volume of 
products onto the market, thus perpetuating the overproduction in a vicious cycle. With 
overcapacity and overproduction ever-worsening, there emerged inexorable problems such 
as growing unemployment, bourgeoning bad debt loads in the banking system, and a 
speculative boom in real estate markets, all of which increased the necessity of a 
destructive crisis shaking off the overaccumulated capital.  
 
In the US, while the value of the dollar and housing prices were supported by the massive 
influx of Chinese funds, the growing debt-financed consumption demand fuelled booming 
economy with the service sectors as the main growth engine. The problem was that the 
debt was expanding without the concomitant expansion of productive activities. The cheap 
Chinese credits were being imported along with ultra-cheap Chinese commodities, which 
drove out the US-based manufacturers whose price competitiveness was significantly 
eroded by the relatively high value of the dollar. As a result, with the trend of so-called 
deindustrialization accelerating, more and more workers were pushed into low-productivity 
and low-wage jobs in service sectors leaving households’ real income growth stagnating 
for a long period. While the increasing level of debt was justified by the growth in 
household wealth in the form of expensive houses, the growing debt-service burden due to 
the stagnating income growth was destined to put growing downward pressure on the 
demand for mortgages and houses, precipitating a burst of the bubble, that is, destruction 
of the imaginary wealth so far accumulated.   
 
In sum, from the findings of the analyses of the social context this thesis derives three 
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arguments on the nature of the Sino-American imbalance. First, this thesis argues that what 
Keynesians call ‘misguided’ policies were employed by each state as a governing strategy 
securing reproduction of social relations in the face of an accumulation crisis, and thus the 
root cause of the imbalance is not the policies themselves but the crisis-tendency inherent 
in the capitalist mode of production. Second, this thesis asserts that the imbalance was 
managed through de-facto international cooperation between the global centre of 
production (China) and the global centre of circulation (the US) which are mutually 
dependent in sustaining accumulation within their respective territories. Third, the thesis 
maintains that the cooperative relations conducive to sustaining growth in the form of a 
growing bilateral imbalance were fundamentally contradictory relations, helping 
productive forces in China maximize themselves without regard for the limited markets, 
and at the same time allowing credits in the US to expand regardless of the debtors’ ability 
to service the accumulated debts, thus amplifying the possibility of a crisis.  
 
Consequently, the Sino-American imbalance was, as it is set out to argue here, a perverted 
form of international cooperation between China and the US for sustaining accumulation 
and securing reproduction of domestic social relations. Expressed another way, the Sino-
American global imbalance, at its foundation, was an expression of the tendency to 
overaccumulation and crisis inherent in the capitalist mode of production, mediated and 
reinforced by mutually complementary economic policies of the US and China, each 
seeking to sustain domestic accumulation.  
 
5. Empirical background of thesis  
 
In this thesis, I will empirically demonstrate the fact that both the US and China were 
under the growing pressure of an accumulation crisis prior to the mid-1990s. 
Macroeconomic indicators in China show stagnating productivity growth, relatively low 
real wage growth, and several eruptions of hyper-inflation that escalated socio-political 
tensions. Meanwhile, empirical material for the US reveals steadily falling capacity 
utilization rates, and exceptionally high unemployment and poverty rates coupled with 
constantly falling real wages until the mid-1990s.  
 
In response to those crises, as will be argued, the Chinese state employed radical reform 
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policies aimed at cheapening the labour force through depoliticizing the class relations of 
production, while the American state employed a set of monetary policies with a view to 
encouraging more investment and consumption on the basis of easy credit. I will 
empirically demonstrate the fact that from the mid-1990s those policies transformed China 
and the US into a surplus-running factory of the world and a debt-ridden consumer of the 
world respectively. This will be done by tracing the trend of relative unit labour costs (or 
the trend of overall trade weighted real exchange rates), the changing world market shares 
for capital operating in China and the US, international flows of FDI, and the trend of 
changing industrial structure in the two countries as well as the cumulative current account 
surplus/deficit.  
 
Meanwhile, the immediate limits of the newly developed accumulation patterns, the lack of 
effective domestic consumption demands in China and the inflationary pressure 
(downward pressure on the dollar) in the US, as will be argued, were overcome through the 
de-facto policy cooperation between the two states. I will empirically demonstrate this with 
data showing the growing role of the Chinese state in stabilizing the US financial market 
(the growing amount of debt issued by the US government and government-related 
agencies, notably MBSs, that were purchased by the Chinese state) as well as the growing 
share of Chinese goods in the US consumption market which sustained and deepened the 
Sino-American imbalance.  
 
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, while the de-facto policy cooperation made it 
possible for both states to continue their rapid economic growth, it ended up intensifying, 
rather than countering, the tendency towards over-accumulation and crisis in both countries. 
I will empirically demonstrate this argument with Chinese data indicating the ever-falling 
average capacity utilization rates (capital productivity), unemployment rates chronically 
remaining high, increasing cases of workers’ collective resistance, and growing bad-debt 
(NPLs) loads in the banking system during the mid-2000s. For the US, data shows the 
ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratios, in particular the rising household debt and debt-service 
payment as a percentage of disposable income in the US until the year 2007.  
 
6. Structure of thesis  
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The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapters 2 and 3 existing approaches to the global 
imbalance are outlined. Chapter 2 examines the explanation of mainstream economics that 
can be divided into Keynesian and neoclassical views, and Chapter 3 reviews the 
perspectives of critical IPE theorists and World Systems analysts on the phenomenon. 
Chapter 4 presents Marx’s theory of accumulation and crisis as the theoretical context of 
this thesis. In that chapter, the basic Marxist concepts on the process of capital 
accumulation, development of overaccumulation crisis, and the nature of the state will be 
outlined. Chapter 5 develops the historical-global context of the global imbalances. It takes 
a brief look at the history of crisis-ridden contemporary global capitalism (from the late 
1960s to the early 2000s), examining major conjunctures related to global economic crisis. 
Chapter 6 and 7 analyse the contradictory development of class relations in China and the 
US respectively. Based on the analyses of socio-economic policies and their effects, these 
chapters explore how and with what contradictions each society came to position itself as 
the ‘factory of the world’ and the ‘debt-ridden consumer market of the world’. Using the 
kernels of the findings of those two chapters, Chapter 8 develops the core argument of this 
thesis providing a comprehensive explanation of the nature of the Chino-American 
imbalance. Finally, Chapter 9, as the concluding chapter, summarizes the thesis and 
considers its implication for the study of the contemporary global political economy.   
 
7. Research documentation  
 
In terms of empirical evidence, this research depends on both primary and secondary 
literature. The former includes official statistics issued by relevant government 
departments (e.g. China Statistical Yearbook issued by National Bureau of Statistics of 
China (NBSC), investment statistics of China Ministry of Commerce, statistical data 
presented by US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), US Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED)), and international organizations (e.g. 
International Trade Statistics of the WTO, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO) of 
the IMF, Country Statistical Information Data base and World Development Indicators of 
World Bank, Stat Extracts of the OECD, etc.). The latter include working papers of private 
or state-sponsored research institutes, press reports, and scholarly publications dealing with 
related issues.   
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Chapter 2. Perspectives of Mainstream Economics 
 
This chapter examines the explanations of the global imbalances provided by mainstream 
economics that can be broadly divided into Keynesian and neoclassical views. The two 
approaches are analysed consecutively across three sections: to begin, theoretical 
framework is examined, and this is followed by two sections analysing the causes of 
Chinese current account surpluses and the US deficit respectively.   
 
It should be noted that the categorization of the views of mainstream economics into 
Keynesian and neoclassical views made in this thesis is not based on a strict academic 
definition of each term but on their general stance towards the state and the market. In this 
thesis, I refer to ‘Keynesian-inspired views’ as those whose attention is generally focused 
on the role of the state as a ‘rational external engineer’ that is perceived to be able to 
correct the malfunctions of the ‘irrational market’, while referring to ‘neoclassical-inspired 
views’ as those that tend to focus more on the ‘rational operation of the globalized market’ 
that determines the concomitant government role as a ‘passive supporter’ or ‘one of market 
actors’. I believe this way of categorizing the existing views of mainstream economists is 
fully acceptable, considering that many mainstream economists themselves admit that 
there is no more a clear-cut definition of either term. 
 
1. Keynesian-inspired perspective  
 
1.1.Theoretical background  
 
Keynesian macroeconomics in general, denying the self-correcting market mechanism 
based on flexible prices, starts with the observation that imbalances between aggregate 
domestic demand and supply cause excessive business swings involving deep recession 
and overheating in a national economy, and then focuses its attention on appropriate 
governmental interventions (manipulation of some key indicators through fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies) that have the potential to smooth out cyclical bumps, ensuring 
stable economic growth (Dutt 1991, p.221, 223). This approach is also applied to the 
problems of external imbalances; they are interpreted as a reflection of a domestic 
imbalance between aggregate expenditure and aggregate production in each country that 
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has not been corrected by appropriate government policies. In other words, a country’s 
long-lasting current account imbalances are considered to be a result of ‘inappropriate’ 
policies that have failed to match domestic consumption demands to domestic productive 
capacity, and thus leaving either supply or demand in excess for a long period (KCW 1971-
89, vol.25, p.30, p.272).  
 
For theoretical simplicity, these Keynesian perspectives (often called the ‘absorption 
approach’ to the balance of payments) can be explained by a manipulation of basic national 
income identity (Glowland 1983, p.88). As the national income account shows, total output 
Y is equal to total expenditures which can be divided into four possible uses: consumption 
(C), investment (I), government purchases (G), and net imports (EX-IM or CA). This is 
described as the following equation: Y = C + I + G + (EX – IM). With total domestic 
spending: (C+I+G) defined as ‘absorption’ (here denoted by A), the above equation can be 
rearranged as follows: Y – A = EX – IM. This shows that a current account surplus will 
occur when total domestic production (Y) exceeds absorption (A), so that the nation has 
redundant output to export. On the other hand, if Y – A is negative, that is, if absorption 
exceeds domestic output, the current account will also be negative as the excess of 
domestic demand is supposed to be met through imports (Alexander 1952, p.274). To 
achieve external balances, a country experiencing a CA deficit should adopt policies for 
increasing Y or decreasing A, while a surplus running country should follow the opposite 
direction. 
 
There is another simple macroeconomic identity useful for discussing the current account 
imbalance. To the national income identity used by the absorption approach, Y = C + I + G 
+ X – M, one can add the national income identity that shows how income received by 
individuals is allocated to different uses: Y = C + S + T. This indicates that income is 
allocated into consumption (C), saving (S) and taxes (T). With Y and C cancelled out from 
these two equations, one can derive: X – M = (S - I) + (T - G). The equation shows that a 
country runs a current account (CA) surplus when private saving is more than enough to 
finance private investment spending plus the government budget deficit (T - G), while if a 
country has national savings that falls short of its capital investment, then this must 
necessarily be matched, in aggregate, by a foreign debt (a surplus of saving relative to 
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investment insufficient consumption (excessive savings) somewhere else). It follows that 
any imbalances between savings and investment ‘in a certain national economy’ inevitably 
involves global imbalances ‘between national economies’ (Köhler 1990, p.260; 
Eichengreen 2005, p.5). This equation also shows the important role of the government in 
offsetting any shocks in the private sector. For example, when there is excess investment 
over private savings (S < I) as a result of an investment boom, the government can and 
should adjust its fiscal balance (T > G) with interest rates raised to cool it down (to prevent 
it from overheating). On the contrary, when private savings exceeds private investment (S 
> I) because of pessimistic expectations of the future, the government can and has to spend 
more (T < G) with interest rates lowered to prevent recession. If all national economies 
attempt to balance national savings and investment in this way, then there would be no 
large and long-lasting current account imbalances. Indeed, when fiscal-monetary policies 
were not active during the Classical Gold Standard period, 1880-1913, S and I were less 
correlated along with the persistently large destabilizing global imbalances. Only after 
Keynesian macroeconomic adjustment policies were invented and became quite popular, 
for example during 1965-1986, the tendency for saving and investment correlation in 
national economies became apparent, thus reducing the scale and size of current account 
imbalances.  
 
Keynesian economists argue that economic growth based on such imbalances cannot go on, 
and without significant rebalancing policies, that is, if left to market forces, would 
ultimately end in a crash, i.e. an abrupt and disorderly adjustment, accompanied by 
substantial exchange rate overshooting, a large increase in interest rates, and a sharp 
slowdown in growth worldwide (IMF 2006, p.12). On the side of countries with 
cumulative current account surpluses, while their national production structures become 
more and more reliant on export industries, the growing pressures of overcapacity would 
put limits on opportunities for profitable investment and thus on overall economic growth. 
On the other hand, the disproportionate growth between debt-driven consumption demands 
(generally accompanied by speculative booms in risk-bearing assets such as stocks and real 
estate) and the capacity to repay debts (the growth of traded goods industries) in deficit 
running countries would ultimately lead to a balance of payments crisis involving a 
destructive adjustment process or the emergence of protectionism calling for stronger trade 
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barriers such as import quotas (Minsky 1992, pp. 6-8; Krugman 2007, p.438). 
Consequently, from Keynesian perspectives any growth based on external imbalances, 
either export-led growth or import-reliant growth, cannot be sustainable in the long run, 
and thus gradual adjustments (rebalancing policies) should be implemented before markets 
force a sudden adjustment. 
 
1.2. Causes of Chinese current account surplus  
 
Since the market-oriented reform process began in 1978, China’s economy has recorded 
the world’s fastest average annual growth rate amounting to almost 10%. Despite China’s 
impressive economic performance, many economists have warned that such a high rate of 
growth would be unsustainable over the long run unless the highly imbalanced economic 
structure, that is, insufficient consumption demand over the capacity to produce, is 
corrected.  
 
The trend of imbalances can be examined in national income accounts. As Table 2.1 shows, 
the share of aggregate domestic demand in GDP declined while the rate of final 
consumption (households and government expenditure for consumption) in GDP continued 
to drop from 62% to 49% between 1992 and 2007. Those consumption rates were the 
lowest in the world and far lower than the world average (which was 78% in 2006)(World 
Bank 2008). While ever-expanding investment (exceeding 40% of GDP) was leading to an 
increase in production capacity and GDP, the consumption growth was slower than GDP 
growth and thus the lower final consumption rate increasingly enlarged the gap between 
aggregate supply of products and effective demand for them (Akyuz 2011, p.3). In fact, 
over the past two decades, real GDP per capita multiplied by five times, while the growth 
rates of real consumption per capita rose only 3.6 times (NBSC 2008).It follows that the 
gap, that is, the insufficiency of domestic demand, pushed firms to expand their sales to 
overseas markets, making net exports a major source of economic growth with the 
contribution to economic growth accounting for almost 20% in 2005-07 (1.98% points of 
GDP growth) (Lardy 2012, p.47). 
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Table 2.1. Composition of Expenditure by Sectors in China: 1992-2007 (% of GDP) 
Year Household Government Investment Net exports 
1992 47.16 15.24 36.59 0.99 
1995 44.87 13.25 40.29 1.57 
1998 45.33 14.28 36.18 4.19 
2001 45.34 16.04 36.47 2.13 
2004 40.51 13.87 42.97 2.63 
2007 36.10 13.46 41.61 8.78 
Source: China National Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Accounts: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm (Accessed 4 April 2010).  
 
According to Lardy’s (2012, pp.58-59) calculation on the basis of flow of funds data, about 
three-quarters of the fall in the consumption as a share of GDP between 1992 and 2008 
was due to the declining share of household disposable income in GDP, and another 
quarter of the decline was due to the rising household savings. Table 2.2 shows that 
household disposable income as a share of GDP declined by more than 10% while 
household propensity to consume also fell by around 8% between 1992 and 2007 (Aziz 
and Cui 2007; Guo and N’Diaye 2010; Baker and Orsmond 2010). Given that wages 
constitute 80% of Chinese household disposal income, it is evident that the main factor 
behind the fall (contributing 60% towards the fall) in household disposable income share 
was the decline in the wage share of GDP. Indeed, wages as a share of GDP fell from 
approximately 53% in 1992 to less than 40% in 2006 (Hung and Qian 2010; Lu and Gao 
2011). 
 
Table 2.2. Disposable income by Sectors in China (% of GDP)  Households’  
propensity to save 
Year Household Government Corporate 
1992 68.3 20.0 11.7 29.5 
1995 67.2 16.5 16.2 29.6 
1998 68.4 18.1 13.5 31.2 
2001 62.0 20.5 17.5 27.0 
2004 57.8 18.9 23.3 31.6 
2007 57.5 24.1 18.4 37.9 
Source: Ma and Yi 2010, p.16 
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Consequently, to understand the imbalanced structure of the Chinese economy, attention 
should be first paid to the reason why wage growth lagged behind overall economic growth, 
and why personal saving propensity grew despite the drop in household income share. 
Keynesian economics argues that the trends were attributable to the ‘wrong’ government 
policies or a lack of positive countermeasures against downward pressures on wages, 
increasing income inequality along with economic insecurity among low-income 
households during the market-oriented reform era. 
 
The underlying factor that put downward pressure on wages was the high degree of 
underemployment owing to the continued labour migration from agricultural sectors in the 
absence of proper institutional protection for those workers (who came to account for 
nearly 70% of the manufacturing workforce and 80% of the construction workforce by the 
mid-2000s). Compounding the problem was the fact that brisk investment did not lead to 
lower unemployment and a quick depletion of the rural labour force. This broken promise 
of a ‘Lewis turning point’ was partly due to the disproportionate investment activities in 
favour of large and capital-intensive industries (mainly the state-owned enterprises) at the 
expense of small, labour-intensive production or service sectors (Bai and Qian 2009; Ma 
and Yi 2010, p.18). Some economists point out that this trend was in fact a result of 
government policies; local administrations’ growth policies favouring SOEs and foreign 
invested firms, along with the central government’s exchange rate policies explicitly 
favoured export industries.   
 
In the wake of fiscal decentralization reforms, governments at the provincial and municipal 
level were preoccupied with achieving faster growth performance in their regions by 
promoting the development of large, capital-intensive and export-oriented firms and also 
by attracting more foreign investment funds. To that end, they competitively provided large 
SOEs and foreign-invested firms with preferential tax rates (e.g. the tax rate for wholly 
foreign owned firms and joint ventures was cut by half) while encouraging the state-owned 
commercial banks (which were under their political influence) to advantage such firms in 
terms of external finance. It was in effect a policy of directly transferring resources from 
small and labour-intensive enterprises toward large and capital-intensive firms (Wang and 
Gang 2009, p.147). 
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Also, it is a well-known fact that the government (and the central bank) had long resisted 
the upward pressure on real exchange rates deriving from cumulative current account 
surpluses and net FDI inflows. While maintaining its fixed parity of 8.28 RMB to the US 
dollar, the authorities absorbed the expanded monetary base by selling domestic bonds as 
well as raising the reserve ratio in order to curb inflationary pressures (a policy called 
sterilization). As a result, the continuous basic balance surpluses accompanied an irrational 
piling up of foreign reserves rather than a rising purchasing power of the yuan (i.e. 
domestic prices and wages). According to Mussa’s (2007) estimation, such monetary and 
exchange rate policies contributed to lowering China’s real exchange rate by about 36% 
from the early 2000s until 2006. By reducing real wages (purchasing power of wages), an 
undervalued yuan played a certain role hindering the growth of consumption-based 
services sectors while artificially raising profitability in the export sector and import-
competing SOE sector, which in turn contributed to the stagnated growth of employment 
and wages (Goldstein and Lardy 2008). 
 
Regarding the fall in propensity to consume, i.e. the increase in propensity to save, two 
factors can be identified as the cause: growing inequality and a lack of social system. 
During the reform period (1978–2007), slower growth of labour wages and faster growth 
of non-labour incomes resulted in widening income inequality (Wang and Gang 2009, 
p.145). For example, the Gini income coefficient in China increased from 0.32 in 1978 to 
0.48 in 2007, reaching a point higher than the generally-known warning level of 0.4 (World 
Bank 2008). The trend accelerated with rapid growth rates recorded from the mid-1990s. 
Indeed, the income of the top 10% of the richest Chinese was 23 times that of the bottom 
10 percent in the country in 2007, as compared with 1998, when the gap was only 7.3 
times (China Daily 2010). The large and widening income inequality may well result in an 
increasing share of savings and decreasing share of consumption in GDP, because it means 
national income is distributed in favour of higher-income resident groups (e.g. employers 
and employees of SOEs) whose propensity to save is significantly higher than low-income 
residents.  
 
Under-development of social security and public service systems also rendered the Chinese 
lacking in confidence regarding consumption. By the mid-2000s there was no social 
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welfare system to fully replace the enterprise-based cradle-to-grave social safety net that 
had been dismantled since China entered its toughest corporate restructuring and 
downsizing period from 1995 (Cai et al 2008). For instance, until 2007 the basic pension 
insurance and urban medical care insurance systems covered only 201 million and 180 
million people, accounting for only 34 and 30%, respectively, of the urban population. The 
unemployment insurance system covered only 116 million workers, accounting for 40% of 
total urban employment. None of these systems covered rural residents. It is not surprising 
that in a society where the only way to prepare for any possible illness or unemployment is 
personal savings, households cannot help but increase their savings as much as possible. 
 
In sum, China’s wage growth lagged behind overall economic growth while personal 
saving propensity remained too high because of a lack of appropriate government policies; 
there was little regulations in the labour market that could offset the effects of the 
oversupply of labour forces from rural areas; the government adopted policies favouring 
capital-intensive export-oriented firms including SOEs at the expense of small and labour-
intensive firms; there was no active response to growing income inequality while the 
problem of insufficient social welfare system was left unaddressed. 
 
All these indicate that the government pursued a transfer of resources from the household 
sector to the corporate sector, in particular the sector of large exporters and SOEs 
(Vermeiren 2013, pp.12-13). It seems that the government believed that letting the 
corporate sector retain huge profits would lead to a higher level of investment that could 
ultimately solve any problem of the national economy including a lack of consumption 
demand (Fan et al 2009). In reality, however, there was no such market mechanism 
allowing labour income and household consumption to grow in line with output growth at 
all. Rather, as discussed above, such a policy actually functioned the opposite way, and 
thus corporate profits and investment were increasingly expanded with the surpluses 
falling into the hands of a small group of individuals, enlarging income inequality.  
 
It is pointed out that this investment-export-oriented growth model is not sustainable in the 
long run, because growing pressures of overcapacity will put limits on opportunities for 
profitable investment while deficit-running countries including the US will not be able to 
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incur foreign debt indefinitely. Given the constraints on exports and the limits to 
investment-led growth, it has been prescribed that the sustainability of China’s growth is 
only possible by raising domestic consumption demands. Economists suggest a package of 
structural reforms aimed at rebalancing the economic structure towards a more domestic-
consumption-based economy, including active income redistribution policies, a drastic 
appreciation of exchange rates, and enforcement of stricter regulations in the labour market 
etc. (IMF Survey Online 2007). They argue that such rebalancing policies would lead to 
slower but higher-quality growth over the long term (IMF 2012). 
 
1.3. Causes of the US current account deficits  
 
Table 2.3.Composition of Expenditure by Sectors in the US (% of GDP) 
Year Household Government Investment Net exports 
1992 67.3 16.7 16.4 -0.5 
1995 67.7 15.3 18.1 -1.2 
1998 67.7 14.2 19.8 -1.8 
2001 69.8 14.7 18.9 -3.6 
2004 70.1 15.8 19.3 -5.2 
2007 70.0 16.0 19.1 -5.1 
Source:  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP and the National Income and Product 
Account (NIPA) Historical Tables, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm (accessed 25 April 
2010).  
 
In the US, the excessive domestic demand over supply, that is, the cumulative current 
account deficits was mainly driven by the increasing rate of final consumption (household 
and the government expenditure for consumption) in GDP. As Table 2.3 shows, the share 
of final consumption in the economy continued to grow from 83% to 86% between 1995 
and 2007 with the household consumption share reaching a record high of 70.1% in 2006 
and the government enlarging its share from the late-1990s. Such a high consumption rate 
(twice as high as that of China) was exceptional compared with the world average that 
stood at 78% in 2006 (World Bank 2008). While corporate sector investment spending and 
production capacity in the US were stagnating, the excessive domestic consumption 
demand generated high economic growth and lower unemployment rates, thus increasingly 
enlarging the gap between aggregate supply of goods and services and aggregate demand 
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for them. As a matter of course, the growing gap, that is, the insufficiency of domestic 
supply, had to be filled by growing imports; since 2002, imports of consumer goods 
increased steeply by more than 10%per annum, which was faster than the growth rate of 
total non-oil imports (7%) and the average growth rate of 8% over the past 25 years (Chinn 
2005, p.9). This consumption-led growth widened the gap between expenditure and 
production and led to the biggest economic imbalance in American history. The US 
became the ‘spendthrift nation’ with total outstanding debt amounting to US$47.9 
trillion—equal to 3.5 times US GDP in 2007 (Lansing 2005; Roach 2008). 
 
Focusing attention on the period after 2001, the nature of American current account deficits 
can be seen more clearly. Although the US current account balances deteriorated 
significantly from the mid-1990s, the deficits shown before 2001 were different from those 
since 2001 in terms of the underlying causes (Roubini and Setser 2004, p.21; Dunaway 
2009, p.8; Chinn 2005). During the second half of the 1990s U.S. current account deficits 
were largely associated with a surge in investment in the midst of the IT industry boom. 
Accordingly, the current account deficit during the period posed little concern because it 
was brisk productive investment promising higher future income that had brought about 
the deficits. More importantly, the fiscal balance was improving significantly from a $197 
billion deficit in 1995 to a $227 billion surplus in 2000, thus partly offsetting private 
dissaving. In a word, current account deficits prior to 2001 can be recognized as ‘benign’ 
both in quantity and quality, providing the basis for future production and capability to 
repay the debts. This aspect of deficits, however, became no longer able to apply to those 
existing since 2001.The bursting of the NASDAQ bubble drove the level of national 
investment down by approximately 4% of GDP from 2001 to 2003, which made it harder 
to link current account deficits to investment activity. The deficit, nevertheless, continued 
to deteriorate from a deficit of 4% of GDP in 2000 to 5% in 2003, 6% in 2005 and 7% in 
2006 (Eichengreen 2008, p.213; Roubini and Setser 2004, p.21; Stiglitz 2006). These 
growing deficits show that the nature of current account deficits changed into being 
definitely unsustainable and consumption-driven. As Figure 2.1 shows, the pattern of 
growth prior to 2000 was almost the same as that of industrial production, until they began 
diverging from 2000 onwards. This meant that the U.S. growth rate came to depend more 
and more on consumption rather than productive investment.  
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Figure 2.1. Development of GDP and Industrial Production in U.S. index, 2000=100 
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release 2010. 
 
It may then be asked, what were the factors behind the consumption boom? The expanding 
household consumption was not induced by a rise in household disposable income as a 
share of GDP (e.g. from 2001 to 2005, personal income fell from 86% of GDP to 82%) but 
by the increasing propensity of households to consume (lower savings rate) along with 
higher indebtedness. The personal savings rate having averaged 9.0% of disposable income 
in the 1980s fell to 5.2% during the 1990s, and then further declined to 1.9% from 2000. In 
the second quarter of 2005, it actually turned into negative (-0.4% of disposable income) 
for the first time since the Great Depression, reaching a record low of -1.1% in 2006 (FRB 
2008). As Table 2.4 shows, during the 2000s while the households were consuming larger 
and larger portions of disposable income, they were also ‘investing’ increasing sums of 
money in housing assets by almost doubling financial liabilities. The expansion of 
household borrowing was not insignificant; as shown in Table 3, the outstanding debt of 
US households was $3.6 trillion or 62% of GDP in 1990 accumulated to US$13.8 trillion, 
equivalent to total US GDP in 2007, contributing the most (except the financial sector) to 
the growth of total national outstanding debt.        
Table 2.4. US household sector financial flows (% of disposable income) 
 Consumption Net acquisition of 
financial assets 
Net acquisition of 
housing assets 
Net acquisition of 
financial liabilities 
Average 
1980s 
91.0 14.9 4.8 7.0 
Average 
1990s 
94.8 8.8 4.7 6.0 
Average 
2000s 
98.7 6.6 6.1 11.0 
Source: Flow of Funds Account, FRB (2008), Iley and Lewis (2007, p.53) 
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Economists argue this trend was ignited and driven by the Fed’s reckless monetary policy 
in the wake of the bursting of the tech bubble. During the period of recession in the early 
2000s, the exceptional monetary policy (which led to the lowest real ex ante Federal funds 
rate since the 1970s and the fastest rate of growth of liquidity since 1980) was adopted in 
the name of a ‘deflation-insurance policy’ (Iley and Lewis, 2007, p.239). But the problem 
was that the interest rates were maintained at the emergency level even long after the 
recession was over (until 2004), and thereafter the policy was turned into a pro-cyclical 
policy, giving the boom more than a helping hand, and thus forming a housing market 
bubble (Taylor 2009, p.5). The Economist (14 January 2006, p.68) described the policy as 
“Alan Greenspan's Monetary myopia” blind to the dangers of excessive monetary 
expansion, encouraging investors to take ever bigger risks and pushing share and house 
prices ever higher. In turn, rising asset prices and the enhanced access to credit of US 
households (the so-called ‘wealth effect’) further pumped up the US economy by 
accelerating consumption spending. As a result, American consumer spending, and 
economic growth as a whole, became dangerously dependent on unsustainable increases in 
asset prices and debt with the Fed forced to stick to the excessive policy even longer. 
 
Most mainstream economists also point out the fact that the unprecedented level of 
household consumption was not at all offset by government savings and rather, brought 
back the notorious ‘twin deficits’ of the 1980s. Between 2000 and 2004, indeed, the budget 
deficit deteriorated to near 6% of GDP between 2000 and 2004 (USG 2009, p.326-7). 
Unlike previous administrations that raised taxes to finance foreign wars, the George W. 
Bush administration, supported by the Fed’s excessive monetary ease, made large tax cuts 
while conducting the enormously expensive war in Iraq. The government increased real 
federal spending by 4.9% per year with the budget appropriated for ‘defence’ rising 
surprisingly at a real annualized growth rate of 8.1% (Rogers 2006; Tabbs 2007). As a 
result, the US government budget was shifted from a 1.8% of GDP surplus at the end of the 
Clinton administration in 2001 to a 4.8% deficit at the end of his first term, with the federal 
debt ballooning to about $4.2 trillion at the end of his second term (USG 2009, p. 128). 
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Unsurprisingly, the pattern of debt accumulation raised a serious concern about the 
problem of sustainability. From a common-sense point of view, higher interest rates, that is, 
a higher risk premium for holding dollar-denominated assets seemed necessary for the US 
as a debtor to take on additional debt. However, as higher interest rates would have a vital 
effect on household spending which was largely financed by debt, the only way remaining 
to induce foreign investors to hold dollar denominated assets despite relatively low return 
was to keep the external credit worthiness high (Roubini and Setser 2004). Unfortunately, 
there were several factors in the rising US current account deficit that gave rise to 
‘concerns’ rather than ‘credit’. First of all, Policies for sustaining a consumption-led boom, 
such as a strong dollar, low interest rates, low unemployment and increasing personal 
income and wealth all had distorted domestic production structure in favour of sectors 
producing non-tradables such as services and real estate. As Table 2.6 indicates the US 
economy became increasingly dependent upon domestic consumer-demand-based 
businesses, while US domestic investment was disproportionately reliant on the non-traded 
goods sector with only approximately 10% of GDP invested in the export-related sector 
(Summers 2004; Roubini and Setser 2004, p.26). The development of this production 
structure made the external imbalance appear increasingly unsustainable and precarious 
because it meant that the source of future ability to pay cumulative foreign debts was being 
drained.  
Table. 2.6. Changes in Production Structure of the US between 1980 and 2007 
(percentage of GDP) 
 Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Services 
1980 2.8 28.3 4.9 63.5 
1990 2.0 23.4 4.5 69.8 
2000 1.2 18.4 5.0 75.3 
2007 1.1 17.0 5.0 76.7 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP and the National Income and Product Account 
(NIPA) Historical Tables, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm (accessed 27 April 2010). 
Table 2.5. Outstanding Debt in the U.S. in 1990 and 2007 (US $ trillion) 
Year Government Household 
Non-
financial 
business 
Financial 
sector 
Sum GDP Debt/GDP (%) 
1990 3.5 3.6 3.8 2.6 13.5 5.8 232 
2007 7.3 13.8 10.6 16.2 47.9 13.8 347 
Source: Data of U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis calculated by Wang and Gang (2009, p.142) 
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Worse, the pace and quantity of debt accumulation seemed too fast and large compared to 
the world’s estimated ability to absorb the claims on the US. As of 2006, the US was 
borrowing from abroad approximately $2 billion a day to finance its trade deficit that 
reached an all-time record, about 6.5% of GDP (Stiglitz 2006). Surprisingly, the US current 
account deficit accounted for roughly 75% of the world total current account surplus in the 
year (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2005, p.1; Roubini and Setser 2004, p.26). Needless to say, 
allocating more than two-thirds of investment resources to one place (the US economy) 
was incompatible with a rational management of portfolios. Apart from the willingness of 
foreign investors to over-invest in claims on the US, it was also questionable whether 
Americans would accept an increasingly higher share of US assets owned by foreigners 
(Eichengreen 2006, p.3). An increasingly large portion of returns from investment in the 
US would be not available to US residents and this situation was likely to lead to a 
substantial rise in protectionist pressures. A rise of protectionism calling for stronger trade 
barriers such as an import quota was historically proven to go hand in hand with a high 
level of trade deficits and the resulting high rates of foreign ownership (Summers 2004). 
These negative features of the US current account deficit played an important role in 
increasing the perceived risk of dollar assets which was not yet matched by higher interest 
rates.  
 
Considering modern financial markets lacking the function of a smooth adjustment of 
macroeconomic imbalances, Keynesian economists argued that the longer the imbalance 
was supported, the greater the likelihood of disorderly adjustment. Disorderly adjustment 
means capital inflows falling steeply with the plummeting dollar value, which would 
involve higher interest rates and import-price inflation, and a sharp decline in asset prices 
and domestic demand in the US and the rest of the world (Roubini and Setser 2004, p.25, 
Eichengreen 2006, pp.3-5). At the same time, Chinese overproduction would have to be 
drastically adjusted by the same amount as the decline in overseas demand, causing 
alarming unemployment. Economists argued that, therefore, government policy actions for 
gradual adjustments should be implemented as soon as possible before markets force a 
sudden adjustment. Of course, rebalancing policies should begin with demand management 
policies at a national level, so-called expenditure-changing policies, i.e. fiscal-monetary 
policies for raising national savings rates. However, such policies should be based on 
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bilateral cooperation between trading partners on both poles of current account balances, 
because any unilateral actions could aggravate the situation. For example, Martin Wolf 
(2006) estimated that a cut in the US trade deficit from 7 to 4% of GDP, without an 
alternation to relative prices, would mean a reduction of nearly 10% of overall demand and 
about a 7% fall in GDP. In this case a remedy can aggravate the disease. Thus, there should 
be policy coordination between related states, gradually and stably transferring 
consumption demand from deficit to surplus country (Cline, 2005; Rajan 2006).  
 
Of course, one of the most important parts of the coordination should be a substantial 
adjustment of the exchange rate (i.e. depreciating the dollar or appreciating the renminbi), 
that is, expenditure-switching policies (Krugman 2009; Cline 2005). Such changes of 
relative prices would make US exports more attractive to Chinese consumers, also making 
imports less attractive to US buyers. Regarding the needed range of currency adjustments, 
it was estimated that the dollar would need to be depreciated against the renminbi by at 
least 20-40% (Eichengreen 2008, p.216; Cline 2005, p.5). This coordination was expected 
to be more than desirable since it would not require any country to undergo severe 
adjustment (recession) in the course of rebalancing. Economists who emphasized the 
importance of policy cooperation also pointed out the necessity of a gradual and 
synchronized currency adjustment coordinated by a multilateral agreement between all the 
Asian exporters and the US. They argued that such multilateral cooperation as the Plaza 
Agreement in the mid-1980s was necessary to ease the Chinese monetary authority’s worry 
about a loss of competitiveness and an abrupt inflow of hot money in the wake of currency 
appreciations (Cline 2005, p.1). It is also argued, in the long-term, strengthening the role of 
the IMF in conducting surveillance of member country policies(especially exchange rate 
policies) and establishing stricter regulation of the international financial system would be 
a fundamental remedy for the systematic global imbalances (Dunaway 2009, pp.24-26).   
 
1.4. Summary  
 
In sum, from the perspective of Keynesian-inspired economists the Sino-American global 
imbalance was a crisis-ridden development of the international economy caused by each 
government’s misguided policies that failed to balance domestic consumption demand and 
35 
 
 
 
productive capacity. In China, the state’s active pursuit of export-investment-led growth at 
the cost of small-medium scale labour-intensive industries, coupled with the state’s 
inactivity in regulating labour-markets, establishing a new social security system, and 
tackling growing income inequality made the propensity to consume too low with the 
household disposable income (real wages) growth lagging far behind overall economic 
growth. On the contrary, in the US, the monetary authority’s reckless monetary policies 
over-using the so-called ‘wealth effects’ for stimulating the recession-struck economy, 
coupled with the government’s excessive spending-sprees, made overall economic growth 
too reliant on the growth of final consumption rates based on precarious debt expansion. 
Keynesian-inspired economists suggest that there should be a policy turn-around in each 
country in the process of close international coordination, in order to ensure the 
sustainability of economic growth and to prevent a disorderly adjustment that would be 
forced by unregulated financial markets.  
 
2. Neoclassical-inspired Perspective  
 
2.1. Theoretical background  
 
While commentators borrowing ideas from Keynesian perspectives participate in debates 
over whether the imbalances are mainly attributable to the US (US authorities printing too 
much money) (Liu and Wray 2010, p.55) or China (pointing to the ‘global savings glut’ 
created by China’s mercantilist policies such as currency manipulation) (Bernanke et al 
2011), some economists argue that the imbalances as such are not an anomaly, but an 
outcome of people's rational choices for maximizing utility on the globally integrated 
financial market. From their perspectives (referred to here as the ‘neo-classical perspective’ 
to the global imbalances), the current account surplus or deficit simply reflects, in the 
aggregate, the rational decisions of many millions of individual households and firms in 
the market, that is, individual saving and investment decisions seeking the best use of their 
resources under a given environment (i.e. the activities of lending or borrowing in order to 
maximize the benefits of consumption).  
 
A neo-classical perspective starts from a microeconomic understanding of saving-
consumption behaviour by relying on the well-known theoretical framework of the 
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permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957) and the basic life-cycle hypothesis 
(Modigliani and Ando 1060). Both hypotheses predict that rational individuals aimed at 
maximizing the expected value of lifetime utility will attempt to smooth consumption over 
time (in consideration of diminishing marginal utility of consumption) by saving when 
their incomes are higher than their expected long-term average income and dissaving when 
their incomes are lower than the anticipated level of permanent income. Applying the logic 
to a lifetime, one can assume a typical life-time pattern of individual saving behaviours; 
when consumers are young they borrow against future earnings to finance (invest in) 
education, housing, and other expensive goods, in middle-age (during their most 
productive years) they repay these loans and accumulate savings for retirement, and in old-
age they spend down their saved assets. Of course, such a pattern of saving and dissaving 
based on age can be significantly affected (amplified) by other factors such as the degree of 
uncertainty about the expected future income and the accessibility of credit. Because 
individuals are interested in saving to smooth their consumption not just over predictable 
change in income but over unpredictable fluctuations due to such causes as unemployment 
and disease, a high level of uncertainty (i.e. a low insurability of future risks) motivates 
them to save more even if their income is expected to rise on average. Also, if people are 
liquidity constrained, that is to say, they have difficulties in obtaining mortgages and other 
forms of consumer credit, even young people might be substantial savers as they cannot go 
into debt for education and housing while having to accumulate the necessary funds ﬁrst. 
Further, with a high degree of liquidity constraints, precautionary savings also become 
more important since unexpected expenses cannot be easily met by temporary 
indebtedness.  
 
Supposing that all individuals are identical, or at least on average behave in a significantly 
similar manner, understanding of individual behaviours of saving can be a good lens 
through which aggregate (national) saving behaviours can also be understood. In other 
words, the propensity to consume and save in a national economy can be explained by 
giving attention to changing demography (how the ratio of working population and retirees 
is expected to change) and whether or not insurance markets and credit markets are fully 
developed in relation to income growth. For example, a fast growing economy with a large 
baby boom generation (a group of people far-outnumbering the previous and future 
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generation) that has reached its peak income-productivity years may well see a relatively 
high savings rate due to the necessity to prepare for the future (the rising share of prime 
savers).The effects are also economically significant, with a 1% increase in the ratio of 
young people (the ratio of the elderly) over time reducing (increasing) private savings by 
0.25% of GDP (Lee et al 2013, p.17), and the rate would be even higher if its financial 
markets are underdeveloped and thus credit-based consumption-investment is repressed 
while the motivation of precautionary savings is enhanced. 
 
As savings are also the source of capital for firms to invest, of course, variations in savings 
in a given country cannot be independent of domestic investment; the amount of savings in 
an economy is a function of savings supply and investment demand, with the interest rate 
being the market price. Thus, investment demand relative to savings supply, that is, 
movement of interest rates, is an important variable affecting individuals’ propensity to 
save (Harbaugh 2004, p.4).For instance, in case of S < I in an economy rising interest rates 
would benefit savers at the cost of borrowers, whereas in the opposite case falling interest 
rates would sacrifice savers to borrowers. With such a flexible movement of interest rates, 
one can expect that the balance between local savings and investment would be made in 
the long run. But it should be noted that this is only true in a closed economy where cross-
border capital mobility is restrained. With open financial markets where capital can be 
obtained either domestically or internationally (and thus domestic interest rates are 
determined internationally), savings in a given country can be relatively independent of 
domestic investment and growth (Harbaugh 2004, p.4). This means that rational decisions 
on savings are set free from local investment demands (and vice versa); the savers in a 
country with excess supply of saving over investment demand are now able to make their 
savings available in international markets at a higher interest rate than at home, and 
likewise the borrowers in a country with excess investment demand over savings are now 
able to borrow more cheaply.  
 
Indeed, until the 1970s during which the so-called home-currency preference (savers’ 
reluctance to accumulate foreign currency assets too much due to high transaction costs or 
investment risks) was strong, there were quite positive correlations between savings and 
investment within each country; thus confining the net lending or borrowing to near zero 
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(Feldstein and Horioka 1980). However, as is well known, the increased mobility of global 
capital based on the highly developed and integrated global financial system since the 
1980s has significantly reduced the home-bias and thus led to a high level of international 
lending and borrowing activities (c.f. OECD 1999). Although this development has been 
expressed in the ominous form of growing current account imbalances between countries, 
it is in fact a reflection of the efficient worldwide distribution of savings through integrated 
global financial markets, and thus “may simply be one of the fruits of globalization” 
(Corden2005, 2007; Coughlin et al 2006; p.6; Greenspan 2007, p.12). It is claimed that 
since nowadays there are few economies in the world which constrain their investment to 
their own level of savings, the international flow of capital assets, that is, cross-border 
savings and investment should be taken seriously into account when a country’s balance 
between investment and savings is analysed (Cooper 2008, p.9). 
 
Viewed in this way (a point of view based on general equilibrium, in contrast to partial 
equilibrium), it is meaningless or even detrimental to a national economy to have an 
artificial current account balance target. It is absurd, for example, to argue that oil 
exporters have to use more of their huge trade surplus in domestic investments (in order to 
achieve external balance) regardless of the limited investment opportunities and low 
expected returns within their countries rather than in providing credits for oil importing 
countries where more profitable investment opportunities exist.  
 
Also, international policy coordination as a ‘remedy’ for current account imbalances is 
seen as contradictable in itself because people in national economies on both sides of 
imbalances are already cooperating with each other through free markets to allocate 
resources most effectively. As the phenomenon of imbalances is a desirable outcome of 
free flows of money in an era of globalization, that is, “a harmonious system in which 
everyone is better off”, attempts to rebalance it by government forces are nothing but a 
distortion of the markets, sacrificing efficiency. There is no economic reason why the gains 
of savers in surplus countries and borrowers in deficit countries have to be transferred to 
borrowers in the former and savers in the latter, that is, why the government has to 
interrupt the rational choices of individuals; the role of government should be confined to 
the role of collective rational individuals institutionally complementing individual 
39 
 
 
 
decisions. In sum, any policy aimed at ‘adjusting’ the current account balance is 
unnecessary at best and harmful at worst, so the best way to solve a possible problem of 
imbalances can be found in the free market where movement of interest rates will 
equilibrate the ‘real’ balances (Whitman 1975, p.494).  
 
Based on this framework, this perspective analyses the case of the US-China imbalances 
by tracing what specific situations in both countries led the collective rational individuals 
to make such peculiar decisions about saving and investment.   
 
2.2. The causes of Chinese current account surplus  
 
Since the early 1980s when Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms started, China has 
witnessed a sharp increase in its national savings rate. Unlike the period of planned 
economy when consumption was repressed in favour of investment, most of these savings 
were made voluntarily. Among others, two factors are frequently singled out as the main 
reasons for the high savings rates: underdeveloped financial markets and a pattern of 
demographic development peculiar to China.  
 
The first reason why people decided to save so much lies in the underdeveloped status of 
financial markets. There are diverse indicators showing the immaturity of financial markets 
in China. First, Figure 1 shows that China’s financial system was exceptionally bank-
centric with the domestic bond and equity markets remaining shallow; banks were 
intermediating more than three-quarters of the economy’s total capital, compared to about 
half in other emerging economies and less than 20% in developed economies (Dearie 2013, 
pp.3-4). Adding to the problems of over-regulation by local government over the state-
owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and the following strong lending bias in favour of the 
SOEs, such a shallow capital market translated into significant credit-constraints upon 
private firms and households as shown in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.2 (Valderrama 2008; Firth 
et al 2009; Yeung 2009; Poncet et al 2010). In Table 2.7, the financial development indices 
of the World Competitiveness Report clearly indicate the underdevelopment of China’s 
financial system in relation to other countries by 2007. Figure2.3 shows the trend of private 
credit-to-GDP ratios, an indicator capturing the changing ability of financial intermediaries 
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to efficiently allocate credit in an economy. One can see from the figure that unlike the 
disparity between the US and South Korea which remained stable over time, that between 
the US and China was growing during the 1992-2007 period, which means China’s 
financial markets remained relatively immature and illiquid. 
 
Figure 2.2. Financial Stock Components of Selected Countries (2004) (%) 
 
Source: Global Financial Stock Database, McKinsey Global Institute 2006, p.13. 
 
 
Table.2.7. Financial development Index, 2007 
 
The US Korea China 
Financial market 
sophistication (mean 4.3) 
6.5 (rank 3) 5.2 (35) 3.8 (rank 83) 
Financing through 
local equity market (mean 4.2) 
5.5 (rank 6) 5.4 (11) 4.1 (rank 80) 
Ease of access 
to loans(mean 3.4) 
4.8 (12) 4.4 (26) 2.7 (99) 
Venture capital 
Availability(mean 3.2) 5.1 (1) 4.3 (16) 3.3 (49) 
Source: World Economic Forum 2008, Table 8.01 – Table 8.05. 
(1 = poor by international standards, 7 = excellent by international standards) 
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Source: World Bank Database, Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP), 
   http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS (accessed 4 May 2010).  
 
The lack of sophisticated financial products such as personal loans, credit cards and 
mortgages made it difficult for households to expand consumption in the present by 
drawing on future income, and thus driving up the propensity to save (households were 
saving on average roughly half of their income). For example, due to the undeveloped 
mortgage markets Chinese households intending to buy a house had no choice but to save a 
large amount of money over a long time. Also, very limited accessibility to banking credit 
forced private firms to increase their savings (to retain profits) to ‘self-finance’ their 
investment. Indeed, close to 80% of private firms’ investments was financed by these ‘self-
raised’ funds – rising from above 60% two decades ago (Huang and Tao 2010, p.8; 
Goldstein and Lardy 2008, p.112). Meanwhile, both households and firms had to commit 
themselves to a large sum of precautionary savings due to the little means (insurance 
products as well as the availability of temporary borrowing) to deal with the uncertainty 
about future income.  
 
It is argued that the second and more important reason for the high savings rates lies in the 
demographic features of China. There have been a number of studies based on a lifecycle 
model (Modigliani and Cao 2004; Horioka and Wan 2007; Horioka 2010; Song and Yang 
2010; and Fan and Zhu 2012), emphasizing the importance of the unique age structure of 
the population (the compressed demographic transition) in understanding savings 
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behaviour in China.  
 
Indeed, China’s demographic development was quite unique mainly due to the one-child 
policy enforced from 1979 which is estimated to have prevented 250 million births 
between 1980 and 2000. With fewer children to care for, as Figure 2.4 clearly shows, 
China’s dependency ratio (an age-population ratio of those aged over sixty five and below 
fifteen and those aged between 15 and 64) rapidly dropped from 69% in 1980 to 42% in 
2005, while the working age population as a portion of total population surged from 59.3% 
to 70.5% during the same period. But because of the artificially restrained younger 
generation, it was expected that the dependency ratio, driven by the ratio of workers to 
retirees rising much faster than conventional trends, will start to surge from around 2010 to 
reach 64T by 2050, while the working-age share of the population (i.e. 15-64 year-olds as 
percentage of total population) would peak around 2010 at 72.2% and then steadily decline 
to 60.7% in 2050 (considering the fact that Chinese workers retire at a much earlier age 
than 65, the actual portion of working age population would be much lower than the 
official figures) (Trinh 2006, p.4).  
 
Figure 2.4. Changing demography in China between 1950 and 2050   
Source: Calculation from the data of UN World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision 
 
In sum, China’s population was expected to age rapidly in the next 50 years with the 
working population largely replaced by the smaller population born after the one child 
policy (Ma and Li 2010, pp.7-8). Under the permanent income hypothesis, this change in 
demography, - an expected decline in working population (and thus income) in the future 
will lead to an increase in current savings so that the difference between future and current 
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income is minimized, realizing inter-temporal optimization (Lee et al 2013p.17). Indeed, 
according to some estimations China’s saving rates would continue to rise until the year 
2011 when the working-age share of the population would peak (Lee et al 2013, p.5-6). It 
follows that considering the rapidly changing age-structure of the population the high 
saving rates (and thus the persistent current account surpluses) seen by the mid-2000s were 
a result of rational decisions over the optimization horizon rather than something 
‘excessive’ resulting from irrationality. 
 
In fact, there are a number of studies even arguing that the level of savings in China, 
contrary to popular opinion, was far from sufficient to cope with a compressed 
demographic transition. They focus attention on the growing pressure upon the pension 
funds (Jackson et al 2009, p.2; Franzier 2010 p.59; Ma and Yi 2010 p.8). From the 
introduction of expanded pension insurance in 1997, the pension fund surplus (so-called 
“demographic dividend”) continuously expanded as the dramatic growth of new pension 
contributors exceeded the increase of the retirees drawing pensions. This demographic 
dividend made it possible to finance pension benefits to pensioners from current pension 
contributions. But this favourable situation was expected to shortly come to an end (i.e. 
pension expenditure for current pensioners was expected to exceed pension contributions 
by current workers), considering the growth rates of pensioners (2.8% per annum between 
1991 and 2005) were even higher than the growth rates of the working-age population (1.1% 
during the same period)(Jackson, Nakashima, and Howe 2009, p.2;Franzier 2010 p.59; Ma 
and Yi 2010 p.8). Worse, considering the exceptionally high speed of demographic shift the 
financial pressures on the pension system were shown to be severe in the coming decades. 
Such an expected pressure was well known as the so-called “four-two-one” problem, 
describing a situation in which one child has to care for two parents and four grandparents 
(Pozen 2013). Unless either the contribution rates or the fund’s investment rate of return 
was raised, the system would certainly be unsustainable in the long run.  
 
This growing pressure upon the pension funds partly explains why the monetary authorities 
eagerly engaged in financial investments overseas. In order to make the pension system 
sustainable in the long run, the funds invested in government bonds and bank deposits at 
low interest rates were reinvested in foreign financial markets that provided more 
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profitable investment opportunities (Lardy, 2012, p. 65, Franzier 2010, p.59). It is argued 
that any assessment of the central bank’s activity, absorbing domestic savings and then 
reinvesting them in foreign developed financial assets, should be made in this context. The 
nature of the activity was not different from that of ‘carry trade’, a rational action of 
interest rate arbitrage that Germany and Japan with an issue of aging population actually 
undertook over the past 30 years. Indeed, because of the ever-growing amount of domestic 
savings and interest rates lower than those on foreign assets, the central bank was able to 
make huge profits from those activities; in 2007, for instance, a net income of RMB243 
billion made the PBC the ‘world’s most profitable bank’ (The Economist 2007). As long as 
the interest rates paid by the central bank on its bills are lower than corresponding interest 
rates on foreign assets, these investment activities will remain profitable, and gains from 
interest rate arbitrage might be useful to supporting pension funds (Yu 2007, p.262; also 
see Wang 2010). 
 
Also, beside the profitability question, China’s purchase of foreign assets can be vindicated 
by the immature domestic financial market that has remained poor at channelling resources 
from savers to investment-consumption demands. A very large pool of savings in the 
context of an inefficient financial system tended to cause undisciplined lending activities 
entailing a chronic problem of growing non-performing loans (NPLs) (e.g. in 2003, for 
instance, reported NPLs were estimated at about 30 per cent of GDP) (Lee et al 2012). 
Pointing to this problem, Corden argues that “it seems perfectly rational to invest some of 
the extra savings abroad given the inefficiency so far of the financial system in allocating 
funds – as reflected in the high volume of non-performing loans held by the banks. The 
public sector also, has yet to improve the efficiency of public investment. It seems 
extremely reasonable therefore to “park” a proportion of funds abroad until efficiency in 
domestic investment allocation improves” (2007, p.5). The remaining question for China 
was then which foreign market should be the recipient of those investments. It could be 
emerging markets such as Brazil and India providing relatively high bond rates. But it was 
still the US that was able to supply the most safe and easily tradable fixed income 
instruments in the global financial market. 
 
2.3. Causes of US current account deficit  
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As discussed earlier, demographic features are an important factor influencing people’s and 
even governments’ decisions on savings and investment; while the ageing of society with 
low birth-rates and declining numbers of young adults makes it necessary to prepare for an 
income in old age and for future generations through savings today, a society with a 
relatively younger population would want to consume and invest now in expectation of 
higher income in the future (Cooper 2007, p.97). These motives and behaviours of inter-
temporal trade deriving from demographics partly explain the cause of the US current 
account imbalance. Unlike most developed countries and China, which had to some extent 
seen rapidly ageing populations and were expected to see the number of young adults 
decrease, as Table 2.8 shows, the US was expected to experience an increase in the number 
of young adults over the next two decades and this increase could be greater if immigration 
was predicted to remain at current rates. Under the permanent income hypothesis, it is no 
wonder that this expected increase in income (working population) in the future would 
reduce current savings so that the difference between future and current income can be 
minimized. In light of this consideration, some economists dealing with the US’ low saving 
rates have emphasized that what appears to be unbalanced from a short-term perspective 
may well be seen as a balancing activity over a long-term horizon (Coughlin and Pakko 
and Poole 2006, p.7). 
 
Table 2.8. Population Projections of the Number of Aged 15 to 29, in the year 2005 and 2025 
County 
Population (Millions) 
Change (%) 
2005 2025 
China 321 259 -19 
Japan 22.6 17.8 -21 
Germany 14.2 11.9 -16 
United States 61.9 66.0 +7 
Source: Cooper (2007) 
 
In addition to the demographic feature, it is noteworthy that there was a remarkable 
acceleration of US labour productivity growth since the mid-1990s (Ferguson 2005; 
Valderrama 2007; Griswold 2007). The U.S labour productivity growth, which had been 
quite tepid at the annual rate of 1 – 1.5% in the two decades prior to 1995, began surging to 
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nearly 3% since then. More importantly, the acceleration was in clear contrast with the 
trend of other industrial countries, whose productivity growth rates still remained around 
1.5% on average during the same period (Germany with 1.65%, Canada with 1.69%, 
France with 1.81%, Italy with 0.68%, and Netherlands with 1.02%)(OECD). This surge of 
labour productivity peculiar to the US economy was arguably due to the improvements in 
technology led by the IT revolution, innovations in business processes including inventory 
management, deregulation of the labour and financial markets, and the growing imports of 
cheap materials and intermediaries, in particular low-tech and labour-intensive goods made 
in China (Valderrama 2007). The surge in labour productivity growth raised the expected 
future income and rates of return on US investments, and thus encouraged people to spend 
and invest more immediately so as to enjoy the benefits of future income growth (Ferguson 
2005).  
 
It should be noted that in order to fully draw the expected higher income in the future 
(reflected in both the demography and productivity growth) to the present consumption and 
investment, that is, in order to realize inter-temporal optimization in an economy, there 
should be highly efficient financial markets capable of attracting the world’s pool of 
savings (capacity to offer the rest of the world financial claims against future US output 
and income) (Iley and Lewis 2007, p.78). As is well known, the US has held the status of 
the world’s leading country for financial infrastructure and capacity for innovation, and the 
most manifest example was the development of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) that 
emerged since the mid-1990s. Mortgage-backed securities, by providing higher returns on 
safe assets, significantly extended foreign demand for them, while enabling American 
citizens to acquire and borrow at lower costs against growing housing wealth. Indeed, 
since the mid-1990s the growth in foreign purchases of US mortgage-securitized bonds 
was phenomenal; the IMF (2006) estimates that foreign holdings of MBSs were worth 
close to $1 trillion by March 2006, representing about one-third of the increase in net 
foreign savings inflows since the mid-1980s. Even foreign official institutions increased 
their holdings of asset-backed securities during the half of the 2000s, so much so that such 
assets came to account for nearly 9% of all the foreign official holdings of US debt 
securities in 2005 (IMF 2006, p.8). 
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In addition to innovative capacity, the attractiveness of investment in the US derived from 
its unrivaled safety. Generally it is assumed that international capital flows should head 
towards relatively poor countries where the ratio of capital to labour is lower and the 
expected rate of return is higher than in rich countries. This conception is only partly true 
as cross-border investments necessitate a high level of reliable social and institutional 
infrastructure of the recipient country such as rule of law, secure property rights, an 
advantageous tax system, and quick and fair dispute settlement (Greenspan 2007 p.3; 
Cooper 2008, p.5; Elwell 2008, p.6). Investors may well want to keep their investment 
secure by means of low-risk repository and this concern is often given priority over 
profitability. As far as risk management is concerned, it is often said that the U.S. has long 
been unrivalled in the world. Indeed, there is little or no possibility of default in foreign 
investment in U.S. assets since the American dollar is the international means of payment 
(Serrano 2003, p.1). This is the reason why the U.S. assets are most preferred whenever the 
uncertainty over the global economy is rising and why investors abroad increasingly hold 
relatively low-yielding US Treasury securities. Making the safety more attractive, yields on 
the low-risk US debt instruments was higher than yields on those in other ‘developed 
countries’ such as Japan and European countries (Cooper 2007, p. 100). Considering the 
frequent financial crises and slow recoveries among emerging markets from the mid-1990s, 
it was not surprising that such a high expected return along with low risks directed global 
investment funds towards the US markets which was the flip side of the current account 
deficit that followed.  
 
Adding to reliability and profitability, the so-called ‘market size effect’ rooted in the deep 
and wide US financial market also influenced the attractiveness of American assets (Elwell 
2008, p.7). US financial markets are the largest in the world, accounting for more than 40% 
of the world’s stocks and bonds (over 50% of the world’s marketable securities) 
(McKinsey Global Institute 2006). This unrivalled size of markets not only offers a wide 
range of instruments of different risk-return composition, it also provides investors with 
very liquid markets in which huge sums of money can be handled without unfavourable 
impacts on prices. Among others, the most attractive markets peculiar to the US were the 
highly liquid government securities markets for bonds and Treasury bills. A study found 
that between 1980 and 2000 the average turnover rate for Treasury bills was significantly 
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higher than that of shares on the New York stock market (13.9 times per annum compared 
with 0.575 times per annum) (Wood 2006). Unsurprisingly, such a high liquidity induced 
investors, in particular foreign governments and their central banks, to invest a large share 
of official reserves in US government securities.  
 
Consequently, the abundant capital flows into the US economy (involving current account 
deficits) was due to the expectation of a low-risk good return, reliable political institutions 
and innovative financial markets providing ample liquidity. Interestingly, the provision of 
these safe and liquid investment opportunities, that is, the superiority of the US financial 
system enabled the US not only to meet the excess investment demand over domestic 
savings but to repackage the funds and invest them back into the rest of the world. As a 
result, the US was able to maintain a net investment income surplus for a long period in 
spite of the persistent current account deficits. The investment income balance shows the 
difference between earnings on foreign investments and payments made to foreign 
investors (interest, dividends, rents and profits on past overseas investments, and net of 
debt servicing by US residents on foreign liabilities). Therefore it is often taken for granted 
that the US, with its net negative investment position, would run an income balance deficit 
by a large margin, that is, the increasing cost of net liability. Surprisingly, however, the 
truth is that the US economy has never been in the red as Figure 2.5 shows, and therefore, 
the US cannot be said to have been a net debtor country when measured by the burden of 
payments.  
 
Figure 2.5. US Investment Income Balance between 1993 and 2007 (Billions of Dollars) 
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Given the fact that the amount of foreign-owned assets in the US was much larger than 
US-owned assets abroad the only answer for this puzzle would be in the different rate of 
return on the assets. In other words, the US earned a higher return on its stock of assets 
abroad than it paid out on the larger stock of foreign liabilities (Higgins and Klitgaard and 
Tille 2006, p.6; Cooper 2007 p.102; Hung and Mascaro 2004, p.2). Indeed, the average 
annual rate of return on US investment in foreign countries since 1990 was approximately 
10 per cent, while that on foreign investments in the US was only 6.2%. Some argue that 
this was because US claims on the other countries were mainly comprised of equity 
investment such as direct investment and portfolio investment (61%), whereas foreign 
investors preferred to invest in US debt instruments such as government bonds (65%). In 
2007, for example, the US investors held foreign stocks worth $5.2 trillion, while 
foreigners held $3.1 trillion invested in US stocks, which is comparable with the amount of 
US debt securities held by foreigners (mostly comprised of risk-free treasury securities) 
amounting to $6.6 trillion in the year (Shirai 2009, p.7).  
 
In this sense, Americans played an important role in taking risk on behalf of foreigners, 
selling relatively low-risk fixed-interest claims and buying high risk high return equity 
around the world (Cooper 2004). Describing the event, Poole (2004) argues that it is useful 
to think of US financial markets as a whole as a world financial intermediary or ‘the 
world’s largest investment bank’, facilitating efficient resource allocation and risk sharing 
in the integrated contemporary global financial system (Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rul 
2007).Such an efficient allocation of resources allegedly allowed all the participants to 
have gains. For instance, the Chinese monetary authorities’ purchase of dollar-denominated 
assets benefited US borrowers, especially the U.S. government and its future taxpayers by 
lowering interest rates (Corden 2009, p.116). In turn, these benefits of the US were to 
return to China in the form of direct investment in FIEs, making contributions to 
employment and household income in China. 
 
Meanwhile, in terms that the US had actually made money on being a net debtor for a long 
period, some economists question whether the US deficit even existed in any meaningful 
sense (Hausmann and Sturzenegger 2006; Cline, 2005a;Iley and Lewis 2007, p.3). They 
see the global role of US financial markets as a powerful proof that can wipe out the 
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concerns about the sustainability problem (i.e. the growth of debt-service burdens). It was 
in this consideration that Greenspan said “I would place the U.S. current account [deficits] 
far down the list of imbalances to worry about” (Greenspan 2007, p. 347). Indeed, from 
this perspective there is no reason why the imbalances should be a matter for public policy 
concern; rather it should be left to financial markets where capital flows will set in train 
their own adjustments.  
 
2.4. Summary  
 
Neo-classical economics sees current account surplus or deficit as an expression of the 
many millions of individual saving and investment decisions seeking the best use of their 
resources. In explaining China’s large current account surpluses and the US large deficits, 
they thus focus on such factors influencing aggregate savings decisions as demographic 
structures or the development of financial markets (credit accessibility) in each country. By 
examining the factors, they derive the imbalances from the simple fact that, in China, the 
majority of individuals wanted (and had) to save now and consume later, while the 
situation in the US was just the opposite to China. They also point out that these 
individuals’ savings activities pursuing inter-temporal utility maximization were 
significantly facilitated by the revitalization of international lending and borrowing 
activities since the 1980s. In other words, the integrated contemporary global financial 
markets made it possible for the Chinese savers (either individuals or the monetary 
authorities) and American borrowers to save or borrow at an international interest rate that 
would be more favourable than domestic rates. Consequently, the Sino-American current 
account imbalances were an outcome of economic agents’ rational savings decisions in 
each country backed by the free global financial markets facilitating efficient resource 
allocation, or financial cooperation for mutual interests between countries. Thus, any 
government’s attempts to ‘adjust’ the imbalances would end up distorting the efficient 
market and sacrificing people’s welfare.  
 
3. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has explored two contrasting perspectives of mainstream economists. It is true 
that each perspective has its own explanatory power based on ample empirical evidence. 
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But it is also true that their explanatory utility is strictly confined to a specific dimension of 
the phenomenon they focus on. For example, Keynesian-inspired views well explain the 
reasons why the imbalance was a crisis-ridden development, and what roles the state 
policies played in developing the affair in that way. But they do not explain why the 
governments first employed and then adhered to such imbalance-inducing policies in spite 
of the growing instability owing to the imbalances. Rather than paying attention to the 
socio-economic context that drove the governments to such policies, they tend to simply 
attribute the policies to ‘misguided’ policymakers. Neoclassical-inspired views, on the 
other hand, well explain the fact that the imbalance was an outcome of international 
cooperation for gaining mutual interests through the global financial markets. But they also 
overlook the broader social context which forced economic agents (both public and private) 
to make such an economic decision. By disregarding the crisis-ridden political economic 
context, they do not explain why the individual economic decisions that appear ‘rational’ 
came to constitute the ‘irrational’ crisis-ridden macroeconomic landscapes.  
 
From the Open Marxist perspective, the fundamental shortcomings of the views of 
mainstream economics are believed to lie not in their detailed flow of logics or empirical 
research but in their starting and ending point of study; the reified notion of the state and 
the market itself. Both of the views do not see the state and the market as forms taken by 
capitalist social relations of production but as some ‘things’ that can mysteriously 
determine our social life, that is, some external determinants that are autonomous from the 
society they originated from. It follows that, by not interrogating the social foundation of 
the state and the market, they confine their own explanatory power within the arbitrarily 
and narrowly assumed role of the state or the market.  
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Chapter 3. Perspectives of Critical IPE and World Systems Analysis 
 
This chapter reviews the perspectives of critical IPE and World Systems analysis on the 
Sino-American global imbalance. Unlike mainstream economics that derives the global 
imbalance from the actions of economic agents, these perspectives seek to locate the cause 
of the phenomenon in the international political economic system. As will be discussed in 
the first section, critical IPE theories see the global imbalance as an outcome of the 
deficient current international monetary system that allows the US to run high deficits 
while making capital flow ‘uphill’ from developing countries to the US. On the other hand, 
some World Systems analysis perspectives, based on the observation of the long-term 
historical evolution of world order, view the deepening imbalance as a symptom of 
declining American hegemony coupled with a new rising hegemon: China.    
 
1. Perspectives of Critical IPE 
 
1.1. The concept of structural monetary power  
 
From the perspective of mainstream economics, the global imbalance is basically a result 
of developments and policies within national economies. In the mainstream of the 
discipline attention is not paid to the international monetary-payments system itself, 
because ‘the system’ is taken to mean a mere combination of national economies that does 
not have its own meaning. Criticizing this narrow viewpoint, critical international political 
economy 9  (IPE hereafter) theorists argue that the global imbalance can be better 
                                         
9 Generally, the term ‘critical IPE’ indicates an approach developed by a group of scholars who 
focus more on ontological enquiry into the historical evolution of the existing international political 
economic system than on empirical research questions related to the behavior of actors within the 
system. More specifically, the term has been applied to an approach developed by Robert Cox 
(1981, 1983) and so-called ‘Coxians’ who have developed their ontological enquiries with the help 
of the theories of Gramsci and Polanyi in opposition to what they call ‘problem solving theory’ of 
orthodoxy. According to Cox and his followers, problem solving theory means orthodox theories 
that tend to seek practical solutions to problems within the parameters of the established world 
order. By presuming the existing order is natural and constant, it is argued, problem solving theory 
actually contributes in maintaining the status-quo of prevailing unequal power relations (Bieler and 
Morton, 2003). Unlike problem solving theory, Cox (1981, p.129) argues, critical theory “does not 
take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins and whether they might be in the process of changing”. In doing 
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understood when it is seen as an outcome of inter-state political relations at the system 
level. For critical IPE theorists, the international monetary and payments system is not a 
neutral ‘economic’ arena independent from ‘political’ relations, but a structure constituted 
by the current international monetary power relations. From this perspective, thus, it is not 
possible to understand the phenomenon of global imbalances without understanding the 
concept and dynamics of international monetary power.  
 
Theoretical attempts at conceptualizing ‘monetary power’ begin with the observation of 
the process in which balance-of-payments disequilibria are adjusted (Andrews 2006; 
Kirshner 1995; Bergsten 1996, pp. 12–45; Kaelberer 2005). In general, large balance of 
payment imbalances that raise the possibility of crises inevitably require both sides of a 
trade relation to embark on a radical policy turnaround even if it would be highly costly in 
both economic and political terms. But the necessity of mutual adjustments does not mean 
that the cost of adjustment (the so-called burden of adjustment involved in an unwanted 
exchange rate adjustment and/or macroeconomic contraction/expansion) is always 
distributed symmetrically between related countries; the distribution tends to be made 
politically and thus asymmetrically. Indeed, it is not difficult to observe the fact that some 
countries considered more powerful than others in terms of monetary power can 
unilaterally decide, in accordance with their own key policy goals, on when and how to 
adjust external balances, while the weaker counterparts have no choice but to accept the 
externally-imposed decision and sacrifice their policy autonomy10 . In this sense, as 
Kirshner suggests, "monetary power is a remarkably efficient component of state power… 
                                                                                                                           
so, it is believed that critical theory is able to not only capture the fundamental dynamics of the 
existing system but also make the idea of structural change possible.  
In this section, I will be dealing with an IPE approach that interprets the Sino-American imbalance 
as an expression of America’s power structuralised in the contemporary international monetary 
system. Unlike other IPE approaches which take the US-centered existing global economic system 
for granted and then focus on practical solutions to the imbalance within the system (e.g. policy 
suggestions for the US managing the problem of ‘rising China’), this approach takes issue with the 
existing system or order itself (e.g. the dollar-based monetary system) and then sees the crisis-
ridden imbalance as a political consequence of it. In line with Cox's notion of the 'critical' character 
of IPE, I refer to this approach therefore as 'critical'.  
 
10 Cohen (2004, p.6, 2006) defines monetary power as states’ capacity to pursue its own key policy 
goals relatively free from the pressure of external imbalances either by delaying adjustment 
(‘power to delay’) or by deflecting the burden onto other states (‘power to deflect’).  
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the most potent instrument of economic coercion available to states in a position to 
exercise it." (1995, p. 29). The concept of monetary power in this way hints that any 
discussion of the growing global imbalances needs to start with the question of America’s 
hegemonic monetary power: how the US exerts its power based on the dominance of the 
dollar (Vermeiren, 2010, p.8). 
 
Critical IPE theorists further elaborate the concept of monetary power (especially the US 
hegemonic monetary power) by means of the concept of ‘structural power’ (Strange 1986, 
1987, 1988). Strange defines structural power as “the power to shape frameworks within 
which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises”, which 
is conceptually distinct from ‘relational power’ i.e. directly visible forms of power 
referring to “the power of A to get B to do something it would not otherwise do” (1987, 
p.564; 1988, p.25). Expressed another way, structural power is a state’s ability embedded 
in the structure, enabling the state to achieve policy goals without putting pressure directly 
on other states. In general, a dominant state wields its structural power by manipulating the 
incentive structures of the global economy in favour of itself, or just by refusing to actively 
adapt itself to the existing rules unfavourable to itself (Helleiner 2006, p.75). Critical IPE 
theorists emphasize that power in such a more depoliticized and thus less visible form is 
more powerful than power in an evident form, since it tends to be “broadly accepted as an 
unavoidable, if regrettable, consequence of inequality – a veritable fact of life” (Cohen 
2004, p.10). And they argue that one of the most important realms in which structural 
power is exerted is the international monetary system; in other words, monetary power is 
exercised in the form of structural power.  
 
It is argued that this concept of ‘structural monetary power’ is critical to overcoming the 
economists’ limited understanding of the global imbalance, because only through the 
concept can one grasp the political context of the phenomenon such as the international 
politics of the US dollar or the political role of US-led financial liberalization. Also, it is 
believed that the concept of structural monetary power helps one overcome the 
conventional view of hegemonic stability theories which see the growing US trade deficit 
and the lack of effective international cooperation as a manifestation of declining US 
hegemonic power (see Gilpin 1987; Krasner 1976; Milner 1992, p.468). As will be 
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discussed below, structural monetary power analyses of critical IPE reveal that the “US’s 
ability to constantly re-finance its debt obligations is not a sign of weakness but evidence 
of its great structural power in financial relations” (Seabrooke 2001, p.105). 
 
1.2. The dollar, the unregulated global financial market, and the exorbitant privilege 
 
Studies of the global imbalances based on the concept of structural monetary power tend to 
begin with the global primacy of the dollar since they hold that the power relationships and 
inequalities of the global economy are inherent in the fact that the global money is 
American national currency and not the world state’s currency. Despite the advent of the 
euro and the periodically erupting worries about ‘unsustainable’ US debt accumulation, the 
dollar has not lost its international preponderance in any meaningful sense (Goldberg, 2008, 
2010, ECB 2005). As Benjamin Cohen suggests, indeed, the dollar remains as “the only 
truly global currency, used for all the familiar purposes of money – medium of exchange, 
unit of account, store of value – in virtually every corner of the world”(2003 p.2).  
 
The dominant role of the US dollar in the international monetary system can be examined 
by various measures. Firstly, the dollar functions as international cash: a substantial share 
of dollar notes are held outside the US territory. By the mid-2000s, approximately $580 
billion or about 65% of US total banknotes was circulating overseas (US Treasury 
Department 2006). Also, the greenback is the most favoured vehicle currency in 
international transactions. For example, nearly 90 per cent of foreign exchange transactions 
and more than half of total world export and import transactions are made by means of the 
dollar (Goldberg and Tille 2006; Kamps 2006). The dollar is also dominantly used in 
international financial markets, where about two fifths of international bonds and 
approximately three-fifths of foreign currency deposits are based on the dollar (Cohen 
2003, pp.3-4). Probably the most widely used measure showing the dominance of the 
dollar is its position as a leading international reserve currency (the foreign currency 
deposits and bonds maintained by monetary authorities and governments). As Table 3.1 
shows, the dollar’s prominence in the portfolios of foreign governments’ official reserve 
accounts has been unequivocal and has not significantly reduced since the 1970s.  
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Table 3.1. Currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (% of total reserves) 
 1973 1987 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 
US dollar 64.5 53.9 59.0 69.3 70.7 66.0 64.1 
Major 
European 
Currencies 
6.7 29.5 27.0 17.1 - - - 
Euro - - - - 19.8 24.9 26.3 
Pound 
sterling 
4.2 1.9 2.1 2.7 2.7 2.6 4.7 
Japanese yen 0.1 6.8 6.8 6.2 5.2 3.8 2.9 
Other 24.7 8.1 5.1 4.8 1.5 2.1 2.0 
Note: ‘European currencies’ include Deutschmark, French franc, Netherlands guilder and ECUs 
Note: the figures only deals with allocated reserves/ Source: IMF Statistics Department COFER database 
and International Financial Statistics, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/cofer.pdf 
 
From here a simple logic derives: the fact that dollar notes and dollar-denominated assets 
are widely used by the rest of world means there is a constant pool of cheap and interest-
free credit available to the US economy (Cohen 2006; Helleiner 2006; Kirshner 2008). To 
put it another way, the rest of the world’s sustained demand for the dollar automatically 
delivers the US an extraordinary capacity to finance payments deficits by supplying dollar 
debts to the world (Gowan 1999, p.30). This capability “may well be the most significant 
attribute of power in the international monetary system” (Strange 1982, p.81). Indeed, as a 
“Hegemonic debtor” free from the usual drawbacks of being a debtor economy, the US has 
been able to advance self-centred and even highly risky policy goals without regard for its 
current account and fiscal balances (Wade 2003, p.82). The Bush administration’s war on 
terror coupled with drastic tax cuts was a typical example of this ability. At that time, 
foreign holdings of outstanding US treasuries soared from $884 billion (35.2%) in 2000 to 
$1,965 billion (56.9%) in 2007 (US Treasury 2008, p.8), which enabled the government to 
run budget deficits without worry about ‘disciplinary’ responses from international 
financial markets. Further, thanks to this power to overspend throughout the past decades, 
the US has been able to make the rest of the world’s growth dependent upon the growth of 
US markets (not vice versa), positioning itself as a Keynesian world state that supports 
global demand by consuming more than it produces even if the deficit is made only for the 
US own interest. Pointing at this ability of the US, Strange (1987, pp.568–9) writes that “in 
most countries, whether the balance of payments is in surplus or deficit indicates the 
strength or weakness of its financial position. With the United States, the exact converse 
can be true. Indeed, to run a persistent deficit for a quarter of a century with impunity 
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indicates not American weakness, but rather American [structural] power in the [world] 
system”.  
 
Foreign savings constantly flowing to the US financial entrepot has been used not just to 
finance the US current account deficits but to be reinvested around the world (developing 
countries in particular) to the benefit of American financial businesses. Such an activity of 
recycling dollars has been proved profitable enough to allow the US to receive a positive 
net income flow from its foreign assets and liabilities despite the negative net international 
investment position since the 1980s (Gourinchas and Rey 2005). The profitability derives 
from the risk (or conversely liquidity) characteristics unique to the US external balance 
sheet. Foreign investors generally put their money into US debt securities in search of 
safety and liquidity, while the main purpose of US foreign holdings is higher rates of return 
(Portes and Rey 1998, p.309). Indeed, in 2005 whereas foreign claims on the US were 
highly concentrated in safe and liquid assets such as Treasury bonds and bank loans with 
an average return of 3.6%, most US foreign investments were tilted towards high risk yet 
high return assets such as corporate shares (i.e. FDI) with an average rate of return of 4.7% 
(see also D’Arista 2005, 2007; Duménil and Lévy 2004). This slightly more than 1% 
differential in rates of return allowed the US to earn net investment income of $11 billion 
in spite of having a net foreign debt position of around $2.7 trillion in the year.  
 
In fact, such a gain of ‘a global system of financial arbitrage’ in the context of the 
structural cost advantage (liquidity/risk premium) owing to the dominant status of the 
dollar was what the US exactly envisaged in the 1970s when it rejected the proposal of 
Japan and Germany for an IMF-led international regulation of the massive amounts of 
petrodollars, and instead insisted on allowing those funds to be recycled by American 
banks (Konings 2005, p.51; Gowan 1999, p.21). This activity of recycling dollars has not 
just been profitable. It has also played an important role in consolidating and reproducing 
the dominance of the dollar-based global system by bringing about a volatile financial 
world order in which countries with financial vulnerability need to hedge financial risks by 
accumulating more reserves, thereby again parking their savings in US financial markets 
(Strange 1986; Helleiner 1994). This aspect of American structural power needs to be 
examined more closely in the context of the post-Bretton Woods financial-monetary 
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system.  
 
From the 1970s the international financial system underwent systemic changes through 
successive deregulation and liberalisation. On the one hand, the change was initiated by 
tremendous expansion of international financial markets and the resultant regulation-
vacuum growing from the 1960s. On the other hand, the trend was developed by the US 
government’s successive policy decisions, resisting attempts at establishing a new formal 
international financial system replacing the Bretton Woods, in favour of American 
financial firms. The outcome of such change was the emergence of what Strange called 
‘Casino Capitalism’ where uncertainty and instability associated with the volatility of 
capital flows came to displace governments’ regulative power. In this new system, the role 
of governments has become strictly confined to efforts at reducing vulnerability to 
potential financial crises, instead of positively managing their economies at their discretion 
(e.g. pursuing expansionary policies for higher growth rates). The contemporary post-
Bretton Woods system has become, in Kirshner’s phrase, a system where “money rules, 
and policy must follow” (2003, p. 646).  
 
As seen in the cases of Mexico in 1994-95, East Asia in 1997-98, Russia in 1998-99 and 
Argentina early in the new millennium, the crisis-ridden character of the international 
monetary-financial system has manifested itself through financial crises triggered by 
speculative attacks on vulnerable currencies, in particular those of developing countries. 
While the unregulated global financial flows searching for higher profit rates makes it 
possible for fast-developing countries to forgo domestic savings large enough for brisk 
investments, they simultaneously expose the receiving countries’ ‘overvalued’ currencies 
to speculative attacks that would entail an abrupt capital flight and destructive financial 
crises. In fact, it is not too much to say that the pattern of speculative activities in the 
global financial market has been a sort of ‘predatory lending’, investing in financially 
vulnerable countries aimed at profits deriving from expected financial crises instead of 
profits accruing from the borrowers’ success in businesses. In such a volatile and hostile 
global environment, any state open to an uncontrollable influx of hot money is obliged to 
brace itself for speculative outflows of the fund by building up a war-chest of 
precautionary reserves in time of peace (Feldstein, 2005). It is in this context that most 
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developing and emerging countries have come to stick with export-led growth strategies 
and to cherish an international creditor status at any cost (Vasudevan 2009, p. 300).  
 
Viewed in this way, current account surpluses are not necessarily seen as an indication of 
superior economic performance; rather they are seen as a reflection of the traumatized 
states’ desperate attempts to defend themselves from the growing volatility of global 
financial markets. Discussing the relation between such a trend and the global imbalances, 
Rajan (2006, p.4) points out that “one reason global imbalances have emerged is because 
emerging markets have recognized the risk posed by volatile cross-border flows, especially 
given the fragility of their financial and corporate systems. They have learnt to fit their 
investment coat within the domestic savings cloth they have available, even leaving a bit 
over to finance rich countries”. It follows that faced with the unregulated global financial 
market which is increasingly beyond states’ control, surplus saving has become not an 
optional but a necessary (structurally forced) policy goal.   
 
Of course, the biggest receiver of the forced surplus savings has been the US which can 
provide the world’s safest and most liquid savings vehicles based on its control power over 
the global currency, the dollar. What has been ‘financed’ by the flow of surplus savings 
toward the US is not just the American government’s political projects. It has also 
paradoxically financed more US private investment abroad which would finally find its 
way back to the US in the form of purchases of safe dollar-assets such as US Treasury 
bonds (Lewis and Iley, 2007, p.183). Martin Wolf described this situation as follows: “by 
accident, the world has found a way to make the crisis-prone world of financial 
globalization work. Investors consider emerging market economies appealing destinations, 
but the governments of many of the most courted countries hate the idea of absorbing the 
capital. So they resist pressure for currency appreciation and recycle the inflow 
predominantly into US liabilities. The US then complains about the deficits, while 
enjoying the inflow of resources” (2006, p.28).  
 
In sum, while rendering the US even freer from the external financial constraints, the 
crisis-ridden global financial system has compelled other countries, in particular 
developing countries, to accumulate more and more reserves and invest their accumulated 
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reserves in low-yielding dollar-denominated assets instead of higher-yielding investments 
in the developing world itself (Panitch and Gindin 2005, p.69) These countries therefore 
carry an opportunity cost of approximately one to two per cent of their GDP, clearly 
revealing the distributional implications of US monetary hegemony in favour of the US 
(Bibow 2009; Cho 2009; Rodrik 2006). Although financial globalization has been said to 
bring about a transfer of financial resources from capital-rich to capital-poor countries, the 
developing world’s massive reverse accumulation has entailed a reverse transfer of 
resources, effectively subsidising America’s over-spending and over-leveraging 
(Vermeiren 2010, p.19). This is “the paradox of economic globalization- it looks like 
“powerless” expansion of markets but it works to enhance the ability of the US to harness 
the rest of the world and fortify its empire-like power” (Wade 2003, p.87)  
 
1.3. Unequal relations between the hegemonic debtor and vulnerable creditors  
 
Many commentators and theorists have warned that the US’ persistent current account 
deficits and the ever increasing foreign indebtedness (a rising ratio of NIID to GDP) would 
sooner or later cause a serious loss of confidence in the dollar, and thus induce a sudden 
capital flight away from dollar assets (Eichengreen 2011, p.160; Obstfeld and Rogoff 2004; 
Roubini and Setser 2004, p.43). Today, many believe the possibility of such a ‘disorderly 
correction’ and the demise of the dollar era has become even greater because of the advent 
of the euro as a potentially attractive alternative to the dollar (Cohen 2004, p.30).  
 
It is undeniable that no nation can borrow indefinitely, and the US is not exempt from such 
admonitions. And it is also true that foreign agents may show unwillingness to hold dollar-
denominated assets if there is a credible alternative to the dollar. However, there is little 
possibility of an uncontrollable collapse triggered by a run on dollars, turning the US from 
a hegemonic debtor into a normal debtor who must undergo drastic reductions in the deficit. 
This is because there is a mechanism embedded in the dollar-dominant monetary system 
that forces other countries, in particular those with their economies heavily dependent upon 
exports, rather that the US, to bear most of the burden of the falling dollar, and accordingly 
that makes them, however reluctantly, cooperate to stabilize the value of the dollar to 
protect their own interests. It follows that the dollar still remains, as famously put by John 
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Conally, the American currency, but the world’s problem. The mechanism of asymmetrical 
distribution of costs related to falling dollars, in Cohen’s terms ‘the power to deflect the 
burden of adjustment onto others’ (2004, p.3), operates broadly in two channels: the effects 
on the prices of imports and exports, and the effects on the value of assets and liabilities.  
 
First, the US is more or less exempted from the general negative effects of currency 
depreciation on domestic economies, while being able to enjoy benefits from it (Wade 
2003, p.79). In general cases, currency depreciation entails a trade-off between improved 
price competitiveness of exports in foreign markets and decreased purchasing power of 
domestic consumers (affecting domestic growth and employment) due to the rising prices 
of imports relative to exports (fall in the terms of trade). As for the US, however, the cost, 
that is, a reduction of purchasing power caused by rising prices of imports is significantly 
less than in other countries due to the huge size of the American economy (Cohen 2004, 
p.31). The large size of economy has made the US the world’s biggest and most important 
market for foreign exporters to the US, while the proportion of imports in the whole US 
economy remains relatively small. In case the dollar depreciates vis-à-vis other currencies, 
the latter feature ensures that the relatively small importance of imports in terms of US 
GDP (which accounts for mere 16%) mutes the impact of the falling terms of trade on total 
purchasing power. Also, the former feature leads foreign exporters (who are under 
competitive pressure to preserve market share in the US market) not to completely pass 
through the falling value of dollars to the dollar price of their goods and services, 
absorbing a part of the exchange loss through smaller profit margins. This practice 
substantially mutes the negative effect of dollar depreciations on US purchasing power and 
the domestic economy (see Elwell 2012). While falling dollars tend to have little influence 
on domestic consumption in the US, the trade deficit can be significantly reduced mainly 
thanks to the brisk growth of US exports in foreign markets. After all, there is little reason 
why the US has to be afraid of a falling dollar and thus little reason for it to sacrifice key 
policy goals for preserving the dollar’s value, while the US would not bear the burden of 
falling dollars in terms of domestic growth and employment; the external balance can be 
restored by boosting foreign demand for US exports without curbing domestic 
consumption. 
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The fact that the burden of falling dollars would be little felt by the US means most of the 
costs would fall on major trading partners. The way in which they bear the burden is 
exactly opposite to the way in which the US escapes from it. Exporters in those countries 
who have to care about their price competitiveness and market shares in the US cannot 
raise their prices in dollar terms as much as the dollar value falls, and thus they cannot but 
see their profits in terms of local currencies fall. For countries whose economies are much 
dependent upon exports to the US, the negative effects of a falling dollar would be 
significant, because the falling profitability of exporting industries (let alone the 
deflationary pressures upon import-competition industries such as agricultural sectors) 
would transmit into lower investment and higher unemployment. In this case, the affected 
governments are strongly pressurized either to intervene to underpin the value of the dollar 
or to ease monetary and fiscal policies even if these would end up helping boost demands 
for US exports. These phenomena (the vulnerability of export-dependent economies to the 
so-called ‘dollar weapon’), indeed, has been frequently seen among the leading Asian 
exporters including Japan and China. In the case of China, the largest exporter in the world, 
during 2001−08, net exports and investment closely linked to building capacity in tradable 
sectors accounted for over 60 percent of its economic growth, up from 40% in the 1990s, 
and the share of the US in China’s total exports accounted for more than 30% during the 
period (Guo and N’Diaye 2009, p.4). It is not surprising that such a growing dependence 
on exports made China much vulnerable to exchange-rate-driven macroeconomic and 
financial shocks. Considering that Chinese policy makers must have learnt from a series of 
events that occurred in then-leading exporter Japan after the dollar dropped sharply vis-à-
vis the yen in 1985 (a loss of competitiveness, output recessions, price deflation, an 
instability in interest rates, an exodus of FDI into the rest of East Asia, the balance-sheet 
problems of banks and corporations, etc.), it is not difficult to predict how China will 
respond to any large depreciation in the dollar (Wang and Zeng 2004, p.98). 
 
The second mechanism through which the cost of falling dollars is unevenly paid by 
surplus countries in favour of the US is that of the valuation effect on foreign debt position. 
In general, currency depreciations directly worsen debtor countries’ net foreign debt 
position because most of their foreign liabilities are denominated in dollars. For the US, 
this effect of currency depreciations occurs in the completely opposite way; a depreciating 
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dollar directly improves the US net foreign debt position. This is due to the fact that US 
foreign liabilities are largely denominated in dollars (reflecting the exceptional ability of 
the US to borrow in its own currency), while US foreign assets are largely denominated in 
foreign currencies. Estimates suggest that almost all of US foreign debts are denominated 
in dollars, while some two-thirds of the US’ foreign holdings are denominated in foreign 
currencies (Tille 2005). Due to this unique currency composition of the external account, a 
real depreciation of the dollar can reduce US net external debt by increasing the value of 
foreign assets (together with the US net investment income) with the value of external 
liabilities unchanged. Considering that US foreign assets amount to trillions of dollars, it 
can be easily estimated how substantial such valuation effects would be. For example, in 
2006, despite the current account deficit amounting to a record high of $81l.4 billion, the 
total value of the US net external debt in the year rose only approximately $300 billion 
because the dollar’s depreciation increased the value of the stock of America’s foreign 
assets by more than $500 billion. In 2007, the impact of valuation changes even allowed 
the US net external debt to fall despite the current account deficits of $638 billion (Elwell 
2012, p.12). 
 
The fact that the US benefits from the valuation effect of dollar depreciations directly 
means that major creditor countries have to take the costs instead; the cost of any 
depreciation of dollars would be imposed in the form of capital losses on their reserve 
holdings. When the dollar falls, the affected governments cannot help but see the value of 
dollar reserves in terms of their currencies fall, while the negative effects on exports and 
domestic growth would force them to increase domestic public spending. This negative 
valuation effect would be substantial to those governments with large dollar balances, and 
thus reserve policies of these governments tend to be constrained by what Larry Summers 
called a ‘balance of financial terror’ (Summers 2004). In case of a large fall of the dollar, 
they will be strongly incentivized to prop up the dollar with further dollar purchases in 
order to defend the value of existing dollar-denominated assets.   
 
For example, because of the huge scale of Chinese dollar-reserve holdings (amounting to 
$1,528 billion or 47.1% of GDP in 2007), it is estimated that each 10% decline in the 
dollar brings about a loss equivalent of approximately 5% of China's GDP (Helleiner 2010). 
Indeed, it is well-known fact that such huge exchange losses were the most likely 
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motivation for central banks of the East Asian exporters –by far the world’s biggest dollar 
reserve holders- to rush to buy up and support the dollar (rather than selling it off) when its 
value was rapidly falling in the early 2000s. As Table 3.2 shows, the investment made by 
official investors formed an increasing portion of total capital flows to the US between 
2001 and 2004, while the importance of private investment was rapidly decreasing during 
the same period (Jackson 2010, p.5). This means foreign monetary authorities (mostly 
Asian central banks) played a critical role in turning the possibility of a sharp depreciation 
of the dollar (the hard landing scenario) into the gradual decline of the dollar (the soft 
landing) during the period (Vermeiren 2010, p.15-16).  
 
Table 3.2. US Net capital inflows by Supplier of funds, 1995-2006 ($, billion) 
 95-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Net Financial 
Account 
1,230 400 501 533 532 701 809 
Total Net Official 317 23 113 280 402 279 496 
Total Net Private 913 378 388 253 130 422 313 
Source: BEA, US Department of Commerce 
 
In this sense, it can be said that the position of a large creditor does not necessarily deliver 
the country much benefit in terms of policy autonomy; rather it can put the state in more 
than a little trouble and uncertainty. While the benefits of repelling a speculative currency 
attack are substantial, pursuit of export-led growth and accumulation of dollar reserves 
make their interests increasingly interlocked with the stable value of the dollar. Like it or 
not, they are compelled to recognize that their prosperity is dependent on the value of the 
dollar. Kirshner (2003) calls such a situation “entrapment”, where a participation in a 
currency system itself reinforces the dependence of the subordinate state on the dominant 
(p.167, p.268). Furthermore, “asymmetric interdependence” has promoted the US’ 
unilateralist tendencies in macroeconomic policy making, while the role of stabilizing the 
existing system has been assumed by other central banks and governments (Vermeiren 
2010, p.14). 
 
Viewed in this way, China is not an exception to “entrapment”; the rise of China, it is 
argued, should be seen in the context of American structural monetary power that China as 
a vulnerable creditor cannot help but accept. Although China with its huge surplus and 
relatively buoyant economy has been seen as an emerging power challenging the US, it is 
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not too much to say that the growth of China’s economy is the growth of the dollar (of 
large accumulation of dollars), by the dollar (by the purchasing power of dollars), and for 
the dollar (for the stable value of dollars). It is obvious that momentarily China’s policy-
options are strongly limited by the fact that it is entrapped and constrained by the lasting 
structural power of Washington and the centrality of US financial institutions: what Wade 
(2003) called ‘The Invisible Hand of the American Empire’  (Chin and Helleiner 2008, 
p.87; Beeson 2009, p.108).  
 
1.4. Summary  
 
Critical IPE theories attempt to find the fundamental cause of the global imbalance in the 
international monetary system itself, rather than in specific policies or developments of 
each national economy. They point out that the current international monetary system (the 
so-called post-Bretton Woods system) is a kind of non-system in which the US dollar 
functions as de-facto world money, giving the American state and financial markets the 
prerogative status of a de-facto world state and a world financial intermediary respectively. 
In this system, the US can pursue any expensive self-centred policies without external 
financial pressures by using the world’s surplus savings deposited in dollar-assets, while 
other states with a great stake in the US over-spending and the stable value of the dollar are 
forced to ‘voluntarily’ support the existing system by providing the US with cheap credits 
and export goods. In other words, the system itself enables the US to exploit the status of 
‘hegemonic debtor’, while forcing other states to assume the role of ‘cursed creditor’. 
From this perspective, it is seen that the growing global imbalance is the outcome of this 
structural monetary power of the US, or the lack of regulatory mechanisms controlling US 
external deficits at the global level.  
 
2. View of World System Analysis and Giovanni Arrighi  
 
World-systems perspectives, especially those developed by Giovanni Arrighi and his 
collaborators, see the phenomena of the Sino-American imbalances as an outcome of the 
long-term historic pattern of world capitalist evolution and hegemonic transition, that is, 
the rise of a Chinese-led East Asia as the emerging 21th century centre of a renewed world 
system, replacing the declining US-led 20th century world system.  
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They share the same view with critical IPE theorists that American structural monetary 
power in the context of the neoliberal financial order has given the US the exceptional 
capability to consume guns and butter far beyond its means at the expense of the rest of the 
world, and thus the global instability accompanied by the deepening global imbalances is 
mainly attributable to the US’ unregulated self-centred policies. However, unlike IPE 
theorists who see the dominance of the US in the financial system as proof showing that 
“the decline of US hegemony is a myth” (Sassen 1996, p.18), world-systems analysts 
interpret the US’ reliance on the structural monetary-financial power as a symptom of 
hegemonic decline: an expression of declining economic power in production or the US’ 
financial predominance in the absence of clear economic predominance as a whole 
(Bergesen and Lizardo 2005, p.232). They see American prosperity sustained by the 
expansion of finance is illusory; the position of the financial centre based on the 
seigniorage privileges can only temporarily ‘conceal’ the crisis, because it as such cannot 
reposition the US as the epicentre of productive accumulation and thus preventing an 
ultimate problem of dollar rout (Arrighi 2005, p.27). Also, unlike IPE theorists who see the 
rise of China as an event confined to narrow limits of US-led structure, they see it as an 
emergence of a new structure actively constructed by China, i.e. a viable alternative to US-
led capitalist development, opening up the possibility of spatial shifts in the epicentres of 
world accumulation.  
 
2.1. The decline of American hegemony 
 
It is often argued in world-systems analysis that American power is in sharp hegemonic 
decline, and has been since the crisis of the 1970s (Wallestein 2003; Arrighi 2005; Frank 
and Gills 1996). Perhaps the most systematic statement of this view has been put forward 
by Arrighi (2005). According to Arrighi, American hegemony, like its Venetian, Dutch and 
British predecessors, was built on its predominant economic power based on the ability to 
design and realise innovative combinations of productive ‘resources’ (labour, capital, land, 
energy, etc.), breaking through the accumulation crisis of the time (Arrighi 2007, p.231). 
World-systems analyses argue that the innovative reorganisation of capitalist production in 
the US opened a new cycle of global economic expansion, that is, the post-war long boom 
with the US placed in the centre of the system. The status of the global growth engine 
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enabled the US to mobilize international consent and cooperation necessary for building up 
self-centred political leadership, by providing followers with material and institutional 
incentives represented by the Bretton-Woods system and generous capital transfers 
(through military-economic aid as well as multilateral development loans) Based on such a 
material and institutional provision, the US carried on a truly hegemonic regime, in which 
the US benefited itself at the same time as leading other states on a particular development 
path (Arrighi 2005b, p.151-2). Indeed, for a decade or two after World War II the US-led 
regime of accumulation was considered successful in expanding profitability and growth 
with Europe and Japan rapidly rebuilt, and the Third World to some extent industrialized.  
 
But these successes were a self-defeating process; the spread of economic growth on a 
world scale brought real competitors for US multinationals, undermining the profit rates of 
capitals operating in the very centre. In other words, the investment of an ever-growing 
mass of profits in production led to the accumulation of capital over and above what could 
be reinvested in production without significantly reducing profit margins. By the mid-
1960s, the crisis of accumulation began putting growing pressure on the US economy. On 
the one hand, diminishing profit rates in productive investments led to low growth rates 
and high unemployment, depleting the source of government revenue. On the other hand, 
the political cost of managing the system was growing due to the rising unemployment 
inland as well as nationalist and communist movements that began picking up steam in the 
South. World Systems analysts argue that it was at this moment of the overaccumulation 
crisis that American hegemony turned into what Ranajit Guha called ‘dominance without 
hegemony’. That is, from then on the US began pursuing the imperialistic strategies of 
‘accumulation by dispossession’ (rather than accumulation by expanded production of 
surplus value), focusing its residue power on draining resources from the rest of the world 
for sustaining its own domestic prosperity and social peace as well as the central position 
in the world system (Arrighi 2005, p.32, quoting Guha 1992 p.231-2; Amin 2004, p.104-6). 
One of the strategies of accumulation by dispossession was taking advantage of its 
superiority in financial power (based on the structural advantages deriving from the unique 
status of the dollar) (2007, p.155, p.132).  
 
The overaccumulation crisis and diminishing investments in production (de-
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industrialization) entailed a tendency towards an increasing flow of money into the 
financial sector (financialisation), as capitalist agencies tended to keep a larger share of 
their earned profits in liquid form, looking for safer ways to make a profit other than 
production (Arrighi 1994, p.6). In theory, the tendency towards financialisation could bring 
about ‘spatial shifts’ in the epicentres of world accumulation as it facilitates capital flow 
from the existing centre to (semi) peripheries that can provide new outlets for productive 
investment (Walker 2010, p.63). David Harvey suggests that such a process of ‘spatial fix’ 
can possibly turn a global downturn caused by oaveraccumualtion to an upturn cantered on 
the new space (2005, pp.121-3). According to the theory, it follows that the phase of 
financial expansion in the center initiates a gradual displacement of one hegemon by 
another in the form of an investment drain (Arrighi 2009a, p.72; Glyn 2005, p.36). But the 
problem is that the process of spatial fix inevitably involves what Harvey called ‘switching 
crises’ in the existing centre, a crisis caused by devaluation pressures on ‘the values already 
fixed in place (embedded in the land and production facilities) but not yet realized’ (2005, 
pp.121-3; 2000, pp.428-9). To put it another way, reemployment of surplus capital in new 
spaces involves a spatial/geographical version of Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction’ -the 
violent clearing of past landscapes (Schumpeter 2008; Arrighi 2005, p.36).  
 
Arrighi argues that America did not tamely submit to the pressure of the spatial fix, but 
attempted to block it by taking the financial flows away from emerging centres (2007, 
p.221-2, p.228). Further, it is argued that the US was even trying to end the cycle of spatial 
fixes by creating an American-led global empire or a world state based on the extraction of 
tribute (Karatzogianni and Robinson 2013, p.115). The first attempt was made in the late 
1970s when the US-cantered overaccumulation crisis culminated in capital flight and a 
serious crisis of confidence in the US dollar. In response to the crisis, the US monetary 
authority made a decisive policy turn from the highly expansionary monetary policies to 
highly restrictive policies accompanied by record-high interest rates, tax breaks and 
increased freedom of action for capitalist producers and speculators. As a result of the 
policy, the massive amount of surplus capital that had until then flowed primarily to low 
and middle income countries dramatically changed its direction towards the US, enabling 
the dollar to recoup its position as the world currency and offering the US an opportunity 
to enjoy a period of renewed profitability and vigour (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Aycock 
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2009, p.33). On the other hand, for low and middle income countries, the massive 
rerouting of capital flows towards the US meant a sudden “drought” of capital, a sharp 
contraction in availability of credit for investment at favourable conditions, and thus an 
escalation of interstate competition for a share of export markets (Arrighi and Zhang, 
2007). While the winner in the competition (most notably East Asia) could manage to turn 
itself into a major creditor to the US by taking advantage of the escalating US trade deficit, 
the loser (most notably, Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa) who did not manage to 
compete for a share of the US demand could not but experience chronic balance of 
payment crises in the position of having to compete directly with the US in world financial 
markets. Meanwhile, “US business and governmental agencies were able to take advantage 
of both outcomes for the South: they were able to mobilize the cheap commodities and 
credit that Southern “winners” eagerly supplied, as well as the assets that Southern “losers” 
willy-nilly had to alienate at bargain prices” (Arrighi and Zhang 2007, p.7).  
 
The radical policy-turn of the 1980s and the following worldwide promotion of the 
neoliberal agenda (that later came to be known as the Washington Consensus) delivered a 
remarkable resurgence of wealth and power to the US with the economy on a seemingly 
permanent upward trajectory (Arrighi 2007, p.232-3). Such a ‘belle époque’, however, as 
did in all incumbent centres of the world system, was bound to be epidermal because ‘they 
tended to deepen rather than solve the underlying overaccumulation crisis’ (Arrighi 2005, 
p.88). Indeed, the influx of foreign capital actually fostered speculative financial-
commercial booms driven by Wall Street and large multinationals, rather than re-
industrialization (channelling funds into “demand-creating investment”) based on 
improved industrial competitiveness and profits. For example, what emerged as America’s 
new leading company (replacing the former: GM the pioneer of Fordism) through the 
successive debt-driven consumption booms was Wal-Mart whose profits mainly accrue 
from channelling cheap foreign imports rather than producing goods in the US 
(Lichtenstein 2005). Further, financialisation was accompanied by polarization and social 
dislocation that in turn “provoked movements of resistance and rebellion among 
subordinate groups and strata”, while the state’s capacity to cope with the new situation 
was undermined (Harvey 2005, p.182; Arrighi 2005a, p.48). In this sense, it can be said 
that the finance-led boom functioned as morphine, rather than a cure to the underlying 
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problem of the overaccumulation crisis, easing pains temporarily but ultimately taking a 
turn for the worse and requiring increasingly large doses. In other words, economic and 
political pressures upon the US were not decreasing but growing, which in turn pushed the 
state to draw a constant (not one-off) influx of new funds from elsewhere (Harvey 2005, p. 
182; Arrighi 2005a, p.48). 
 
The growing need to repeat once again ‘the original sin of simple robbery’ culminated in 
military adventurism: Washington’s adoption of the new imperial project represented by 
the invasion of Iraq aimed at the control over the global oil spigot (Harvey 2005, pp.201–
2). The project of global military control was not different from the neo-liberal projects in 
terms that it was an attempt at compensating for economic deficiencies for maintaining the 
hegemonic position (2004, p.106; Khanna 2008). Unlike the neo-liberal projects, however, 
the neo-conservative project was moved forward without concealing the fact that America 
has ‘given up on hegemony through consent and resorts more and more to domination 
through coercion’ (Harvey 2005, p.201)11. It straightforwardly signalled that America had 
become a ‘naked apparatus of coercion and domination’ (Arrighi 1994).  
 
For the US government, the immediate problem of staging a war was not political or 
military resistance but the way in which it would be financed. While both taxes and interest 
rates could not be raised due to the deep recession in the wake of the 2000–01 crash and 
fallouts of 9/11, financing the war (along with other current account deficits) came to 
almost solely rely on borrowing from foreign central banks and government agencies. 
Indeed, after Bush took office, East Asian central banks began buying up enormous 
amounts of Treasury securities, thus funding nearly a third of the US current account 
deficit. This growing financial dependence on foreign governments meant that major 
creditor states, that is, the governments that had financed the growing deficit were given 
increasing political leverage over US policies, constraining US ability to pursue its national 
                                         
11 There is no difference between the promotion of neo-liberalism in the 1980s-90s and the 
promotion of neo-conservatives’ war projects in the 2000s in that both were a strategy aimed at 
reversing the relative decline in US wealth and power by using non-productive American 
dominance. The difference lies in that the former was at least presented to the world as a new 
global development project with the consent of ruling elites across the world secured, while the 
latter was driven plainly unilaterally or imperialistically.  
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interest in a unilateral way (Arrighi 2005, p.66)12. This growing leverage was expected to 
pose a serious problem for Washington, given the fact that China had emerged as the 
leading creditor to the US, surpassing the subordinate allies such as Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan. The Bush administration, reluctant to give China more political leverage over 
its own policies, reacted to the problem by exploiting the seigniorage privileges once again, 
that is, by depreciating the dollar with a view to wiping trillions off the value of the 
creditors’ dollar assets. The Bush Administration might have thought that a falling dollar 
was not an American problem but rather “a very effective means of forcing friends and 
foes to finance the US war effort and US economic growth” (Arrigh 2005a, p.74).  
Whether this tactic (staging a war without cost) would succeed or lead to the eventuality of 
a dollar rout depended on whether other creditor countries would continue to lend to the 
US despite the partial default on its debt through massive depreciation of the dollar. 
Arrighi and other world-system analysts anticipated that it would not be possible in the 
long run; US’ frequent exploitation of seigniorage privileges would someday induce the 
global financial flow to reroute from the financing of US deficits to the emerging centres 
of production, China in particular, which may offer more profitable and stable outlets for 
surplus capital than in the US.  
In the event of a new dollar rout comparable to that of the late 1970s, it is expected that the 
US will not be able to avoid a fundamental structural adjustment entailing “an unheard of 
degree of austerity the likes of which have not been seen since the Great Depression of the 
1930s” (Arrighi 2005a, p.70). Such an adjustment will inevitably result in a further fall of 
the weight of the US market in the global economy, along with the demise of the dollar as 
the key international currency. Consequently, far from being the opening act of ‘a new 
American Century’, the neo-conservative project was actually a closing act of the ‘long 
twentieth century’, signalling the ‘terminal crisis’ of US hegemony (Arrighi 2005, p.80; 
Panitch 2010, p.81).  
 
                                         
12 It is also undeniable that the surplus-running countries became reliant on the US market for 
selling their commodities. It is seen, however, that a dependence on demand is different from a 
dependence on supply, because those dependent on external demand can always create the required 
demand internally whereas those dependent on external supplies (of both finance and cheap 
commodities) may not be able to create the required supply internally at the same or lower costs. 
Thus, this mutual dependence at first favoured the US but was becoming more and more in favour 
of the creditors (Harris 2012, p.164).   
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2.2. The rise of Chinese hegemony: Adam Smith in Beijing13  
 
World-systems theorists hold that “in the longue dure´e, the declining hegemon’s autumn is 
another rising hegemon’s spring”. The period of hegemonic transitions is characterised not 
only by systemic chaos but also by “organisational revolutions in a newly emerging 
hegemonic bloc of business and governmental institutions and spatial shifts in the 
epicentres of world accumulation that brings about structural changes in the world-system” 
(Robionson 2010, p.7). Through this historical lens, China is put forward as a potential 
new hegemon because it is “the pioneer of a new model of economic organization”, 
possibly offering “the conditions for the resolution of the preceding overaccumulation 
crisis and the take-off of a new phase of material expansion” (Arrighi and Silver 2001, 
pp.73–77; Arrighi 2005a, p.16). 
 
In distinguishing the Chinese development model from others, the concept of (Marxian) 
capitalism is distinguished from that of (Smithian) market economy (a form of exchange 
and cooperation among individuals acting in the social division of labour). It is argued that 
capitalism is established when two things take place. First, a market economy becomes 
capitalist when capitalist strata powered by unregulated markets take up the “commanding 
heights of society – the state”. Second, capitalism comes into the picture when the market 
economy, out of the state controls, is subsumed by the logic of profit maximization that 
constantly destabilizes the market economy itself. Consequently, a market economy itself 
is not a capitalist economy if the state remains strong enough to curb and constrain the 
market to serve the national/public interest (i.e. making the market “the invisible hand of 
                                         
13 The term is quoted from Giovanni Arrighi’s book: Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the 
Twenty-First Century (2007). Interpreting The Wealth of Nations, Arrighi in this book argues that 
what Adam Smith envisaged was not so much “capitalist development” that happened in Europe as 
“market-based, non-capitalist development” that occurred in the East. Smith, according to Arrighi, 
emphasized the role of the state in curbing markets in a way to make capitalists compete with one 
another, rather than the role of self-regulating market in which workers compete in favour of 
capitalists. Also, it is pointed out that Smith was an advocate of the Asian type of development 
based on small-scale enterprises and agricultural production, rather than endorsing the European 
model of development based on large-scale industry, foreign trade and dispossession of the 
peasantry. In this ‘new’ interpretation of The Wealth of Nations, Arrighi titles his book on Chinese 
development ‘Adam Smith in Beijing’. For more explanation in Arrighi’s own words see Harris 
(2012), pp.157-166. 
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the government”), resisting the capitalists’ attempts to use the market as a means of 
pursuing their own private interests (Harris, 2012, p.162). As Arrighi puts it, “the capitalist 
character of market-based development is not determined by the presence of capitalist 
institutions and dispositions but by the relation of state power to capital. Add as many 
capitalists as you like to a market economy, but unless the state has been subordinated to 
their class interest, the market economy remains non-capitalist.” (Arrighi 2007, pp 331–2). 
In this view, China’s accumulation regime, particularized by the strong party-state 
retaining the upper hand in the relations with the capitalist classes (represented by large 
multinationals), is seen as a new development model, that is, a desirable alternative to 
crisis-ridden capitalist development.  
 
Arrighi claims that a form of non-capitalist market-based development in China first 
occurred between the 16th and 18th centuries, during which China experienced 
unprecedented prosperity and population growth, paralleled by a thriving domestic market. 
Compared to the Western countries during the period, what made the growth unique was 
that there was no corresponding development of the means of production. Mark Elvin 
suggests there was some socio-economic fetters to technological advancements in China at 
this time: “[w]ith cheapening labour but increasingly expensive resources and capital, with 
farming and transport technologies so good that no simple improvements could be made, 
rational strategy for peasant and merchant alike tended in the direction not so much of 
labour saving machinery as of economizing on resources and fixed capital” (Elvin, 1973, 
p.314. quoted by Arrighi 2007, p.330). Arrighi points out that these tendencies brought 
about the development of ‘labour-absorbing institutions and labour-intensive technologies', 
that is, what Kaoru Sugihara called an ‘Industrious Revolution' (Arrighi 2007 p.32-33). 
Both Arrighi and Sugihara interpret the Industrious Revolution as “a market-based 
development that had no inherent tendency to generate the capital- and energy-intensive 
development path opened up by Britain and carried to its ultimate destination by the United 
States.” Unlike the Western ‘industrial' path, the East Asian ‘industrious' path is 
characterised by a disposition to ‘mobilize human rather than non-human resources.' (Ibid, 
p.34). 
 
The tradition of China’s industrious revolution, after having been suspended during the 
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colonial period, was revitalized and transformed by China’s socialist revolutionary 
tradition, which, unlike Stalin’s USSR, pursued modernization not just through the 
internationalization of the Western industrial revolution, but through the revival of the 
industrious path with emphasis on rural infrastructure, education and land reform (Arrighi 
2007, pp.353–54). The distinct Chinese form of Marxism-Leninism (called Maoism) 
developed during the Red Army’s Long March in the 1930s was distinguished from the 
Russian tradition in terms of putting the masses and the peasantry before the vanguard 
party and urban proletariat as the principle foundation of the socialist revolution. Arrighi 
claims that it was the Maoist tradition, coupled with a pragmatic approach of the CCP to 
the crucial problem of “how to govern and develop a country with a rural population larger 
than the entire population of Africa, or Latin America, or Europe”, that made the CCP 
leadership continue to pursue a form of accumulation without dispossession instead of the 
forms of accumulation by dispossession (Arrighi 2007, pp. 361-4, pp.370-1, p.375; Amin 
2005, p.268, pp.274-75). Indeed, according to Arrighi’s observation, Chinese rapid growth 
in the post-Mao era was not based on the so-called ‘advantages of backwardness’, that is, 
large reserves of low-productivity agricultural labour available to higher-productivity 
industries; rather it was based on highly effective agricultural reforms (the land-tenure 
system established in the 1980s) which barred individuals from selling land, and thus 
enabled the peasant not to lose control of their means of subsistence while being involved 
in other non-agricultural rural activities such as working in Township and Village 
Enterprises (TVEs) (Andreas 2008). In addition to the rural-oriented policies, Arrighi 
points out that the rapid growth in China was driven by development policies reflecting the 
Maoist tradition “aimed at expanding and upgrading the social division of labour; the huge 
expansion of education; the subordination of foreign capitalist interests to the national 
interest; and the active encouragement of inter-capitalist competition” (2007, p.361). 
Arrighi sees those various socio-economic policies based on the socialist tradition as 
making it difficult to interpret Chinese development as associated with adoption of 
doctrinaire neoliberal principles as David Harvey did with the expression ‘Neoliberalism 
with Chinese characteristics’14.  
 
Then what was the source of China’s competitiveness in attracting capital and promoting 
                                         
14 See Harvey (2003, pp.120-151). 
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economic growth? Although the distinct Chinese development path with a strong bias 
towards the utilization of human resources and community-based small-scale production 
left little room for big innovations through investment in fixed capital, it paved the way for 
the development of labour-intensive technologies including managerial and interpersonal 
skills that became Chinese producers’ chief competitive advantage (Sugihara 2003, p.87). 
Discussing the competitive advantage of China, Arrighi keeps emphasising the high 
productivity of labour that was gained without actually investing in expensive plant 
equipment. “The basis of Chinese success was not simply cheap labour, but the quality of 
labour; China’s advantage was due to ‘low-price, high-quality labour” (Arrighi 2007, 
p.365). Arrighi cites, as an example, the Wanfeng automotive factory near Shanghai, where 
there “is not a single robot in sight”. “As in many other Chinese factories”, writes Arrighi, 
“the assembly lines are occupied by scores of young men, newly arrived from China's 
expanding technical schools, working with little more than large electric drills, wrenches 
and rubber mallets” (Ibid., pp.365-366). In this factory, “engine and body panels that 
would, in a Western, Korean or Japanese factory, move from station to station on automatic 
conveyors are hauled by hand and hand truck. This is why Wanfeng can sell its handmade 
luxury Jeep Tributes in the Middle East for $8,000 to $10,000. The company isn't spending 
money on multi-million dollar machines to build cars; instead, it's using highly capable 
workers [whose] yearly pay ... is less than the monthly pay of new hires in Detroit.” (Ibid., 
p.366). Further, Chinese firms were able to substitute inexpensive educated labour, not just 
for expensive machinery, but also for expensive managers. As Fishman describes, “despite 
the enormous numbers of workers in Chinese factories, the ranks of managers who 
supervise them are remarkably thin by Western standards... an indication of how incredibly 
well self-managed [workers] are.” (Fishman 2004). Consequently, China’s distinctive 
development path based on its historical heritage was not only egalitarian but also more 
efficient and competitive than the Western capitalist development model.  
 
Arrighi also suggests that one of the advantages of China’s ‘non-capitalist market economy’ 
is its ability to insulate itself from the negative impacts of crisis-ridden global financial 
markets (and thus the influence of the US structural financial-monetary power). The ability 
derives from the state’s strict hold on its own financial markets through capital controls, 
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exchange rate controls and interest rate controls.15  
 
Since the early years of market-oriented reform and the opening up policy of 1979, the 
control over capital inflows has largely been removed, but capital outflows are still under 
strict government controls. With stricter controls on foreign exchange transaction, 
domestic exporters are allowed to retain only a very small portion of foreign exchange 
earnings while the remainder should be handed over to the central bank which holds it in 
the form of official foreign exchange reserves (Zheng et al 2007, p.4). As the path of 
outbound capital flows is more or less blocked, there is little possibility of financial crises 
associated with the volatility of capital flows. Capital controls like this, however, tend to 
worsen problems related to inflation. In general, central banks can react to the problem by 
means of sterilization policy: raising the reserve ratio for banks or/and selling central bank 
bills to them. But such a policy inevitably undermines the profitability of domestic banks’ 
operations; it is a de-facto tax on banks since the interest rate banks receive on both 
reserves and central bank bills tends to be below the rate that banks could receive if they 
lent the money to private borrowers (Lardy 2008, p.3). China solved this problem by 
means of strict interest rate controls, maintaining a fixed gap between the lending and 
deposit rates (Vermeiren 2013, p. 19-20). Arrighi interprets such a policy of financial 
repression as an essential policy not only for keeping domestic economy autonomous from 
crisis-ridden global financial markets, but for subordinating the capitalist (financiers) 
private interest to the national interest. 
 
One of the results of the effective sterilization policy was the accumulation of a huge 
quantity of dollar reserves, totalling US$1.022 trillion by the end of 2007. Arrighi points 
out that this new creditor position surpassing Japan and oil exporters certainly boosted 
China’s potential power of influence in the international arena (2005a, p.70). Indeed, using 
the direct control over the massive foreign reserves and the high degree of discretionary 
                                         
15 From the perspectives of the ‘left’ including World System theorists and post-Keynesians, it was 
these kinds of state control that are in clear contrast to the prescriptions of Washington, that, by 
countering the negative effects of liberalization, spared China disastrous political economic crises 
which had frequently occurred in the global South such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and 
the former Soviet Union. For further discussion of this issue, see Arrighi (2007); Stiglitz (2002) 
and Chang (2002). 
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influence over Chinese financial institutions (e.g. those dealing with sovereign wealth 
funds), the state eagerly made a political investment through aid, loans, and debt 
forgiveness to developing and low-income countries across the world. Such grants of 
generous aids and loans, allowing developing countries to forgo strings-attached-loans 
from the IMF and the World Bank, not only improved China’s political influence, but 
significantly weakened the power of the Washington consensus pursuing ‘vulture 
capitalism’ (e.g. “shock therapies” aimed at transferring wealth from crisis-struck low-
income countries to the financial centre) (Arrigh and Zhang 2007, pp.2-3; Arrighi and 
Silver 2001, p.260; Trichur and Sherman 2009, p.258). For example, Beijing offered 
Angola a loan of US$2 billion in 2004, allowing the government to turn down a similarly 
sized loan offered by the IMF that included conditionalities on employing strict neoliberal 
structural adjustment policies. In 2006, China also out-competed the World Bank in 
negotiations over funding the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, by offering Chad more 
generous terms for investment funds. These were just one part of many similar cases in 
which China made itself an alternative source of funds for the global South; as of 2006, 
Beijing had offered preferential loans to twenty-six African countries including Ghana and 
Congo which were once the clients of the World Bank and IMF (Arrighi and Zhang 2007, 
p.31). 
 
Also, China has consistently pursued the building up of a regional monetary financial 
system aimed at reducing the dependence of East Asia on the US-led monetary financial 
regime. In cooperation with the ASEAN, Japan and South Korea, for example, China 
attempted to create an Asian Currency Unit that could be used as an international currency 
in the region. The state has also been an active promoter of the Asian Bond Markets 
Initiative backed by the post-2003 ASEAN plus-Three, which aims to re-direct Asian 
surpluses toward Asian development projects. Lastly, China also supported the post-2000 
Chiang Mai Initiative and the creation of a multilateral fund in 2008 with the object of 
providing short-term financial assistance to East Asian states undergoing balance of 
payments problems.   
 
The Chinese state’s active mobilization of foreign reserves, along with its efforts to build 
up a regional scheme, would make room for other states (in particular Asian and 
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developing states) to reconsider their past international investment patterns based on the 
imperatives to finance the US’ consumption binge. Because the major creditor position of 
China would continue to rise, Arrighi hopes that this trend, smoothly or abruptly, will lead 
to a new mechanism of recycling surplus savings of the emerging market countries within 
the periphery, fading out the US influence as a global investment bank. Some critical IPE 
scholars argue that the effect of such an effort would be limited as it cannot undermine the 
status of the dollar as the leading international currency. Refuting such arguments, Arrighi 
emphasizes that “whether Asian and other Southern countries continue to use US dollars is 
not the most important issue. As one can see from the example of Venezuela’s use of 
windfall proceeds from high oil prices to assume the role of new “lender of last resort” for 
Latin American countries, thereby reducing Washington’s historically enormous influence 
over economic policy in the region, what really matters for the future of North-South 
relations is whether Southern countries will continue to put the surpluses of their balances 
of payments at the disposal of US-controlled agencies, to be turned into instruments of 
Northern domination, or will instead use them as instruments of Southern emancipation” 
(Arrighi and Zhang 2007, p.32). In this sense, “China is assembling the resources to eclipse 
the US in many essential areas of international affairs and constructing an environment that 
will make US hegemonic action more difficult.” (Ramo 2004, p.5).  
 
In sum, while the US is undermining its central position in the world political economy by 
relying increasingly on the abuse of residual hegemonic power (financial, monetary and 
military power), China, gaining a foothold from the declining US, is rising as a new 
hegemon providing the whole system with an alternative leadership. Joshua Cooper Ramo 
describes the emerging Chinese leadership as the replacement of the Washington 
Consensus by a Beijing Consensus, that is, the China-led development path for other states 
“not simply to develop but also to fit into the international order in a way that allows them 
to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices” (2004, pp. 3-5). 
In line with such arguments, Arrighi sees that the Chinese ascent and the provision of its 
‘development project’ are actually contributing to a collective empowerment of the South, 
that “can lead to the formation of a new and more effective Bandung–i.e., a new version of 
the Third World alliance of the 1950s and 1960s better suited than the old at countering the 
economic and political subordination of Southern to Northern states in an age of 
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unprecedented global economic integration” (Arrighi and Zhang 2007, p.29).  
 
2.3. Summary  
 
World System theories agree with critical IPE perspectives that the immediate cause of the 
global imbalance was the US’ exploitation of its dollar privileges. But World System 
theories take it one step further by arguing that the US’ reliance on monetary-financial 
power was a reflection of declining economic power in production, and thus declining US 
hegemony. They explain the relative decline of US economic power by means of a 
Marxian concept of over-accumulation crisis; the brisk growth in the post-war boom era 
resulted in the accumulation of capital to the extent that no more productive investment 
could be profitable. By the mid-1960s, the crisis of accumulation began putting growing 
pressure on the economy that had so far been the most dynamic centre of global 
accumulation, and it was those pressures that precipitated the US to rely ever more on its 
residual power in the financial system and even military strength for sustaining its own 
domestic prosperity as well as central position in the world system. It follows that the 
growing current account deficits of the US were an outcome of such a desperate struggle to 
stave off an imminent crisis.   
 
Meanwhile, World System theorist Giovanni Arrigh and his collaborators argue that the 
decline of American hegemony was accompanied by the rise of Chinese hegemony, 
providing a viable alternative to the existing US-led capitalist world system. Analysing the 
distinct role of the Chinese state in regulating the market to serve the public interests rather 
than private capitalist interests, they insist the growth of China should be seen not as one of 
capitalist developments but as an emergence of a new development model that fits a 
Smithian concept of a non-capitalist ‘market economy’. They argue, in the long run, 
China’s rise, and the promotion of the Beijing Consensus to replace the Washington 
Consensus, is expected to provide system-level solutions to the system-level problems left 
behind by US hegemony. Consequently, the global imbalance was one of the by-products 
or symptoms of this historical process of hegemonic transition.    
 
3. Conclusion  
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This chapter has reviewed the perspectives of critical IPE theories and World System 
analysis on the global imbalance. Unlike mainstream economists’ views focusing on 
policies and markets of national economies, both perspectives attempt to derive the global 
imbalance from the historically developed international system. Thus, it can be said that 
they provide a wider context on the global imbalance than mainstream economics does. 
Despite such a merit, however, their explanatory power, like the mainstream economists’ 
views, is also limited to some specific aspects of the phenomenon. It seems the problem 
lies in their narrow concept of the ‘system’. For critical IPE theories, the ‘system’ means 
nothing but an institutional arrangement governing inter-state monetary relations, rather 
than the capitalist mode of production itself. In other words, their critical enquires into the 
historical evolution of the existing system do not expand to the capitalist world system 
itself; instead, in the same way mainstream views have often done, they simply assume the 
capitalist system and its social forms such as the state and the market to be self-evident. In 
the case of World System theories, the term ‘capitalist world system’ is used as 
synonymous with a specific pattern of growth or a globalised (hegemonic) development 
model determined by certain relations between the state and the market, rather than a 
specific social relations of production. From the Open Marxist perspective, they can be 
criticized for uncritically accepting the reified notion of the state and the market; like 
mainstream economists (and some traditional Marxists) they see the state and the market 
not as separate forms of capitalist social relations of production but as independent entities 
externally influencing each other. Based on the dichotomy between the state and the 
market, they also see international relations not as a form of the global class relations but 
as inter-state economic relations in which one state, by using ‘its own economy’, can 
exploit another. 
 
These narrow concepts of the ‘system’ make them unable to explain some important 
aspects of the global imbalance; critical IPE tends to overlook issues related to relative 
industrial competitiveness (e.g. how China was able to enlarge the global market share 
while the US’ was shrinking), whilst World System theories cannot explain the fact that 
despite their different forms of development the US and China, as a moment of the same 
global circuit of capital, are dependent upon each other in terms of their own stability and 
prosperity.  
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This thesis argues that a comprehensive understanding of the global imbalance is only 
possible when it is based on an understanding of the historically specific ‘capitalist social 
relations of production’ itself, because particular inter-state relations or state-market 
relations are mere expressions or the mode of existence of the underlying social relations 
of production. For this reason, the following chapter explores Marx’s theory of capitalist 
society as a theoretical foundation for a further analysis of the Sino-American global 
imbalance.  
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Chapter 4 Marx’s theory of accumulation and crisis 
 
"We turn to Marx … not because he is infallible, but because he is inescapable." 
(Heilbroner 1980, p.15). 
 
This thesis argues that an analysis of the Sino-American global imbalance should be based 
on an understanding of the crisis-ridden process of capital accumulation. This chapter 
explores Marx’s theory of capitalist social relations to establish the theoretical background 
for the analyses of the Sino-American imbalance. For this end, the exploration of the basic 
Marxist theory of accumulation places greater weight on the theory of crisis and the nature 
of the capitalist state within the context of global economic relations.  
 
1. Value, money, and capital  
 
All societies are constituted by human labour producing their own material conditions of 
existence. In different times the way in which human labour power is organized during the 
process of production has been radically different. Marx’s critique explores the form of 
social production historically specific to capitalist society, which sets the fundamental 
context of the various components of our social world. One of the historically defining 
features of the capitalist mode of production is that most useful products are produced as 
commodities. In capitalist society, individual commodity producers who are separated and 
independent from each other produce useful things not for their own use but for the sole 
purpose of exchange. This means that it is the process of exchange on the market, rather 
than conscious decisions of social members, that establishes the social connection between 
independent producers. In other words, the private labour of individuals is validated as 
social labour only after the useful things produced are validated as socially useful objects 
via the act of exchange in the market (Reuten 1988, p.126). 
  
Commodities as use values are qualitatively different from each other, reflecting their 
diverse concrete and material properties. But commodities in the process of exchange on 
the market acquire an additional abstract property of having been socially validated as 
values. Commodities in exchange thus double into use-value and value, and as values they 
are qualitatively homogeneous and distinguished from each other only quantitatively. In a 
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parallel fashion, one particular form of labour is qualitatively different from another in its 
concrete character. But in terms that both acts of labouring have acquired a social validity 
via exchange of products, they share the common abstract character of being value-
producing labour. Marx called labour in this consideration abstract labour that is 
conceptually distinct from concrete labour. Just like commodities as values, all kinds of 
commodity-producing labour as abstract labour are counted equal in quality and different 
only in terms of quantity. For Marx, the substance of value is not just human labour but 
this abstract social labour, and thus the magnitude of a commodity’s value is determined 
not by the labour-time actually spent by individual producers but by the labour-time 
socially necessary for the production of the commodity.16 
  
Value is a purely social concept. It is not something inherent to a useful thing but a specific 
social relationship that is constituted in the process of exchange. For this ‘spectral’ value to 
become visible, tangible, and measurable, there must be something external to the world of 
commodities that can manifest the abstract social dimension of commodities (i.e. the 
common reference to abstract labour) in its specific material form. This external thing, 
assuming the role of an independent form of value, or equivalently, a representation of 
abstract labour, is money (Arthur 2006, pp. 16-18, Heinrich, 2012, p.84).17 As such, 
money is not a mere expedient but an essential to generalized commodity production; it is 
only in terms of money that commodities can be comprehensively related to one another as 
values18. To recognize that money is an independent manifestation of value is to recognize 
that in capitalism money is not only an intermediary serving commodity exchanges but it is 
                                         
16 “Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the 
conditions of production normal for a given society and with tire average degree of skill and 
intensity of labour prevalent in that society” (Marx 1976, p.129). It follows that, thus, if the 
productivity of labour for producing a commodity increases, then the labour-time socially 
necessary for the production of the commodity diminishes and the magnitude of its value declines. 
17 This insight is essential to the open Marxist argument that value appears in the form of money, 
and that money is therefore the form of value. See Arthur (2006), Heinrich (2012), and Bonefeld 
(2010). 
18 By making value visible, money also functions as a socially objective measure of value. The 
magnitude of value is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour time or abstract 
labour time. But units of time cannot be a measure of value because the only form of labour that 
can be measured with a clock is always the concrete individual labour expended before the act of 
exchange. It is money that actually expresses units of socially necessary labour time and thus 
making commodities quantitatively comparable (in price forms). 
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an end in itself. As a thing of value, or, to put it another way, as a material form of abstract 
wealth, money is something to be achieved, retained, and multiplied, rather than just to be 
used for exchange (Heinrich 2012, p.68). 
  
In mainstream social theories, commodity production and exchange is conceived as a 
complicated barter economy served by money as a means for the circulation of 
commodities. In these theories there is a tendency to comprehend the basic organization of 
the market economy in terms of C-M-C circuits: every commodity producer sells his 
commodity (C), and uses the money (M) obtained to buy a different commodity (C). The 
aim of this process is the general satisfaction of needs, and money is used as a convenient 
tool for human ends. This perception fails to see the historically defining feature of our 
social world. Capitalism is not merely a barter system in which money is devised for 
convenience; it is itself a “historically unprecedented monetary system” (Bellofiore 2005). 
In a capitalist society, indeed, the use of money is not a matter of option for convenience; 
individuals are compelled to acquire money in order to remain a part of the society. As 
Marx notes, “each individual … carries his social power, as well as his connection with 
society, in his pocket.” (Marx 1993, pp. 156-157).  
 
In this consideration, it should be seen that the central organizing principle of capitalist 
society is production for money. In this society money is advanced (rather than just spent) 
in production with a declared intention of achieving more money (represented by the M-C-
M’ circuit). Marx called the sum of value in this process of valorisation (M-C-M’) capital, 
and the difference between M’ and M surplus value (Heinrich 2012, p.87). Consequently, 
the ultimate goal of production in capitalist society is surplus value; the satisfaction of 
human needs only occurs as a by-product of or a means for the valorisation process (Marx 
1976, pp.255-6). It follows that capitalist society is based on a perverse ontological 
inversion in which human ends are subject to the inhuman end: 'money must beget money'.  
 
2. Capitalist class relations of production  
‘ 
Every society in history has been based on the generation of social surplus, that is, social 
wealth beyond what its direct producers consume. Furthermore, the history of production 
of social surplus has been that of exploitative class relations with different forms. The 
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exploitative relations were evident in pre-capitalist societies (e.g. societies based on slavery, 
serfdom, or tribute-extraction) where the products of surplus labour of a subordinate class 
(labour in excess of the necessary labour required for their own subsistence) was directly 
handed over to a ruling class. In capitalist society where the surplus takes the form of 
surplus value, however, the exploitative character of class relations is not evident on the 
surface level of appearances.  
 
Looking into the valorisation process represented by the M-C(lp/mp)-P-C‘-M‘ circuit (lp: 
labour power, mp: means of production, P: production process, C’: produced commodity 
outputs), one can see that the units of production in capitalism are capitalist firms which 
purchase labour power as a commodity input. As wage contracts, like others, are free 
agreements for mutual benefits, and the seller of commodity labour power, according to the 
terms of contract, is paid for the whole working day, there seems to be no exploitation of 
labour at all. Mainstream economics explains, thus, the difference between M’ and M 
derives from a set of free individual choices of firms and consumers on the market. This 
view can explain how the total surplus value produced in the society is distributed among 
the firms, but it cannot explain the source of surplus value itself.   
 
In order to understand it, wage labour should be seen in the context of the valorisation 
process, M-C(lp/mp)-P-C‘-M‘, as a totality, each phase of which defines a class relation. 
The circuit starts with a relationship between one class that owns money, and another that 
does not, which brings about the relationship between a purchaser of labour power (along 
with other means of production), and a seller of its labour power as a commodity. The 
purchaser of labour power controls the seller’s living labour in the production process, and 
then appropriates the monetary returns after the sale of outputs which would generally 
exceed its own consumption needs. Finally, the circuit restarts with one class which owns 
even more money, and the other class that must once again sell the only commodity it has, 
labour power, to maintain itself at the given standard of living.  
 
The valorisation process is thus the process in which the class relations are reproduced. 
The core of the process lies in the difference between a sum of value created by the 
exercise of labour and the amount of value initially invested by the capitalist. In terms of 
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labour time, surplus-value can be grasped as a sum of value produced during what Marx 
calls surplus labour time, which constitutes the working day on top of necessary labour 
time for reproducing the existing values invested. This wage labour/capital relation is thus 
a fundamentally exploitative relation in which unpaid labour of wage labourers is 
appropriated by the owners of capital. Expressed another way, the labour of one class is 
appropriated without the equivalent by another class, and as such the free and equal 
exchange relations between the traders of labour power amounts to a relationship between 
the buyers of labour power and the producers of surplus value.19  
 
The fact that the process of surplus-value production is a process of exploitation means that 
it is also a process of class struggle over the appropriation of additional atoms of unpaid 
labour time. The capitalists may well struggle to extract as much surplus value as possible 
by lengthening surplus labour time in either absolute or relative terms, while the workers 
may well seek higher wages and resist the reduction of their life-time to not only to labour 
time but, rather, to surplus labour time. In the early stages of capitalist development, the 
capitalist tended to focus on increasing surplus labour time in absolute terms by extending 
the working day, intensifying labour, or employing more workers, on the basis of existing 
methods of production. However, because of the limit set by the competition for labour-
power, the physical limits of workers and the social barrier of organized workers’ 
resistance, the capitalists in mature capitalist societies have come to focus more on 
strategies of increasing relative surplus labour time, i.e. reducing the necessary labour time 
within a given length of the working-day. This form of exploitation, which in the parlance 
of economics might be called a strategy of appropriating productivity gains, has involved 
introducing (or replacing existing workers with) new labour-saving machinery and 
technologies, as well as improved labour management skills that enable workers to 
produce with greater time-efficiency.20 
                                         
19 Unlike in pre-capitalist societies, capitalist exploitative relations are not constituted by direct 
coercion. Instead of direct compulsion, in capitalist society the principle of private property 
imposes social compulsion on the working class. It denies the majority of people the access to 
means of production and subsistence unless they agree to sell their labour power to those with 
investment funds. It follows that individual workers are free to choose their occupation and 
employer, but they are not free to be unemployed.  
20This form of exploitation, what Marx calls the production of relative surplus value, makes it 
appear that the source of surplus value is the capital itself in the form of new machines. This 
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3. Tendency towards overaccumulation 
 
The practice of reducing necessary labour time by means of greater labour productivity is 
not a purely subjective matter, but is also driven by the objective force of world market 
price movement (the so-called ‘law of value’). As discussed, the value of a commodity is 
determined by the labour time socially necessary for producing it (the average social 
productivity in the sector), not by the necessary labour time spent by individual producers 
(individual productivity). Thus, any capital that is less productive than the average of the 
sector it operates in, i.e. those have spent more labour time than socially necessary, may 
well not be able to realize all the value embodied in commodities in the form of profit. 
Expressed another way, as the market price of the commodity tends to be determined by 
the average unit labour costs, those who have failed to reduce their own unit labour costs 
below the average level will have to run at a very low rate of profit or even at a loss, with 
potentially ruinous consequences. Of course, in a sector where demand exceeds supply, the 
market price of the specific kind of commodity could remain high enough to spare even the 
least efficient capitals such a ‘realisation problem’. But such a case is rarely possible or 
temporary at best since the surplus profit of the more efficient capitalists due to the high 
market price will induce them to expand production to the utmost, leading to a rapid drop 
in prices.  
 
In general, for the less productive capitalists, the prevailing market price means the reality 
that they cannot but see either shrinking market share with growing stocks (in case their 
selling price is not adjusted) or falling profit rates and devaluation of capital (in case the 
selling price is cut to the level of the market price). In either case, they will have a lower 
amount of profit that can be reinvested into modernizing production facilities and thus 
increasing labour productivity. If a capital is continuously unable to keep up in the race to 
improve labour productivity, then at some point the market price might even fall to far 
below their costs of production, making the existing scale of production sustainable only 
with the help of increased access to credit. Credit-financing entails a mortgage on the 
                                                                                                                           
illusion derives from the fact that introduction of new machines tends to lead to an increased 
quantity of final products. But it is self-evident that that the quantity of value they transfer to the 
output cannot be bigger than the cost of them as inputs (equal exchanges); value does not grow 
magically in machines.  
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future extraction of surplus value and there is thus the risk that this mortgage cannot be 
sustained, leading to default. Consequently, the law of value rewards those who produce 
above the average rate of productivity and punishes those who fall below. There is thus a 
dynamic that drives every capitalist to develop productive capacity without limit in order to 
sustain themselves as functioning capital. 
 
The general increase in labour productivity (general pursuit of relative surplus value 
production that reduces the socially necessary labour time for the production of 
commodities), however, entails a contradiction for capital. It increases the costs of 
exploiting labour (i.e. greater necessary investments in means of production), depresses the 
value of individual commodities, and expands the total amount of commodities that need to 
be sold for profit. It follows that capitalist accumulation itself constitutes a vicious circle. 
In the words of Simon Clarke, “the more successful are capitalists in overcoming the 
barriers to the increased production of surplus value, the more certain is it that they will 
confront barriers to its realisation through the sale of the commodities produced” (1988, 
p.101). While each capitalist, under ever-intensifying competitive pressure, tries to avoid 
ruin by maximizing the productive power of labour, profit becomes more difficult to come 
by as the cost of exploiting labour increases and a greater amount of commodities needs to 
be sold.  
 
The general trajectory through which overproduction develops can be explained through a 
hypothetical situation of a branch of industry producing similar goods. Assume a capitalist 
in a particular sector of production has managed to make a breakthrough in productivity. 
Armed with the lowest unit labour costs, they would be able to gain surplus profits. With 
the help of these higher profit rates than the prevailing rate, they can further expand surplus 
value production, placing an increasing mass of commodities onto the market. Here, if the 
demand for the specific kind of commodity is concomitantly growing, then the capitalist 
will be able to continue to sell a growing amount of commodities at prevailing market 
prices, preserving the existing level of surplus profits. But even with a limited growth of 
effective demand for the product, the capitalist will not curtail productive capacity, rather 
they will increase investment as much as possible because the relatively low costs of 
production allow the driving out of competitors and expansion of market share by cutting 
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their selling price to just below the existing level. Although the reduced price would 
repress profit rates, the growing quantity of profit would enable him to still enjoy a profit 
above the average level. Consequently, the immediate way in which the most efficient 
capitalist responds to the emergence of overproduction is expanding production even 
further, capitalizing on comparative advantages in the sector.  
 
Of course, such a response would increase the pressure on the less efficient producers who 
are unable to reduce unit labour costs in their factories by at least as much market prices 
fall. In spite of shrinking market shares and growing unsold stocks, however, they are 
unlikely to cut their selling prices or immediately liquidate their capital and move to other 
sectors, because the former means they abandon profitability on paper (and their 
creditworthiness) while the second option means a direct loss of the sunk costs: the capital 
immobilized in the form of unsold commodities, fixed capital and work in process. Rather 
than simply accepting the pressure of devaluation and destruction of their capital, they are 
much more likely to try to overcome the barriers of the market. On the one hand, they will 
desperately attempt to dispose of their growing stocks by means of aggressive marketing 
and opening up new markets. More importantly, on the other hand, they will expand 
borrowing not only for maintaining the existing scale of production but for further 
investment in up-to-date methods of production, while struggling to reduce the costs of 
production by cutting wages, intensifying work and lengthening the working day, and by 
reducing the cost of exploiting labour. Ultimately, identical to the case of more advanced 
capitalists, the less advanced producers are also likely to refuse to tamely curtail their 
productive capacities in the face of limited market and growing competitive pressures. 
Rather, capitalists in whatever position are likely to respond to the pressure of the market 
in ways that would further exacerbate overproduction and intensify competition.  
 
Since capitalists are not mere passive price-takers as assumed by neo-classical economists, 
accumulation does not proceed in the form of the smooth adjustment to the market as 
depicted in economics textbook. If, on the one hand, labour productivity improves at a 
slow pace with less opportunity for surplus profits, then the downward pressure on 
backward producers’ profit will also be relatively small. In that case, the process of 
accumulation will take the form of slow and chronic overproduction (stagnation). On the 
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other hand, if a great breakthrough in productivity is found, then the opportunity for 
substantial surplus profit will lead to a rapid accumulation of capital. The scale of 
overproduction will be determined by the scale of necessary investment and the period of 
rapid accumulation will be affected by the time at which the new methods of production 
will become generalized. Once a huge amount of investment leads to placing of the 
concomitant huge mass of commodities onto the market, the pace of falling prices may 
exceed the pace of falling costs of production for some capitalists, rapidly eliminating the 
profits on which their ability to service debt depends. If the least profitable capitalists 
respond to the pressure by unloading their stocks, then the price will collapse leading to a 
generalized crisis with successive bankruptcies.  
 
To better describe the process of a generalized crisis of overaccumulation, the process 
should be seen in the context of uneven development of productive forces between the 
various branches of production. The tendency to overproduction of commodities and 
overaccumualtion of capital exists in all sectors of industry, but the development of 
productivity growth does not proceed evenly across all sectors of industry due to the 
different conditions of production (the natural, technical or social limits each confronts) 
(Clarke 1988, p.68; Clarke 1994; Weeks 1981). Thus in a capitalist economy some sectors 
will be less productive than others and some will be more dynamic than others. All sectors 
are linked together through the market interactions as suppliers and buyers. If a 
revolutionary method of production is introduced in a large sector of the economy (such as 
the car industry requiring many suppliers in markets ranging from labour power to raw 
materials), then an investment boom ignited in the sector would lead to a period of rapid 
accumulation across the economy. This point is entirely disregarded by the traditional 
theory of under-consumption, which argues that the tendency to overproduction would 
directly entail the emergence of general overproduction and under-consumption. As a 
growth engine, one large sector’s boom can have a significant ramification on even the 
least productive and stagnating sectors as the economy as a whole expands. This 
development does not arrest the tendency towards capitalist overaccumulation. Rather, it is 
fed by it. This comes to the fore most dramatically once the main engine of accumulation 
stops running, which in its impact spreads to the whole economy through the same chains 
of market interactions that have so far fed the boom, leading to a crisis of general 
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overaccumulation.  
 
4. The role of credit and crisis  
 
The expansion of credit plays a critical role in shaping and boosting the pattern of 
overaccumulation and uneven development. As overaccumulation difficulties emerge, the 
rate of industrial investment begins to slow down, simultaneously forming a growing pool 
of money capital. This financial capital throughout the world market is eager to flow into 
newly-found sectors where high future rates of growth are anticipated. While the price of 
capital assets (stocks, bonds, etc.) soars due to the influx of funds, the assets are now 
traded in the hope of speculative gains, rather than expectations of future earnings (Marx 
1981, pp.615-6, p.742). This trend is reinforced when previously gained capital assets are 
used as collateral for borrowings to finance further purchases of assets, stimulating even 
steeper inflation in the market.  
 
During the boom, it appears as if the expansion of credit can resolve problems of liquidity 
to sustain accumulation. While demand for cash remains low (leading to low interest rates), 
rising asset prices makes even the least profitable capitals appear increasingly wealthy on 
paper, thus allowing them to extend credit further to maintain the existing scale of 
production. However, credit by nature “can only suspend the contradiction inherent in the 
capitalist mode of production, it cannot resolve it” (Clarke 1990, p.17). Indeed, by helping 
capitals to overcome the barrier of the market the ready availability of credit plays an 
important role in driving overaccumulation of capital to an extreme level across sectors 
and regions. Credit, as a powerful lubricant for the system, accelerates all the processes of 
accumulation, making it both more dynamic and long-lasting, and more destructive and 
crisis-prone. As Marx put it, “banking and credit thus become the most potent means of 
driving capitalist production beyond its own limits- and one of the most effective vehicles 
of crises and swindle” (Marx 1981, p.739).  
 
Financial instability is “the structural instability of capitalist social relations, the instability 
of the basic relation between capital and labour on which the society is based” (Holloway 
1992, p.159). Crisis is latent in credit-sustained accumulation. It can come to the fore in the 
form of open crisis by any accidental prick to the bubble on which the whole circuit of 
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capital relies. “Credit-sustained accumulation is no more than ‘fictitious’ accumulation or 
‘fictitious’ integration of labour into the capital relation, because the monetary 
representation of value becomes more and more detached from the value actually produced” 
(Holloway 2000, p.176). If the expansion of surplus value cannot keep up with the 
expansion of credit, a portion of total surplus value for interest and dividend will 
increasingly encroach on another portion for functioning capital’s profits, thus requiring 
ever greater injection of credit for productive capitals to remain operational as well as 
solvent. With the risk of default looming, demand for means of payment will suddenly 
skyrocket, boosting interest rates and worsening the problem of bad debts, leading to a 
chain of bankruptcy, defaults, and mass lay-offs that will spread throughout the system in a 
destructive spiral. The more accumulation has been sustained by the expansion of credit, 
the more devastating the social fallouts of a collapse will be.  
 
Ironically, a destructive crisis plays an essential role in creating the conditions for the next 
boom. As workers are made redundant and unprofitable producers are liquidated, the 
capitalists that have managed to survive now can buy up means of production, unsold 
commodities, and labour power much more cheaply than before. By using the means for 
restoring profitability, the remaining capitalists would start investment again and a 
renewed accumulation would get under way (Harvey 2007, p.183). Crisis, in this sense, is 
a necessary element of the capitalist mode of production. Capitalist accumulation and the 
crisis do not belong to different worlds. They are two sides of the same coin. The drive to 
accumulate makes capitalism productive and destructive at the same time. Thus, as Marx 
put it, “the real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself. It is the fact that capital and 
its self-expansion appear as the starting and closing point, as the motive and aim of 
production; that production is merely production for capital… Thus, while the capitalist 
mode of production is one of the historical means by which the material forces of 
production are developed and the world market required for them created, it is at the same 
time in continual conflict with this historical task and the conditions of social production 
corresponding to it” (Marx 1981, p.293). 
 
The above explanation of the pattern of overaccumulation and crisis may not be directly 
applicable to the various forms of crises as they unfolded in the real world. Nevertheless, it 
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is undeniable that Marx’s theory of capital accumulation contains the seeds for 
conceptualizing complex phenomena in a coherent manner. At the risk of repetition, the 
important insights of Marx’s critique of political economy can be summarized with 
important qualifications as follows.  
 
Marx defined the money which directly connects the capitalist with the workers as 
‘variable capital’, while the money that buys the means of production as ‘constant capital’ 
(Marx 1976, pp.131-137). Variable capital and constant capital establish a production 
relation between the capitalist and the workers. By ‘variable’ he means that part of capital 
which may produce a new, surplus value in the course of the labour process. On the other 
hand, the ‘constant capital’ is ‘constant’ because it does not by itself add new value to 
output, or increase in value in the production process, but its value is only transferred to the 
new product by living labour. Marx found that the ratio of constant capital to variable 
capital, that is, the organic composition of capital, tends to rise in the course of capital 
accumulation due to competition that rewards capitalists capable of intensifying and 
expanding exploitation of labour and thereby depressing the exchange value of 
commodities to the utmost. By definition, the rising organic composition of capital means 
more and more money needs to be invested in the means of production in order to establish 
a production relation with the workers. What is here changed is not that the rate of 
exploitation declines, but that exploitation becomes more costly for capital; in order to 
exploit a worker profitably, capital is required to invest an ever-increasing amount in 
machinery and raw materials which tend to increase the cost price of production (Bonefeld 
2000, p.54; Holloway 2007, p.24). Increased labour productivity also results in a growing 
mass of surplus value in the form of a large volume of commodities each containing less 
value per unit of output. There is thus a risk that the rate of return, that is the rate of profit, 
on committed investment falls. Also, this fall in the rate of profit might not be compensated 
by a greater mass of profit. If the quantity of money in circulation is not increased in 
accordance with the increasing volume of commodities, the average mass of profit will 
inevitably fall. As a consequence, this relentless process of making money out of money 
becomes difficult to achieve and appears crisis-ridden. While credit expansion can 
postpone the inherent necessity of crisis for a while, it is only through crisis, by the 
destruction of productive capital and commodity capital, that profitability can be restored 
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to the level appropriate for renewed accumulation (Harvey 2007, p.183). In this sense, the 
violent destruction of capital is not caused by some extraneous events. Rather, it belongs to 
the condition of capitalist accumulation. Marx thus argued that capital is a “living 
contradiction” (Marx 1973, p.749, cited by Bonefeld 2000, p.59). 
 
5. Limits of state monetary policy  
 
As outlined above, in the cycle of overaccumulation and crisis the boom and bubble 
accompany an overextension of credit while a crash follows an abrupt contraction of credit. 
Observing this pattern of boom and bust, economists argue that an appropriate monetary 
policy can smooth out such a crisis-ridden cycle by repressing credit expansion in the 
boom, and by injecting large volumes of liquidity into the economy in the face of crisis. 
Assessing failures of previous policies, they have always pointed at the monetary 
authorities’ ‘misjudgement’ of the situation or populist governments’ ‘irresponsibility’. As 
discussed, however, the source of the cyclical expansion and contraction of credit lies deep 
in “the contradiction between the tendency for capital to develop the productive forces 
without limit, and the need to confine production within the limits of the expanded 
reproduction of capital” (Clarke, 1988, p.18). The tendency towards overaccumulation is 
not the failure of the proper operation of the market mechanism, it is the necessary form of 
the accumulation of capital and thus it is no wonder states’ ‘correct’ policies always turn 
out to be something ‘wrong’. Unable to overcome the contradiction inherent in the course 
of accumulation, in other words, state policies can only underpin one pole or the other of 
the contradiction.21 
  
For instance, the state may adopt expansionary policies, providing capitals with ample 
credits to overcome the barriers to accumulation by improving methods of production, 
opening up new sources of supply and developing new markets, in the face of an 
impending stagnation, recession or deflationary pressures. But by loosening market 
discipline, and by strengthening the bargaining power of labour, it is likely to end up 
stimulating uncontrollable inflation or speculative boom in asset markets which will 
ultimately lead to an even more destructive crisis. In a word, there is no guarantee that 
                                         
21On the concept and mechanism of state economic policy see de Brunhoff (1978, pp. 81–82, p.92). 
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expansion of credits will lead to a concomitant expansion of surplus value production 
validating the expanded credits (Holloway 2000, p.176). Likewise, the state can pursue 
restrictive monetary policies in order to avert the threat of a speculative bubble, but such 
policies, by jacking up the limits of the market, inevitably entail a great risk of stagnation, 
recession or deflationary collapse. The policy provides a strong imperative for capital to 
overcome the barriers to accumulation by improving methods of production, opening up 
new sources of supply and developing new markets, but at the same time it eliminates the 
financial means to do so while precipitating social-industrial disquiet across society. There 
is no guarantee of the effectiveness of the imposition of tight money: the liquidation of less 
efficient capitals and rising unemployment will not transmit to other productive capitals 
through the chain of market interactions causing a vicious circle, during which even the 
most efficient producers cannot but cease accumulation.  
 
Since the dynamism and crisis-tendencies cannot be separated in the course of capital 
accumulation, it is also impossible for the state to successfully pursue monetary discipline 
and brisk growth at the same time. Capitalist production, Marx notes, “moves in 
contradictions which are constantly overcome but just as constantly posited” (Marx 1993, 
p.750), and state economic policies can help capitals to overcome barriers to accumulation, 
only to bring about another form of barriers. Of course, it does not mean that state policies 
have no discernable impact on the accumulation process. Although states’ interventions in 
markets cannot deal with the underlying contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, 
they can significantly affect the scale in which the contradictory character of accumulation 
manifests itself (Clarke 1988, p.83-84). Moreover, the state is fundamental to the handling 
of the class struggle, maintaining capitalist social relations and thus sustaining the law of 
value by political force in the face of severe down-turns. In this sense, state economic 
policies should be seen as a political tool of managing crisis-ridden class relations, rather 
than an economic solution, given by some external balancer which intervenes in capitalist 
economic relations ‘from outside’, to a specific crisis (Burnham 2011, p.496). 
 
To deepen the understanding of the nature of state economic policies (i.e. to understand 
why their utility is confined to maintaining capitalist class relations), it is necessary to 
examine the nature of the capitalist state itself. As will be discussed below, the state is not 
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an institutional structure or apparatus that is separate from the capitalist mode of 
production; rather it is an integral part of it, thus depending on the contradictory 
reproduction of capitalist class relations for its own existence.  
 
6. The nature of the capitalist state 
 
The modern capitalist state emerged in the course of social struggles that abolished the 
direct political power relations characterizing pre-capitalist societies. Capitalist social 
relations are based on abstract forms of dependency, such as world market price 
movements and the wage based access to the means of production. In terms of the political 
economy of capital, it is characterized by the absence of direct forms of domination; 
capitalist society doubles itself into (depoliticized) society and (political) state. As Marx 
put it, “the establishment of the political state and the dissolution of civil society into 
independent individuals – whose relations with one another depend on law, just as the 
relations of men in the system of estates and guilds depended on privilege – is 
accomplished by one and the same act” (p.167, quoted by Bonefeld et al 1995, p.24). 
Capitalism replaced thus the relations of private power (e.g. monarchical power, noble 
privilege or guild masters’ power etc.) by the rule of law22. The rule of law designates a 
central authority that functions as the guardian of the public interest to which the many 
private interests have to conform, sustaining the impersonal and thus impartial ‘rule of law 
and money’ in the face of competing private claims. Correspondingly, the newly shaped 
‘private sphere’ is meant to be devoid of direct, personal coercion. The social individuals, 
be they rich or poor, are all treated as equals before the law; each contracts with the other 
in pursuit of their own individual interest. In this society where the ‘political’ is abstracted 
out and then monopolized by the institutional state, labour and capital meet not as 
producers and appropriators of surplus value. Rather, they meet in “the exclusive realm of 
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham”: 
 
                                         
22 The development of the bourgeois state form is not a necessary outcome or the essential 
structures of capitalist development. Instead, “it is the historical result of struggles in pre-bourgeois 
societies and the historical pre-condition for the possibility of capitalist forms of exploitation 
becoming dominant”. For a more in-depth explanation of the formation of bourgeois states see 
Gerstenberger (1992, pp.151-176; 2010, pp.60-86). 
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Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, let us say labour-
power, are determined only by their free will. They contract as free persons 
equal before the law. Their contract is the final result in which their joint will 
finds a common legal expression. Equality, because each enters into relation 
with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange 
equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his 
own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage … And 
precisely for that reason, either in accordance with the pre-established 
harmony of things, or under the auspices of an omniscient providence, they all 
work together to their mutual advantage, for common wealth, and in the 
common interest (Marx 1976. p.280). 
 
It follows that the capitalist state, by transforming the inequality of social positions into the 
equality of the subjects of law, by imposing formal equality and freedom on the 
substantially unequal and exploitative class relations, plays an essential role in establishing 
and reproducing the relations of private property that characterize capitalist society. For 
Marx, the law of private property is the law of value. In its dynamic it is a law of more 
money, of profit. The political state is thus not a particular form of social organization that 
stands apart from the economic. Rather it is the political state of a depoliticized exchange 
society. As such it is the ‘political’ moment of the ‘economic’ process of capitalist 
production (Kettell 2004, p.21) and thus integral to the capitalist mode of production. 
Economy is political economy. From this perspective, the understanding of the state as a 
distinct force of social organization that can be appropriated by classes or ‘factions’ of 
capital for their own ends falls short in its analytical grasp of the political character of the 
political economy of capital.23 The institutional existence of the state as a ‘political’ 
sphere presupposes the ‘depoliticising’ of bourgeois society rendering its conduct civil on 
the basis of the rule of law and money.  
 
In sum, in the capitalist mode of production class exploitation takes place in the form of 
the free and equal exchange of labour-power. This is an exchange between the buyer of 
                                         
23Examples of this approach include Jessop (1983); Ingham (1984); Poulantzas (1973); Miliband 
(1969) 
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labour power and the producer of surplus value. The exchange relationship between labour 
and capital is one between equal legal subjects of law. The capitalist form of class 
domination presupposes that the use of coercion necessary in the course of exploitation (i.e. 
keeping workers away from the means of production) is not undertaken by individual 
capitalists but by an independent institutional authority: the state. It maintains an 
exploitative social order on the basis of the legal right of private property and the sanctity 
of contracts. In this sense, the state is a historically specific form or the process of political 
domination in capitalist social relations rather than a neutral institution which somehow 
rises above. Understanding this class character of the state provides a means of explaining 
why the state, in whatever form, and whoever is in office, cannot be the answer to the 
contradiction inherent in the capitalist mode of production.  
 
7. The National political constitution of states and the global character of 
accumulation 
 
By drawing the boundaries between the political and the economic, i.e. by depoliticizing 
class relations based on the right of private property, the state sustains the social foundation 
of the capitalist relations of production. Any state, however, that does little more than to 
uphold the rule of law and money will soon confront servere problems in maintaining 
political legitimacy. Legitimacy is bound up with brisk accumulation providing 
opportunities for wage-based income. For the sake of social order and political stability, 
economic profitability is a must. Every national state is thus under constant pressure to 
pursue socio-economic strategies for accelerating the expanded accumulation of capital 
(e.g. the provision of infrastructure, the education and regulation of workers, as well as the 
maintenance of monetary disciplines,etc.). Of course, the forms of such strategies would 
significantly differ from one state to another because every state exists in different 
conditions of production (e.g. the difference in terms of access to raw materials and 
technologies, population of workers, and the balance of power between labour and capital 
etc.), and emerged from different socio-historical contexts. Whatever the forms and 
contexts, however, each national state develops in the same global context that is governed 
by the relations of world market prices. They thus confront the same barriers to 
accumualtion set by the world market. Capitalist society does not exist as a multitude of 
independent national societies; rather it is “a single global relationship of class antagonism 
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in which state power is allocated between territorial entities”, and thus “national states 
subsist through the global accumulation of capital which sets limits to the way in which 
political authorities contain social conflict” (Bonefeld et al 1995, p.30). The limits of 
capitalist accumulation are felt by states in the form of declining relative productivity that 
exposes its national currency to a growing speculative pressure. Worse still, speculative 
attacks on an ‘overvalued’ currency might well bring about a drain of international reserves 
and a depreciation of the national currency, with potentially disastrous effects on the public 
finances as deficits abound in the face of contracting credit supply.  
 
Prevailing market prices are ultimately determined on the world market, while costs of 
producion are determined nationally according to different exploitaion conditons. 
Accordingly, capitals operating within a country where unit labour costs are higher than 
other countries would see their global (including domestic) market share shrink with 
unsold commodities piling up unless their selling prices are cut to the prevailing market 
prices. But cutting selling prices without cutting real wages means sacrificing profit rates 
and the resultant growing devaluation pressures on operating capitals. In that case, while 
sustaining the existing scale of production and employment would require more and more 
expansion of credits, devaluation pressures in the world market would emerge in the form 
of downward pressure on the country’s currency value. The growing gap between the 
nominal value of the currency (reflecting the purchasing power of the currency on the 
world makret) and the real value of the currency (reflecting the labour time it can 
command in the production process) will inevitably precipitate the possessor of the 
currency to change their wealth into what they perceive as more reliable foreign currencies 
on the exchange market. If the central bank’s foreign reserves are not sufficient to meet the 
growing demand on the money market, the currency would have to be depreciated, 
precipatating further capital flight.24 
                                         
24Critical IPE theorists (see Chapter 3) argue that the US is exempted from these kinds of pressures 
on currency owing to the special status of the dollar as the de-facto world currency that drives other 
countries (whose stake is also in the value of the dollar) to support it in favour of the monetary 
hegemon. This argument needs to be revised based on the Marxist conception of money as a form 
of social relation that is distinct from money as a commodity. The dollar, like other currencies, has 
a double existence; within the US territory, it is the sole material form representing value-
producing social labour, while, outside the US, it is a commodity in relation to the various other 
currencies. As a commodity in the international money market, its price in terms of other currencies 
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Of course, such a currency depreciation offers capitals operating in the country an 
opportunity to offset the relatively high unit labour costs, but it would only be possible on 
the condition that the fallout of currency depreciation such as high interest rates, growing 
foreign debt burden and rising costs of imported capital goods can be fully offset by falling 
real wages in the midst of rising unemployment and poverty rates. If the state cannot 
successfully contain workers’ resistance to the imposition of radical restructuring, then 
widespread bankruptcy and default would be inevitable, putting in peril the whole global 
accumulation process and through it, the reproduction of nationally organised class 
relations. The crisis cannot be contained in the original epicentre since for other countries 
it means an abrupt disappearance of export markets as well as a threat of default causing a 
chain of bank failures on a global scale. As Marx makes clear, “the balance of payments is 
in times of crisis unfavourable to every nation … but always to each country in succession, 
as in volley-firing … It then becomes evident that all these nations have simultaneously 
over-exported (thus over-produced) and over-imported (thus over-traded), that prices were 
inflated in all of them, and credit stretched too far. And the same break-down takes place in 
all of them” (Marx 1981, p. 492). 
 
The validity of the law of value is world market validity. That is, for the sake of national 
wealth every state is fundamentally aterritorialised political force for the achievement of 
competitive unit labour costs at prevailing world market prices.25  In the pursuit of 
competitive labour relations, states pursue a plethora of policies aimed at keeping the 
exploitative condition of their boundaries ahead of the rest of the world. However, 
achieving global competitivenss is by no means a permanent solution to a crisis, because 
                                                                                                                           
can be buttressed by foreign authorities’ purchasing interventions. But such a ‘support’ for the 
price itself does not change the class relation in the US in the way of producing more surplus value. 
Rather, by raising the average unit labour costs in the US relative to those in other countries, i.e. by 
making the condition of production worse, it is likely to widen the gap between the price (i.e. 
purchasing power over commodities) and the ‘underlying value’ (i.e. class power over labour) of 
the dollar, precipitating productive capitals in the US to move overseas in pursuit of surplus profits, 
and more and more speculators to bet on the fall of the dollar prices. As shown in the several cases 
(e.g. crises of 1977-9, 1987, 1992-3 etc.), dollar crises indeed frequently occurred in this way, 
which always required the American state (rather than other states) to reorganize the class relations 
to ‘support’ the class power of the dollar. In this sense, it does not make sense to argue that the US, 
due to the dollar’s special status, is free from the pressure of the world market on its currency. 
25 On this in the context of classical political economy, see Bonefeld 2013. 
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the very pursuit of a higher producitivty accererates the tendency to overproduction and 
overaccumulation of capital on the world market. In the world market society of capital, 
“accumulation for accumulation’s sake and production for productions sake” are both the 
means of avoiding bankruptcy and the source of a crisis-ridden process of economic 
adjustment. Consequently, crisis is not the outcome of domestic policy failures; rather the 
tendency to crisis is inherent in the course of accumulation on a global scale. Thus states 
cannot find a resolution of crisis; they can only attempt to suspend it in hope of moderating 
the fallout on their territorialised relations of production. 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have discussed Marx’s theory explaining how exploitative class relations 
in capitalism are organized in the value form, what the fundamental contradictions of the 
relation that is expressed as the tendency towards overaccumlation crisis are, and what the 
limit of the state as a form of the contradictory relation in managing the repeated crises is. 
Based on this theoretical foundation, in chapters six, seven, and eight I will analyse the 
development of the Sino-American imbalance by focusing on the states’ diverse efforts to 
make the social relations within their territories more conducive to accumulation, together 
with the tendency towards an overaccumulation crisis in the world market intensified by 
the very same state efforts. In empirical terms, those chapters will examine how state 
policies affected the trend of real unit labour costs (labour productivity) and how such 
policies as a response to an accumulation crisis, despite the resultant sustained (unbalanced) 
economic growth in both countries, ended up deepening, rather than countering, the 
overaccumulation crisis. This will be done by showing the empirical data such as the trend 
of falling capital productivity (low capacity utilization rates), rising unemployment rates, 
falling real wage growth, rising debt-to-income ratios and ultimately the growing 
possibility of financial crisis as well as widespread social unrest.  
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Chapter 5. Global accumulation crisis since the 1960s 
 
This chapter reviews the history of the contradictory process of accumulation of capital in 
the world market, or more specifically, the development of the over-accumulation crisis 
that plagued the world economy from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. This chapter will 
present the historical-geoeconomic context, that is, understanding of the historically 
specific conditions of global capitalism, in which the US became a debt-ridden ‘consumer 
of the last resort’ while China emerged as the largest ‘global factory’, forming the Sino-
American global imbalance.  
 
1. Crises of 1960s: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system  
 
In the early post-war years, the global economy was in a severe imbalance of productive 
forces between the US and others. The war-ravaged Western Europe and Japan (without 
adequate international reserves, either dollars or gold) were under the pressure of the 
necessity of employing strict deflationary policies (for low real wages offsetting the low 
productivity relative to the US level) despite growing political unrest and the urgent needs 
of post-war reconstruction. As proven by the UK’s failed attempts to restore the full 
convertibility of the pound during 1945-47, such a requirement was clearly untenable, and 
1930s-style protectionary measures or floating exchange rates seemed inevitable (Helleiner 
1994, pp.62-63). These difficulties of the post-war global economy were resolved by the 
US’ massive provision of the dollar (which was as good as gold under the BW agreements) 
to Western Europe and Japan under the 1947 Marshall Plan and other aid programmes 
related to the Cold War. The ample infusion of the dollar into the world economy enabled 
US firms to enjoy ever-expanding markets, while allowing the European states to employ 
expansionary policies by which brisk investment in new means of production for boosting 
productivity was possible. Under these circumstances the US and other advanced 
economies could enjoy a heady mix of high profit margins, annual wage increases, 
moderate inflation, and relatively low levels of unemployment ensuring social stability.  
 
During the latter half of the 1960s, however, the brisk investment and productivity growth 
began to give rise to the “basic phenomenon in crises,” namely commodity overproduction 
(Marx 1992, p.156). While international competition was becoming increasingly fierce as 
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the war-shattered economies of France, Germany, Italy, and Japan (which was now 
enjoying the most phenomenal growth of all advanced capitalist nations) staged a return to 
the world market, the growth of output was outpacing the growth in effective demand 
despite a rise in real wages (Kettell 2004, pp.31-32). By the end of the decade, the effects 
of this re-emergent crisis of overproduction were starting to make themselves felt 
throughout the industrialized world. Levels of unemployment and social unrest were 
starting to rise, investment and productivity growth were starting to decline, and profits 
were under increasing downward pressure in a vicious circle. From their peak levels during 
the latter half of the 1960s until the mid-1970s, profit rates in manufacturing sectors more 
than halved in France, Italy, and the United States; declined by nearly three-quarters in 
Japan; and fell by more than four-fifths in Britain (Mandel 1978, p.22; Moseley 1997, 
p.23).  
 
Paradoxically, the crisis of profitability that, since the end of the 1960s, undermined the 
conditions for accumulation in advanced Keynesian capitalism, accompanied a dramatic 
expansion of financial markets. With the profitability in real productive investments ever 
falling, many firms had no choice but to increase their level of borrowing in a bid to 
maintain their existing scale of production, while other capitalists were increasingly 
inclined to hoard money or to pursue accumulation through financial (rather than 
productive) investments. In addition to this, governments also began to relax their 
macroeconomic policies and to enlarge public spending in an attempt to uphold levels of 
economic demand and to placate rising social tensions, while more and more individual 
households were trying to avoid any decline in living standards by incurring debt 
(Bonefeld et al 1995, p.41). Such growing monetary expansion detached from productive 
accumulation, or the attempt to sustain accumulation of capital through financial 
accumulation, was particularly vivid in the US whose global market shares were rapidly 
eroded by Europe and Japan. 
 
Considering the narrowing productivity gap between the US and other advanced 
economies, the US had to cut real wages or make a breakthrough in productivity in order to 
preserve the competitive position it had enjoyed for decades (Mandel 1969, p.12). 
Unfortunately for the state, however, rising wages and social expenditure (such as on 
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public education or health-care systems) enabled workers to struggle against intensification 
of work and for higher wages, rather than bring about higher productivity of labour 
(Cleaver 1989). As a result, the US economy began to suffer from rapidly rising unit labour 
costs of production, directly pinching business profits26 (Cleaver 1992; Glyn et al 1991). 
With rising unit labour costs, the only way business could avoid an even more rapid 
decline in the rate of profit was raising prices (the average rate of inflation between 1961 
and 1965 was 1.3%, while between 1966 and 1970 it was 4.5%, reaching 6% by the end of 
the decade). Inflation was an immediate business response to the wage increases 
outstripping productivity. The government had accommodated this strategy by allowing 
the money supply to expand enough to finance the price increases. For policy makers, 
expansionary monetary-fiscal policies were one of the most pragmatic ways to sustain the 
present level of production and employment, and thus to placate rising social tensions. 
However, a rise in prices (meaning higher real unit labour costs) ultimately eroded the 
international competitiveness of US goods, reducing market share at home and abroad. As 
a result, the US trade accounts were constantly deteriorated during the 1960s, and it 
dropped to a deficit in 1971, while corporate debt rose markedly (corporate borrowing as a 
share of fixed investment more than doubled from an average of around 15% during 1962–
1967 to around 36% by 1973) (Kettell 2004). Together with persistent capital exports and 
high levels of government spending (especially military expenditures related to Vietnam 
and other spending for the Johnson administration’s Great Society programmes), the rapid 
deterioration in the trade balance produced a rising balance of payment deficit and the 
resultant growing ‘dollar overhang’—the difference between the dollars in international 
circulation and the value of the gold backing held in Fort Knox. By 1968 the volume of 
dollars circulating outside the US had grown to an enormous $38.5 billion from just $9 
billion in 1951, some $23 billion more than America’s available gold reserves (Mandel 
1978, p.29-30; Armstrong et al 1991, p.163).  
 
This expansion of dollars outside the control of US regulation developed a market in 
international debt, usually called the Eurodollar markets, which ‘grew from $3 billion in 
                                         
26 As the average growth rate of hourly compensation rose to 6.8% between 1966 and 1970, from 
4.2% between 1961 and 1965, the average increase rate of unit labour costs also soared to 4.8% per 
year between 1966 and 1970 from 0.46% between 1961 and 1965 (Cleaver 1989). 
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1960 to $75 billion in 1970’ (Strange 1994, p.107). The role of the Eurodollar market as an 
unregulated international credit provider made it possible for any state to sustain 
expansionary policies (just like the US) without immediate internal or external adjustment 
measures (e.g. austerity measures or currency devaluation) in spite of a deteriorating 
current account balance. However, unless the expansion of the money supply leads to a 
corresponding decisive breakthrough in productive investment and productivity growth, 
reducing relative unit labour costs and current account deficits, a large and persistent 
current account deficit would trigger speculation against the national currency whose value 
came under growing suspicion. In fact, such balance of payment crises and financial 
turmoil became increasingly frequent and violent since the mid-1960s, as international 
borrowing by states was rarely matched by a corresponding expansion of productive 
investment owing to widespread industrial conflicts. Ultimately, following speculative 
attacks on the pound in 1968 and the franc in 1969, the US dollar became a target of 
speculation in 1971 amidst a growing realization that its value was now being 
progressively undermined (Krugman and Obstfeld 2008, p.517). The speculative attack led 
to a drastic depletion of US gold reserves, impelling Nixon to announce in 1971 that the 
US would no longer abide by the Bretton Woods agreement. In spring 1973 this 
culminated in the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed rate system in a generalized shift to 
a more volatile system of floating exchange rates throughout the industrialized world. 
 
2. Crises of 1970s: oil price hikes and Latin America’s debt crisis  
The sharp spike in oil prices (which between October 1973 and March 1974 quadrupled 
from $3 per barrel to $12 per barrel) was mostly a consequence of the same phenomenon 
that caused the BW system to collapse—the rapid depreciation of the dollar in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. Although the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 was the immediate event 
that caused OPEC to cut production, the consequent rise in the price of oil served to 
accomplish OPEC’s long-term objective: reversal of the decline in revenues in terms of 
gold (commodities) (Kliman 2012, p.59). In other words, it was an attempt by the oil 
exporting countries to recuperate some of the value they had been losing over the previous 
decade due to declining terms of trade. Such attempts were necessary for the governments 
of the OPEC countries to respond to their growing internal problems of rising social unrest 
which they could only manage with increased revenues from oil exports (Cleaver 1989). 
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As an immediate effect of the rise in oil prices the world economy went into deep recession 
with consumption and investment slowed down everywhere. Over the same period, 
however, inflation accelerated in most countries even though unemployment was rising. 
This combination of stagnating economic growth and high inflation, called stagflation, was 
the result of the failed attempts of states to convert higher costs of oil into a reduction in 
the real wage, i.e., in holding down nominal wage increases in the face of oil boosted 
inflation (Cleaver 1989). Higher oil prices would mean higher prices for all consumer 
goods requiring energy in production and this inflation would undermine real wages. In 
this situation, if real wages are kept repressed, then the loss of real wages would be 
transferred in a roundabout manner into the Eurodollar market and hence become available 
for business investment. However, in most countries workers, despite increasing rates of 
unemployment, achieved higher nominal wages to maintain their customary standard of 
living, while governments employed expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the fear 
of even-higher unemployment and social unrest. Any policies for monetary growth 
(incurring further current account deficits or depleting international reserves) during this 
period, thus, contributed to maintaining workers’ real wages rather than to improving the 
conditions of production, just like in the late 1960s. As a result, during the 1970s 
international credit rapidly expanded at an annual rate of $50 billion between 1973 and 
1975, $ 100 billion between 1976 and 1978, and more than $ 150 billion between 1979 and 
1981, the majority of which was increasingly dissociated from industrial accumulation, and 
instead financed public and private consumption spending (Bonnet 2002, p.107). Insofar as 
production conditions remained the same, there was no reason that rising prices would 
stimulate productive investment, reducing unemployment. Instead, the expanded credits 
(petrodollars) were used to underpin existing levels of consumption with deteriorating 
current account deficits (incurring non-repayable foreign debts). This trend was most 
manifest in the US and Latin American nations where the power of labour constrained 
policy makers who were unable to halt expansionary policies. 
Latin America’s rapid economic growth from the early 1960s until the mid-1970s 
corresponded to the period in which capitals in industrialised nations increasingly sought to 
escape militant workers' struggles at home (Bonnet, 2002, p.104). Nations in Latin 
America whose working class was then subject to the open repression of military 
dictatorships provided a seemingly perfect site for investment. However, this relocation of 
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production to territories where the conditions for accumulation appear more favourable 
tends to soon encounter barriers of its own creation: the explosive growth of industry 
quickly led to labour shortages, which, in combination with more active and organized 
workers struggles, drive up costs of exploitation (real unit labour costs). As Bonnet puts it, 
“the insubordination of labour trails capital like its own shadow. The flight of capital from 
the insubordination of labour in the capitalist centres meets up with the insubordination of 
labour in the periphery” (2002, p.105). This was the case in Latin American developing 
countries since the mid-1970s with a wave of strikes throughout the region.  
 
Faced with strengthening workers’ struggles and rising costs of production, states and 
capitals in the region relied on credit expansion in an attempt to improve productivity by 
introducing new means of production and development of infrastructure, while curbing 
rising unemployment. They extended the public sector by taking over failing private 
enterprises, maintaining them as sources of employment to stave off the threat of working-
class unrest. The number of state enterprises more than doubled between 1970 and 1980, as 
did the number of their employees (Harvey 2007, p.99). In the 1970s many Latin American 
countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico borrowed huge sums of 
money from international money markets where huge sums of petrodollars (lacking 
attractive investment opportunities elsewhere) were being accumulated. The borrowing 
was also facilitated by the US, which relaxed the capital controls that it set up before 1974 
while their persistent expansionary policies induced the weak dollar and low interest rates 
in financial markets. The annual net capital flows to Latin American countries climbed 
gradually at an average rate of $814 million between 1950 and 1965 (equivalent to 1.2% of 
regional GDP) to $4,042 million between 1966 and 1973 (2.8% of GDP). From then, the 
increase accelerated, reaching averages of $15 billion between 1974 and 1976 (4.2% of 
GDP) and $28 billion between 1977 and 1981 (4.5% of GDP) (World Bank 1995). In 
consequence, the total stock of Latin American external debt had already ascended to $258 
billion in 1980, a sum of which the major part was long-term public debt ($146 billion) and 
an important portion was short-term ($68 billion, against $42 billion of long-term private 
debt and $1,413 million owed to the IMF), while interest payments and the repayment of 
the principal amount increased rapidly, amounting to $66 billion in 1982 compared to only 
$12 billion in 1975 (Bonnet 2002, p.108; Theberge 1999). At the time of borrowing, Latin 
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American economies were exhibiting great performance and growth, which also played an 
important role in relieving the effect of the recession in other countries during the 1970s.  
 
Credit expansion itself does not necessarily cause a financial crisis. It leads to a crisis when 
it is not matched by a corresponding expansion of productive investment and productivity 
growth that presupposes class relations favourable to capital (carrying out restructuring 
plans). As referred to above, the expansion of credit in Latin America, during the period, 
was largely dissociated from industrial accumulation and instead used to finance public 
and private consumption (especially oil deficits) (Soederberg 2001). As a result, the ratio of 
debt-to-GDP continued to increase with ever-growing debt-service burden, eroding 
potential for future growth, and so creating bad debts. By the early 1980s, most nations in 
Latin America could not but increase resources towards repaying debts which resulted in 
further reduction of domestic output and investment (Palat 2003). The economies were no 
longer capable of increasing their economic growth by means of increasing debts. In short, 
foreign debt of Latin American nations surpassed the amount their economies were able to 
earn.  
 
The US at that time was witnessing the futility of currency depreciation in improving 
domestic production conditions. Just like the effect of oil price hikes, depreciation of 
national currency can be effective in lowering relative unit labour costs only when it is 
accompanied by cuts in real wages. Without a cut in real wages the fall in terms of trade 
caused by depreciation will lead to further trade deficits and more depreciation in a vicious 
cycle (Shaikh 1996, p.67). The US government (trying to avoid direct confrontation with 
workers), however, had only focused on dealing with unemployment problems through 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. As a result, while the unemployment rate 
dropped from a recession high of 8.3% in 1975 to 6.0% in 1978, inflation was reignited 
and the current account was pushed further into deficit with a steep depreciation of the 
dollar from 1976 (Krugman and Obstfeld 2008, p.541). The value of the dollar depreciated 
almost 20% between 1976 and 1979, which in turn encouraged oil exporters and 
speculators to re-boost the price to its historical level. There emerged an urgent need for 
the US monetary authorities to intervene to stop the vicious cycle and regain confidence in 
the dollar. In 1979 a strong intervention was implemented by Paul A. Volcker, the newly 
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appointed Federal Reserve chairman, who announced a tightening of US monetary policy 
and the adoption of more stringent procedures for fighting inflation (wage increases) (the 
reference interest rate passed 15% during 1981 and the start of 1982 whilst annual dollar 
inflation fell from 12 to 2.5%) (Mussa 1994). As a consequence, the feeble credit-based 
recovery from the oil shock fell into the deepest recession since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s.  
 
The dramatic interest rate hikes in 1979 immediately undermined debt-ridden Latin 
America’s ability to repay its debts. The US’ macroeconomic stringency -the soaring 
interest rates together with the strong dollar- raised the cost of debt service to unsustainable 
heights, while the subsequent global recession (and a heavy fall in the prices of primary 
commodities) made it more difficult for the ‘debtors’ to earn foreign exchange. As a result, 
global debt problems went from bad to worse. As Mexico, in August 1982, threatened to 
default on its national debt, the majority of international banks refused to refinance 
developing states’ short-term loans, which in turn drove Argentina, Brazil, Chile and a host 
of other developing countries to financial crises. In a bid to forestall the danger of a 
generalized default and an international financial collapse and to ease the strains of the 
severe recession, major industrial states led by the US now reversed their tight economic 
policy stance and embarked on another large monetary expansion based on the provision of 
fresh credit to debtor nations. While this led to a resumption of large-scale capital flows to 
developing countries at an average of $18.5 billion a year during the latter half of the 
1980s (Kettell 2004, p.35), most of this now gravitated toward the booming economies of 
East Asia, where average annual growth rates were at that time some two and a half times 
higher than those in advanced countries.  
 
3. Crises of the 1980s: failures of restructuring in Latin America and the US 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the debt crisis of Latin America (and some Eastern European states) 
had continued, resulting in what many commentators have called a ‘lost decade’ of growth. 
Between 1970 and 1980 the GDP of the region expanded by almost four folds (396%) 
whereas between 1980 and 1990 it scarcely increased by one fourth (27%). In a number of 
years there was actually an absolute fall in production. The stock of foreign debt and its 
impact, despite the massive outflow of money-capital during the decade, could not but 
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increase in the wake of this poor performance. By the end of the 1980s, the total stock of 
Latin American foreign debt had risen to $476 billion: of this a larger part than in 1980 
was long-term public debt ($355 billion against $77 billion short-term debt) and a much 
smaller part ($25 billion) was long-term private debt, owing to various policies of state 
assumption of private debt, and a significant part ($18 billion) was owed to the IMF for 
restructuring programmes. All the debt indicators had worsened: the stock of debt 
represented 33 percent of the annual product of the region compared to 26.5% in 1980, and 
162% of exports in 1990 as against 88% in 1980 (Bonnet 2002, p.108; World Bank 1995). 
 
This long continuation of the crisis reflected the inability of states and capital to discipline 
the working class and to restore conditions for a new cycle of accumulation through 
restructuring processes. In the years of crisis, structural adjustment programmes were 
imposed by the creditors (with the IMF as their proxy) upon the ‘debtor’ nations as a 
requirement of debt refinancing, and the programmes were essentially policies of austerity 
designed to increase the availability of foreign exchange (the source of debt-repayment) 
primarily by cutting imports and fiscal expenditures as well as privatization of state-owned 
properties. However, no state was able to put their people to work profitably by making 
them willing to accept the austerity demanded by the IMF, albeit they could force workers 
to work harder and longer by threatening poverty and unemployment (or even by open 
repression of military dictatorships entailing persecution and assassination of union readers, 
and prohibition of unions and strikes) (Cleaver 1989). In other words, the states failed to 
achieve real unit labour costs (the combination of lower real wages and higher productivity 
growth) low enough to earn profits on the world market. Rather, in some countries like 
Brazil, intense strike waves survived through a decade of repression and recession in the 
1980s, which made it possible for workers to achieve higher real wages (during the four 
years from 1985 to 1988, real industrial wages in Greater Sao Paulo grew by an average of 
10% per year) (EIU, Brazil, 1989-90). 
 
The persistent inability of states to impose repressive policies and strict discipline on 
society forced them into repeated rescheduling of debt, instead of debt-repayment and re-
establishing development. The crisis did not end until 1989 when the US, fearing political 
instability to its south, insisted that American banks give some form of debt relief to 
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indebted countries. In 1990, banks agreed to reduce Mexico’s debt by 12%, and within a 
year debt reduction agreements had also been negotiated by Costa Rica, Venezuela, 
Uruguay, and Niger. When Argentina and Brazil finally reached preliminary agreements 
with their creditors in 1992, the debt crisis of the 1980s had officially been resolved even 
though it re-emerged after a while (Krugman and Obstfeld 2008, p.634). 
 
The struggle to take advantage of the crisis to reequip and reorganize production processes 
was also underway in the US and later in other states with strict anti-inflationary or 
monetarist policies. Drastic reductions in money supply and a dramatic increase in interest 
rates (first employed by the Fed aimed at fighting inflation and stemming the dollar’s 
freefall, and then employed by European and Japanese monetary authorities fighting 
domestic inflation caused by strong dollars –depreciation of their currencies) were 
essentially a strategy of improving the conditions of production by ‘eliminating’ inefficient 
capital and labour (‘living beyond means’) under the intensified competitive pressures 
during a recession.  
 
Bankruptcies and liquidations of inefficient firms would allow larger and more efficient 
capital to benefit from takeovers and mergers, while rising unemployment would 
undermine workers’ resistance to higher exploitation in the form of wage cuts, longer 
working hours, and intensification of work. In this way, the shock of recession can 
possibly serve to restore the profitability of remaining capital, paving the way for renewed 
economic growth (Clarke 1988a, 1991). In the US, under the Reagan administration, such 
policies were accompanied by more active government intervention in an attempt to make 
labour market more flexible (more sensitive to high unemployment) by cutting subsidies 
(‘social wages’) for the unemployed and by attacking trade unions, while privatizing state-
owned businesses and removing costly regulations on financial markets.  
 
The strategy, however, was to exert a full restorative influence on the economy only if the 
government was fully determined or strong enough to risk a recession deep enough to 
literally ‘remove’ inefficient capital and labour in spite of successive bank failures 
(entailing a generalized default and an international financial collapse) and widespread 
social-industrial disquiet. Of course, such a crisis was not realized. From 1981, further 
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reduction in social programmes was blocked by both organized workers and affected 
businesses, while tax cuts offsetting the impact of high interest rates and massive military 
spending as a Keynesian stimulus were accelerated.27 More importantly, the key monetary 
policy was dramatically reversed from restraint to expansion (3-month T-Bill rate of 
interest fell rapidly from 14.03 % in 1981 to 7.86% in 1983 to 5.18% in 1986) to reduce 
the risk of the bad debt crisis resulting from the heavy debt service burdens of foreign and 
domestic debtors (Mussa 1994, pp.121-124). Due to this policy turnaround, ‘inefficient’ 
capital and labour were still able to weigh the economy down as a ‘cost’, bedevilling the 
whole 1980s.   
 
After a deep recession between 1980 and 1982, the US economy (and other countries 
reliant upon exports to US markets) had rebounded and began a sustained period of 
economic boom with the general rate of profit pulled out of its long slump. However, the 
recovery was mainly based on credit expansion and high unemployment, not upon brisk 
productive investment and rising household income. It is not deniable, despite the rosy 
numbers on the chart, that the economic boom started in 1983 had been founded on the 
unsustainable pillars of further intensified work of the employed workforce (including 
longer working hours and lower hourly earnings) by a concerted attack on labour, a 
loosening of macroeconomic policy, and a continuing accumulation of debt, rather than an 
expansion of employment or a significant restructuring of productive means or methods.28 
As a result, although the US’ relative unit labour costs were reduced, it remained still 
higher than other countries (such as Japan, Germany, and Asian NICs), leaving global 
market share eroded (Shaikh 2011, p.54). Many manufacturing firms producing tradable 
goods, which were affected by the exceptionally strong dollar, turned into commercial 
vendors, closed down plants and sub-contracted production to low-wage countries and 
imported final products (cheaper than locally produced ones) into the US (Glassman 2001, 
p.83). Also, as the rise in profits was not sufficient to make productive investment more 
profitable than investing in other unproductive (commercial and financial) sectors of the 
                                         
27 As a result of the so-called Military Keynesianism of the Reagan administration, the federal 
budget deficit rose to $221,000 million in 1986 from $74,000 million in 1980 (Harman 2007). 
28 For example, the household debt-to-income ratio grew steadily from 63% in 1981 to 82% in 
1990, while productivity growth had stagnated at around 1.5 % during the 1980s (Shaikh 2011; 
Harman 2007; Kliman 2012, pp.62-63). 
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economy, the gains achieved through wage and tax cuts remained in money-form, 
searching for investment opportunities in financial markets. Moreover, the competition 
among financial lenders in the context of a series of deregulatory moves furthered debt-
financed consumer spending and property speculation, fuelling real estate bubbles and the 
long bull market on Wall Street at a time when manufacturing exports were declining, 
starved of investments.  
 
The major by-product of such a credit-driven economic boom was the constantly 
ballooning federal budget deficit and an expanding trade deficit, both of which had to be 
increasingly financed by overseas borrowing (Cleaver 1992). It was by this time the 
financing of the US trade and budget deficits through capital imports transformed the US 
from the ‘world’s largest net creditor to its largest net debtor’ (Walter 1993, p.231). The 
imminent problem was that to attract the money necessary for financing deficits, the Fed 
had to maintain enough monetary restriction to keep American interest rates attractive to 
foreign investors. Further, as it was evident the deficits were rising for financing public-
private consumption demand rather than productive investments (that would be the source 
of debt repayment), it was necessary for the US to offer increasingly higher interest rates 
(as a risk premium for possible dollar depreciation) to dollar-denominated asset holders, 
despite the possible negative effects on debt-financed boom (especially the negative effects 
on banks suffering from bad-debt burdens). Faced with this dilemmatic situation, the US 
attempted to overcome the external constraints on its credit-based boom by means of 
policy coordination with other states whose economic growth also depended upon the US 
consumption growth. Through a set of international policy agreements, known as the Plaza 
Accord (1985), surplus-running countries, especially Japan and West Germany cooperated 
to bring down the value of the dollar and pursued expansionary fiscal-monetary policies in 
an attempt to improve the US trade deficit while allowing the Fed to further lower interest 
rates. This was essentially a strategy to lower the US’ relative unit labour costs (improving 
the competitive position of the US) by deteriorating the production conditions of other 
trading partners especially Japan and Europe, rather than by improving the exploitation 
conditions either in the US or in other countries. In other words, as it seemed impossible to 
repress consumption further in the US, state managers choose to boost consumption in 
other regions through expansionary fiscal and monetary measures together with an 
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appreciation of their currencies against the dollar. The outcome of these policies was a 
world-wide inflationary expansion of credit; too much international liquidity was released 
without corresponding improvement of production conditions.  
 
Further, in the US, the rapid depreciation of the dollar (approximately 30% by 1987) did 
not improve the trade account as workers soon achieved higher wages to maintain their 
standard of living, making the real exchange rates unchanged. Rather, the fall in terms of 
trade made the size of the deficit larger, reaching the (then) post-war record level of 3.6% 
of GNP in 1987 (Helleiner 1994, p.183-5). As a result, Japan and Europe encountered an 
explosion of monetary growth with stock markets and real estate markets overheated. The 
level of corporate debt began to grow far in excess of investment throughout industrial 
nations (especially in the US, where levels rose from around 30% to 43% of GDP from 
1981 to 1991); the scale of household financial liabilities as a share of disposable income 
also grew steadily, increasing by around a fifth in the US and by roughly a third in France, 
Japan, and Britain; and a speculative boom rapidly emerged on the world’s stock markets, 
during which the total value of US shares tripled, that of the FT quadrupled, and Japan’s 
Nikkei average soared by more than four-and-a-half times (Kettell 2004, p.36). ‘Money 
expanded without having been earned and without being checked by the generation of 
industrial profits’ (Bonefeld et al 1995, p.55), and the debt-driven boom and stock market 
bubble required ever more expansion of credit merely to maintain themselves. At a certain 
point, there was certain to be an outbreak of panic as speculatively inflated asset prices and 
levels of accumulated debt were too high to be sustained by productive activities. The 
result would be a frenzied scramble for cash, a collapse of stock market values, and a sharp 
restriction of credit, while the immediate prick to the bubble could be in any form. 
When the German Bundesbank finally raised interest rates in the fear of further inflation 
and resurgence in wage struggles in August 1987, the dollar started to go into freefall as 
speculators bet on further dollar depreciation. When the Fed rapidly increased the interest 
rates to save the dollar, the stock market bubble based on cheap credit also started to 
collapse, which in turn drove banks to raise interest rates further, putting a drastic end to 
another speculation-driven phenomenon: the real estate bubble that had been expanding 
during the 1980s.  
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The crash of 1987 was followed by the deep and prolonged recession of the early 1990s. 
From 1990 to 1992 levels of output growth, productivity, investment, and profitability all 
declined heavily, while unemployment again soared. In response to the recession, the 
industrialized nations of the West again embarked on the well-worn path of 
macroeconomic relaxation in an effort to revive economic growth. From 1991 to 1993 
average short-term interest rates fell from 8.1% to 5.3% and the annual growth of narrow 
money rose from 6.9% to 8.8% (IMF 1996, quoted by Kettell 2004, p.36). This was a sort 
of bailout plan to ‘fix’ the crisis by throwing vast sums at big lenders in the hope that they 
would resume lending and so pull the economy out of its crisis. Because this ‘solution’ 
paid little attention to the underlying problems of production, speculative activity increased 
as capital again clamoured to find non-productive means of accumulation. This was 
graphically demonstrated by the rising torrent of capital now seeking solace in developing 
economies, inflows to which rose from $95 billion in 1991 to a peak of $245 billion by 
1996 (Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2001, p.5). In particular, this influx of capital helped to 
sustain the boom in East Asia, where real GDP growth was now accelerating to more than 
three times the level of the world’s most advanced economies. Belying these appearances 
however, the Eastward extension of the world market did not offer a sufficient means of 
escaping from the problem of global overproduction, but was itself predicated upon an 
unsustainable rise in debt and speculation. Less than half of the capital inflows to East Asia 
were being used for direct productive investment, while Japan, by far the dominant 
economy in the region and the second largest economy in the world, was now entering its 
worst ever recession crippled by a rising stock of bad debts accumulated during the boom 
of the 1980s (Bernard 1999, p. 191). 
 
4. Crises of 1990s: the Asian financial crisis  
 
While rates of economic growth slowed dramatically in the North Atlantic economies from 
the mid-1970s, and the economies of Latin America and Africa contracted under the 
weight of the debt crisis in the 1980s, East and Southeast Asia were a dynamic pole of the 
global economy from the mid-1980s until the end of 1990s (Dicken 1998). 
Industrialisation and export-led growth in East Asian countries had been built heavily upon 
low-wage labour. Under anti-communist dictatorships, real wage growth was extremely 
limited between the end of the Second World War and 1975, and was far slower than 
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labour productivity growth from 1975 until 1990 (Glassman 2001, p.135). While such 
national development policies were critical to the rise of Asian economies, global 
economic restructuring also played an important role. With the global economic crisis of 
the early 1970s, some core country manufacturers began countering falling profitability by 
selectively off-shoring labour-intensive assembly operations to developing countries. 
Much of this investment, in electronics for example, went to Asian countries to take 
advantage of the favourable conditions for capital there (Henderson 1989). In particular, as 
the value of the yen against the dollar doubled in the wake of the Plaza Accord in 1985, 
more than a few Japanese manufacturers suffering from the increased costs of production 
also began off-shoring labour-intensive functions. 
  
The boom of the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, quickly encountered barriers of its 
own creation: an enormous excess-capacity and price wars in export markets (such as autos, 
semi-conductors, chemicals, steel, and fibre-optics markets) in which they competed with 
one another (McNally 2009, p.63). While falling market prices was eroding profit rates, 
increasing barriers to export-led growth were also brought on by the rise of China as an 
export manufacturing power with price competitiveness based on the strict labour 
discipline and exceptionally low wages (which had been made possible by a huge 
expansion in the reserve army of labour, resulting from massive dispossession of peasants 
and agricultural labourers) (Bernad 1999, p.197). The opening of China and the movement 
of large amounts of investment by Hong Kong and Japanese capitalists posed a serious 
threat to continued expansion of East Asian manufacturing, particularly in low-wage, 
labour-intensive industries. During this period China had taken a larger share of the US 
import market, driving out other Asian countries (Glassman 2001, p.133). According to an 
estimate proposed by Fernald and Loungani (2004, p.2), China’s share of the total Asian 
exports to the US market doubled from near 25% in 1989 to 50% in 2002. Examining this 
trend in a detailed industry level (Table 5.1), they also found that China’s US market share 
soared across virtually all the sectors of industry, while the share of the NIEs (South Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan) and the ASEAN-4 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand) 
significantly fell or stagnated during the period.  
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Table 5.1. Asian countries’ export shares in US market (per cent) 
 Computers  
and semiconductors 
Apparel and footwear Household goods 
China  
&HK 
1989 7 36 24 
2002 24 69 67 
NIEs 1989 72 52 66 
2002 42 12 22 
ASEAN
-4 
1989 21 12 10 
2002 34 20 11 
Notes: This table indicates the three largest industries of US imports from these countries.  
Source: Fernald and Loungani 2004, p.2 
 
Moreover, the Chinese state exacerbated the competitive pressures in 1994 when it 
devalued its currency –a move that occurred in the same year as the NAFTA went into 
effect, improving Mexico’s position as a production base for low-wage exports to the US.  
 
The barrier to further development of capital accumulation was finally solidified by 
strengthening working class struggles. The development of working class struggles, shown 
in a rapidly increasing number of strikes and workdays lost from 1990 to 1997 around 
Southeast Asia (Pasuk and Baker 1998; Glassman 1999, pp.310-11; Chang 2009, pp.194-
209), through undermining state regulation of labour and labour relations on the shop floor, 
continually worsened the conditions of production. Growing labour militancy might be 
seen as reflecting the increased bargaining power of labour under conditions of relative 
labour shortage, or as an overdue response to years of wage repression, or as a combination 
of these factors. It can also be seen as part of the emergence of more democratic forces in 
the societies that have pushed for political liberalization and demilitarization (Ji 1997). The 
immediate outcomes of working class struggles were the rising cost of exploitation, 
pinching business profits: rapid wage increases outstripping productivity growth with unit 
labour costs soaring, a phenomenon clearly seen in most of Asian countries including 
Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia in the 1990s.  
 
Faced with increasing competitive pressures in global markets as well as an increasing cost 
of exploitation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, states and capital attempted to 
overcome the barrier through liberalization of financial markets, enabling individual 
capitals to introduce new means of production and survive competition through the 
massive expansion of credit. In order to encourage rapid inflows of foreign capital and 
bridge a projected savings- investment gap, most Asian governments undertook a number 
118 
 
 
 
of financial liberalization measures during the early-mid 1990s (Pasuk and Baker 1998, 
pp.98, 116-17, 318-19; Bernard 1999, p.191). The growing demand for credit was met by 
the growing supply of credit in the global financial markets which rapidly expanded during 
the recession of the industrial countries. Much of this new global finance found its way 
into these ‘emerging markets', as the previous manufacturing growth booms there made 
their prospects appear good (Bernard 1999) As a result, external debt in developing Asian 
economies rapidly grew from $367 billion in 1991 to a peak of $655 billion by 1998 (IMF 
2003).  
 
Just as was in other developing and developed nations in the previous decades, however, 
expansionary policies were ineffective in creating more favourable conditions of 
production (in particular compared to the exceptional conditions of China). While 
unsuccessful in overcoming working class resistance to restructuring processes, individual 
capitals attempted to go beyond national boundaries, moving to places with more 
subordinate labour forces, notably China. For instance, Korea’s overseas FDI began 
massively to increase in China since 1994, outstripping inward FDI by $62 billion in 1996 
(Kim 2000, p.113). Over the same time, inefficient capitals sustained by expanded credit 
continued to place earned profits into markets which promised higher returns and shorter 
turnover times than productive investment: principally the real estate sector and the stock 
market, booming under the dramatic inflow of hot money.  
 
Ultimately, returns in finance and real estate markets are dependent on the continued 
profitability of production, and the growing disjuncture between them leads to them finally 
becoming a trigger of financial crises. The phase of open crisis began with the collapse of 
real estate values and manufacturing export growth during 1996, which led to 
disinvestment from the stock market and speculative pressure (capital flight) on the Asian 
currencies29 (Chang 2001). While banks were attempting to recover their losses in the 
collapsed firms by withdrawing further loans, foreign financial institutions began to refuse 
rollover of the short-term loans in the fear of default. With the massive increase in demand 
for dollars in foreign currency markets, the deadly currency crisis followed, precipitating 
                                         
29 The stock price, which showed its highest level, 1,027.4, in the Korean Composite Stock Price 
Index in late 1994, fell to 350.68 in late 1997 (Chang, 2001). 
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massive liquidation of capital (Chang 2001, p.208). Capital accumulation sustained by 
massive credit expansion without more substantial shifts in the organization of labour 
failed to overcome crisis tendencies, revealing its limits in the form of financial crises and 
mass bankruptcies. While Asian states and the IMF were carrying out a structural 
adjustment program designed for repayment of foreign debts at the cost of domestic 
consumption, the economies entered into a severe recession until 2000, with official 
unemployment more than doubling (as of 2000 it remained more than twice the 1996 level 
in Korea and Thailand), and real wages remained 10% below 1997 levels in the Asian 
countries (Glassman 2001, p.141).  
 
Meanwhile, East Asia’s setback sparked a broader crisis that engulfed developing countries 
as distant as Russia, Brazil and Argentina, as it brought about a general capital flight from 
emerging markets (capital flows to emerging markets as a whole almost halved from $292 
billion in 1997 to $150 billion by 1998) while the prices of primary commodities (their key 
exports) were under growing downward pressures. When Russia defaulted on its internal 
external debts, causing global investor jitters and financial chaos in early 1998, the fear of 
a worldwide depression prompted a series of interest rate cuts by the Fed together with an 
unprecedented coordinated interest rate cut by eleven European countries. 30  These 
emergency measures helped to avert a global economic meltdown, and by the end of 1999 
the worst of the financial crisis seemed to be past. However, while the dramatic explosion 
of monetary growth suspended the emergence of an imminent worldwide financial collapse, 
it now began inflating the biggest stock market bubble, the so-called dot-com bubble, in 
the US.  
 
5. Crises of the early 2000s: the burst of US dot-com bubble 
 
During the latter half of the 1990s the faltering world economy was being increasingly 
propped up by a surge in the economic performance of the US. American GDP growth 
doubled from around 2 % during the first half of the 1990s to an annual average of 4 % 
from 1995 to 2000; US profits peaked at a twenty-five year high in 1994; and labour 
                                         
30 From 1996 to 1999 short-term interest rates were reduced from an average of 4.3% to 3.4%, 
while the growth of narrow money increased from 4.9% to 8.2% (Krugman and Obstfeld 2008, 
p.548) 
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productivity grew from an average of around 1.5 % during the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, 
to around 2.25 % during the latter half of the decade, stimulated by the extensive 
application of information technology and by a more intensive rate of exploitation than in 
other advanced economies (including longer working hours and lower hourly earnings) 
(Kettell 2006, p.40; IMF 2003). While the Reagan era’s military Keynesianism was not the 
answer to the low levels of economic performance, it was at least politically successful in 
disciplining labour and thus restoring class power to capitalists (Harvey 2007, p.90). And 
this, together with the impact of the severe recession of the early 1990s, enabled the 
Clinton administration to ‘complete’ the Reagan era’s neo-liberal reform processes 
(through large cuts in social programmes and balanced budget). Flexibility in labour 
markets and drastic reductions in welfare provision (social wages) began to pay off for the 
US, putting competitive pressures on the more rigid labour markets that prevailed in most 
of Europe and Japan (Harvey 2007, p.92).  
 
This brisk growth referred to as ‘New Economy’, however, was largely predicated on 
relatively low interest rates supported by the large transfer of capital searching for a ‘safe 
heaven’ away from emerging markets’ currency risks (and in part from the impacts of the 
‘Reverse Plaza Accord’ which artificially lowered the yen against the dollar in 1995). As 
low interest rates made stocks relatively more attractive than bonds, a significant portion of 
this increase of foreign capital went into the US stock market. When financial instability in 
developing countries became serious in 1997, this torrent of financial capital became even 
stronger, generating a speculative bubble once again; it was in effect a transfer of bubble 
from East Asia and Japan to the US. Net foreign purchases of US stocks rose rapidly from 
$12.6 billion in 1996 to $66.9 billion in 1997, thereby boosting the demand for stocks 
further. This was over three times the previous record of $19.0 billion in 1993. As a result, 
stock prices have increased roughly 50% between 1998 and 1999 (and have increased 150% 
since 1993) (Moseley, 1999, p.36). Without a corresponding breakthrough in production 
conditions and generation of more profits, the enormous amount of funds injected into the 
stock market would necessarily form a speculative bubble which was bound to burst with a 
financial crisis and a subsequent recession just as occurred in East Asia. In the late-1990s, 
for example, price-earnings ratios on the NASDAQ were recording an all-time high at 
more than eleven times the post-war average (Kettell 2006, p.39). During the early months 
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of 2000, as it became evident that high-tech stocks were now massively overvalued given 
their rate of return, the dot-com boom rapidly collapsed, driving stock markets around the 
world into a precipitous decline followed by the severe global recession in 2001. 
 
At that time the recession was presented as the deepest since the Great Depression. 
However, another quick bout of interest rate cuts by the Fed, coupled with large tax cuts 
and massive military spending favoured by the Bush administration, made the effects of 
the crisis brief. It seemed inevitable for the US monetary authority and government to 
adopt such measures, considering the growing burden of servicing the huge debts piled up 
by both business and household during the period of stagnating real wages and speculative 
property boom. The interest burden of the US corporate sector (expressed as a proportion 
of its fixed costs), for example, had grown from around 10% in 1996 to around 18% by 
2001, while the ratio of household debt to disposable income had reached the 
unprecedented height of 94% by the year 2000 (Harman 2007; Glyn 2006, p.53). In this 
situation, allowing interest rates to rise meant a widespread outbreak of default that would 
pressure the banking system as a whole. Also, it would trigger the onset of a global crisis 
as global economic growth and the ability of developing countries to continue servicing 
their debt burden, since the end of 1990s, had become ever more dependent on the US’ 
growing consumption market which itself was also heavily based on growing household-
indebtedness (by 2000, for instance, US imports accounted for almost 20% of world 
exports, and 4% of global GDP).  
 
Consequently, over the course of several decades for the US and all other countries reliant 
on US consumption demands, as Harman put it, “credit expansion acted like a drug for the 
system, seeming to give it great energy and creating a sense of euphoria, with each brief 
hangover being followed by a further dose until the metabolism as a whole suddenly found 
itself being poisoned” (Harman 2009, p.280). 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has briefly outlined the history of the contradictory process of accumulation 
of capital in the world market from the late 1960s to the early 2000s. During this period, 
the world economy was driven by the dynamics of an overaccumulation crisis. The 
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tendency to overinvestment and overproduction inherent in the capitalist mode of 
production expressed itself as falling profit rates, decreasing growth rates, and intensifying 
class struggle on a world scale, which was accompanied by a growing pool of workers and 
capitals sat idle from the production process. While governments tended to respond to 
rising unemployment and growing social tensions by expanding the supply of money and 
credit, surplus capital ‘unemployed’ in the increasingly unprofitable productive activities 
began to reinforce the global torrent of money moving across the world in search of more 
favourable exploitative conditions and/or more profitable speculative outlets, entailing 
brisk yet temporary economic growth on the one hand, and a destructive financial crisis on 
the other. It was this contradictory development of capital accumulation and crisis in the 
world market that had enabled or forced indivdual national economies including the US 
and China to develop in the specific form. Keeping this historic context of the global 
accumulation process in mind, the following chapters will explore particular policies and 
socio-economic developments of China and the US that formed the peculiar phenomenon 
of the global imbalance from the mid-1990s until the mid-2000s.  
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Chapter 6. The Rise of China as a World Factory 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how China transformed itself into a surplus-
running ‘factory of the world’; how the state secured such a position in the global economy. 
For this purpose, the chapter analyses the economic policies employed by the state during 
the reform era with special attention to its role in creating social conditions conducive to 
lowering relative unit labour costs in China. At the same time, the contradictions and 
limitations the policies have borne will also be discussed. As the Chinese economy has 
been shaped not only by domestic social relations but by the development of global capital 
relations (in particular by the ‘consumer of the world’: the US’ economy), it should be 
noted that this chapter provides only one part of understanding China’s rise as well as the 
phenomenon of Sino-American global imbalance. These analyses will be supplemented by 
the following chapters. 
  
This chapter consists of three sections. The first section presents the contradictory class 
relations in the Mao era which resulted in a serious politico-economic crisis in the mid-
1970s. The crisis of Maoist social relations, together with the well-developed social 
infrastructure, provided the basis upon which the reform process gathered momentum. The 
second section deals with the second stage of reform (from 1978-1992). It first briefly 
outlines economic policy changes during the period, and then discusses the limitations and 
contradictions of such policies in creating conditions conducive to productivity growth. 
Examining the trajectory of this period’s reform is important, as the following round of 
reform in the 1990s was based on lessons learned from this era. The third section analyses 
how the Chinese state organized social relations as a way of lowering relative unit labour 
costs through diverse economic policies encompassing restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises, public management of the labour force, the banking system and foreign trade/ 
exchange rate policies. There analyses are followed by examinations of the contradictions 
brought about by the reform and growth itself.  
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The findings of this chapter are empirically supported by diverse macroeconomic 
indicators. Firstly, the existence of the accumulation crisis faced by the Chinese state 
between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s will be empirically proved by the relatively 
low productivity growth rates, a decade-long stagnating real wage growth rate, and several 
eruptions of hyper-inflation that resulted in growing socio-political tensions. Secondly, the 
fact that the growth of China as a world factory was due to the diverse economic policies 
employed in response to the accumulation crisis (a set of reform policies aimed at creating 
social conditions more conducive to the exploitation of labour) will be examined with 
empirical material showing the inter-related policy outcomes such as the world’s lowest 
unit labour costs, and increasingly bigger world market shares for capital operating in 
China along with the influx of FDI between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. Thirdly, the 
fact that sustained growth on the basis of ever-expanding export markets intensified, rather 
than countered, the tendency towards overaccumulation crisis will be empirically 
demonstrated with the constantly falling average capacity utilization rates, chronically high 
unemployment/underemployment, the increasing number of cases of workers’ collective 
resistance, and growing bad-debt (NPLs) loads in the banking system during the mid-
2000s.  
 
2. Historical Context for Post-Mao Reforms 
 
In the early years of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) made it clear that their historical mission was to transform China 
from a predominantly agrarian economy into a fully developed industrial economy, thereby 
creating the “material conditions for socialism” (White 1998, pp22-24). For this purpose 
the state-party at first envisaged a state-led ‘mixed economy’ focusing on labour-intensive 
light industry and agriculture. However, a fear among the CCP leadership soon arose that 
there would be a US-backed invasion from the nationalist stronghold of Taiwan and US 
troops stationed in South Korea after the war. If the CCP was to defend the hard won gains 
of the national revolution from American imperialism then it would be necessary to build 
modern well-equipped armed forces which required heavy industry. Moreover, considering 
its backwardness and subordinate position within the world division of labour at the time, 
it was considered that opening the economy to the world market would inevitably involve a 
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reliance on cheap imports and foreign debts from advanced ‘enemy’ capitalist nations 
which broke down the Great Wall decades before.  
 
Under these considerations of the CCP, China turned to a semi-autarkic command 
economy or so-called ‘state capitalism’ with the aim of rapid, crisis-free, and self-reliant 
industrialization. With the onset of the Soviet-style first five-year economic plan (1952-
1956) a programme of nationalisation was launched, bringing almost all trade, commerce 
and industry under public ownership. As the sole employer of workers, the state 
determined who worked where and when and at what wages, through its diverse labour 
bureaus. The surplus product, through the economic plan, was then reinvested mainly into 
military production and certain strategic heavy industries such as machine-building, 
metallurgy, petroleum, chemicals and electric power. Through most of the period under 
Mao more than 30% of national output was devoted to investment, and in the peak year of 
1957 this rose to almost 50%, of which three-quarters were taken by heavy industry (White 
1998 p.43). Meanwhile, the political support for the CCP regime and social peace in urban 
areas was secured through the danwei system (a social institution based on 
interdependence among state-owned enterprises employees, functioning as a mini welfare 
state providing members with housing, healthcare and pensions) and the ‘iron rice bowl’ 
policy which ensured the provision of a basic welfare and lifetime employment for the 
mass of the working population.  
 
Such large surplus products for high levels of investment as well as operating the danwei 
system were secured through the so-called ‘industry/agriculture price-scissors’ policy, 
adopted from the Soviet Union. The policy, by holding down the price of agricultural 
goods relative to that of industrial goods (i.e. by increasing taxes on the rural sector), 
allowed the state to concentrate resources on centrally planned investment in industry 
(Chai 2011, pp.110-111). Such adverse terms of trade for agricultural products were 
imposed on the peasantry through the rural commune system: a politico-administrative 
authority built with an eye to improving productivity based on collectivization and a more 
efficient procurement system, as well as to restricting migration to cities where real income 
was much higher. Also, under the authority of rural communes the under-used labour of the 
peasants was mobilised both for major infrastructure projects and for the establishment and 
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running of rural industries producing industrial inputs for agriculture. In the same way as 
the danwei system, the commune system also provided peasants with a very basic, but 
wide range of public services including health care, education, and care for the elderly (Li 
2008, p.51).  
 
The economic achievements during the era of Mao’s semi-autarkic command economy had 
not been negligible in comparison with economic performance of other developing 
countries, notwithstanding the years of political and economic disruption during the Great 
Leap Forward (1958-61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-69). Indeed, Mao’s China had 
enjoyed high rates of industrial growth (nearly 11% per annum between 1953 and 1978) 
with agricultural production growing steadily (at 3% per annum gross), which successfully 
implemented structural change in the economy with industry’s share of GNP soaring from 
25% in 1949 to nearly 60% in 1977 while avoiding political or economic dependence on 
foreign countries (Girdner 2004, p.125). Also, with improvements in public education and 
social welfare services the level of human capital was significantly raised, while realization 
of full employment provided a certain extent of social and political stability. 
 
Despite these figures of success, at the time of Mao’s death (1976) the Maoist model of 
state capitalism was running out of steam. The most manifest sign of crisis was found in 
sluggish growth of productivity throughout the national economy. While labour 
productivity in heavy industry was declining and output increases were sustained merely 
through ever-larger capital investments and a growing industrial labour force, excessive 
concentration on heavy industry starved other sectors of funds and retarded their growth in 
productivity as well (White 2002, p.31; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005, p.38). 
According to some estimation, by the mid-1970s about 20-25% of urban workers in state 
industry were employed more than was required for maximum production (Knight and 
Song 2005, p.34). In rural areas, despite the massive infrastructural projects agricultural 
output per worker only rose 5% in real terms over the whole period between 1952 and 
1978 (Nolan 1990, p.11). While productivity growth was stagnating, the commitment to 
rapid industrialization and high levels of capital accumulation was able to be maintained at 
the expense of the working population’s standard of living; the per-capita grain available to 
rural populations barely rose over the twenty-six years, and urban real wages remained 
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roughly the same, rising on average by only 0.4% per annum over the planning period 
(Knight and Song 2005, p.31). By the 1970s, many in the leadership of the CCP had come 
to be sceptical about how far such a state of affairs could continue without triggering 
political unrest.  
 
One of the most obvious causes of the productivity problem was technical backwardness. 
China's isolation, particularly following its break with the USSR in 1960, ensured that 
much of Chinese industry remained technologically backwards. As a result, capital 
accumulation had been largely extensive, that is, it was expanded by simply building more 
factories and plants employing more or less the same technology. However, another and 
more fundamental cause of stagnating productivity growth was the class relations in 
production process that were based on the law of state-plan (instead of the law of value). 
Of course, regulating the producers by central planning rather than by the discipline of the 
market enabled the party leadership to achieve a rapid and self-reliant industrialization 
from a position of relative underdevelopment. But at the same time it did deprive the state 
of an effective control over the labour-process using the disciplinary power of money. 
Although the state could force workers (who themselves had no means of production and 
subsistence) to turn up to the factory and work for certain hours, with life-long 
employment guarantees and nationally set wage rates (that is, pre-validation of the value of 
the labour-force in the labour market) there was no effective ways (neither carrots nor 
sticks) for factory managers and cadres in the workplace to intensify and rationalize work 
during working time. Also, the collective integration of large sections of the industrial 
working class into the party-state through the mediation of the danwei system turned out to 
be a double-edged sword; it enabled the state to promote political acquiescence and often 
even loyalty, but it also provided workers with a ready source of solidarity against 
managerial attempts to impose stricter working disciplines (White 1998, p.38).  
 
In the case of the rural communes, while the party cadres could demand corvee-work on 
local infrastructural projects and impose policy restrictions on agricultural work, peasants 
were also able to exercise a considerable degree of negative control over the labour process 
through rural collectives. For agricultural workers, although the state had monopolized the 
agricultural markets, the level of the total agricultural output (and therefore the surplus that 
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could be extracted from agriculture) was dependent upon the peasants’ productive effort. 
The collective organization of agricultural work and relatively egalitarian income 
distribution within the collectives had moreover removed competition among individual 
peasants as a potential disciplining mechanism that could force the peasants to deliver a 
higher level of labour effort (Li 2008, p.52). The peasantry manifested their discontent 
(emerging from the continuing adverse terms of trade between agricultural and industrial 
goods) in passivity at work and evasion of state levies (by under-reporting production), 
which led to slow productivity growth in agriculture. As a result, by the mid-1970s the 
state was finding it increasingly difficult to appropriate surplus products from the peasantry. 
Indeed, the amount of grain had long stagnated and even begun to decline by that time 
(White 1998, p.40). 
 
In the 1960s and the 1970s the CCP leadership reacted to these problems of class 
dominance by emphasizing moral-ideological incentives for higher productivity, that is, 
self-conscious observation of labour discipline. Maoist party leaders appeared to have 
thought that so long as workers and peasants realized that the socialist state’s control over 
work is beneficial for their long-term common interest, there would be no difficulty in 
raising productivity and thus accumulation could proceed at a sustainable pace (Li 2008, 
p.52). Based on these perceptions, advocates of the Cultural Revolution pointed at so-
called ‘capitalist roaders’ as a disturbance to inspiring ‘socialist consciousness’. In line 
with this ideological strife, the party waged waves of political campaigns orchestrated from 
above, reasserting hierarchical party control both in production and throughout society. 
However, as Sheehan describes, workers already knew that the “difficulties they were 
experiencing were by and large a direct result of national decisions on individual and 
managements policy”, and accordingly “much of their wrath was directed against cadres in 
factory, government, Party and union positions” (Sheehan quoted in Hart-Landsberg and 
Burkett 2005, p.36). Not surprisingly, the mass mobilization tactics of the Cultural 
Revolution turned against the party leadership in a boomerang fashion; the urban 
population used the opportunity of the officially-sanctioned campaign against ‘the 
capitalist roaders and revisionists’ in venting their anger against their political and 
administrative masters. After brutal crackdown on such defiant movements (e.g. the ‘first’ 
Tiananmen incident of April 5, 1976), popular attitudes to the party changed to cynicism, 
129 
 
 
 
apathy or active opposition while “ideological principles and political institutions lost 
much of their former meaning and authority based on revolutionary heritage” (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett 2005, pp.38-39).  
 
The international context in the 1970s also affected the legitimacy of the CCP leadership. 
The legitimacy of the CCP rule was partly based on the nationalist slogan that its ‘socialist’ 
form of national economy was superior to ‘capitalist’ others, thus ultimately making China 
a ‘rich and strong’ country compared to enemy states such as Japan and Taiwan. However, 
the reality of the 1960s and 1970s was increasingly putting the ‘socialist’ leadership in the 
shade. China was falling far behind advanced nations. For example, China’s GNP that had 
accounted for 4.7% of the total world GNP in 1955 halved to 2.5% in 1980. In 1955 
China’s GNP had equalled Japans’, but it became only one fourth of Japans’ by 1980 (Li 
1989).  
 
In every aspect, Chinese class relations were clearly in crisis by the time of Mao’s death in 
1976. The crisis, together with the socialist legacy of social-material infrastructure, became 
the basis upon which the reform process of what David Harvey calls ‘neoliberalism with 
Chinese characteristics’ gathered momentum. Although there was neither clear vision nor 
predetermined trajectory of reform, for the workers and peasants reform meant a promise 
for higher incomes, greater consumer choice and personal freedom, while for the party 
leaders it was considered a useful tool for restoring the battered political fortunes of the 
CCP without confronting workers and peasants directly (White 1993, p.41).  
 
3. First Phase of Reform and its Limitations 
 
 
The political significance of the productivity issue was apparent to the post-Mao leadership; 
slow productivity growth would certainly undermine the legitimacy and credibility of CCP 
rules. Deng Xiaoping (1983, p.215) made it clear that what China needed was a socialism 
that could exceed capitalism in terms of both the speed of growth and economic efficiency. 
Without high productivity, Deng pointed out socialism would be nothing but boasting.  
 
In the early years of reform, the main cause of stagnated productivity growth was 
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considered to lie in the overly centralized decision making system and the backwardness of 
technology (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005). Deng Xiaoping pointed to the economic 
management power that was too concentrated at the central government level and the 
resultant lack of incentives as a critical factor discouraging localities, enterprises and 
workers to improve productivity and efficiency of economic activities (Deng 1993, pp.150-
152). Accordingly, the main strategy employed by the new reformist CCP leadership was 
to introduce market elements into the planning system as a means of decentralization (i.e. 
devolution of economic decision-making power to local governments and enterprises). 
Also, arguing that foreign investment would bring new technology and teach advanced 
management, the state launched the so-called ‘open door’ policy, promoting foreign trade. 
  
Initially it appeared the reform projects succeeded brilliantly. During 1980-89, China’s 
GDP grew at an annual average rate of 9.7%, which was the world’s highest rate of growth. 
The average real wage of urban workers soared to 9.4% per annum between 1984 and 1986 
with unemployment rates remaining quite low (Knight and Song 2005, pp.22-25). 
However, it soon turned out the surprising growth was based on monetary expansion rather 
than improved productivity. Typical fallouts of such fictitious growth soon followed: 
uncontrollable inflation, accumulation of trade and budget deficits, a run on the banks and 
ultimately serious political unrest. Among others, the most underlying cause of the derailed 
reform was the reformist CCP leadership’s reluctance to enforce negative incentives (e.g. 
wage cuts, unemployment and bankruptcy) for productivity growth in fear of losing 
political support. Put differently, there was no draconian financial discipline imposed upon 
workers and enterprises.  
 
This section first presents a brief outline of economic policy changes during the first stage 
of reform, and then discusses the limitations and contradictions of such policies in creating 
a condition conducive to productivity growth. Examining the trajectory of this period’s 
reform is important, as the following round of reform in the 1990s was based on a lesson 
learned from this era.  
 
3.1. Outline of Reform in Each Economic Field   
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3.1.1.  Reform of State-Owned Enterprises 
 
Following experiments in various areas around the country, in 1984 the party introduced 
new provisions of radical reform, emphasizing the utility of market forces. Under the new 
provisions, any state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that had exceeded their production quotas 
were allowed to sell their products outside the state plan at “market prices” (above the 
state-set “plan prices”), and to use that profit in re-investing in production or in providing 
workers and managers with bonuses and collective welfare. Through this policy called the 
Dual Track System or policies of the ‘planned commodity economy’, the party-state was 
supposed to take advantage of market forces without abandoning the alleged advantages of 
the planning system (Lawrence et al 2000, p.120). In 1984 the government permitted the 
market track for all industrial goods with the market price range restricted to within 20% of 
planned prices (the restriction was soon removed in the following year) (Wu and Zhao 
1987). As a result of this policy, the share of transactions at ‘plan prices’, in terms of output 
value, fell from 100% in the pre-reform years to 64% in 1985 and further to 45% in 1990 
(Xu 1988, p. 292). Alongside this introduction of the dual track system, several 
complementary measures were also introduced; SOEs were allowed to hire middle-level 
administrative or technical staff, and to establish direct links with suppliers at their 
discretion; a profit tax system was introduced to replace profit remittance. However, SOEs 
were not yet allowed to freely recruit or dismiss workers according to business 
considerations, although newly hired workers from 1985 were placed under a labour 
contract system without lifetime employment guaranteed. 
 
Together with a set of SOE reforms, the state strongly encouraged the growth of other 
forms of enterprise such as private firms and urban collective enterprises. This was a 
pragmatic response to the unprecedented problem of "people without jobs" and "jobs 
without people" at that time; the late 1970s and early 1980s saw a growing problem of 
urban employment (with an estimated unemployed urban youth of 10 to 25 million) 
concurrently with a severe lack of basic urban services and consumer goods (very limited 
rationed quantities) (Tang and Ma 1985, p.614). It was considered that a rapid 
development of those forms of non-state firms would provide both jobs and consumer 
goods at the same time. In that consideration, many advantages were given to the non-state 
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enterprises. They could benefit from very low rates of taxation as well as completely free 
labour markets; they were not forced to employ job seekers according to a plan; they did 
not need to provide job protections or benefits; they were even allowed to use a piece-wage 
system at their own discretion (Tang and Ma 1985, p.618). In response to these advantages 
given, that is, prospective profit opportunities, local governments rushed to organise such 
enterprises under their jurisdiction. The introduction of fiscal decentralization policy, 
granting autonomy to local governments in the promotion of economic growth and in the 
use of fiscal residuals for their own bonuses, strongly incentivized local authorities to 
invest in the profitable sector. As a result, between 1978 and 1994, employment in the non-
state sector soared by 318.8%, whereas employment in SOEs increased by only 50.5% 
(China Labour Bulletin 2007). 
 
3.1.2. Reform of Rural Industry   
 
In 1980, fundamental reforms of agricultural policy were implemented on a national scale. 
Firstly, agricultural collectives were dismantled and the state drew up contracts for the 
purchase of staple crops with each individual peasant household. Secondly, the peasant 
household was set free to sell in local markets anything they had produced beyond the 
production quotas specified in their contracts. In addition, in order to give an incentive to 
increase production, plan prices for compulsory grain deliveries were raised by 20% (with 
a 50% bonus for grain delivered above quotas) (Cheng 2002, p.61). With the help of the 
infrastructure built during the collective era, the effect of such an incentive and lifting of 
restrictions was more than immediate; there was no more passivity at work or evasion of 
state levies by under-reporting production. Indeed, there was a substantial spurt in the 
growth of agricultural output and peasants’ incomes.  
 
Meanwhile, this growing productivity combined with the limited arable land per household 
released the rural population from their land to work for ‘industries’. The surplus labour 
force was then absorbed by the former communes, now renamed ‘township or village’ 
authorities that established township and village enterprises (TVEs) mainly producing 
intermediate and consumer goods by means of the former communes’ industrial assets. In 
this earlier stage, their labour intensive orientation enabled TVEs to absorb more than 60 
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million rural workers (or about 20% of rural employment) by 1988. In the same way as 
urban areas, local governments delegated the responsibility (financial and operational 
autonomy) to those firms and were eager to invest in TVEs. The effect on rural areas was 
quite impressive. The gross value of rural output, including that produced by the TVEs, 
grew by 9% per annum while per capita rural incomes doubled over the 1978-84 period 
(Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005, p.45). 
 
3.1.3. Reform of the Foreign Trade System 
 
Unlike earlier periods during which China was committed to achieving self-sufficiency, 
under Deng Xiaoping foreign trade was regarded as an important source of investment 
funds and modern technology. Accordingly, reformers went ahead with diverse policies, 
accepting foreign credit from both governmental and private sources, encouraging FDI 
through wholly-foreign-owned or joint ventures, and establishing special economic zones 
(SEZs) and ‘Open Cities’ to foster freer foreign participation in the economy (White 1993, 
p.48). The effect of open policies was immediate; while virtually the entire coastal area 
was designated as SEZs and Open Cities by the mid-1980s, the total value of foreign 
trade/GDP ratio rapidly increased from 15% in 1980 to 21% in 1984 and further to 35% in 
1986 (AMRC 2007). Encouraged by the impressive growth of trade and investment, in 
1986 the government in turn introduced new and more liberal regulations for foreign 
investment. These included lowering taxes and other business costs, giving foreign 
companies more freedom to hire and fire workers, and making it easier for them to acquire 
foreign exchange. In 1987, Zhao Ziyang, then secretary general of the CCP, declared that 
China “should enter the world economic arena more boldly” and that its aim should be to 
develop an “export-oriented economy” (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005, p.49). The basic 
strategy was building a reciprocal process in which foreign investors would benefit from 
China’s socio-economic infrastructure including a cheap and well-disciplined workforce 
while China would benefit from the advanced technology embodied in modern plant and 
machinery alongside the technical know-how and management skills of foreign investors.  
 
3.1.4. Reform of the Banking System   
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During the pre-reform era, the People’s Bank of China (PBC), the sole monetary authority 
of the country, was merely an administrative agent of the state’s planning system. The role 
of the banking system was just to provide the state with needed funds. As Deng Xiaoping 
described it, the banks in the pre-reform era were not banks, but accounting offices, 
cashiers, and money issuing companies (Deng 1993, p.193). To proceed with the reform 
process, it was more than necessary for the state to undertake banking system reform. First, 
the role of commercial banks was required to be established as the burgeoning economy 
was creating a huge demand for funds and credits while profits retained by enterprises and 
rising income of individuals constituted huge sources of funds at the same time. Second, 
the revitalized economy also called for competent and reliable monetary management. As 
elements of “commodity economy” had already been introduced deep into the country’s 
economic life, an elaborate management of money by a central authority became necessary 
to curb inflation and disorder (Ji 2006, p.107).  
 
Against this backdrop, the government in 1983 passed a resolution to separate central 
banking from commercial banking functions. Accordingly, the PBC no longer engaged in 
industrial and commercial credit activities or urban and rural savings businesses, and 
instead concentrated its resources on performing central banking functions (CSC 1983). Its 
commercial banking business was taken over by four state-owned specialized banks (SOBs) 
and several regional banks including non-bank financial institutions, offering day-to-day 
financing to firms and dealing with saving deposits. Now the PBC began to perform 
standard central bank responsibilities such as issuing currency, regulating interest rates, 
supervising foreign exchange affairs and setting reserve ratio for the commercial banks. 
SOBs also underwent “enterprisation”, transforming them from a type of state agency into 
relatively independent commercial entities. The profit retention system was applied to 
SOBs as to many other SOEs; the banks were allowed to retain the agreed proportion of 
after-tax profits, while bank branches were granted greater autonomy with regards to 
business operations and financial affairs.  
 
3.2. Limitations of Reform 
 
3.2.1. Problem of SOEs  
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The immediate problem faced by the reform process was that the productivity of most 
SOEs still remained at a very low level; they failed to productively organize state workers 
(who still accounted for more than 70% of all urban workers and 42% of the whole 
working population by the late 1980s) (Cai et al 2008). This undermined the whole picture 
of reform because the overall reform processes, cantered on the provision of incentive 
bonuses for agricultural and consumer oriented industries, were premised on the 
concomitant growth of productivity in state-running heavy industries which had so far been 
dependent upon subsidies from the former sectors. It appeared the reformist party 
leadership at first envisaged state workers’ pre-existing living standard could be financed 
by the increased productivity and profits of SOEs that would be responsive to positive 
incentives in the same way as the farmers’ case. This meant, in other words, unless SOEs’ 
productivity growth was sufficient, state workers should be willing to abandon their 
existing level of real wages. In reality, however, neither productivity growth nor wage-
benefit cuts were realized. Despite the workers lacking certain formal or legal rights to 
form independent unions and to strike, with free housing, medical care, education and 
foods for families as well as ‘iron’ job security provided by the danwei system of SOEs, 
managers (lacking effective disciplinary power over workers) found it difficult to impose 
new working practices conducive to improving productivity (Andreas 2008). Further, with 
the paternalistic relationships within the danwei remaining pervasive, managers used their 
newly given discretion over company funds and wage rates just to keep workers’ real 
wages from falling, thus buying obedience and compliance from the workers (Walder 1994, 
pp. 297-323). Indeed, new performance-based pay initiatives were rarely implemented; if 
salaries for professionals were to be raised, other workers in the factories tended to demand 
a similar wage increase, limiting their output until they received one (Weil 1996, p.34). 
Without any compelling profit motives and market competition (without threat to their own 
careers), managers tended to accommodate workers’ pressures rather than put pressure on 
them. In addition, the forced absorption of the unskilled youths according to the pre-
determined state plan greatly compounded the existing problem of excessive labour power 
rooted in many SOEs for a long time. Indeed, the annual addition of more than 2.5 million 
new workers seriously affected the normal operation and management of factories and led 
to a steady reduction of their productivity and profits (Knight and Song 2005).  
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While most SOEs were raising their prices, passing their costs to consumers, to avoid an 
even more rapid decline in profitability, the state in an attempt to head off worker 
opposition to the reforms began providing additional funds to inefficient state enterprises 
so that they could raise wages. In 1988 while more than half of SOEs were running at a 
loss, they were recipients of subsidies amounting to nearly $11 billion—a figure 
representing about 50 % of the total earnings of China’s industrial enterprises (Southerland 
1988, p.5), and the deficits were financed to an increasing extent by state-owned banks’ 
credits. Despite their transformation into profit-orientated commercial corporations, SOBs 
passively accommodated the credit demands not only of SOEs but also of local 
governments (running urban collectives and TVEs) that were eager to expand industrial 
activities in pursuit of profits. There was neither a rigorous loan screening in lending 
activities, nor the exertion of creditors’ power to “restrict credit to loss-making enterprises 
and to require their restructuring”, that is, any threat of bankruptcy to enterprise managers 
or local authorities (Bowles and White 1993, p.488). Not surprisingly such generous 
subsidies for SOEs and local firms’ over-investment based on overexpansion of credit 
created a massive excess demand for goods and services, ultimately triggering inflation 
and economic instability. After rising at an annual rate of approximately 8% over the years 
1985-87, prices soared by more than 18% in both 1988 and 1989. Prices jumped even more, 
by as much as 30%, in Beijing and other big cities (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005, 
p.59).  
 
In sum, the state expected SOEs to operate like profit-oriented corporations responsible for 
their gains and losses in competition with other forms of enterprises, while at the same 
time it prevented them from doing so by imposing political missions (i.e. the financial 
burden of supporting unproductive state workers) upon them. The contradictory dual role 
of SOEs was able to be assumed only through subsidies for losses in the form of easy 
credit. SOEs did not seriously care about cost efficiency and profitability because they 
would not be held responsible for their losses anyway. The financial shortfalls of their own 
operations were supposed to be subsidized (socialized) by the state or higher prices of their 
commodities in the market.   
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3.2.2. Problem of the Banking System 
 
Under the new banking system, credit planning was a major monetary instrument of the 
PBC (Ji 2006). The PBC set credit/monetary targets for commercial banks by using 
instruments such as credit ceilings and quantity rationing to control money supply. This 
role of the central bank was supposed to be executed by local PBC branches regulating 
local banks according to centrally-set targets. In reality, however, due to interference by 
local administrative authorities local PBC branches tended to compromise macroeconomic 
objectives for local developmental goals. The core problem was that local PBC branches 
were subject to the ‘dual leadership’ of both the PBC head-office and local governments (Ji 
2006, pp.108-111). Whereas officially PBC branches were only accountable to the head-
office, it was the provincial governments that had the authority to appoint branch managers 
(in consultation with the head-office). As local authorities were more incentivized than 
ever to pursue local growth following fiscal decentralization, local branches of the banking 
regulatory body were oriented by local governments to serve local developmental or 
entrepreneurial goals. This in turn resulted in loss of control over money supply and credit 
over-extension. 
 
While the PBC could not in this way assume the role of independent central bank, 
commercialized state-owned banks also did not act like fully profit-oriented commercial 
entities; rather, they continued to be required to provide part of the ‘policy loans’ to SOEs. 
It was estimated that total outstanding policy loans amounted to one-third of total 
outstanding loans extended through the banking system at the beginning of the 1990s 
(Mehran et al 1996). Although SOEs and SOBs were supposed to act as corporate entities 
with independent accounting, in practice the ‘soft budget constraint’ still existed (Kornai 
1986, pp.3-10). Under state ownership, both creditors’ rights and debtors’ responsibilities 
were not clearly stipulated. The local government, which represented the state at the local 
level, was still able to use administrative power to allocate resources among SOEs and 
SOBs, albeit indirectly rather than through the budget system. For Bank branches, it was 
rational to conform to the request of local authorities in making loans, because the 
economic welfare of their specific branches was dependent upon the local governments’ 
decisions whereas the risks and losses related to lending activities as a whole would be 
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ultimately shouldered by the state. In principle, commercial banks should limit their 
lending volume within the “credit quota” set by the central bank, thereby maintaining the 
overall scale of credit and loans the central bank hoped to achieve. However, as the actual 
enforcement of this quota were being implemented by the local PBC branches where local 
governments already exerted their influence, ‘extra’ credit quota was easily made available 
to local SOBs. It follows that the state’s credit plan was actually set by such bottom-up 
pressure from local production units which did not pursue the overall interest of the 
national economy.  
 
In sum, the entrepreneurial behaviour of local governments and their collaboration with 
state banking institutions led to over-expansions of credit. As local governments competed 
with each other to set up and duplicate projects, production lines, factories and shops, and 
as banks supplied funds to support this investment rush, the economy soon became 
overheated nationwide. In the second half of 1984, for example, money supply in terms of 
M131 increased by about 40% in the second half of the year (Ji 2006, p.140). Inflationary 
pressure was mounting. The central bank, however, was not effective and timely in taking 
adjustment measures to curb overheated microeconomic activities and stabilize 
macroeconomic environment. One important cause for this was the PBC local branches’ 
tendency to meet local governments’ needs rather than follow the orders of the bank 
headquarters. With bank activities integrated into the state plan, the demarcation between 
banks and state finance remained blurred, which tended to perpetuate banks’ reliance upon 
the state and gave rise to irresponsible lending behaviour.  
 
3.2.3. Problem of Foreign Trade 
 
What was not changed during this period was the overvalued currency (named RMB-
rinminbi or yuan). Although the state substantially devalued RMB several times32 to boost 
export-oriented industries, a burst of domestic inflation during the whole period ended up 
offsetting the effectiveness of devaluations, making ‘real’ devaluation negligible 
                                         
31 In China M1 refers to money in circulation and demand deposit by enterprises. 
32 Official rate of RMB 1.5 to the dollar in 1980 rose to RMB 2.8 in 1985 and further to RMB 3.7 
in 1986 (McKinnon and Ono 1997). 
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(McKinnon and Ono 1997, chs. 6 and 7). Specifically, consumer prices rising at 12% per 
annum along with labour compensation per worker soaring at about 13% annually in BMB 
terms completely offset the positive effect of currency value alternation (depreciating by an 
average of 8% a year in the 1980s) on export competitiveness (i.e. international relative 
prices of Chinese commodities) (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005, p.126; Ceglowski and 
Golub 2007, p.605-6).  
 
While real exchange rates remained relatively high, exporters would incur structural losses 
while importers would find trading highly profitable in domestic currency. Under these 
circumstances it was unrealistic to pursue ‘export-oriented development’ policy. Faced 
with this problem, the state tried to change the environment (to lower the real cost of 
production within China) by means of a kind of import substitution strategy; obtaining 
more foreign exchange by subsidizing loss-making exporters, and then financing import of 
advanced technology and machinery conducive to improving productivity. The state 
expected local governments and associated enterprises which gained access to foreign 
trade in the SEZs to implement this strategy.  
 
In reality, however, this strategy ended up producing an unintended effect nationwide. 
Since the central government continued to provide provincial governments with fiscal 
subsidies on exports based on an estimation of the region’s average export costs, provincial 
governments found it only logical to maximize this part of earnings so as to create a 
favourable fiscal environment for their own regions. Rather than pressing producers to 
reduce export costs, they tended to encourage the firms to raise their export costs. In this 
way, their provinces or regions was able to obtain maximum amounts of state subsidies in 
domestic currency on top of the portion of foreign exchange they were allowed to retain. 
As a result, total amount of state subsidies mounted; in 1988 the aggregate amount of 
export subsidies reached 7 billion yuan, equal to 4% of total export value (World Bank 
1994, p.27). Moreover, as an increasing number of local enterprises gained access to 
foreign trade, competition in the procurement market intensified. Within each province, 
prices of exportable goods and raw materials continued to be kept at a high level as 
numerous trading companies and industrial enterprises were now eager to acquire the 
goods, export them and earn foreign exchange (Yin 1998, p.61). Domestic prices for such 
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goods were driven high, as different localities and departments, port cities and inland 
provinces competed against each other. In the international market, the situation was just 
the opposite: enterprises with direct trading rights were in price wars against each other to 
get their goods sold. The result was “raised procurement prices at home, slashed prices 
abroad, outflows of profits, and reduced bargaining power with foreigners on the part of 
the state” (Ji 2006, p.59; Shirk 1994, p.49). All foreign trading companies’ losses were to 
be compensated by state subsidies. In 1986 alone, their losses financed by the central 
government amounted to about RMB 25 billion, more than 2% of China’s GNP (World 
Bank 1994, p.26). 
 
A more serious problem was the uncurbed internal “importing” activities. Indifferent to the 
cost efficiency and profitability of foreign trade operations, enterprises and local 
governments were not incentivized to import advanced technology and machinery for 
improving productivity. Rather, the geographical particularistic nature of SEZs 
incentivized them to engage in “inward-looking” transactions, accommodating the surge in 
domestic demand for foreign commodities in particular luxury consumer goods (officially 
reported as “materials and technology needed for foreign-invested facilities”) (Yeung and 
Chu 1998). The most notorious case was the Hainan Scandal in 1985. As an open 
economic area, Hainan was granted the freedom of arranging its own imports. Officials in 
Hainan made huge profits by reselling imported vehicles to provinces where imports of 
automobiles were not allowed. By the time their misconduct was discovered by the central 
government, they had already spent $1 billion importing automobiles and other consumer 
durables (Xiao 1996, p.76-78). Provincial governments and companies’ gains in foreign 
trade, consequently, came at the losses of the state. With sizable trade deficits ($14.9 
billion in 1985 and $12.0 billion in 1986) by frenzied import activities, China’s foreign 
exchange reserve was severely depleted, while domestic inflation was exacerbated (Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett 2005, p.57-9).  
 
It is not surprising the environment that was not conducive to export also led to stagnating 
FDI inflows. Despite a number of preferential policies were used by both central and local 
governments of SEZs, the share of FDI in private investment declined from 15% in 1985 to 
10% in 1988 (ADB 1990). Up until 1992 most foreign investment in China had been 
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limited to small-medium scale investments originating from the overseas Chinese in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan. Throughout the 1980s the flow of FDI was largely towards NICs where 
relatively more stable and productive class relations were maintained, and neither rampant 
inflation, exchange controls nor any ‘restrictive’ terms (e.g. requiring a technology transfer) 
on FDI existed like in China.  
 
3.2.4. Inflation and Political Crisis  
 
Meanwhile, growing problems in agriculture began producing a serious political and 
economic crisis. By the mid-1980s the spurt of agricultural production began to peter out. 
Although the reforms gave peasants an incentive to increase production, both central and 
local governments did little to increase the actual productive capacity of agriculture. 
Indeed, with the drive to expand rural industries, the township and village authorities did 
not pay attention to maintaining the roads and irrigation projects that had been constructed 
in the pre-reform era. Also, the breakup of the collectives meant that the advantages of 
mechanisation and modern farming methods dependent on large-scale collective farming 
were lost.  
 
With decreasing productivity in agriculture, higher food prices (e.g. a 41% rise in the price 
of tortillas) began fuelling the growing unrest amongst the urban workers who were 
already being squeezed by the rising price of necessities, whilst peasants were caught in a 
price squeeze with the cost of inputs such as fertilizer increasing faster than the prices of 
agricultural goods they produced (Girdner 2004, p.130). The average annual growth of real 
wage for urban workers plummeted from 9.4% during the period of 1984-86 to -1.6% 
between 1987 and 1989. Agricultural incomes, which had grown by 15% per year during 
1978-84, rose by 5% annually over 1985-88, and by mere 2% in 1989-91 (AMRC 2007). 
Ultimately, attempts at raising procurement prices to stimulate greater agricultural 
production only served to exacerbate the problems caused by inflation.  
 
As a result of ever mounting inflationary pressure, waves of panic buying swept across the 
country. Beginning in May 1988 run on banks happened in major cities such as Nanjing 
and Hangzhou. Bank savings deposit, which had been growing at an annual rate of 30% 
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during the 1980s, fell to negative growth in August 1988 whereas average retail price 
nationwide rose by 18.5% (Zhao and Guo 1998). Parallel to this economic crisis, the party-
state form also entered into crisis. Following the events at Tiananmen Square in June 1989, 
Zhao Ziyang - who had been the chief proponent of reforms - was removed from office and 
the reform process was brought to an abrupt halt. The money supply was tightened and 
bank loans were reduced. The rights to set and adjust prices that enterprises had just gained 
were revoked. The old practice under the planning system was reinforced. And the 
economy went into a deep recession in 1989 with urban collectives and rural TVEs that 
relied heavily on bank loans went into bankruptcy in rows.  
 
4.  Second Phase of Reform  
 
In the first stage of reform, the foundation of exponential economic growth was not an 
enhanced productivity but undisciplined lending activities. It was the banks directed by 
local governments with tacit permission of the party-state that shouldered the financial 
burdens resulting from SOEs’ reluctance and inability to undergo politically unpopular 
restructuring. This subordination of the commercial to the political brought about a 
problem in foreign trade sector as well. Rather than achieving price competitiveness of 
exports by lowering relative unit labour costs, enterprises that were free from regulations 
yet still subsidized by the state just focused on arbitrage (interprovincial trading). 
Unsurprisingly, the result of these activities was the accumulation of fiscal and trade 
deficits together with uncontrollable inflation which ultimately came to destabilise the 
entire system.  
 
In the second stage of the reform, thus, the state focused attention on restructuring SOEs. 
On the one hand, the government allowed banks to cut the tie with the state and loss-
making SOEs, while, on the other hand, taking the measures to shed the entrenched state 
workers (who had still constituted the majority of the working population by the early 
1990s). For attracting foreign investment, more radical policies were adopted under the 
perception that it is an improved productivity (lower relative unit labour costs) and 
profitability that boosts FDI (rather than vice versa). Ultimately the CCP leadership was at 
that time determined to risk a degree of political instability inherent in the restructuring of 
class relations. It embarked on a draconian policy of labour-shedding, transferring 
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unemployment from the unproductive SOEs and rural farms (where it was disguised) to the 
streets (where it was open) in the hope that the non-state sector and FDI would absorb the 
redundant workers while competition in labour market would lower real wages (Song and 
Knight 2005).  
 
The ‘success story’ of China’s stunning growth as a result of the reform in this period is 
now well known fact. The world-lowest relative unit labour costs in China attracted the 
world-largest amount of foreign direct investment by creating opportunities for surplus 
profits, and as a ‘world factory’ China came to take the largest share of world markets for 
almost all sorts of commodities. But it should be noted that at the same time China was 
facing serious contradictions created by the reform process itself; notably ever-growing 
problems of overcapacity, unemployment and intensified resistance of workers which 
could hardly be solved without involving either political crises or potential productivity 
losses. And this growing possibility of crisis has made the state rely ever more on the US’ 
debt-financed expansion which has in large part constituted the global condition through 
which the Chinese economy has grown.   
 
The remainder of this section analyses how the Chinese state organised social relations 
conducive to lowering relative unit labour costs via diverse economic policies. These 
analyses are followed by an examination on the contradictions created by the reform 
process itself.  
 
4.1. Restructuring of Enterprises Ownership 
 
It was pointed out by reformist policy makers that the problem of the first stage of reform 
lay mainly in public ownership of SOEs (and some urban collectives and TVEs operated 
by local governments). Without any debtors’ responsibility and the threat of bankruptcy, 
for mangers, whose career as danwei cadres was not dependent upon productivity levels in 
factories, it was not necessary to utilize resources with great prudence and in a more 
economically ‘rational’ fashion. In other words, they were not fully pressurized to make 
profitability a primary goal by confronting workers (their danwei ‘comrades’) who might 
well refuse to abandon the long-cherished iron rice bowl. Indeed, the economic 
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performance of the majority of SOEs remained at a very low level. For example, in 
Zhucheng, Shandong province, 103 of the 150 SOEs were running at a loss at the end of 
1992, with total losses amounting to 147 million yuan – equivalent to the municipal 
government’s entire revenue for 18 months (Garnaut et al 2006, p.37). Of course, the party-
state could directly repress managers and workers by means of administrative measures, 
but this, just as was the case in the Maoist era, would be costly in terms of the political 
legitimacy of the reformist CCP leadership as well as productivity levels affected by 
passive resistance in workplace. 
  
Against this backdrop, the state took a decisive step in pushing SOEs outside the ambit of 
the political system towards the economic realm (where property owners as equal citizens 
interact) by turning over state assets and factories in townships and villages to private 
hands. The privatization projects were supported by provincial-local party cadres “whose 
ability to pursue their private gains [had] been much enhanced by the material resources 
provided by sweeping fiscal decentralization” during the previous reform process (Cheng 
1999). Their transformation into new property-owners (so-called ‘red capitalists’) was also 
legitimated by Deng’s newly pronounced reform direction: to develop the “socialist market 
economy”, “a few have to get rich first,” and “to get rich is glorious” (Girdner 2004, p.125; 
Meisner 1999, pp.516-18). 
 
In actuality, it was during the first stage of reform that the SOE ownership reforms were 
initiated and carried out33. But the first reform projects were limited to a small number of 
SOEs with strict regulations on the process unchanged. Further, between 1988 and 1992, 
the projects were almost withdrawn over concerns about the social and economic impact of 
the reform process as a whole. It was not until Deng Xiaoping’s now famous Southern 
Tour in early 1992 that the SOE reform projects got back on track. Deng called for an 
intensification of reform and urged officials to think less about ideological correctness and 
                                         
33 The first SOE change of ownership occurred in 1986, when three people (high-ranking party 
cadres) put up 34,000 yuan as collateral to lease the Wuhan Motor Engine Factory. In the same year, 
private shareholding was introduced in three Guangzhou based SOEs where the employees bought 
30% of their firms’ shares. In May 1988, the State Council issued regulations on the leasing of 
small SOEs, which officially established the legal grounds for this practice. In 1990 and 1991 
respectively, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange opened, enabling a 
limited number of SOEs to issue shares to the public. 
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more about economic development. In Deng’s own words: “it doesn’t matter if a cat is 
black or white, as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat.” The top advisor to the party 
interpreted Deng’s comments as meaning that the market, as such, has no political 
attributes, but is “neutral,” having the ability to serve either socialism or capitalism 
(Girdner 2004, p.138).  
 
In response to Deng’s urge, in July 1992, the government issued regulations allowing 
inefficient, under-performing enterprises to completely overhaul their structure and to be 
sold to the public or the employees. In line with privatization drives, policies that had 
limited the size of private firms and restricted foreign investment were lifted and state 
officials were encouraged to promote both (Andreas 2008). In 1995, ownership reform was 
significantly accelerated when the central government renounced the ownership of SOEs 
except for 500-1000 large state firms of key strategic industries. By 1998, a national survey 
showed that 50% of China’s 87,000 industrial SOEs had restructured or planned to do so. 
Among the restructured firms, 60-70% had been partially or fully privatized. By the end of 
2001, 86% of all SOEs had been restructured and about 70% had been partially or fully 
privatized. As a result, the number of SOEs fell from 64,737 in 1998 to 27,477 in 2005 
(Garnaut et al 2006, pp.33-65). The party’s push was not limited to SOEs; local 
governments began a rapid sell off of debt-ridden urban collectives and TVEs in the mid-
1990s. The sales were expected to generate desperately needed local government revenues, 
and at the same time to create potentially profitable investment opportunities for cadres 
(managers) and foreign investors. Since then, most TVEs and collective enterprises were 
privatized, and TVEs owned by local states came to employ only 2% of workforce in 2003 
while privatized TVEs were employing 16% (Naughton 2007, p. 182).  
 
As the public sector shrunk, the private sector expanded. The number of private enterprises 
increased from 440,000 in 1996 to 1.32 million in 2001, from 16.9% of all enterprises to 
43.7% (NBSC 2003). As a result, the public sector’s share of all industrial output dropped 
from 73.4% in 1983 to only 11.1% in 2003, while the share of the urban workers employed 
in the public sector plunged from nearly 82% to about 27% between 1991 and 2005 
(Andreas 2008, China Labour Bulletin 2007). Ironically, the more private enterprises grew, 
the more remaining SOEs came under pressures to restructure as the former free from 
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obligations of social welfare and employment increasingly undermined the latter’s 
profitability and monopoly power. As competitive pressure on state firms from private 
sectors grew, deeper and more painful reforms of China’s beleaguered state firms were 
justified (Gallagher 2005, p.154).  
 
4.2. Restructuring of Labour Management  
 
4.2.1. Breaking the Iron Rice Bowl 
 
As part of the state's effort to remake SOEs into "modern enterprises" which can be 
efficient and profitable enough to compete with those in the non-state sector, or to be 
saleable to private investors at higher prices, a series of measures were implemented to 
reduce the historical burden of SOEs, and the key to the measures was the process of 
transforming a (inflexible) labour system into a (flexible) labour market.  
First, in the early 1990s the planning quota for recruitment by state enterprises was 
abolished, and they were allowed to recruit their own employees according to their 
management plan (Knight and Song 2005, p.23). But what mattered more than freedom to 
hire was freedom to fire workers. Central to this issue was the unproductive ‘iron rice bowl’ 
cherished by most existing state workers. Clearly, it was not going to be possible for SOEs 
to be ‘efficient’ if they had to continue to provide lifetime employment and the danwei-
based comprehensive welfare for workers that did not contribute to productivity. The new 
reform projects, thus, focused attention on the introduction of a universal labour contract 
system and the establishment of a societal-level safety net that would substitute the 
function of the danwei.  
 
A system of labour contracts of a limited duration introduced in 1985 was not applied to 
the existing workers and by 1988 only 6% of state workers were covered (Greenfield and 
Leung 1997 p.99). On the contrary, the Labour Law of 1994 required all employees to 
have such contracts, and they were thus extended to then permanent workers, re-
categorising them as fixed term contract workers (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005). 
According to the law, labour contracts would stipulate the legal rights and responsibilities 
for both parties over a specified period of time. In theory, contracts meant voluntary 
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bilateral choices: managers were to gain a new license to dismiss workers for the purpose 
of productivity gains and higher profits while workers were supposed to enjoy a new 
freedom to switch jobs for higher wages. However, in practice labour contracts accentuated 
managerial power at the expense of workers' interests, particularly those in less 
competitive and older industries. The majority of state workers fell vulnerable to the new 
pressures from managers because they lacked the market capacity required to change to 
non-state employment in competition with millions of young and well-disciplined migrant 
workers flooding into the cities. The more bankrupt and inefficient the enterprise, the more 
desperately dependent were its workers. To them, labour contracts meant managers' 
unfettered power to discipline, if not dismiss, them. 
 
The introduction of the universal labour contract system was accompanied by the 
establishment of a societal-level safety net as a substitute for the danwei system. The new 
principles of social protection were that the employer, the employee, and the state should 
share financial responsibility, that the funds should be pooled and administered by 
provincial or local social insurance departments, and that the system should be extendable 
to all urban workers and not just danwei members (Lee 1999, pp.47-8). Reforms 
concerning old age pensions, medical care, unemployment, and maternity benefits etc. 
were implemented or planned according to this principle; any employee covered by the 
scheme, regardless of the firms’ ownership forms, was supposedly able to claim 
reimbursement of at least a part of the cost of public services. In the case of housing 
provisions, housing benefits in the form of a cash allowance would be paid out of housing 
funds collected from the local government, the enterprise and the individual worker. With 
this allowance, workers could buy or rent low-cost accommodation to be constructed by 
local governments. Reformers interpreted such changes as "severing the ties that bind 
workers' lives to leaders of state danwei" (Karmel 1996, pp. 111-133). In theory, ‘severing 
the ties’ meant freedom of both SOEs and state workers. SOEs would be released from the 
financial duty for providing welfare and housing for all danwei members; they would now 
become liable only for workers employed by them. At the same time, state workers were 
released from the forced dependence on any specific danwei in terms of public service and 
housing; as long as employed by some form of enterprise they, as costumers, were 
supposedly able to purchase any public services outside of the danwei, and if they had 
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enough money they would be able to buy and live in better houses in any places of their 
choosing. Although reformers emphasized the newly given workers freedom from danwei, 
what was actually realized was SOEs’ freedom from the danwei burden (which accounted 
for 50% of their total wage bill) (Lee 1999, p.47). In practice, as the coverage rates of 
enterprise other than large and medium SOEs remained less than 10% throughout the 
1990s, the insurance programmes virtually meant that if workers move to jobs in the non-
state sector, they would be much less likely to gain any insurance and welfare benefits (Lee 
1999, p.48). It followed that the new social protection system in effect ended up playing a 
role in pushing state workers out of the social safety net.  
 
Among other measures, what most contributed to facilitating massive lay-offs of SOE 
workers was a particular scheme -‘xiagang’- that was introduced in 1994 (Knight and Song 
2005, p.21). Workers with xiagang (meaning ‘to step down from one’s post’) status were 
categorized as still employed by the SOEs, paid 60% of their wages and offered three years 
of recruitment training in state training centres. Xiagang status lasted for three years and 
workers who could not find jobs within those years became officially unemployed (who 
then become eligible for unemployment benefits for two years).34 The xiagang policy did 
facilitate ‘optimization’ of employment in SOEs; by the end of 2002 approximately 34 
million workers (60% of all SOE workers) were sacked in the form of xiagang (Zhang 
2003). As a result of such mass lay-offs, SOEs’ contribution to total employment in the 
manufacturing sector continued to decrease from 44% in 1980 to a mere 14.8% in 2001 
and slightly higher than 10% in 2007 (China Statistical Yearbook 2002, 2011).  
 
The problem was that despite the massive lay-offs, labour productivity of SOEs still lagged 
behind the non-state enterprises. In 2001, labour productivity of SOEs in the 
manufacturing sector accounted for only 71% of private producers, suggesting that about 
one-third of a million of the SOE workers in the sector could be seen as redundant if 
productivity of non SOEs is used as benchmark (Brooks and Tao 2003, p.17). This 
pressure of the productivity race made the massive lay-offs in SOEs’ an endless mission, 
                                         
34 These benefits of xiagang status were only in theory. In reality, many xiagang workers were left 
without any protection as the firms frequently overrode the entitlement and local authorities, which 
were supposed to share the cost, did not have sufficient budgets for it. As a result, many of the 
xiagang workers ended up in informal employment (Chang 2012, p.30).  
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because the laid-off workers, left in the labour market as a ‘new informal class’, have 
turned themselves into an even cheaper and more flexible workforce for private firms 
(Solinger 2004, p. 51).  
 
4.2.2. Legalization of labour relations 
 
The state’s attempts to break the iron rice bowl entailed “a spectacular increase in disputes 
that began in the early 1990s” (Pringle 2002). According to official statistics, collective 
action including strikes increased nine fold from 752 cases in 1992 to 6,767 cases in 1998 
(Pringle 2002; Hart-Lansberg and Burkett 2005, p.83). Many of those laid-off organised 
protests over their forced redundancy and insufficient compensation, demanding a new 
economic compensation package or new employment within the SOEs from management 
and local government (China Labour Bulletin 2007). Collective organised protests by laid-
off workers usually took the form of sit-ins, assembly outside government offices, 
petitioning to higher-level government and also large scale ‘mass incidents’. From the mid-
1990s large scale protests took place throughout the country and were often well planned 
as some older laid-off SOE workers called upon organising skills learned during the 
Cultural Revolution (AMRC 2007; for concrete instances see Callaghen 2005, p.155).  
 
To deal with growing worker resistance to structural reform without serious harm to 
productivity growth and political legitimacy of CCP rule, the state attempted to embed 
labour relations in a legislative framework. The legislative approach began in 1995 with a 
comprehensive labour law (1994) which stipulated all manner of regulations on working 
conditions, minimum wages, working hours and overtime. The law also assigned to the 
sole official trade union the responsibility of arranging collective contracts between 
employers and workers, while workers right to strike and form an independent union 
remained denied under the law (Chan 2008). To this it added mediation and arbitration 
channels to resolve industrial conflicts that had seen increasing uptake from aggrieved 
workers.  
 
This legalization of labour relations had several purposes. It was a genuine attempt to rein 
in the most notorious abuses of worker rights, thereby pre-empting serious disputes and 
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normalizing factory life. It was also an attempt to demobilize and individualize working 
class discontent – to drive it from collectivized strikes and demonstrations in the streets 
toward arbitration and mediation in government offices (‘officially sanctioned resolution 
processes’) (Callaghen 2005, p.103). For the CCP leadership, it was also to save the party-
state from workers’ direct ire over the restructuring process, making the party-state appear 
to be an ‘impartial arbiter’ or ‘workers’ party’ who occasionally hands over to workers 
central government directions as weapons against their abusive managers and local 
government officials (Chan 2003, p.143).  
 
Trade unions (All-China Federation of Trade Unions: ACFTU) were also supposed to play 
a role in streamlining and regularizing labour relations. By arranging collective contracts, it 
was expected to save employers the administrative trouble of offering, inking and 
implementing contracts with each individual worker. It was all the more beneficial for 
employers (especially foreign firms which escaped from militant trade unions in their own 
countries) that ACFTU, under the direct influence of CCP (which continued to appoint 
union officials and organize the workers congress), generally would do little or nothing to 
enforce such contracts but simply channelling individual workers’ grievances into the 
dispute mediation system (Blecher 2010, pp.104-105).  
 
4.2.3. Allowing Rural Migrant Workers into Cities  
 
Throughout the 1980s most TVEs flourished, employing over 100 million rural workers, as 
subcontractors to urban state enterprises. Hence, when many lead-firm SOEs went 
bankrupt in the early 1990s or found more cost-effective suppliers, thousands of TVEs 
were left in the lurch (Walker and Buck 2007, p.42). Also, TVEs were severely hurt by the 
harsh administrative measures to cut back the banks’ credit quotas in 1989 as their 
expansion was largely underpinned by bank loans. The collapse of TVEs brought about a 
serious problem of high unemployment in rural areas. In the early 1980s, the surplus of 
rural workers (who were underemployed or unemployed) was an estimated 70 million, or 
18% of the entire rural labour force and this surplus grew to about 130 million, or 28% in 
the early 1990s (Zhang 2004). As a result, the income and consumption disparity between 
rural and urban residents was increasingly widening. In 1978, annual per capita disposable 
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income was 2.6 times higher for urban residents than for rural peasants and, by 2001, that 
ratio increased to 2.9. Over the same time period, the ratio of urban to rural consumption 
per capita increased from 2.9 to 3.5, demonstrating widening income and consumption 
disparities (NBSC 2003; Knight and Song 2005, p.36). It was against this backdrop that 
millions of workers began migrating to the cities in search of employment and higher 
wages (from rapidly growing private and foreign-invested enterprises).  
On the other hand, many urban employers had a profit incentive to buy their labour force, 
mostly in preference to more expensive and less-disciplined urban workers. After decades 
of being mobilised under the strict control of the party-state and different collective work 
units, the rural population was not merely ‘peasant’ in the traditional sense, but rather 
constituted a well- disciplined reserve army of labour (with more than half educated in 
secondary school) ready to work productively (Li 2008, p.36).  
 
In line with these growing demands for rural-urban migration, regulations on residential 
movement, that is, the household registration system of hukou35 was more or less relaxed. 
While permanent movement from the rural areas to the big cities was still not permitted, 
rural residents were largely allowed to work and live in the cities temporarily. Prior to 
economic reform, urban rationing made even temporary migration extremely difficult. 
During the first stage of reform, when the ‘dual track’ system operated, rationed food was 
distributed at low prices, as before, and higher prices prevailed in the free food markets. 
The ration coupon system was largely abolished in 1993: it became easier for migrants to 
live in the city without a city hukou. Moreover, with free markets for food, peasants could 
buy grain to meet their production quotas, that is, to pay their taxes in the form of 
compulsory grain sales to state agencies, so that they could more easily leave their farms 
(Knight and Song 2005, p.26). 
                                         
35 The Hukou (户口) system had been used by authorities for millennia for the purpose of tax 
collection and migration control. In 1958, the government officially reintroduced the system to 
ensure that the peasants stayed in the countryside and continued to provide cities with agricultural 
products. Each town and city (broadly categorized as ‘rural’ or ‘urban’) issued its own hukou, 
which invested only its registered residents with access to public welfare services within the 
jurisdiction. Like nationality, the hukou was hereditary; children were given a rural or urban hukou 
according to their parents’ hukou regardless of their place of birth. For analyses of the hukou 
system and migrant labour see Chan (2010, pp. 357-364). 
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 Living and working in cities but still registered as ‘rural residents’, migrant workers were 
welcomed by urban employers as they could hire them without labour contracts required 
by the law. According to official survey findings, only 46.3% of all migrant workers (in the 
case of construction industry, less than 10%) were hired with written labour contracts 
(China State Council 2006, p.4). Employers had strong incentives to avoid signing labour 
contracts with workers and not reporting such employees. First, by hiring informally, 
enterprises could avoid having to pay required payroll taxes for pensions, unemployment 
insurance, medical insurance, and work injuries, which could be quite costly (e.g. in 
Shanghai in 2004, the regular employer contribution rate for these types of insurance 
totalled 36.5% of wages) (Chan 2003, p.137). Also, hiring workers on an informal basis 
would give employers greater flexibility to adjust the size of the labour force to respond to 
changes in economic conditions. Moreover, this greater managerial power of dismissal and 
ambiguous legal identity of migrant workers would make them more obedient than urban 
workers, which in turn would put disciplinary pressures on urban workers in factories.  
Indeed, well-educated young migrant workers worked intensively for an average monthly 
wage of $24 (200 RMB) (which was only 44% of an urban workers’ average wage, and 
less than 1.1% of US workers’ wages) for 67.1 hours per week on average (which were 
15.4 hours longer than urban workers) throughout the 1990s (Du, Wang, and Lee 2009, 
p.17, p.25), and these workers provided Chinese producers with the source of a strong 
competitive advantage: the use of inexpensive productive labour rather than expensive 
machines and managers (Arrighi, 2007, p.365).  
 
According to some estimates, the number of rural people working in urban areas grew 
significantly from about 30 million in 1995 to 62 million in 2000, and further to more than 
130 million in the mid-2000s (Cai 2003 p.32; Chan 2003, p.135). The 2000 population 
census data show that 144.39 million rural residents in China, or 11.6% of the total 
population, moved into cities and towns in 2000 (NBS 2002). This trend would be 
increasingly strengthened by China’s entry to the WTO in 2001 and the resultant 
liberalization of grain imports; it would continue to swell the ranks of the rural poor (about 
800 million people, accounting for 65% of the population), out-competed by foreign grain 
companies and thus migrating to the cities in search for work even under sweatshop 
conditions (Ofreneo 2002; Li 2008, p.70). Indeed, from the early 2000s they became no 
153 
 
 
 
longer a supplementary workforce but a ‘major component of the new Chinese working 
class’, accounting for 46.7% of total urban employment across different industrial sectors 
including manufacturing, construction and services in 2006 (Leung and Pun 2009, p. 552).  
 
4.3. Restructuring of the Banking System  
 
4.3.1. Reform of the Central Bank  
 
A major step in building an independent central bank was the enforcement of the Central 
Bank Law enacted in 1995. The law made it clear that the central bank should be separated 
from the administrative authorities at various levels. Article 7 of the Law dictated that 
“PBC shall, under the leadership of the State Council, independently implement monetary 
policies, perform its functions and carry out its operations according to law free from any 
intervention by local governments or government departments at all levels, public 
organizations or individuals.” Accordingly, the law stipulated that the PBC should not act 
as sole sales agent for state and other government bonds; it must not act as financial 
guarantor for any organization or individual (Ji, 2006, p.143). In other words, the PBC was 
now to fully assume the role of an independent and detached regulator, whose ultimate aim 
is to maintain the stability of the value of money and thereby ensure a ‘sound’ financial 
environment.   
 
Dealing with the problem local governments’ structural influence over PBC branches, the 
PBC decided to formally abolish its branches at provincial and municipal levels and 
instead set up a small number of regional branches (Ji 2006, p.146). In provinces where a 
PBC branch became absent, a supervisory office was established to assume the role of 
arms of the “cross-district” PBC branch. With this new organizational structure, the PBC 
would be hopefully more protected from interference by local governments. Of course, the 
emphasis on central bank independence did not mean that the central government was 
going to sit by as a spectator on banking issues. According to the Central Bank Law, the 
PBC would be under the direct leadership of the State Council. It follows that the central 
government has come to take a more active role in ensuring that the PBC is freed from the 
influence of undisciplined administrative authorities.  
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In terms of the approach to macroeconomic management, the central government dictated 
the PBC to use a more indirect adjustment mechanism. In the past, the focus of PBC 
monetary policy had been on direct control over credit volume. Under the new law, the 
PBC should instead focus on the control of total money supply in terms of M1. 
Accordingly, the PBC began to mainly rely on monetary policy instruments rather than 
administrative directives over credit quotas for macro financial control. Indeed, 
instruments such as open market operations, discount and rediscount policy were adopted 
since the mid-1990s. The system of money markets was also improved by establishing a 
nationally unified interbank market (1996) where interest rates were formally liberalized. 
By using these indirect control instruments rather than resorting to administrative 
recentralization, the PBC successfully assisted the central government in controlling 
inflationary pressure between 1992 and 1993 without a serious political crisis.  
. 
4.3.2. Reform of Commercial Banks  
 
The clear objective of SOBs reform was to make them truly ‘commercial’ by disentangling 
the banking system from SOEs and local governments. In other words, SOBs were 
supposed to be able to make profit an overarching goal, free from responsibility for 
macroeconomic stabilizations, welfare provision, or industrial policy promotions. To this 
end, the central government took a series of deregulatory and liberalization measures of the 
banking system since the mid-1990s, and the 1995 Law on Commercial Banks was the first 
step. The law, bestowing legal person status on SOBs (granting legally independent status 
to banks), made it possible for the banks to “independently manage their businesses, 
shoulder their own risks, be responsible for their own profits and losses and follow the 
principle of self-restraint in conducting commercial activities” (Ji 2006, p.151).  
 
The PBC’s change to the practice of monetary management referred to above also helped 
commercial banks to become truly commercial. They were now allowed to determine their 
lending activities according to their own financial situation, as long as they maintained the 
required level of bank reserves. This did not mean, of course, that the banks were set free 
from all constraints. The newly introduced asset-liability ratio system meant that they were 
now forced to optimize asset to liability ratios and limit their credit and loan activities 
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accordingly. 
 
Meanwhile, one of the most difficult problems in transforming commercial banks into 
independent legal entities was the fact that they were carrying the burdens of the past 
represented by the huge amount of non-performing loans. According to Chinese official 
sources by the end of 1995 bad debt had mounted up to nearly 25% of the four major SOBs’ 
total loans (China Daily 1995). The banks’ total debts had already exceeded their total 
assets, rendering the banking system virtually insolvent. In response to the problem, in 
1998 the government executed a series of measures of bank recapitalization, such as setting 
up asset management companies (AMCs) to take over the non-performing loans of the 
SOBs, directly injecting capital into bank assets and debt write-offs (Hart-Lansberg and 
Burkett 2005, p.65).  
 
In sum, with a series of banking reform, banks came under increasing pressure to operate 
on a more commercial basis and to scrutinize loan applications more carefully. This 
pressure was directly transferred to SOEs and TVEs whose expansion until the early 1990s 
was largely dependent upon easy bank loans. Indeed, some 1,000 large to medium state 
owned industries (let alone thousands of small collectives and TVEs) were driven into 
bankruptcy by the mid-1990s (AMRC 2007). Faced with potential bankruptcy, surviving 
firms in turn had to undergo severe restructuring or be sold to private investors.  
 
4.4. Restructuring of Trade and Foreign Exchange Markets 
 
4.4.1. Reform of Trade Policy  
 
As discussed above, the de facto import substitution policies in the first stage of reform 
contradicted the state’s goal of export-oriented development. Fiscal subsidies on export 
costs encouraged exporters to buy up exportable goods (mainly raw materials) inland 
rather than to reduce costs of production in their factories, whilst importers in SEZs 
focused on taking advantage of overvalued currency for importing consumer goods (rather 
than importing advanced technology and machinery) in response to soaring domestic 
demands. As a matter of course, these activities worsened fiscal and trade balances and at 
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the same time deterred inflows of export-oriented FDI by raising the cost of production 
within China.  
 
Learned from the previous experience, the new program in the 1990s called for “adapting 
to international norms on trade”, that is, more liberalized import and export management 
(Xie et al 1999 p.149). The government first abolished export subsidies in 1991, making 
exporters truly independent entities responsible for any losses in trading. This would 
expose exporters directly to the competitive pressure of world markets, thus forcing them 
to try to reduce costs of production. Meanwhile, in an attempt to use tariffs rather than 
import protections to manage import activities, import substitution lists were abolished in 
1993 while licensing controls over trade were to a large extent reduced. With the process of 
delegating foreign trade rights to individual enterprises accelerated and the foreign 
exchange retention system was also abolished. Enterprises were now allowed to sell their 
foreign exchange income to banks licensed to conduct foreign exchange transactions as 
well as to purchase foreign exchange freely. With provinces and individual enterprises 
gaining greater access to imports and exports, and the gap between inland provinces and 
SEZs in foreign exchange retentions narrowed, incentives for “inter-provincial trading” 
were accordingly reduced.  
 
Further, in line with its efforts to join the WTO, the government began to lower tariffs 
decisively, cutting the overall rate of 23% in 1996 to 10% by 2005 (China’s customs 
statistics). Interestingly, there occurred a more rapid reduction of tariffs for means of 
production such as foreign advanced machinery, equipment and raw materials than that of 
consumer goods. For instance, tariffs for metal materials decreased on average by 47.7%, 
to the level of 8.15% while the tariffs for textile materials remained at a relatively high 
level of 18.8% (Chen and Feng 2000, pp.328-9). In the case of advanced electrical 
machinery and equipment, tariff rates were reduced by 36.5% to the level of 13.65%. 
These practices show the government’s strategic intention not only to more thoroughly 
subject Chinese firms (especially SOEs) to external competition, but to reduce the relative 
cost of production in Chinese industries so as to increase their competitiveness in the 
international market.  
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4.4.2. Reform of Exchange rate policy  
 
Related to the abolishment of the foreign exchange retention system was the exchange rate 
reform. After a series of devaluations of the currency to RMB 5.8 to the dollar in 1993, the 
government finally unified the official and swap market rates by raising the official rate to 
the then prevailing swap market rate, RMB 8.7 in 1994. Then by 1996 the currency 
appreciated slightly to 8.28 to the dollar where it remained almost unchanged until a 
limited flexible rate regime was established in 2005 (Lardy 2002, p.49). Unlike the 
previous round of devaluations, this time the nominal devaluation was effective in 
lowering the ‘real’ exchange rate as domestic price inflation was much settled down after 
1996 (e.g. average annual inflation of consumer prices was only 1.3% between 1996 and 
2002) as a result of the restructuring process repressing domestic consumption and social 
wages (e.g. between 1990 and 2005, China’s household consumption continued to fall 
from 50% of GDP to 37% of GDP) (Li 2005, p.81; NBSC 2007).  
 
  Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: BIS Effective Exchange Rate Indices, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/RBCNBIS (accessed 30 Sept 2010) 
 
To keep this ‘competitive’ real exchange rate constant over time, the Chinese central bank 
used a dual intervention policy (i.e. the intervention in the foreign exchange market to fix 
the nominal value of the exchange rate and intervention in the domestic monetary market 
to control the inflation rate). While large sums of foreign currencies (the sum of the current 
account surplus and capital account surplus including net FDI) flew in, the central bank 
bought in foreign exchange (building up official exchange reserves) in order to keep the 
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renminbi from appreciating on the one hand, and at the same time as counteracting these 
purchases by issuing bonds in domestic markets (or/and raising reserve ratio of commercial 
banks) on the other. This intervention policy called ‘sterilization’ is employed to absorb the 
addition to the domestic money supply that has been created by the purchases of foreign 
exchange, neutralizing its impact on the domestic monetary base and inflation (Frenkel 
2007, p.2; Husted and Melvin 2007, p. 443). However, the sterilization has a cost, when 
the interest rate paid on the domestic bonds exceeds that of foreign currency (the dollar) 
denominated bonds held by the central bank (Frenkel 2007; Frankel and Wei 2007). 
Theoretically, such costs tend to rise leaving costs to the government budget increasingly 
large, as the policy ends up either effectively raising domestic interest rates or inducing 
speculative ‘hot money’ to inflow with an eye to a perceived future currency revaluation.  
 
In the case of China, while the government kept capital account transaction restricted to 
some extent, the central bank shifted the cost of sterilization to state-owned commercial 
banks by forcing them to buy these domestic bonds at a rate lower than market rates (Lardy 
2008, p.3; Vermeiren 2013, pp.19-20). The SOBs then in turn offset the loss by means of 
high profit margins (i.e. a wide spread between deposit and loan rates of interest) deriving 
from deposit rates being kept very low. While workers had to increase savings in the 
context of an inadequate social security system, the lack of investment vehicles alternative 
to bank deposits allowed the banks to exploit their monopolistic position. Ultimately, those 
who subsidized the cost of sterilization policy, making the policy ‘sustainable’, were 
workers who had been forced to consume less and save more in spite of very low and even 
negative real rates of interest (e.g. the average real return on a one-year deposit for the 
years 2000 through 2007 was less than 1%, while household savings continued to rise 
reaching 36% of disposable income by 2007) (Lardy 2002, p.78; Vermeiren 2013, p.22).  
 
5. Economic Growth and Contradictions of Reform  
 
5.1. Low Unit Labour Costs and the rise of China  
 
“The cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which batters 
down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate 
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, 
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to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it 
calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one 
word, it creates a world after its own image.” (Marx and Engels 1971, Ch.1). 
 
In an October 1987 report to the Thirteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, entitled ‘Advance along the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’, then 
secretary general of the CCP Zhao Ziyang declared that China “should enter the world 
economic arena more boldly” and that its aim should be to develop an “export-oriented 
economy”. As many figures prove, China finally achieved that goal. Nobody could deny 
that it is the result of the restructuring process from the early 1990s, creating conditions 
highly conducive to exploitation. 
 
As discussed above, from SOE ownership reforms to the labour market, foreign trade, 
exchange rate, and financial reforms, all the reform policies since the mid-1990s, in close 
relation to one another, were focused on creating conditions favourable to lowering relative 
unit labour costs (i.e. low wages and intensification of work along with a low inflation rate, 
fixed exchange rate, low cost of importing means of production etc.), which turned out to 
be some extent successful. For instance, between 1995 and 2002, annual productivity 
growth (real value added per worker) (11.1%) was faster than the growth of labour costs 
per worker (including employer contributions to social insurance funds) (9.9% per annum), 
thereby resulting in unit labour costs that fell by -1.2% each year (Ceglowski and Golub 
2007, pp.605-6). Also, as the exchange rate was almost fixed since 1995 (8.28 yuan to the 
dollar) unit labour costs in dollar terms were reduced at similar rates. 
 
Comparing Chinese unit labour costs to other countries’ in dollar terms, one can estimate 
Chinese ULCs were well below those of most other countries during the period. According 
to Ceglowski and Golub’s (2007) calculation based on World Bank, Chinese and BLS-
based estimates, in 2002 China’s relative unit labour cost (RULC) vis-à-vis developed 
countries (Japan, the EU, and the US) were 26–30% of their RULC, while against 
developing countries it varied from 23% for Singapore to 88 % for Brazil with the other 
NICs at around 30–40% (cf. Cox and Koo 2003; Banister 2005, p.32; Szirmai et al 2005).  
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Table 6.1. Chinese Productivity, Wages and RULC vis-a-vis Selected Countries, 2002 
(As a per cent of comparator country levels) 
 Relative Productivity Relative Wage RULC 
United States 7.7 2.1 27.0 
Japan 8.7 2.6 30.3 
EU average 10.7 2.8 25.8 
India 152.1 61.8 40.6 
Indonesia 102.1 72.6 70.9 
Malaysia 41.4 16.9 40.8 
Korea 11.6 5.3 45.5 
Singapore 16.6 3.9 23.3 
Mexico 28.1 9.8 34.9 
Brazil 22.7 19.9 87.8 
Source: Ceglowski and Golub (2007, p.610) 
 
Chinese unit labour costs which were very low relative to a wide range of other countries 
offered the exporting producers in the country potential surplus-profits, that is, the 
difference between the world prices of commodities and their costs of production in China. 
This was the first and foremost factor that induced huge amounts of export-oriented FDI 
(seeking “global labour arbitrage”) into China. Also, the Chinese government’s continued 
commitment to joining the WTO (which was finally realized in 2001) played an important 
role in attracting FDI, by allaying the fears of foreign investors about the lack of well-
defined and established property rights and the absence of the 'rule of law' which might 
threaten the security of investments sunk in real productive capital in China.  
 
As Figure 6.2 shows from the early 1990s FDI in China began to surge. Between 1991 and 
1995, FDI grew more than ten times (from 3 billion dollars in 1991 to 33 billion dollars in 
1995). In the mid-1990s, the flow of FDI was largely diverted from the East Asian NICs to 
China, with the Chinese share in FDI flows into Asia more than doubling from 
approximately 19% ($1,021 million) in 1981-86 to 47.5% ($16,736 million) in 1987-96 
(UNCTAD 1997). In 2002, China, receiving FDI of $53 billion, surpassed the US as the 
largest recipient of world foreign direct investment (China’s Ministry of Commerce 2003). 
By the end of 2005, the accumulated FDI in China was $622 billion.  
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Source: World Bank, Foreign direct investment, net inflows:  
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD (accessed 1 Dec 2010). 
  
As Table 6.2 shows, the contribution of FDI to the Chinese economy was significant in 
diverse terms. In 2004, FDI inflows accounted for 7% of gross capital formation; 21% of 
tax revenue was generated by FIEs, which produced 28% of industrial output and took 57% 
of China’s overall exports (87.9% of high-tech exports) (China Ministry of Commerce 
2006, 2007).  
 
Table 6.2. The Contribution of FDI to the Chinese Economy 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 
Share in gross investment (%) 7.4 17.0 10.3 8.2 
Share of exports by FIEs (%) 20.4 41.0 47.9 57.1 
Share of industrial output by FIEs 7.1 15.1 22.5 35.9 
Number of workers employed by FIEs (million) 6.0 17.0 20.1 23.0 
Share of tax revenue from FIEs (%) 4.3 11.9 17.5 20.9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005, tables 17-19; China Ministry of Commerce, Investment 
Statistics: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Statistics/default.htm (accessed 30 Dec 2011).  
 
With the help of such a huge influx of FDI, Chain began battering down walls worldwide 
with its own heavy artillery: cheap commodities (Blecher 2010, p.93). While China’s 
exports were ranked as the 26th in the world in 1980, with the volume of $18 billion and 47% 
of exports as manufactured goods, the corresponding numbers in 2005 were 3rd rank, $762 
billion, and 93% (Zhang 2006, p.4). China’s share of world manufactured exports 
continued to grow from about 4% in 1997 to 7% in 2003 and further to 13% in 2009, 
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producing (or at least assembling) 90% of all children's toys, close to 60% of the world's 
clothing, 30% of the world's television sets, 50% of the world's cameras, 30% of world’s 
printed circuit boards and 70% of the world's photocopiers (WTO 2009). The 
manufacturing structure also increasingly diversified and moved into high-end goods with 
China ranking second after the US in research and development (R&D) investment (OECD 
2006). Electronics products such as PCs and cell phones constituted 56% of total exports in 
2006, climbing second only to the US (Iley and Lewis 2007, p.29). 
  
Not surprisingly, China’s stunning economic growth (with an average GDP growth rate of 
around 10.5% during 1990-2007) was in large part based on the rapid growth of exports 
(which soared by 18.5% per annum since end of the 1990s). During 2001−08, net exports 
and investment which was predominantly linked to building capacity in tradable sectors 
accounted for over 60 % of China’s growth, up from 40 % in the 1990s. This was much 
larger than the average of the G7 (16%), euro area (30%) and the rest of Asia (35%) (Guo 
and N’Diaye 2009, p.4). On the production side, exports were estimated to contribute 30% 
in 2003 and 39% in 2006 in terms of value added to output growth up from 15% in the 
early 1990s (World Bank 2007). All the remarkable figures above indicates that since the 
early 1990s China had undergone a remarkable transformation in which it turned itself 
literally into the ‘factory of the world’.  
 
5.2. Problems of Workers’ Resistance  
 
Through the reform process China firmly secured a favourable position in the global 
economy. However, it does not mean that such condition was secured once and for all; in 
order to maintain the status quo, thus avoiding a political crisis, the Chinese state had to 
constantly restructure social relations in an attempt to keep the productivity level high. 
Central to the attempts was dealing with growing workers’ resistance.  
 
As referred to above, as a means to deal with workers’ resistance, the state tried to legalize 
labour relations. However, such methods, that is, a strategy of demobilizing worker 
discontent through the institutionalized legal and bureaucratic systems was not effective 
throughout the reform era. Most labour contracts in written form were predominantly 
163 
 
 
 
short-term, while such contracts were not even available to millions of rural-urban migrant 
workers. Also, driven by competition to attracting and keeping profitable firms in their 
jurisdiction (known as ‘the race to the bottom’), local governments that were supposed to 
protect workers enforced labour laws and regulations ‘flexibly’ by influencing lower courts 
which largely depended upon funding from local states (Chan 2003, p.145). Indeed, 
minimum wages, set by local governments without any unified central regulations, rarely 
reflected the rising costs of living. For example, the municipal governments in the Pearl 
River Delta regions increased the statutory monthly minimum wages by as little as 68 yuan 
(approximately $10) over a 12-year period between the 1990s and early 2000s (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security 2004). Worse, the official trade union, the ACFTU, which was 
supposed to regularize worker discontent, was in large part inactive with little 
representative role. At the end of 2006, only 18 % of FIEs in China entered into collective 
wage contracts, while more than 10 million of the 13 million small and medium-sized 
enterprises in China did not have collective wage bargaining systems at all throughout the 
2000s (Chen and Estreicher 2011).  
 
Such circumstances met with the emergence of a ‘new generation of Chinese workers’ 
(Leung and Pun, 2009). The new generation of the working class, born during the 1980s 
and 1990s and more deeply integrated into capitalist China, was more sensitive to social 
issues and workplace rights than their parents. Previous generations might have taken any 
city job available, even at low salaries. But these young workers tended to seek jobs that 
would not only pay well enough to secure a better life for their families, but also provide 
career development, treat employees with respect, and help them gain a foothold in the 
cities (Leung and Pun 2009, p.553; Chang 2012, p.11; Chen and Estreicher 2011). 
Furthermore, despite state oversight, internet access helped those workers to quickly learn 
about strikes, wages, and working conditions at other companies, involving them in 
spontaneous collective actions. These characteristics of young workers were also prevalent 
among migrant workers, of whom more than 60% were estimated to be ‘new generation 
migrant workers’ (China Labour Bulletin 2011, p. 13). In other words, internal rural 
migrant workers, who were supposed to be willing to work under harsh conditions with 
low wages and thus weakening the position of urban workers, began refusing to be docile 
any longer. 
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Through waves of strikes, challenges to injustice and inequality against migrant workers 
was increasing in terms of numbers and ‘radicalizing’ in terms of its form (Leung and Pun 
2009). More active individual and collective actions taken by migrant workers has moved 
the centre of labour disputes from SOEs to the private sector over the past decade (China 
Labour Bulletin 2012, p. 13) and became important aspect of social unrest.36 By the mid-
2000s labour activism in China made an important further development; by creating a 
wave of strikes concentrated in a particular industrial sector and then spreading out to the 
entire area in the form of solidarity strikes and protests, these struggles began to overcome 
the limitation of previous struggles that commonly ended as isolated incidents (Chan 2008, 
p.12; Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005 p.83). This increasing social unrest and 
radicalisation of migrant workers in particular led the party-state to address emerging 
discontent amongst the working population.  
 
Under the pressure of intensified workers’ resistance,37 undermining the legitimacy of the 
CCP’s authoritarian subordination of labour, from 2003 the new Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao 
leadership began emphasizing ‘harmony and stability’ in society, even over the pursuit of 
economic growth and efficiency. Dubbed as ‘harmonious development’, the new labour 
policy was directed at addressing rural-urban disparity with increasing government 
investment in inland areas, a stricter implementation of the minimum wage policy (setting 
up hourly minimum wages to protect irregular workers, and enforcing local governments 
to adjust minimum wage standards at least once every two years), improved access to 
training and higher education (more investments in ‘human capital’), more aggressive 
campaigns to establish trade unions in private enterprises, encouragement of collective 
wage negotiation through collective contract systems and finally labour law amendments.  
                                         
36 According to China’s Ministry of Public Security, the number of ‘officially recognised’ mass 
incidents and demonstrations, such as collective suicide attempts, traffic blockage, and other public 
forms of civil disobedience taken by desperate workers, increased ten times from 8,700 in 1993 to 
about 87,000 in 2005 (Chan 2010; Leung and Pun 2009, p. 553). Approximately 70% were 
organised by peasants and migrant workers (Leung and Pun 2009, p. 553). Unofficially, at least one 
strike involving more than 1,000 workers occurred every day in the manufacturing hub of the Pearl 
Delta region in Guangdong, to say nothing of the many smaller spontaneous strike (AFP, 15 Jan 
2008). 
37 For more examples and statistical data on labour disputes see CLB Research Report No.5 (2007, 
pp.15-24); Cai and Wang (2012, pp. 11-17); and Chan (2009, pp.60-77). 
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Although the fundamental purpose of the set of policies and amended laws was to keep the 
working class from burgeoning collectivism and to absorb them as individual citizens by 
conceding real material and institutional gains, it brought about strong protests from both 
foreign and Chinese business leaders as the law indeed had the effect of improving the 
labour security of migrant workers to some extent (Gallagher 2010; Wang et al 2009). 
While the issue of whether such an approach would lessen or strengthen labour activism 
remains to be seen, it was predictable that it would make (at least short-term) costs of 
exploitation in China rise significantly, threatening the current engine of Chinese growth. 
For instance, minimum wages in China increased substantially in terms of both nominal 
and real term rates. The average monthly minimum wage in 1994 was less than 200 yuan. 
Meanwhile in 2006, the monthly minimum wage reached a concentrated range of 550 to 
650 yuan, with a highest of 780 yuan in the largest export platform, Guangdong Province. 
In 2006, average increases of minimum wages were 72.8 yuan (approx. $11) per month, 
and the growth rate was far more than the economic growth rate in the same year. Of 
course, such rises in minimum wages boosted the average wage level even faster. Between 
1995 and 2006, the average annual growth rate of the average wage was 11.8% in nominal 
term and 10% in real term (from 514 yuan in 1995 to 1750 yuan in 2006) (Du et al 2006, 
pp.14-16). In response to these rising wages, many multinationals began either installing 
robots in their plants or moving production lines into lower wage countries such as 
Indonesia, Vietnam or Cambodia instead of employing more workers in China.  
 
What such a changing environment implicated for the state was clear; to keep the pace of 
existing growth it had to employ policies for raising productivity as fast as wage growth. 
The imperative of keeping productive competitiveness through the efficient exploitation of 
cheap labour made the government’s efforts to mitigate class conflict always contradictory 
and self-defeating (Andreas 2008).  
 
5.3. Problem of overcapacity and overproduction.  
 
Adding to FDI funds that rushed in, huge surplus profits (deriving from the difference 
between world prices of commodities and the Chinese costs of production) earned from 
exports were eagerly reinvested in production, facilitating ever greater levels of capital 
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accumulation. The rapid accumulation, however, was building up its own barriers to 
further accumulation; productive capacity was increasing faster than the pace of growth of 
consumption demand in both domestic and foreign markets, repressing the prices and 
profit rates. Figure 6.3, the declining average capacity utilization rates, clearly shows this 
trend of overinvestment and overcapacity.  
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008, National Accounts: 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm (accessed June 6 2012). 
 
The tendency to overinvestment was inherent to the capitalist reform process itself. In the 
face of rising wages and intensifying competitive pressures, individual firms were 
increasingly preoccupied with investing money (either earned profits or borrowed money) 
in high-tech new machinery, more advanced technologies and labour management skills 
while shedding ‘surplus’ workers through downsizing and reengineering, in an attempt to 
produce a greater amount of final products with a smaller number of workers (i.e. to reduce 
unit labour costs). As a result of these activities, despite the investment boom the 
unemployment problem38 remained persistent and wage growth was checked by the 
                                         
38 According to official statistics, urban unemployment in China stayed below 3% throughout the 
1990s and the 2000s. However, these series are severely biased downward; they underestimate the 
unemployment among rural residents and rural-urban migrants (those without urban hukou); 
dismissed workers aged more than 50 (for men) or 45 (for women) are not counted as unemployed; 
it does not include about 40 million workers who have been laid off by SOEs (called xiagang, they 
are treated as still employed by SOEs). If the ILO definition of unemployment (persons without 
work, available for work, and seeking work, meaning not only registered unemployed but also 
xiagang and unemployed without hukou in cities) is applied, an even higher real urban 
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growing reserve army of labour, pushing the aggregate effective demand down 
increasingly further. Of course, the low cost of production made it possible for China-
based firms to enlarge the global market share that could to some extent complement 
inefficient domestic demands. But the problem was that the competitive pressure 
intensified by the flood of commodities made in China on the world market was also 
forcing foreign-based firms to follow suit; they, just like firms in China, reacted to the 
cost-cutting pressures by replacing workers with new machinery or lowering wages, and 
thereby ending up with increasing productive capacity and at the same time decreasing 
aggregate demand.39 Of course, many inefficient firms that could not keep up with the race 
to the bottom pulled out of the market. But it did not directly lessen the burden of 
overcapacity of remaining firms, because their withdrawal from markets inevitably 
entailed mass unemployment and the resultant shrinking markets. It follows that 
overinvestment, overproduction of commodities and sluggish aggregate demand growth in 
the world market reinforced each other with prices and profit rates increasingly depressed. 
The fallout of this tendency was not only to be limited to individual firms. With profit rates 
ever-falling, a growing mass of capital would be no longer reinvested in production, which 
in turn would aggravate the market situation by increasing unemployment, bankruptcies, 
and losses to the banking system in a vicious circle.  
 
From the late-1990s, the Chinese government sought to confront this problem through 
debt-financed investments in huge mega-projects of building infrastructure. In the same 
way as the US during the 1950s and the 1960s, thousands of highways, airports, new 
railroads, and huge dams were to be built in every big city. Considering China’s under-
developed infrastructure relative to the rapid expansion of manufacturing, it seemed quite 
reasonable for the state to invest in such projects for long-term productivity gains. But the 
problem was the increasing instability of SOBs. Much money that had previously gone to 
                                                                                                                           
unemployment rate comes out. According to Knight and Xue (2004), urban unemployment rose 
over the 1990s, from 4.2% in 1990 to 5.6% in 1995 to 11.5% in 2000 and further to 15.2% in 2005. 
Ofreneo (2002) cites a figure of 13%, while an even higher 17-20% was estimated by the ILO. 
39 Faced with cost-cutting pressures and falling profit margins, established firms cannot simply 
withdraw from markets because they have large amounts of assets in the form of fixed capital. As 
long as the cost of moving out of the market (so-called sunk cost) is higher than the cost of over-
investment the firm should continue to operate in spite of the negative effects on profit rates (this is 
a situation often called ‘sunk cost dilemma’) (see Weeks 2000, Walker 1999 p.185).  
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the banks in an attempt to clean up bad loans during the banking reform of the mid-1990s 
was again mobilized for a variety of local government projects and the volatile real estate-
construction sectors since that time (e.g. investment in real estate soared by near 20% per 
year from 2001 to 2005 and reached 11% of GDP in 2005) (Barnet and Brooks 2006, p.17). 
Adding to this, the government also commanded those commercial banks to increase their 
lending and to loosen credit controls regardless of risk calculations just as was the case in 
the 1980s. As a result, by the mid-2000s, a serious bad debt problem arose again (let alone 
the growing problem of the property bubble). In 2003, for example, while nearly 50% of 
all loans (approximately worth $500 billion) made by the major banks were estimated to be 
‘non-performing’, the government had to transfer $45 billion from its foreign exchange 
reserves to two big state-owned banks as “the third large bailout in the banking system in 
less than six years” (Harvey 2005, p.134).  
 
With the chronic problem of an ‘unhealthy’ banking system remaining, the state’s 
outstanding public debts (not including SOBs’ non-performing loans, that is, so-called 
‘hidden liability) more than doubled from 6.5% of GDP in 1996 to 20% of GDP in 2007 
(IMF 2009). Of course the figures had remained well below the so-called ‘safety level’ of 
60% of GDP, but such debt/GDP ratios were not unproblematic considering some other 
factors related to it. First, as a result of privatization and lax taxation policies, China’s 
public revenue/GDP ratio had remained very low at 13% compared to ratios of around 30% 
or more typical of many European countries (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 2005 p.74). This 
means its GDP growth would generate far less government revenue with which the state 
could fund deficits. Second, from 2007 the Chinese banking sector began to be fully 
opened up for foreign banks according to its WTO obligations. Although it would take 
some time for foreign banks to ‘adapt’ to the opaque and exclusive Chinese banking 
system, they would certainly put increasing competitive pressure on SOBs in the long run. 
Competition among banks would result in higher interest rates that banks have to pay out 
on savings deposits, and the lower rates they were able to obtain on the loans they make. 
As a result profit margins for SOBs were likely to be squeezed, making it more difficult for 
them to carry the burdens imposed by any sub-commercial loans they would be obliged to 
make. Thus the ability of the banks to support capital accumulation within the state sector 
(including ‘sterilization’ policy) was likely to be more and more impaired (Hart-Landsberg 
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and Burkett 2005 p.74). These factors show there were real limits on how much the 
Chinese government could safely increase its deficit spending by.  
 
The limitation of debt-financed government spending in dealing with the overcapacity 
problem encouraged the government to take the second option: exporting cheap credit as 
well as cheap commodities, thus helping trading partners to spend more based on credit 
expansion. By using the revenue deriving from the sales of sterilization bonds, the state 
purchased the inflowing dollars in the exchange market, with which it bought up a massive 
amount of dollar-denominated assets, thereby underpinning the purchasing power of 
dollars as well as lowering interest rates in the world market: a financial environment 
conducive to employing expansionary policies. Expressed another way, pouring huge 
amounts of unemployed money capital into the global financial centre, China made it 
easier for the US and other states (in fact made it impossible for them not) to employ 
expansionary monetary-fiscal policies upholding levels of global effective demand in the 
face of the growing deflationary pressure. It follows that the Chinese state’s desperate 
attempts to overcome overcapacity problems expressed itself in the world market as 
overproduced commodities on the one hand, and overextended credit on the other. 
Although such state financial intervention indeed to some extent lessened the burden of 
overcapacity and overproduction by allowing foreign markets to rapidly expand, it, as will 
be discussed in later chapters, ended up contributing to increased overcapacity and 
overproduction problems that would entail a potentially more devastating crisis in the 
future.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the process in which China transformed itself into a surplus-
running ‘factory of the world’ with special attention to socio-economic policies the state 
employed during the reform era. As discussed, the party-state embarked on the reform 
process under the pressure of accumulation crisis that led to the crisis of the CCP rule in 
the mid-1970s. The existence of this crisis has been demonstrated with the empirical 
material showing the falling productivity growth rates, a decade-long stagnating real wage 
growth rate, and frequently-recorded hyper-inflation rates that triggered socio-political 
unrest represented by the first and second Tiananmen incidents. The immediate goal of 
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reforms was, thus, to restructure underlying class relations of production in a way to 
increasing labour productivity. The core of the restructuring process was to set both firms 
and workers free from the imposition of state plans (i.e. the directly political form of class 
relations), and thereby to establish class relations based on commodity exchanges in the 
market where the rule of money and law obtains. The result of reforms was immediate; 
firms, exposed to the competitive pressure on the one hand, and endowed with the freedom 
of management on the other, began struggling to improve the conditions of production by 
forcing down wages, expelling ‘surplus’ workers and intensifying work for the remaining 
workers. Coupled with the socialist legacy of high-quality social-physical infrastructure, 
and the introduction of advanced technologies by foreign investors, such a drastic re-
composition of class relations, as expected, brought about a dramatic growth in 
productivity. With the world’s lowest unit labour costs delivering capitals larger world 
market shares and higher profit rates than the average, China was able to rise as the largest 
global factory attracting the world’s productive capitals. In this chapter, this fact has been 
empirically demonstrated with the world-lowest unit labour costs and increasingly larger 
world market shares for firms operating in China coupled with the historically 
unprecedented influx of FDI between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s.  
 
The very ‘success’ of the reform process, however, posed another form of threat to 
dominance over labour: intensifying workers’ resistance and chronic problems of 
overcapacity and unemployment. The CCP leadership responded to the potential crisis by 
means of more accommodative labour policies pacifying class confrontation, along with 
debt-financed state-led investment projects injecting demand into the market. The 
contradiction was that such practical responses of the state might well bring about higher 
costs of exploitation and escalating financial instability, possibly making the initial 
problems even worse and deeper in the long run. Ultimately, despite its rapid growth, or as 
a result of the rapid accumulation, China was becoming ever more vulnerable to political 
and economic crisis, which in this chapter has been empirically examined with the ever-
falling average capacity utilization rates, chronically high unemployment, increasingly 
more cases of serious industrial action, and growing bad-debt loads (NPLs) in the banking 
system during the mid-2000s. This growing possibility of crisis made the state rely 
increasingly on the growth of the ‘consumer of the last resort’, that is, US’ debt-financed 
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consumption expansion as one of the most attractive ways to ease the growing 
contradiction it faced. It was in this context that China had come to form the global 
imbalance together with the US. 
The following chapter will examine the other pole of the global imbalance, that is, the 
development of the US economic growth between the mid-1990s and mid-the 2000s during 
which it played the role of ‘the world consumer of last resort’.  
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Chapter 7. The Rise of America as the debt-ridden consumer of the world 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter explores why the US came to play the role of the ‘debt-ridden consumer of 
the world’ from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s and how the state was able to sustain such 
a position in the global economy. For this purpose, the chapter analyses economic policies 
during that period with special attention to their role in creating so-called ‘bubbles’ (the 
stock market bubbles in the second half of 1990s and the housing bubble in the first half of 
2000s). At the same time, based on the understanding that bubble-led growth is a fictitious 
and temporary prosperity built on credit expansion (rising paper-value of assets) without 
corresponding improvements in productive conditions, the contradictions and limitations 
that it entailed will also be discussed.  
 
The chapter consists of three parts. The first section outlines how the state responded to the 
crisis in the 1980s and what was left for the Clinton administration in the early 1990s. The 
second part examines the debt-driven consumption-investment boom based on the stock 
market bubble in the 1990s. It starts with a brief outline of economic policy changes, a 
turnaround from the previous policies under Clinton, and then shows that the economy 
enjoyed a debt-financed consumption boom in the face of worsening conditions of the ‘real’ 
economy that the policies actually brought about. The remainder of this section focuses on 
how the state inflated the contradictory stock market bubble. The third part surveys how 
the fallouts of the collapsed bubble were weathered by another bubble, that is, the housing 
bubble in the early 2000s, which enabled the US to continue to pursue economic growth 
based on credit expansion. By tracking the origin of the housing bubble, this section 
explains what roles the state assumed in forming the bubble, and what contradictions it 
involved.    
 
The findings of this chapter are empirically supported by a variety of macroeconomic 
indicators. Firstly, the existence of the accumulation crisis faced by the American state in 
the early 1990s is demonstrated with the steadily falling capacity utilization rates and 
exceptionally high unemployment and poverty rates coupled with constantly falling real 
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wages. Secondly, the fact that the rise of the US as a world debt-ridden consumption 
market was due to the economic policies employed in response to the crisis (a set of 
economic policies with the objective of encouraging more active investment based on easy 
credit) will be proven by presenting empirical data related to the policy outcomes such as 
the relatively high unit labour costs (e.g. upward pressures on the overall trade-weighted 
real value of the dollar), rapidly shrinking world market shares for firms producing 
tradable goods in the US, and the constant trend of de-industrialization/financialization. 
Thirdly, the process in which the continued rapid growth ended up intensifying, rather than 
countering, the tendency towards overaccumulation and crisis in the US will be examined 
in reference to empirical data such as the ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratios, in particular the 
rising household debt and debt-service payment as a percentage of disposable income until 
the year 2007.  
 
2. Historical Background  
 
1.1.  Failed Restructuring and the Precarious 1980s  
 
By the mid-1970s the US was witnessing the limitations of Keynesian demand 
management in overcoming the accumulation crisis; the traditional expansionary response 
to falling rates of profit, sluggish economic growth, rising unemployment and social unrest 
were making the problems even worse by increasing rates of inflation with the balance of 
payments deteriorated. Ultimately, the growing separation between money and production 
exposed the dollar to speculative attacks, leading to the 1977-79 dollar crisis1. In response 
to the dollar crisis, a dramatic policy turnaround was taken by the monetary authority in 
1979; rather than supporting inefficient firms and workers by sacrificing the value of 
money and the whole system, the Fed decided to drive them out of the economy by forcing 
up interest rates to their highest level. The intent of the policy was clear; any firms unable 
to cope with high interest rates by cutting unit labour costs were to leave the market, while 
workers unwilling to accept lower wages and more intense work were to be sacked and fall 
into poverty (Harman 2009, pp.200-1). At first, this brutal restructuring project appeared to 
some extent successful; with widespread bankruptcies and high rates of unemployment and 
                                         
1 On the detailed observation of the dollar crisis at that time see Helleiner (1994, pp.131-5). 
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poverty, the trend of ever-rising wages/prices finally changed its course while productivity 
rose sharply, leading to lower US unit labour costs by the mid-1980s (Glyn 2006, p.81).  
 
However, a series of ramifications of such an unprecedented hike in interest rates made the 
Fed and the administration abandon the policy drive shortly after. First of all, the 
unexpected interest rate hike forced a number of developing countries that had incurred 
huge amounts of debt at a time of low-rates and weak dollars to threaten a default, possibly 
putting US banks in serious jeopardy. Also, a steep trend of strong dollars (that appreciated 
by more than 40% until 1985) built by speculative inflow of funds did huge damage to US-
based producers. For US firms producing tradable goods, any gains from lowering unit 
labour costs were effectively offset by the high value of the dollar vis-à-vis other 
currencies. Faced with growing pressures from banks and firms as well as trade unions, the 
Fed and the administration changed policy direction once again; while the Fed cut the rate 
from 16.38% in 1981 to 9.09% in 1983 and further to 6.81% in 1986 in an attempt to 
reduce the burden of indebted firms, the government began focusing more on how to 
protect less competitive US manufacturers, rather than on how to restructure them. Among 
other policies (notably the aggressive tax-cuts), the most prominent was a weak-dollar 
drive directed by the Plaza Accord in 1985 (Brenner 2002, pp. 59–74; Helleiner 1994, 
p.184). Through bouts of concerted interventions into exchange markets (sales of Treasury 
bonds along with lowering other countries’ interest rates relative to US’), the US and other 
advanced states devalued the dollar against other major currencies by more than 50% from 
1985 to 1987 with the trend persisting until the mid-1990s. It seems evident to some extent 
that such a weak dollar together with low real wages made US producers more competitive 
relative to producers in Japan and Europe; the US’ unit labour costs in terms of dollars 
came to be within striking range of many of its advanced trading partners since then (van 
Ark 1995; Shaikh 2000).  
 
However, a weak dollar as such was not a cure-all; rather, the effects were contradictory in 
some ways. Above all, it effectively supported the manufacturers in Asian NICs and 
emerging BRICS whose currencies were pegged to the dollar. Indeed, the relatively strong 
yen and European currencies encouraged FDI flows into those countries providing 
exceptionally low-wage and disciplined workers, which in turn boosted their 
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competitiveness vis-à-vis US-based producers. In the race to the bottom, the US 
successfully caught up Japan and Europe, but in so doing the US ended up calling stronger 
competitors to the ring. As a result, although the US current account deficit had come back 
somewhat from its record highs of the mid to late 1980s, the persistence of the current 
account deficits appeared quite inexorable through into the-mid 1990s. In addition to this, a 
weak dollar also caused the uncomfortable problem of stagnating productivity growth 
relative to other advanced countries. Low value of the dollar (and relatively higher interest 
rates in the US) made imported capital goods more expensive, which in turn made it 
difficult for US-based producers to engage in more aggressive capital-intensive forms of 
investment. Indeed, from the mid-1980s Japan saw a significantly higher growth rate of 
productivity (in particular in high-tech electronics industries) compared to the US, thus 
threatening the US’s competitive position once again (Dertouzos et al 1989, p.10).  
 
After all, the policy of weak dollars was not that successful in securing larger market 
shares for US producers and thus reinvigorating productive investments. Rather, it attracted 
large amounts of speculative funds from Japan and Europe (taking advantage of the strong 
yen and interest rate differential made by the Plaza Accord), forming a financial market 
bubble (represented by highly-leveraged M&A crazes) into which US firms, reluctant to 
expand productive activities, also rushed to invest with earned profits. While such bubbles 
repeatedly brought about a debt-driven consumption boom and a subsequent collapse, the 
economy as a whole was largely dependent upon an unprecedented sum of government 
spending in particular military expenditure as well as successive state bail-out operations 
for stock markets with government debt growing from 44% to 69% of GDP. Defence 
spending hit a peak of $456.5 billion or 10% of GNP in 1987 (in 2005 dollars), compared 
with $325.1 billion in 1980 and $339.6 million in 1981 (CSBA 2010), while the US 
military economy (so-called Military Keynesianism) employed almost six and a half 
million people and one job in twenty depended, directly or indirectly, on military spending 
(The Washington Post, 17 January 1986; Tirman 1984, p. 22). Growing deficit spending 
without increasing international competitiveness might well result in an expanding trade 
deficit, that is, overseas borrowing. It was by this time that the financing of the US trade 
and budget deficits through capital imports transformed the US from the “world’s largest 
net creditor to its largest net debtor” (Walter 1993, p.231). Also, the economy was growing 
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on the precarious political basis of income redistribution named ‘Keynesianism of the New 
Right’, injecting demands into the economy by means of tax-cuts for the rich while 
carrying out political assaults on workers who were demanding higher wages.  
 
When the credit expansion without corresponding improvement in productive conditions 
(i.e. a source of debt repayment) reached the ultimate limit and the increasing costs of 
borrowing (due to bad debt problems of banks) began to make it more difficult for the 
government and firms to borrow and spend any longer, the economy by the early-1990s 
fell into the deepest recession ever experienced in the post-war period, a typical 
overaccumulation crisis just like that of the mid-1970s.  
 
1.2. Recession and Growing Political Pressure in the early 1990s 
 
The fallout of the early 1990s recession was not limited to the years 1990 and 1991. 
Though by official measures the formal recession was short—running from July 1990 
through to March 1991, every economic indicator other than GDP growth and stock market 
indexes (responding to a massive expansion of liquidity by the Fed) grew increasingly 
worse well into the mid-1990s (Henwood 1999). Capacity utilization rates, which once 
reached a high point of 83.9% in 1988, declined to 77.1% in 1991 and then remained 
below 80% in 1993 (FRED). With excess capacity, firms were not eager to borrow and 
invest despite the Fed reducing real interest rates to almost zero (although corporate 
borrowing and investment were gradually recovering from the end of 1993, they remained 
at half the mid-1980s level). Instead, it seemed that relatively inefficient firms were 
preoccupied with cutting costs by means of mass lay-offs, intensification of work and wage 
cuts, which again clouded the overall investment environment by undercutting aggregate 
domestic demand. As a result, the recovery did not result in any signs of improvement in 
labour markets. Unemployment rates, which had peaked at 7.8% in 1992, did not fall 
below 6% during 1994, while the rate of unemployed plus underemployed (‘contingent’ 
workers) remained exceptionally high at 11.5% in 1995 (Moseley 1999, p.32; Smith 2008, 
p.198). High unemployment precipitated the decade-long downward trend of real wages. 
Continuing to fall from $15.7 (measured in 2001 dollars) in 1973, average real wages 
reached a trough of $12.27 in 1993. Considering the feeble US safety net (the short 
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duration of unemployment benefits as well as the substantially higher costs of health care 
for those without jobs), it is not surprising that such a long-lasting high unemployment also 
led to a widespread poverty problem. The official poverty rate rising continuously from 
13.5% in 1990 to a record high of 15.1% (just below 40 million people) with more than 30% 
of black and Hispanic people living under the poverty line (the relative poverty rate, 
showing the relation to median income, also broke the record at 24% in 1994) (Notten and 
Neubourg 2007, p.16).  
 
The political fallout of such a gloomy economic situation was not only felt by Bush-I and 
Democrats who unexpectedly lost elections to rivals in 1992 and 1994 respectively, but by 
the whole political system through 1992 LA riots and growing cynicism towards bipartisan 
politics as the lowest turnout rates of each election showed. Although imposing 
deflationary pressures at the cost of the majority of people, that is, repressing consumption 
to its utmost was an unavoidable course of restructuring in the economic sense state 
managers were under growing political pressure to find whatever ways to immediately 
improve the lives of their voters even at the cost of the general long-term interest of the 
economy.  
 
Apart from domestic political stresses, growing pressures were also applied by a 
deteriorating external and financial environment. During the early months of 1995, in the 
wake of the collapse of the peso and the subsequent US bail-out of the Mexican economy, 
there followed a new run on the dollar, sharply accentuating its secular fall over the 
previous decade. The Clinton administration, implicitly favouring further falls in the dollar, 
did not at first resist the trend in the name of ‘benign neglect’ policy towards exchange 
rates (Callahan and Garrison 2003). By April 1995, however, a decade of an 
unprecedentedly weak dollar seemed to have brought the Japanese to the edge of collapse 
(Powell 2002). The yen had risen by 60% over its level at the start of 1991, and by 30% 
over its level at the beginning of 1994, to a record-high exchange rate of 79 against the 
dollar (Murphy 1997). A high value currency, unless validated by sufficient curtailment of 
nominal wages or rapid productivity growth, would lead to higher unit labour costs in 
dollars which not only drives domestic producers (exporters) to the verge of bankruptcy 
but encourages them to invest in lower-wage countries or in more profitable financial 
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markets with earned profits, thus ultimately causing political distresses deriving from 
financial instability (in the wake of debt-driven prosperity), stagnating productive 
investment and high unemployment. With such an exceptionally strong yen for a sustained 
period, Japan was not an exception; highly-indebted producers still remaining on Japanese 
soil could not even cover their variable costs, and the Japanese growth machine appeared 
to be grinding to a halt (Murphy 1997). The real headache to Washington was not the 
possible collapse of Japan’s manufacturing-based economy as such, but the ripple effect on 
its own financial markets that it would bring about. It was almost certain that any serious 
crisis of Japan (or any further fall of the dollar) would precipitate a large-scale liquidation 
of their enormous holdings of US assets, especially Treasury Bonds (Brenner 2000, p.15). 
Such a development would drive up interest rates, frighten money markets, and possibly 
lead to a deeper recession at the very moment the US economy was still in the shadow of 
the 90-1 recession. Given that the next presidential election was beginning to loom, a 
policy turnaround seemed inevitable at that time.  
 
3. New Economy based on Stock Market Bubble  
 
3.1. Policy Turnaround for a Breakthrough  
 
By the mid-1990s, it became clear that the decade-long strategy of reviving US industrial 
growth by cheapening the corporate USA (a weak dollar through international policy 
cooperation as well as cheap labour through imposition of unemployment and poverty) was 
a futile attempt to swim against the tide. Acknowledging that it was not only ineffective but 
also unsustainable both in political and economic senses, a sharp reversal of economic 
policy occurred under Clinton. Central to the new strategy of restructuring was a 
combination of a strong dollar and low interest rates, by which it seemed policy-makers 
sought for a growth based on brisk investment for higher productivity growth. Larry 
Summers justified the policy turnaround by arguing that “pushing the dollar down leads to 
a lack of confidence in financial markets and undermines the discipline needed to increase 
productivity” (Summers 2002, p.261) In other words, he was expecting “an appreciation of 
the dollar would force rationalization and cost-saving upon undisciplined manufacturing 
sector” (Frankel 1994, p.325). But unlike under Volker, such a disciplinary pressure of 
strong dollars would be combined with low interest rates and brisk stock markets, thus 
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hopefully leading firms to more investment activities instead of more bankruptcies.  
 
In theory, there are close links between a strong dollar, low interest rates and investment 
growth. A strong dollar would not only cheapen imported capital goods (machinery, 
technology, and raw materials) but also imported consumer goods (and thus wages). These 
disinflationary effects of a strong dollar (together with the Clinton government’s spending 
cuts) would enable the monetary authorities to expand liquidity without the worry of 
inflation (Callahan and Garrison 2003, p.72). This low interest rate, in turn, coupled with 
the deregulation of financial markets, would make it easier for firms to incur bank debts or 
to raise money by issuing shares through brisk stock markets. Of course, a strong dollar 
would put deflationary pressure upon some manufacturing firms by exposing them to 
fiercer price-competition from those operating in low-wage countries, but it was 
considered that more aggressive investments in advanced methods of production and 
technology as well as the highly flexible labour markets (allowing even lower wages) in 
the US would give them a breakthrough to successful restructuring.  
 
This optimism was partly based on the legacy inherited from Reagan era: highly developed 
new information and communication technologies, and highly flexible labour markets. As 
noted, the Reagan era’s military Keynesianism poured huge amounts of money into such 
projects as the Missile Defence System (the so-called Star Wars) of which a large part was 
spent on R&D into the new information and communication technologies in particular the 
Internet. They might have considered it was high time to finally benefit from the past 
investment; its ability to assimilate the new technologies for commercial ends, allowing 
them to capture surplus profits by being the first in the field with new commodities. 
Another legacy came from the decade-long new-conservative crusade against trade unions 
along with successive industrial shake-outs and high unemployment which to no small 
degree dissolved the entrenched positions of American organized workers. Combined with 
the introduction of new technologies, a more compliant labour force allowing more 
flexible working times was expected to lead to a more rapid turnover of capital (Harman 
2009, p.235). 
 
As shown in Table 7.1, the ‘New Economy’ boom of 1996-2000 apparently achieved the 
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goal set by policy-makers (Pollin 2006, p.35). While the international policy cooperation of 
the ‘reverse Plaza Accord’ successfully appreciated the dollar with interest rates kept 
relatively low, the period saw a very powerful boom, marked by an acceleration of 
productivity, employment and, eventually, real wage growth as well as booming stock 
markets.  
 
Table 7.1. Two phases of macroeconomic performance under Clinton (percent) 
 1993-95 1996-2000 
Real GDP growth  3.1 4.1 
Productivity growth  0.9 2.5 
Unemployment rate 6.2 4.6 
Inflation rate 2.8 2.5 
Industrial Production Index 4.2 5.14 
Real hourly wage growth -0.1 1.4 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP & Personal Income, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm (accessed June 14 2012); Bureau of Labour Statistics, Economy at 
a Glance, http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.us.htm (accessed June 14 2012).  
 
But, as will be discussed in the following, this boom was almost entirely dependent upon 
debt-driven consumption growth based on a stock market run-up without basis in 
underlying growth of productive activities. Such fictitious prosperity persisted through into 
the mid-2000s. 
 
3.2. Reality: Declining US Industrial Competitiveness 
 
 Before discussing how the debt-driven consumption boom developed, this section 
examines the reality of the underlying ‘real’ economy during the second half of the 1990s, 
which was characterized by declining American industrial competitiveness and the 
resultant trend of deindustrialization along with the growing pool of low-wage labour.  
 
3.2.1. Declining Competitiveness and Deindustrialization  
 
 Table 7.2 shows that the trend toward de-industrialization (the tendential decline of the 
manufacturing share in an economy) in terms of employment had continued over the 
period in spite of the boasted investment boom of the New Economy. The share of US 
employment in the manufacturing sector declined from a recorded peak of 32% in the early 
1940s to 16.7% in 1989 and then further to 13.1% in 2000, whilst the proportion of 
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workers employed in services (retail, finance, public utilities, entertainment and real estate 
etc.) and construction sectors which are largely insulated from foreign competition 
continued to grow from 77.3% in 1979 to 82.6% in 1989 to 86.5% in 2000 (Mishel et al 
2007, p.169). This trend of de-industrialization can also be found in terms of output; US 
manufacturing value added as a share of the total US economy steadily fell from 24% in  
1970 to 18% in 1990 and further to 15% in 2000 (UN NAD 2013). 
 
The main factor shaping the pattern of deindustrialization was the shrinking market share, 
that is, the falling competitiveness of US-based manufacturers and the resultant reduction 
of domestic production (Burkett and Hart-Landsberg 2001, p.34; Shaikh 1998, p.60-61; 
McKinnon 2004, p.3)2. Indeed, as Figure 7.1 shows, between 1997 and 2007 the US share 
of world exports fell 4.3% from 12.6% to 8.3% in a steady trend of decline since 1980.3  
 
                                         
2 It can be argued that the most important factor that shaped the pattern was the pace of 
productivity growth in manufacturing sectors that had been faster than that of other non-
manufacturing sectors (see Harman 2009, p.333). It is undeniable that different productivity growth 
between sectors indeed to some extent influenced the trend, but the factor alone cannot show the 
whole picture; considering the falling ratio of domestic manufacturing production to total 
manufacturing demand, and the ever-growing amount of the trade deficit in manufactures, one 
cannot ignore that the shrinking market share and reduction of domestic production had played an 
important role in shaping the pattern.  
3 From 1980 to the mid-2000s the U.S. share of world manufactured exports fell by almost one 
third (Del Gatto et al 2011, p.2). 
Table 7.2. Employment growth by sector, 1979-2005 (percentage) 
 1979 1989 2000 2005 
Manufacturing 21.6 16.7 13.1 10.7 
Services 72.2 77.7 81.3 83.4 
Construction 5.1 4.9 5.2 5.5 
Government 17.9 16.6 15.8 16.3 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics:  
http://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm (assessed Sept 7 2012); Mishel et al (2007, p.169). 
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Figure 7.1. World export shares of US between 1997 and 2007 (%) 
Source: WTO international trade statistics 2009 
 
The market share losses were concentrated in certain product groups (capital goods such as 
electronics, machinery, and transportation equipment) and in specific geographical areas 
(East Asia in particular China) that had been expanding fastest as a share of world trade. 
Indeed, the US share of machine and computer exports fell from a third of the total in 1984 
to around 20% in 1994 and then further to 14% in 1999 in spite of the supposed US 
competitiveness in these areas. In terms of exports to fast growing China, Chinese demand 
for US products relative to others was also falling; the US share of world goods exports to 
China declined from 12% in 1995 to 9% in 2004, while the share of such countries as 
Japan, Germany, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore tended to increase (del 
Gatto et al 2011, p.8). While US manufacturers’ ability to penetrate export markets was 
increasingly eroded, they were also becoming less competitive at home. The US domestic 
manufacturing market saw growing penetration by imports: foreign-produced 
manufacturing goods took 26% of the market in 2000 (up from 14% in 1991), including 80% 
for leather and shoes, 57% for apparel, 51% for computers and electronic equipment and 
33% for cars and a wide swathes of machinery. It is estimated that by the mid-2000s, about 
a quarter of manufacturing sectors ceded more than half their domestic market to imports 
with the trend accelerated (Glyn 2007, p.83; Mishel et al 2007, p.171).  
 
Such shrinking market shares can also be identified by the falling capacity utilization (that 
is, excess capacity or insufficient demand to warrant further expansion of output through 
more investment). As shown in Figure 7.2, while the rate of capacity utilization for all 
industries saw a relatively slight fall of 2.5% from 84% in 1995 to 81.5% in 2000, the rate 
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for manufacturing fell by 4% from 83.3% to 79.3% during the same period. From this 
figure it can be estimated that manufacturing in the period had disproportionately shrunk 
with less investment compared to other sections of the economy due to the market share 
losses. 
 
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:  
 Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, 
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU; accessed Sept 17, 2012. 
 
Behind this trend was the problem of production costs that had been higher in the US than 
in other countries. As Shaikh put it, “relatively high-cost regions would tend to have 
declining shares in a market as customers will flock in greater numbers to firms with lower 
selling prices. Their higher unit labour costs would make it difficult for them to sell outside 
the region and would leave their markets vulnerable to products produced in lower-cost 
regions.” (Shaikh 1998, pp.60-61).  
 
During the second half of 1990s, the unit labour costs of manufacturing production in the 
US declined at an average annual rate of more than 1% owing to the growth rate of labour 
productivity (3.2% per annum) higher than the annual growth rate of nominal wages (2.2%) 
(Brenner 2000, p. 65). Nevertheless, US manufacturers’ price competitiveness significantly 
fell during the same period, because the fall of unit labour costs was overwhelmed by both 
the large appreciation of the dollar (21% in real trade weighted terms) and the emergence 
of Asian exporters including China where the extremely low level of wages as well as 
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relatively well disciplined labour practices resulted in a great price competitiveness. For 
example, in 1998 although the US manufacturing productivity level (value added per 
person) was about 14 times higher than that of the Chinese, the US wage level (labour 
compensation per person in dollar terms) was 63 times higher than that in China, thus the 
US unit labour costs in dollars were 4.5 times higher than China’s (Ceglowski and Golub 
2011, p.14). Matters were made even worse for US producers when the East Asian (and 
other developing) countries fell into crisis in 1997–98, leading to a drastic devaluation of 
their currencies vis-à-vis the dollar (i.e. a drastic reduction of wages in terms of dollars). 
During the period, crisis-struck developing countries such as South Korea, Mexico and 
Brazil competitively joined the Chinese-led race to the bottom, driving down the prices of 
tradable goods in the world market at a rate of a staggering 4% every year. Not surprisingly, 
such a rapid fall of prices in world markets made the pace of declining US unit labour costs 
too slow for production in the US to be profitable (Brenner 2000, p.66). In that situation, if 
American producers were to fully catch up the foreign competitors (and thus to maintain or 
expand production in the US), a combination of an even faster growth of labour 
productivity, even lower real wages and a drastic devaluation of the dollar, that is, a 
combination that could be called a ‘crisis’ would have been necessary.  
 
Unable and unwilling to withstand these pressures from the world market, many US 
businesses began giving up investing in manufacturing production in the US. In some cases, 
they turned themselves into a sort of financier dealing with consumer finance, for instance 
Enron, GM, and GE (Blackburn 2006; The Economist, 17, April 2008). In other cases, they 
became commercial vendors, closing down plants and sub-contracting production to low-
wage regions such as China or tariff-free export platforms of 'Maquiladora' sweatshops and 
then importing final products into the US (Cravy 1998, p.71; Glassman and Carmody 2001, 
p.83).4 It follows that, for them, strong dollars were both a means and opportunity for 
                                         
4 Bronfenbrenner and Luce’s (2004) observation on this pattern of restructuring provides a good 
example: “US based Amerock announced in February 2004 that it would be shutting down its 
Rockford, Illinois cabinet and window manufacturing plant after seventy-five years in operation. 
The company plans to move 450 jobs from Illinois to China and Mexico – not to sell hardware to 
the Chinese and Mexican market, but in an effort to reduce production prices and stay competitive 
in the US market. This is true for a wide variety of products that will be produced in China to sell 
back to the US market by companies such as Carrier Corp. (air conditioners), Levis (jeans), Werner 
Co. (ladders for Home Depot), Union Tools Inc. (lawn and garden tools) and Remington Products 
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liberating themselves from the production in the US, rather than financing a decisive 
breakthrough in labour productivity. And such activities of them made the existing problem 
of declining competitiveness even worse and hastened the decline of US manufacturing 
production by supporting debt-financed consumption in the US at the same time as 
upgrading low-wage regions’ productive capacities.  
 
3.2.2. Growing pool of low wage workers  
 
As shown in Table 1, the other story of de-industrialization was the growing population 
(around 85% of all workers) working in the ‘non-traded sector’ –services, finance and 
construction sectors. According to Mishel’s estimate (2007, p.175), in the 1990s the US 
manufacturing sector subject to import competition, including toys, clothing and electronic 
goods saw about 3.5 million trade-related job losses (with 1.7 million and 1.9 million in the 
1980s and the 2000-4 period respectively). Such new supplies of workers to the service 
and construction sectors (from displaced workers plus young workers not able to find 
manufacturing jobs) lowered wages of workers already employed in those jobs.  
 
Further, the declining manufacturing sector was not the only source of supply of workers to 
those sectors; while the government, seeking spending cuts, did not assume the role of job 
creator (e.g. the government share of employment fell from 16.6% in 1989 to 15.8% in 
2000), millions of former welfare recipients were also forced into the sectors. In 1996 
President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act, to end “welfare as we know it.” The act as a market-based social welfare policy 
replaced the existing entitlement programme for single mothers with a new work-based 
program that required recipients to participate in work or work-based activities in order to 
receive cash assistance. Between 1996 and 2001 more than two million single mothers 
were dropped from the welfare rolls and 70% of those who left welfare were working in 
the service sectors, especially retail and eating and drinking establishments where they 
were paid at a $5 to $7 an hour range that was below a conceived ‘living wage’ of $8 per 
hour at that time (Harris 1996; Cancian et al 1999; Hays 2004; Corcoran et al 2000). While 
the former recipients had a hard time making ends meet with reduced disposable income, 
                                                                                                                           
Company (electric shavers)” (pp. 33–34). 
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their move to the labour market increased the size of the reserve army of labour and 
intensified competition for jobs among non-welfare low-wage workers, exerting downward 
pressure on wages and upward pressure on the unemployment rate.  
  
In addition, the 1990s saw a huge influx of migrant workers into the labour market. 
Immigrants were forming a growing part of America’s labour force, and Mexican 
immigration was a key part of the trend. The Mexican immigrant population grew by 104% 
during the 1990s, from 4.3 million to 8.8 million overall (Fix et al. 2003). One of the most 
important factors accelerating the trends was the ratification of NAFTA in 1994. NAFTA, 
by permitting heavily-subsidized US agri-business products to compete with small 
Mexican farmers, drove more than 2 million Mexican farmers off the land. These people 
living in desperate poverty were among those that crossed the border to feed their families 
(Bybee and Winter 2006). Also, NAFTA's service-sector rules allowed big firms like Wal-
Mart to enter the Mexican market and, selling ultra-cheap goods made in China, to displace 
locally-based manufacturing firms. Meanwhile, Mexico’s economic woes from the peso 
crisis increased the “push factors” leading to migration. While government policies to 
discourage immigration (e.g. expanding border patrols and capping the number of legal 
visas) had little effect in deterring transnational movement, they were not without 
influence; rather than reducing the flow of Mexican migrants, their principal effect was to 
drive migration further underground; the overall flow of migrants continued to grow as 
before, with the composition shifting from legal to illegal. During the period 1990–2000, 
the number of undocumented immigrants more than doubled from 3.5 to 8.5 million for the 
United States overall (Passel 2005). While the harsh suffering in Mexico forced millions of 
desperate Mexicans to cross the border, these "illegal immigrants" provided US employers 
with a vast disposable pool of cheap labour with no meaningful rights on the job (Massey 
1998, pp. 22-3). While one in five low-wage workers were immigrants, nearly 10% of all 
workers in sectors such as construction, nondurable goods manufacturing, and services 
were undocumented Mexican migrants. Their average wage was estimated at less than 41% 
of native workers in the same job positions without accounting for the other benefits which 
range from 27-30% of their total employment compensation (AILF 2002). Among others, 
immigrants did increase the reserve army of labour, a mass of workers who compete 
against one another for jobs under any conditions.  
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Considering that workers were not pulled into such industries by rising demands for 
services, but rather that they were pushed out and then forced into the sectors where 
oversupply of labour was putting downward pressures on wages, and half of those who 
were still working in manufacturing sectors suffered a wage cut of 15% or more, it is not 
surprising that the average wages for non-supervisory workers and the earnings of those in 
the lowest 10% docile of the wage distribution not only remained well below those of the 
Nixon/Ford and Carter administrations, but were actually lower even than those of the 
Reagan/Bush years. Indeed, during the 1993-96 period real wages were stagnating at a 
forty-year low ($13.27 in 2001 dollars) while unemployment rates remained at a relatively 
high point above 6% (Glyn 2007, p.111; Rowthorn and Coutts 2004; Yates 2004). People 
were to pay for the declining profitability of corporate America.  
 
3.2.3. Boom of Stock-market Keynesianism  
 
However, a quite surprising turnaround of the New Economy occurred from 1997; as 
Figure 7.3 and 7.4 show, real hourly compensation started rising sharply for four 
consecutive years (reversing the long lasting trend since the 1970s) with unemployment 
rate dropping to a record low of 3.9% by 2000. As a result, individual poverty rates also 
dropped while the chronic problem of income inequality was somewhat improved.  
 
 
 
From Table 7.3 that shows the composition of GDP according to expenditure categories, 
one can estimate that the turnaround was fuelled largely by the increase in private 
consumption and to a lesser degree by private investment, while public expenditure 
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substantially contracted and trade deficits persisted. This trend of private consumption and 
investment boom naturally turns attention towards the issue of credit expansion given the 
fact that the average wage for non-supervisory workers was declining or stagnating until 
the second half of 1997 under the continuous pressure of de-industrialization discussed 
above (Henwood 1999). In addition, as Table 7.4 shows, households and businesses did 
increase their debts more than enough to actually raise the overall domestic borrowing 
relative to GDP despite drastic reduction of government borrowing.  
 
Table 7.3. Changes in the Components of GDP between 1977 and 2000 (%) 
 1977-80 
Carter  
1981-92  
Reagan/Bush 
1993-2000 
Clinton 
Consumption 62.6 64.9 67.1 
Government  20.0 20.6 18.2 
Investment 18.2 16.1 16.4 
Net exports -0.9 -1.6 -1.7 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP & Personal Income, 
http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm  (accessed June 14, 2012). 
 
Table 7.4. Average Borrowing as a Percentage of GDP during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Years Government  Household Business National International 
1980-1991 8.58 7.47 4.82 20.87 2.14 
1991-2000 3.9 11.48 6.99 22.37 6.5 
Source: Meeropol (2007, p.8). 
 
While between 1992 and 2000 consumer expenditures increased 4.4% annually, much 
faster than the 3.3% increase in disposable personal income, and savings rate plummeted 
from 8.7% to -0.12%, household debt (including mortgage and consumer debt) relative to 
disposable income soared dramatically during the Clinton era, reaching 97.4% from a then-
unprecedented record of 79.0% under Reagan/Bush (Roach 2001). The trend of the rising 
debt/income ratio was also found in business categories. Under Clinton, firms’ internal 
funds (their flow of available new funds from after-tax profits and allowances for 
depreciation of operating equipment) relative to their total debt declined to an all-time low 
of 9.8% from 10.5% in the 1980s (FRB 2001, Pollin, 2005, p.40).  
 
As a matter of course, linking stagnating income growth with growing consumption and 
investment by means of debt was made possible by low interest rates, which significantly 
reduced costs of borrowing for those in growing need of debt to cover falls in real wages 
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and profits. Indeed, despite the size of national debt (total demand for credit) expanding, 
real interest rates (of 10-year Treasury bonds) were actually lower during the period 
averaging 3.6% compared to 5.3% during the Reagan/Bush era. This was partly because of 
the Fed’s cuts in the fund rate and partly because of the influx of huge funds from abroad 
(international borrowing) which amounted to 6.5% of GDP. However, the 3.6% rate was 
still far higher than the level of any previous presidential era; for the 1961-80 period prior 
to Reagan, the average real Treasury rate was 1.1%, less than a third of its level in the 
Clinton period. These figures make it difficult to argue that the increase in household and 
corporate debt in the period was directly due to low interest rates (Pollin 2005, p.41).  
 
What really made such a rising debt/income ratio (and thus rising consumption-
investment/income ratio) possible was a hike in financial asset prices, a bigger capacity 
(collateral) to borrow. In other words, the stock market boom during the second half of the 
1990s effectively increased net wealth (the value of total assets minus total debts) of 
households and firms, which in turn enabled and encouraged them to borrow more and 
spend a higher fraction of their incomes. Indeed, by the first quarter of 2000, the value of 
corporate equities had soared to $19.6 trillion, up from $6.3 trillion in 1994. Measured as a 
percentage of GDP, it had tripled from 50% to 150% between 1995 and 2000 (FRB 2001). 
According to a research on this so-called ‘wealth effect’, the unprecedented rise in the 
stock market in 1995-1999 actually injected between $275 and $460 billion, or roughly 2-4% 
more spending into the economy per year, which in turn stimulated further growth through 
its impact on investment and jobs (Maki and Palumbo 2001; Roach 2001). In effect, the 
increase in the public deficit that was so indispensable to US economic growth during the 
1980s was replaced by an increase in the private deficit financing of demand based on 
stock market run-up—what Brenner called ‘stock-market Keynesianism’ (Brenner 2004, 
p.60).  
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Responding to the growing consumption demand, firms, in particular those that were 
insulated from foreign competition such as retail, community services, finance and 
construction began expanding investments. Of course, the platform of their prosperity was 
built on the growing pool of low-wage workers, whose hourly compensation, falling at an 
average annual rate of 1.6%, was only 48.3% of that in manufacturing sectors in the 1990s 
(Mishel et al 2007, p.168). While more and more workers were pushed out of unprofitable 
manufacturing and forming a pool of cheap disposable labour force, retailers and service 
providers benefited from the rapid increase in consumer expenditures fuelled by the wealth 
effect of bull markets. Also, the steep rise of the dollar, by making imported goods cheaper, 
provided retailers such as Wal-Mart with an increasing opportunity for profiting from 
commerce (e.g. Wal-Mart contributed no less than 10% of all imports from China, which 
grew from $44 billion in 1995 to $122.5 billion in 2002) (Wonnacott 2003). Those firms 
reliant on domestic consumption spending, together with financial firms benefiting from 
fees and profits for superintending share issues and mergers and acquisitions, enjoyed 
unprecedented prosperity.  
 
The US economy was experiencing typical consumption-led growth based on deficit 
spending. As Henwood (1999) put it, “a lot of the “real” investment occurring in the late 
1990s [was] actually in the service of a great financial bubble. So this wasn’t really the 
investment-driven expansion it’s said to be. Quite the contrary, in fact: it’s the most 
consumption-intensive expansion in U.S. history since the 1930s Depression”. One of the 
contradictions of this consumption-led growth was that it actually accelerated the trend of 
deindustrialization. Considering that the upward pressure on wages amid declining 
unemployment as well as the strong dollar together made productive activities in the US 
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even less competitive and attractive (Thornton 2006, p.10), it is not surprising that 
manufacturing investment grew considerably more slowly than general business 
investment “in sharp contrast to the 1960s and early 1970s, when manufacturing grew at 
the same speed. The growth of manufacturing investment was about a third lower in the 
US … than in the earlier period” (Harman 1993). In short, the stock market boom set in 
motion consumption that was not supported by a corresponding expansion of productive 
activities and one of the results was the ever-expanding trade deficit, that is, accumulation 
of increasingly irredeemable foreign debts.  
 
3.3. Origin of the Stock Market Bubble and its Contradiction  
 
Already in the early 1990s, the stock market was gradually rising despite the deep 
recession due to the short-term real interest rates being reduced to zero. Since then, as 
productive investments did not seem profitable enough, the massively expanded liquidity 
began flowing into the stock market, creating conditions for the unprecedented surge 
during the years 1995-2000. Conventional explanations for the stock market boom based 
on the “New Economy” theory, however, focused their attention on the internet revolution 
and the so-called ‘productivity miracle’ which supposedly opened vast new vistas for 
business profits (Pollin 2006, p.36-37). Justifying the unprecedented stock price inflation, 
they argued that the prospect of future internet-led productivity growth and hugely 
expanding Internet-related markets might well drive rational investors to bet on shares of 
firms in particular dot-com-companies. But, as will be examined in the following section, it 
was speculative financial flows set off by state economic policies from 1995 that the 
actually boosted stock markets, and thus the growth of claims on future profits in the 
market that were not matched by a corresponding increase in productivity and profits.  
3.3.1. Reverse Plaza Accord and Strong Dollars based on Speculative Funds 
 
Led by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin the US entered into an arrangement with Japan 
and Germany to take joint action to drive down the yen (and Deutschmark) and push up the 
dollar. In much the same way as had the original Plaza Accord of 1985, the reversal of the 
exchange rate trend "was to be accomplished by lowering Japanese interest rates with 
respect to those in the US, but also by substantially enlarging Japanese purchases of dollar-
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denominated instruments such as Treasury bonds, as well as purchases of dollars by 
Germany and the U.S. government itself" (Brenner 2003, p.331). According to the plan, in 
April 1995 the Bank of Japan cut the official discount rate, already a very low 1.75%, to 1% 
and, the following September, reduced it further to 0.5%. This did help to bring about the 
desired effect of reducing the yen’s value, falling by 60% with respect to the dollar for the 
same period.  
 
These concerted government interventions, however, did not lead to brisk investment in 
productive activities in a country where its currency was depreciated (this time, Japan) just 
as did in the US after the 1985 Plaza Accord. Instead, it provided private investors with a 
conduit through which they can safely funnel out large quantities of speculative funds into 
a country where its currency was appreciating. The interest rate differential available from 
the so-called carry-trade, combined with the orchestrated rise of the dollar against the yen, 
meant that as long as the Reverse Plaza Accord held, investors would be offered a nearly 
guaranteed profit by borrowing yen in Japan to invest in financial assets denominated in 
dollars such as Treasury bonds or corporate stocks (Callahan and Garrison 2003, p.73). 
Indeed, between 1994 and 1995, net foreign purchase of T-bonds was almost doubled from 
$78.8 billion to $134.1 billion while net flow of foreign funds into corporate stocks 
increased about six fold from $1.8 billion to $11.2 billion (FRB 1998). Such a speculative 
movement could not but accelerate the rise in the price of US financial assets with 
downward pressures upon interest rates (Moseley 1999, pp.34-36). After having risen 
respectively by just 2% in 1994, the S&P 500 jumped up by 17.6% in 1995, by far the 
biggest increases since 1989. The index rose by a further 23% during 1996 in spite of 
Greenspan’s famous warning against ‘irrational exuberance’. In 1997, the S&P 500 
increased by another 30% (Shiller 2005). The expansion of the US equity price bubble 
beginning in 1995 was soon amplifying the acceleration of growth in the economy at large.  
 
The most contradictory effect of the speculative flows was that, even as the productive 
conditions of American industries was further undermined by the rising cost of production 
(a strong dollar and rising wages amid a consumption boom), their asset prices were given 
a further impetus upwards, as speculators were able to make profits from both exchange 
rate movements and the rise of the American stock markets.  
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3.3.2. Asian Crisis and Monetary Policy   
 
One of the unexpected results of the reverse Plaza Accord was the outbreak of financial 
crises in East Asian countries (most of whose currencies had been pegged to the rising US 
dollar) and its ripple effects on the American economy. As the value of their currencies was 
steeply falling (e.g. while most of their currencies fell by more than 50-60%, even the 
Japanese yen depreciated by more than 30% during the June 1997-December 1998 period), 
hitherto fast-growing East Asian export markets (i.e. Asian demand for US goods) were 
collapsed and at the same time US-based producers were faced with the flooding of 
domestic markets by even cheaper Asian goods (Moseley 1999, pp.66-67). Indeed, 
between 1997 and 1998 the growth of US exports plummeted from 14% to 2% (in real 
terms) while imports continued to grow at 11.8% (Brenner 2000, p.20). These negative 
impacts on US industries along with growing uncertainty in financial markets began 
affecting the booming stock markets. While net foreign purchase of US financial assets 
declined from $218.7 billion in 1997 to $67.0 billion in 1998 (mainly due to crisis-struck 
Asian governments’ sales of Treasury bonds), and remaining private investors moved their 
funds into ‘safe havens’: Treasury bonds, the S&P 500 had begun to drop rapidly, losing 10% 
from its mid-July peak and it fell a further 10% in the wake of the Russian default 
(Moseley 1999, pp.35-36). Finally, when the highly leveraged Long Term Capital 
Management hedge fund (LTCM) admitted that it was about to fail, the Fed intervened 
once again not only to bail-out the hedge fund investors but to keep the stock market from 
collapsing. It was an explicit ‘too big to fail’ policy towards the entire stock market (Foster 
and Magdoff 2009, p.84). Justifying the bail-outs as an attempt to stabilize the domestic 
and international economy, the Fed made its famous three successive interest-rate cuts in 
autumn-winter 1998, followed by sudden and drastic Federal fund rates cut from 5.5% to 
below 4% (the widest deviation from its target rate in nine years) in 1999.   
 
As an expected result of such rate cuts, after increasing at a rate of less than 2.5% during 
the first three years of the Clinton administration, liquidity (measured by MZM) increased 
over the next three years (1996–1998) at an annualized rate of over 10%, rising during the 
last half of 1998 at a binge rate of almost 15% (Callahan and Garrison 2003, pp.81-82). 
From June 1995 to March 2000, it grew 52%, well ahead of real GDP growth of 22% for 
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the same period (Rogers 2002). Bank loans thus raced ahead at a 19.4% annual pace during 
the fourth quarter of 1999, the highest in at least fifteen years. This expanded liquidity, as 
the Fed must have hoped, found its way into stock markets (Anderson 2000). Also, after it 
was confirmed that the Fed would keep stock markets from falling too far (or after they 
realized how dependent the US economy was on the bull market), foreign investors 
(fleeing troubled parts of the world) immediately responded to the Fed’s signal by flocking 
from bond markets (or Asian markets) to stock markets. As Table 7.5 shows, between 1998 
and 2000, net foreign purchase of corporate stocks soared from 50 billion to 174.8 billion 
(accounting for 30% of total purchase of shares in the years), whilst the figures for T-bonds 
turned negative from 184 billion to -9.9 billion.  
 
 Table 7.5. Net foreign purchases of Treasury Bonds and Corporate Stocks  
between 1998 and 2000 ($ millions) (Source: FRB 2001) 
 Treasury Bonds Corporate Stocks 
1998 49,039 50,020 
1999 -9,953 107,522 
2000 -54,032 174,890 
 
Consequently, regardless of the ever-aggravating conditions for underlying productive 
capitals’ activities, the stock market skyrocketed further and further by feeding itself 
(Henwood 1999; Harman 2009, p.283). During 1998 and 1999, the S&P 500 Index 
increased by 27% and 19%, respectively, and by March 2000, the S&P 500 had risen 20% 
above its level at the end of October 1999. It now stood at 3.3 times its level at the end of 
1994. The technology and internet-dominated NASDAQ had exploded in much more 
extreme fashion, up from 2736 in early October 1999 to 5000 in March 2000. By the first 
quarter of 2000, the value of corporate equities, their market capitalization, had soared to 
$19.6 trillion, up from $6.3 trillion in 1994 (Shiller 2005; Callahan and Garrison 2003). 
 
3.3.3. Corporate buy back mania and contradictions of the stock market bubble 
 
Throughout the stock market boom, while the overall environment for incessant expansion 
was built by the Fed, the biggest bulk of stock was bought by the issuer: corporations 
themselves. Between 1994 and 2000, it is estimated that firms repurchased an average of 
$121 billion per year of their own stocks (Pollin 2005, p.62). This activity of buy-backs 
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was precipitated through ever increasing assumption of debt. For instance, in the years 
1994–99, borrowing by non-financial firms amounted to $1.22 trillion, of which firms used 
just 15.3% to fund capital expenditures, financing the rest of such purchases out of retained 
earnings plus depreciation, while they spent no less than 57% or $697.4 billion, on buying 
back stocks—an amount equal to about 75% of their retained earnings and 40% of after-tax 
profits (Brenner 2000, p.24) 
 
There seemed to be diverse immediate purposes of these activities. Firstly, it was a 
resumption of the pattern that already emerged between 1984 and 1990 when the mergers 
and leveraged acquisitions crazes (including buy-backs as a defensive strategy to fend off 
hostile takeovers) absorbed many firms in speculative share repurchases (Foster and 
Magdoff 2009, pp.58-60). Second, it was a speculative strategy to realize capital gains 
through selling stocks while the speculative market was experiencing a cyclical up phase. 
In fact, while the Fed was building up a so-called ‘firewall’ protecting the real economy 
from stock market shocks, the very ‘insurance’ against falling stock prices actually made 
speculating in stock markets look better than investing in the worsening ‘real’ economy 
where profits through expanded production were less and less guaranteed (Callahan and 
Garrison 2003, p.84). The Fed actually was encouraging a relative increase in non-
productive activities against productive activities (Shostak 2003). Also, it was one of the 
major means through which firms (that incurred growing debts to stock their offices with 
computers and telecommunications equipment) could keep themselves current on 
payments, as higher stock prices, rather than increased profits, was the actual foundation 
providing them with the capacity to refinance maturing loans (Harman 2009, p.285). Lastly, 
such activities became increasingly attractive to corporate executives during the boom 
because most of them were receiving a large fraction of their pay through stock options 
rather than salary. Thus, the managers might well focus attention on driving up share prices 
(by resorting to more debt) even for a brief period through buy-backs, during which they 
could sell their shares (Weissbenner 2000).   
 
Whatever the immediate reason, however, it is undeniable that such buy-back mania was 
reflecting the fact that firms were taking advantage of the increase in finance through stock 
markets not for supporting more efficient production (investing in long-term productive 
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potential) but for making money from money, accumulating potentially irredeemable debts.   
 
High prices of shares as such cannot be something problematic, but it forms a ‘bubble’ to 
be burst if prices rise without regard to the underlying economy, that is, the value produced 
in the productive sections of the economy. In case of the 1990s boom, there is lots of 
evidence showing the lack of links between them, and the movement of the price-to-
earnings ratio is one of the most manifest examples. As Figure 7.6 shows, the 
price/earnings ratio for the firms on the S&P 500 index began soaring from 1995 and 
reached an unprecedented peak of 43.8 in July 1999 (Shiller 2000, 2005). This means that 
by the middle of 1999, investors were paying $43.8 for one dollar of reported earnings; in 
terms of the so-called earnings yield (the price/earnings ratio inverted), it means the annual 
rate of return on shares was a mere 2.2%. Compared to the historical average (1880-1989) 
of 14 (P/E ratio) and 7.7% (earnings yield), one can see that both figures of 1999 peak 
were exceptional; stock buyers were paying roughly two and half times more for a dollar 
of reported earnings than they had done over the previous 110 years (Pollin 2005, p.58). 
This actually reveals that the boom was based on bubble dynamics; shares were being 
purchased, for the most part, simply on the expectation that their prices would go up 
further, regardless of firms’ rates of profit (Smithers and Wright 2000, p.226). 
 
By early 2000, investors began to see the fact that stock prices, in particular those of 
internet-related firms were too high relative to the earnings of firms. For example, at its 
peak when the NASDAQ Composite rose over 80% in 1999 alone, the price/earnings ratios 
of Yahoo and eBay were 1468 and 9571 respectively. This meant anyone who bought a 
Yahoo or eBay’s stock was paying $1,468 or $9,571 for one dollar of their reported 
earnings. If the ratios were to keep up with the historical average price-to-earnings ratio of 
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14 without any fall of prices, their profits would have had to increase more than 100 fold 
(for Yahoo) and 700 folds (for eBay) in the foreseeable future however implausible it 
would be (Henwood 1999, p.129). In effect, many of those investments were purely 
speculative gambles. Stock owners, in particular highly leveraged investors began 
recognizing that they were being exposed to extremely high risk (if stock prices decline, 
they would discover those claims are no longer valid and that they cannot pay their own 
debts unless they get cash from elsewhere) (Harman 2009, p.289). 
 
Finally, from July 2000, a series of ever-worsening corporate earnings reports precipitated 
a sharp descent of stock markets and the whole economy rapidly lost vitality, both by 
reversing the wealth effect and by revealing the mass of redundant productive capacity and 
mountain of corporate indebtedness that constituted the dual legacy of the bubble-driven 
investment boom. With their market capitalization sharply reduced, firms not only found it 
more difficult to borrow, but less attractive to do so, especially since declining profits and 
the growing threat of bankruptcy led them to try to repair balance sheets overburdened by 
debt. 
 
4. From Stock Market Bubble to Housing Market Bubble  
 
4.1. Collapse of the Stock Market Bubble and its Fallouts 
 
As discussed earlier, the stock market boom was the main engine driving the US debt-
driven consumption economy forward during the 1990s. Correspondingly, the sharp 
descent of the market was the primary force pushing it down over the early 2000s. The 
collapse of stock prices (i.e. the dramatically contracted value of collateral or decreased 
ability to borrow) directly meant the collapse of a debt-financed consumption boom for 
households as well as a debt-financed investment boom for firms. Without such bubble-
induced spending excesses, that is, with insufficient demand for their products, it was as a 
matter of course that businesses found themselves much saddled with excess productive 
capacity. This can be seen from Figure 7.7 showing that until the end of 2003 the rate of 
capacity utilization remained quite low relative to that of pre-recession years.  
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Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TCU; accessed September 17, 2012. 
 
Vastly over-supplied with plants and equipment, firms had little incentive to borrow more 
and step up capital accumulation, no matter how far interest rates were brought down by 
the Fed. On the contrary, having increased their indebtedness from 73 to 90% of output 
between 1995 and 2000, firms had every motivation to restore their balance sheets by 
saving more (indeed firms were net savers in 2002, 2003 and 2004, accumulating earned 
profits as cash) (FRB 2001), and their doing so made the investment environment even 
worse. Indeed, real non-residential expenditures on plant and equipment thus, as Figure 7.8 
shows saw a deep slump, declining from an average annual rate of 10.1% between 1995 
and 2000 to an average annual rate of minus 4.4% between 2000 and the middle of 2003.  
 
 
 
 
Above all, firms radically reduced employment. With capacity utilization, as well as 
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investment, falling off so rapidly, they were forced to reduce the labour force fast enough 
to prevent a huge fall in productivity growth. In 2001, 2002 and the first half of 2003, 
employment in the non-farm economy fell by 2%, 2.5% and 1.5% respectively, after 
having increased at an average annual rate of more than 2% between 1995 and 2000. 
Between July 2000 and October 2003, employers eliminated 2.8 million jobs in the 
manufacturing sector. Simultaneously real hourly wages, which had grown 3.5% in 2000, 
were brutally cut back—to minus 0.1%, 1.2% and 0.3%, respectively, in 2001, 2002 and 
the first half of 2003 (Brenner 2004, p.68). As a result of the combination of reduced 
hourly wage growth and falling employment, the aggregate demand steeply fell, 
discouraging further investment and employment. All else being equal, these huge blows to 
consumer and investment demand, resulting from the mammoth reductions in employment, 
compensation and capital spending growth, would have entailed an inexorable and 
persistent downward pull on the economy. Indeed, although output growth, riding on 
recovering productivity growth, was relatively strong, unemployment remained high at 6.0% 
until June 2003 and the poverty rate kept soaring from a low of 11.3% in 2000, reaching 
12.7% in 2004, long after output growth had resumed and the recession was officially over 
(Pollin 2006, p.106).  
The situation was not unlike that of the early 1990s when a deep and long recession 
brought about widespread political unrest including riots. The period between 2001 and 
2003, just like the years following the 1990-91 recession, was the moment when the US 
economy once again faced the grim reality that it had been living beyond its means, and 
the state must force its ‘excess’ people to accept lower wages, intensification of work, and 
poverty however politically implausible it is.    
 
4.2. Credit-sustained spending boom 
 
4.2.1. Return to Keynesian deficit spending  
 
By the end of 2003, however, the economy surprisingly began accelerating with GDP 
leaping forward at an 8.2% annualized pace, the largest quarterly gain since 1984. Equally 
significant, job growth suddenly turned positive in September and October. The economy 
seemed suddenly to have taken off.  
200 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.6. Contributions to GDP growth in the US between 2001 and 2005 
 2001 2002 2003-5 Total 
GDP growth (%) 0.3 2.4 2.35 5.05 
Consumption  1.67 2.15 2.02 5.84 
Investment -1.90 0.15 -0.26 -2.01 
Government 0.65 0.81 0.83 2.29 
Net exports -0.18 -0.67 -0.51 -1.36 
Investment includes residential and non-residential Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
GDP & Personal Income, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_nipa.cfm  (accessed June 14, 2012). 
 
As can be seen from Table 7.6, one of the two factors pulling the economy out of the 
doldrums was government spending backed by the Fed’s extraordinary monetary ease. 
While the monetary authority decreased its short-term rate from 6.5% to a post-1958 low 
of 1%, the government’s fiscal position moved from a surplus of 1.8% of GDP or $172 
billion at the end of the Clinton administration in 2001 to a deficit of 4.8% or $554 billion 
at the end of the new administrations’ first term in 2004 (Table 7.7). The newly incumbent 
Bush Administration adopted a determined fiscal stimulus apparently modelled after that 
of the Reagan Administration, combining enormous tax cuts with huge increases in 
military spending. Taking a step forward, the government unlike Reagan’s made no major 
cuts in other government programmes, rather it actually increased expenditures for health 
care, education and income security.  
 
Table 7.7. US total government fiscal budget between 2000 and 2007 
 Balance % of GDP 
Total Federal Total Federal 
2000 172.2 236.2 1.8 2.4 
2001 25.3 128.2 0.3 1.3 
2002 -322.7 -157.8 -3.1 -1.5 
2003 -554.9 -377.6 -5.1 -3.5 
2004 -554.9 -412.7 -4.8 -3.6 
2005 -435.0 -318.3 -3.6 -2.6 
2006 -384.1 -248.2 -3.0 -1.9 
2007 -322.5 -162.0 -2.4 -1.2 
Source: GPO, U.S. Government Printing Office, Budget of the United States Government,  
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=BUDGET&browsePath=Fiscal+Yea
r+2006&isCollapsed=true&leafLevelBrowse=false&isDocumentResults=true&ycord=0 (accessed Oct 
25 2012).  
 
As a typical Keynesian tax reduction, the administrations’ fiscal policies emphasized 
deficit-financed tax cuts as a way to stimulate aggregate demand, that is, to get money into 
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the hands of consumers and businesses. In promoting his plans, President Bush repeatedly 
appealed to this argument. His weekly radio address from May 24, 2003, was typical: “by 
leaving American families with more to spend, more to save, and more to invest, these 
reforms will help boost the Nation’s economy and create jobs. When people have extra 
take-home pay, there’s greater demand for goods and services, and employers will need 
more workers to meet that demand” (Mitchel and Castillo 2012, p.12).  
 
The 2001 tax cut immediately reduced marginal income tax rates, and repealed the estate 
tax. In addition to reducing marginal tax rates, each tax cut also included a number of 
additional provisions. The 2001 tax cut, for example, included a one-time retroactive “tax 
rebate”: the Treasury sent checks (up to $300 for singles and $600 for married couples) to 
taxpayers who had filed their taxes in 2000. The 2003 bill included more rebates (putting 
about $25 billion into people’s pockets in the third quarter of 2003—a massive $100 
billion on an annualized basis), extended the child tax credit, cash grants to the states to 
help cover the cost of education, Medicare and Medicaid, and expanded an investment 
incentive known as “bonus depreciation” worth more than $114 billion, which allowed 
firms to write off equipment investments faster than the equipment wore out. In addition, 
the 2003 law immediately cut the top marginal capital gains tax rate for financial assets 
with the promise of phasing it out by 2008.  
 
Given these measures the intentions of Bush’s tax policies seemed clear: making firms 
invest more, the rich buy more stocks and bonds, and households consume more, so as to 
reinvigorate productive investments or to re-inflate the stock market. Although it is 
questionable how much those tax-giveaways had direct effects on consumer and 
investment spending (cf. Mitchell and Castillo 2012), it seemed clear that the tax rebate at 
least helped receivers lessen debt burdens to some extent, that is, replaced private debts 
with government debts, thus making room for more borrowing and spending (e.g. while 
pre-tax personal income grew by 1% by the end of 2003, after-tax personal income grew 
by a stunning 7.2%) (Brenner 2004, p.89).  
 
In terms of military spending, there is no doubt that the increased arms spending in the 
wake of 9/11 helped to pull the economy out of the recession, just as the ‘military 
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Keynesianism’ of Reagan had before. The Bush administration’s average annual official 
defence budget (2001-07) amounted to $496 billion, up 31% from during Clinton’s time in 
office (not even including emergency supplemental funding for wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and for anti-terrorism efforts which taken together were worth $661 billion, 
surpassing the costs of the Vietnam War in real terms). Amounting to about 65% and 80% 
respectively of the total increases in federal spending, “official military expenditures for 
2001-2005 averaged 28% of gross private investment and 42% of gross non-residential 
private investment” (Foster and Magdoff 2009, p.44). Without the enormous military 
budget financing production of arms-related industries, a huge increase in private 
investment would have been needed to keep the economy from falling into deeper 
recession. Of course such an increased demand without increasing overall productive 
efficiencies resulted in ever-ballooning trade as well as budget deficits (Harman 2009, 
p.273). 
  
4.2.2. Household debt based on housing boom  
 
While the combination of huge tax breaks and giant increases in military spending 
provided a palpable temporary boost to the economy, by far the most powerful stimulus 
was once again growing household spending and its impact on investment. Between 2000 
and the middle of 2003, the growth of real consumption spending amounted to 2.8% per 
annum, certainly stabilizing the economy between 2001-02 and finally promoting growth 
from the end of 2003. While real wage was rapidly declining with unemployment rates 
kept relatively high, not surprisingly the sustained growth of consumption was largely 
dependent upon growing household debts (along with less savings) which climbed to about 
7% of GDP by 2003. As shown in Table 7.8, whilst businesses were trying to reduce debt 
burdens from 2001, households were not hesitant to increase their debt even in the middle 
of the recession.  
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Table 7.8. Growth of non-financial sector debt in the US between 2000 and 2007 
(%changes: annual rates) 
 Total Households Business Government 
(Federal+States) 
2000 5.0 9.1 9.3 -6.6 
2001 6.3 9.6 5.8 8.6 
2002 7.3 10.8 2.6 18.7 
2003 8.1 11.5 2.5 19.2 
2004 8.9 11.2 6.2 16.4 
2005 9.5 11.2 8.5 17.2 
2006 9.1 10.2 10.5 12.0 
2007 8.6 6.8 13.0 14.2 
Source: Flow of Funds Account, FRB 2008. 
 
It may be asked, what enabled them to borrow so much? Of course, the Fed’s dramatic 
reduction of interest rates must have played a role in fostering borrowing when 
“indebtedness became central in maintaining people’s regular living standard” (Harman 
2009, p.280). As was the case in the 1990s, however, what really drove the debt-financed 
consumption boom was the growing paper-value of assets enhancing both peoples’ 
capacity and propensity to borrow and thereby to spend. This time, it was soaring house 
prices that made them apparently ever richer.    
 
Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:  
 http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USCSCOMHPISA (accessed Sep 17, 2012). 
 
Figure 7.10 illustrates how fast house prices soared since 2000. Until 1995, housing prices 
increased at an approximately similar rate to consumer prices, so remaining roughly steady 
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in real terms. But between 1995 and 2000, the rise in the home price index exceeded the 
growth of consumer prices by more than 28.5 points—an unprecedented rise in real 
housing costs. Surprisingly, between 2000 and 2006 housing prices rose even faster than in 
those previous years –real home prices increased almost 80% in the period.  
  
Signs of the advent of a "new era" in housing were everywhere. Housing construction was 
taking place at record rates. New records for real estate prices were being set across the 
country, especially on the east and west coasts. The huge appreciation of home values 
encouraged homeowners to extract equity from housing mainly by the refinancing of home 
mortgages (Forster and Magdoff 2009, p.35). During the period, “people were using their 
homes like an ATM machine, withdrawing cash by refinancing in order to supplement 
their wages” (Swann 2006, p.26). As a matter of course, the economy boomed on the basis 
of growing personal consumption and residential investments. The growth of residential 
investment (including purchases of home furnishings) amounted to 75% of total GDP 
increase during 2001-2002, and investment in private housing accounted for more than 30% 
of total private investment between 2003 and 2005, a level unprecedented since 1948 
(Foster and Magdoff 2009, p.50). Reflecting such a trend, the household consumption 
share in GDP reached a record high of 71.1% in 2003 from the average rate of 67% during 
the period between 1975 and 2000. 
 
In sum, the possibility of a deep recession was effectively blocked by the upsurge of 
lending to households, including the recipients of subprime mortgages. It created a demand 
for the construction and consumer goods industries – and via those sectors for heavy 
industry and raw materials- that would not otherwise have existed. As Harman points out, 
“US households must spend more than their incomes. If they fail to do so, the economy 
will plunge into recession unless something changes elsewhere”, and booming housing 
markets enabled people to be indebted to spend more (Harman 2009, p.288).  
 
4.3. Origin of the housing bubble  
 
While some Keynesian economists pointed out there was a housing bubble, mainly caused 
by psychological factors (‘the ebb and flow of mass consciousness and emotions’) and the 
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government’s inaction in countering it (Shiller 2005), the dominant view among the 
general public and modern mainstream economists during the 2000s was to deny the 
existence of the bubbles themselves and to declare that what seemed like “bubbles” were 
really the result of market forces (high demands for houses) based on ‘real’ factors such as 
financial innovation, demographic features and productivity growth. Most people seemed 
to have agreed with the majority of economists, that there was no such thing as a housing 
bubble—housing prices, they said, “never go down” considering the strong demand in the 
market. This was essentially the view of Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke as well as 
government policy makers. In particular, Greenspan was aware of the possibility of a 
housing bubble, but he offered many reasons to suggest that it did not exist, and that if one 
did exist it would not be a major problem (cf. Greenspan 2002).5 
  
Now it is a well-known fact that the bubble did exist in housing markets; the prices were 
raised by overextended credits without growing household incomes, and the government 
policies were responsible for the development. But the state’s responses cannot be simply 
pointed out as the only source of the problems because the state’s economic policies were 
adopted to evade devastating political and economic fallout deriving from deep slumps in 
the real economy, that is, growing pressure for liquidating past excesses including 
inefficient workers, an unavoidable result of the overaccumulation crisis. This section 
discusses how and why the state inflated the housing bubble, thus enabling people to 
borrow and spend more, and then examines what the limitations and contradictions of such 
policies were.  
 
4.3.1. Jobless Recovery and Monetary Policy  
 
As noted, the Fed responded to the stock market crash in 2000-01 by dramatically cutting 
short-term interest rates from 6.5% in January 2001 to 1% by June 2003, which were 
negative interest rates when price inflation is taken into account (FRB 2002). By lessening 
the heavy debt burdens of firms, the Fed appeared to have tried to encourage brisker 
                                         
5 Regarding the management of the housing bubble, there was an optimistic argument that as long 
as interest rates remained at low levels in close international cooperation the housing market would 
remain stable and there would be no possibility of the bursting of the bubble (Himmelberg et al 
2005; Shostak 2003).  
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investment and job creation. However, as discussed above, firms remained reluctant to 
engage in productive investment by taking on more debt. In spite of this gap between 
monetary stimulus and productive activities, the Fed decided to hold the rate much lower, 
because high unemployment and poverty rates as well as ballooning government debts 
made it politically implausible to tighten monetary policy, while keeping rates low was 
justified by quiescent inflation rates (Rajan 2010, pp.107-108). In fact, it seemed that it 
was fear of deflation inevitably involving a profoundly adverse consequence like in Japan 
in the 1990s or the situation during the Great Depression that forced the Fed to stick to 
expansionary policies. Greenspan acknowledged it when he said, “in the summer of 2003, 
the Federal Open Market Committee viewed as very small the probability that the then-
gradual decline in inflation would accelerate into a more consequential deflation. But 
because the implications for the economy were so dire should that scenario play out, we 
chose to counter it with unusually low interest rates. ... Given the potentially severe 
consequences of deflation, the expected benefits of the unusual policy action were judged 
to outweigh its expected costs” (Greenspan 2005b).  
 
The ‘unusual policy actions’ based on fear of the possibility of deflation persisted; although 
the Fed finally started to raise rates in June 2004 in an apparent worry over asset price 
inflation, it did so with a pledge that short-term rates would be held low for “a considerable 
period” and would rise slowly at a “measured pace” (Backus and Wright 2007). This 
actually meant that short-term rates would remain at the exceptionally low point for a 
sustained period, and thus encouraged financial institutions to borrow short-term while 
making riskier long-term loans without hesitance even as the Fed was inching up short-
term rates. With firms still saddled with excess capacities, the reduced risk premium on 
long-term loans (i.e. lowered interest rates on long term debt) naturally led to higher prices 
of risky long-term assets including housing rather than brisk productive investments. As 
Figures 7.11 and 7.12 show, indeed, between 2000 and 2005, the interest rate on 30-year 
fixed mortgages fell from 8.29% to 5.71%, and the amount of real estate loans at 
commercial banks reached $3 trillion at the end of 2005, up from $1 trillion in November 
1994 and $1.5 trillion in 2002 with house prices rising 71.1% in the same period. It follows 
that the Fed actually attempted to trade-off between economic recovery and the housing 
bubble.  
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Also, the Fed directly encouraged the growth of the bubble through a commitment to the 
so-called “Greenspan put option” (Stiglitz 2010, p.135; Palley 2005). In a 2002 speech, 
Alan Greenspan argued that although the Fed cannot recognize or curb an asset-price boom, 
it can “mitigate the fallout when it occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next 
expansion” (Greenspan 2002). He was saying that the Fed would not raise interest rates in 
order to deal with asset price inflation but if matters went wrong, it would be willing to 
intervene to put a floor under asset prices. He was actually sending signals to speculators 
that if they gambled, the Fed would not limit their gains, but if their bets turned sour, the 
Fed would limit the consequences (Rajan 2010, pp.112-113). In fact, such an asymmetric 
policy direction called “riding the booms and cushioning the busts” had been implicitly but 
consistently pursued by the Fed since the 1987 crash (Iley and Lewis 2007, p.94); 
whenever stock markets plummeted ‘too far’ during a crisis, the Fed released huge amount 
of liquidity by lowering the federal funds rate to its utmost (often to zero or negative in real 
terms) and encouraging risk-taking to reboot stock markets. With the help of such a policy 
(now officially confirmed by the Fed), it was not surprising that leverage began to build up 
throughout the market fuelling the flames of asset-price inflation (Wolff 2010; Cooper 
2008, p.17).  
 
In sum, by adopting deflation insurance policies, the monetary authority actually provided 
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a channel through which firms and banks, reluctant to invest in production, could move 
their excess savings from the deflating stock market into the housing market, the so-called 
“great bubble transfer”(Pomboy 2002; Pollin 2006, p.115; Murphy 2008). As will be 
discussed, in addition to the policies of the Fed, the administrations’ mortgage policies 
helped direct all the new credit money into the housing bubble. 
 
4.3.2. National homeownership strategy: affordable housing through affordable 
debt 
 
Both the Clinton and Bush administrations were eager to expand homeownership by 
broadening access to easy housing credit. It was considered a cure-all addressing political 
and economic problems deriving from low-real wage, high unemployment, growing 
poverty and economic inequality (Rajan 2010, 39). Indeed, it can immediately achieve 
many socio-economic goals at the same time without political resistance because the costs 
all lie in the future. It pushes up house prices, making households feel wealthier, and 
allows them to finance more consumption. It creates more profit and jobs in the financial 
sector as well as in real estate brokerage and housing construction. Providing debt-financed 
housing is also an effective tool for transforming the poor working class into individuals 
who are responsible for debt-repayment or afraid of losing their wealth, rather than letting 
them be an uncontrollable mass without any responsibility to society, and anything to lose. 
In 1995 President Clinton emphasized the socio-economic importance of homeownership 
by saying that “expanding homeownership will strengthen our nation’s families and 
communities, strengthen our economy, and expand this country’s great middle class” 
(HUD 1995, quoted by Rajan 2010, p.36). Also, emphasizing the political aspect, that is, 
disciplinary effects of homeownership expansion among low-incomers, Bush pointed out: 
“if you have something, you have a vital stake in the future of our country. The more 
ownership there is in America, the more vitality there is in America, and the more people 
have a vital stake in the future of this country”.  
 
The major task of the government for this goal was “removing barriers to mortgage 
financing for starter homes” deriving from the fact that private lenders are naturally 
unwilling to making long-term riskier loans to low-income home buyers with relatively 
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low interest rates (Action 11 HUD 1995). The practical means for the goal was providing 
“subsidies to reduce down-payment and mortgage costs” (Action 36) through the 
operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) 
under the direction of HUD (HUD 1995, Moseley 2008, p.10, Wolff 2010, Beitel 2008). 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought mortgages in particular those for low income home 
buyers, thus allowing the banks (and brokers) they bought from to go out and make more 
mortgage loans with almost no risk of losses (both interest rate risk and default risk). They 
then packaged pools of loans together and issued mortgage-backed securities (MBSs or 
"agency debt") on credit markets. The securities that the agencies sold were widely 
perceived by investors to carry an implied government guarantee, which thus enabled 
Fannie and Freddie to raise money at a cost just above the rate of the Treasury bonds 
(Thornton 2006, pp.18-19). In this way (‘securitization’), financial assets which bear low-
risk relative to stocks/corporate bonds and high-return relative to government bonds were 
created. With this fantastic financial instrument, poor home buyers could borrow at lower 
rates and looser mortgage underwriting standards (e.g. the average down payment declined 
from 10% to 3% by the early-2000s) while banks could benefit, without any risks, from 
commissions deriving from brokerage between borrowers and MBSs issuers (Blumen 
2002). MBS issuers (Fannie and Freddie) could also benefit from commissions while 
investors in those securities were offered higher returns than they would receive from T-
bonds without worries about default. Lastly, while all made money from a boom in low-
income housing construction and lending, the government and firms also benefited from 
political support and higher domestic demand respectively.  
 
Setting the stage for a boom, the amount of funding the government required the agencies 
to allocate to low-income housing was steadily increased. After being set initially at 42% 
of assets in 1995, the mandate for low-income lending rose to 50% of assets in 2000 and 
further to 56% of their assets in 2004 (Calmiris and Wallison 2008). As more money from 
the government-sponsored agencies flooded into financing or supporting low-income 
housing, the private sector (mainly hedge funds and institutional investors) joined the party. 
While households were enjoying growing wealth, banks and brokers did not miss the 
chance of making money from low-risk and high-return subprime mortgages. As the 
erosion of lending standards pushed prices up by increasing demand, construction 
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industries also rushed to build low-cost housing that would certainly increase in price (Coy 
2008). As a result, home ownership rates continued to increase from 64.5% in 1994 to 69.2% 
in 2004 while household mortgage debt grew 75% from 2000 to 2005, magnifying the 
amount of systemic risk. As noted, this housing boom was the primary force pushing the 
US economy forward during the 2000s. The boom produced first a debt-financed 
consumption boom for households then a debt-financed investment boom for corporations. 
It also created a highly attractive investment location for foreigners, whose inflow of funds 
into the US market provided a major demand-force pushing up house prices as well as 
pushing down interest rates.  
 
4.3.3. East Asian support for the Dollar 
 
As the stock market declined from mid-2000 (and thus, without prospective capital gains 
plus exchange gains), the rest of the world’s private investors began to see US assets as 
decreasingly attractive. Between 2000 and 2001, new equity purchases by foreign investors 
declined by 20%, from $482 to $287 million. The fall in foreign purchases of bonds and 
other US assets was less steep in 2001, but started plummeting from the first quarter of 
2002, with overall foreign investment in US assets falling by more than 60% in the first 
months of 2002 compared to the same period of 2001. These trends of fleeing US assets 
were mainly led by Europeans. Having peaked in the year ending in October 2000 at 
$115.6 billion, Eurozone purchases of US equities collapsed to just $4.9 billion in the year 
ending in April 2003 (FRB 2004). The result was an inevitable downward pressure on the 
dollar, intensified by soaring interest rates in Europe and the hyper-expansionary policies 
pursued by the Fed. Between early 2001 and the middle of 2003, the dollar fell by 37% 
against the euro, 27% alone in the year ending June 2003. Whilst the decline of the dollar 
did not bring about any improvement in the US trade and current-account deficits (partly 
because of worsening recession in Europe and partly because of a fall in US productivity 
growth), the expectations about the future value of the dollar made it even less attractive to 
hold US stocks and bonds. There was a growing fear of the possibility of capital flight. 
Obstfelt and Rogoff warned the dollar could fall by as much as the Mexican peso did in 
1995 (Tabb 2001). Were the dollar to continue to fall, the Fed would be faced with an 
agonizing choice: either to let the currency drop and risk a wholesale liquidation of US 
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assets by foreign investors (worth $7 trillion by the end of 2001) in the expectation of 
continual depreciation—which could wreak havoc in asset markets and set off a serious 
run on the dollar—or raise interest rates to support the dollar and risk pushing the domestic 
economy back into recession or deflation at all political costs (Brenner 2004, pp.86-87). 
The dilemmatic situation was similar to that in the mid-1990s when the reverse Plaza 
Accord was agreed. This time, the dilemma was solved not by an explicit agreement but by 
implicit policy-cooperation between the US and others in particular East Asian countries 
whose economic growth also depended upon US consumption growth (Helleiner 2008, 
p.363).  
 
Since the beginning of 2002, when the dollar started depreciating, all East Asian currencies 
appreciated against the dollar considerably less than did the euro owing to Asian central 
banks competitively rushing to buy up dollar-assets. Between December 2001 and June 
2003, East Asian countries (China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) spent $10 billion every 
month in purchasing US Treasuries with overall East Asian dollar reserves reaching $1.6 
trillion-70% of the world’s total (Morrison and Labonte 2012, p.6). In particular, China 
and Japan intervened massively, covering nearly 55% of the US current account deficit in 
2003. Far beyond simply building up a war-chest of precautionary reserves with respect to 
the prospect of future financial crisis, East Asian governments were evidently and 
desperately intervening to prevent the dollar from falling vis-à-vis their currencies 
(McKinnon 2004, p.356; Summers 2004, p.7). For them, a strong dollar meant lower 
relative unit labour costs in their countries as well as higher commodity prices (effective 
demand) in the world (US) market, which were the key foundation on which their 
economic and political stability had long been based (cf. Harman 2009, p.282). Thus, it 
was worth pouring billions of dollars in dollar assets even in the midst of the freefall of its 
value.  
 
With the help of such heavy interventions, the US monetary authorities regained the ability 
to pursue incompatibles: underpinning the value of dollars in spite of the low interest rates, 
stagnant stock markets and expanding trade deficits (Brenner 2004). While the stable 
conditions for US expansionary policies were underpinned by East Asian central banks in 
this way, private investors also began recycling the dollar inflows; in particular German 
212 
 
 
 
banks and Japanese insurance companies rushed to buy seemingly safe yet high-yielding 
US mortgage backed securities (issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) with the dollars 
their customers deposited (Rajan 2010, p.109). Table 7.9 shows this trend; the rapid growth 
of official holdings of US assets by overseas governments during the 2000-04 period was 
followed by the gradual growth of private capital inflows from 2004 (Jackson 2010, p.5). 
Surprisingly, in 2005 nearly 80% of the total cross-border savings was heading to the US 
(Iley and Lewis 2007, p.11).  
 
Table 7.9. US Net capital inflows by Supplier of funds, 1995-2006 ($, billion) 
 95-00 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Net Financial 
Account 
1,230 400 501 533 532 701 809 
Total Net Official 317 23 113 280 402 279 496 
Total Net Private 913 378 388 253 130 422 313 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Investment Position, 
http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm (accessed June 1, 2012). 
 
As both the US and Asian state managers expected, this influx of funds onto US financial 
markets (by mid-2006 gross US assets held by the rest of the world reached $7.7 trillion, or 
67% of GDP, compared to $3.5 trillion, or 46% of GDP in 2000)(FRB 2008) in particular 
the booming mortgage-backed securities directly or indirectly fuelled ongoing asset-price 
bubbles and consumption-led growth by pushing down both the cost of borrowing and the 
prices of imported goods in the US. Acceleration of consumption in turn gave a major fillip 
to what appeared to be an increasingly powerful boom, while the rise in US imports and 
current-account deficit helped pull the East Asian economies out of their economic 
downturn.  
 
5. Contradictions of Bubble economy  
 
As noted, without Chinese and other Asian authorities’ purchases of dollars, the hyper-
expansionary policies pursued by the Fed and the Bush Administration would, almost 
certainly, have issued in a major fall in the dollar, leading to declining asset prices and 
rising borrowing costs that could plunge the US, East Asia, and the rest of the world 
economy back into deep recession. However, such preventive policy actions (i.e. the 
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international mechanism of dollar deficit recycling) were not a solution to a crisis but a 
means of speculative deferral of forthcoming bigger crises, given the fact that the huge 
injection of credit was growing the US’ obligations to the rest of the world at the same 
time as curtailing its ability to honour those obligations (undermining the conditions of 
production in the US by supporting a strong dollar, that is, keeping the relative costs of 
US-based production or the capacity of American workers to consume high). 
           
     Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:  
          http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TWEXBPA (accessed Jan 10, 2013). 
 
Figure 7.14. US Net Direct Investment between 2000 and 2007 
 
Indeed, as Figure 7.13 shows, because of the influx of funds from surplus-running 
countries the overall trade-weighted real value of the dollar (reflecting the trend of relative 
real unit labour costs) did not fall, but actually rose in spite of the dollar’s steep fall against 
the euro between 2000 and 2003, and although it began falling from 2002 because of 
stagnating real wages along with high productivity growth (that grew at 2.6% per annum 
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from 2000-2007, which was 0.5% higher than that of the 1990s), it did remained well 
above the 1997-1998 levels which had significantly eroded the price competitiveness and 
market shares of US-based producers. As a result, while the overall American economy 
grew based on the growth of domestic consumption-reliant industries (finance, retail, 
construction etc.), the trend of widening trade deficits (overseas borrowing) further 
accelerated to an unprecedented level: to more than $700 billion or 6% of GDP in 2006 
(Eichengreen 2008, p.213). Also, as Figure 7.14 indicates US firms whose operation was 
not tied to specific regions were increasingly eager to invest in factories overseas, which 
resulted in net direct investment amounting to a historical high of -1.0% of GDP, more than 
$135 billion per annum in the mid-2000s. Lastly, just as was the case in the 1990s, the 
trend toward de-industrialization accelerated; the share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector further declined from 13.1% 2000 to 10.7% in 2005 with the 
proportion of workers pushed into low-wage, precarious and domestic-consumption-
dependent jobs in service and construction sectors continuing to grow from 86.5% in 2000 
to 88.9% in 2005) (Mishel et al 2007, p.169).  
 
Unsurprisingly, this self-undermining development of the debt-financed bubble economy, 
that is, the growing separation between credit expansion and productive activities, raised 
the possibility of a run on the dollar followed by high interest rates. Some argued that as 
long as surplus-running countries, having a great stake in the stable value of the dollar, 
continued to underpin the global mechanism of dollar deficit recycling, there would be 
little risk of destructive adjustment processes triggered by a dollar crisis (Himmelberg et al 
2005; Shostak 2003). What such an optimistic view did not see was that the ballooning 
external deficits were ultimately a reflection of the rising domestic private indebtedness 
that was rapidly growing without corresponding income growth.  
 
Table. 7.10. Household Outstanding Debt and Debt-service payment  
as a percentage of Disposable income (%) 
 Mortgage Consumer debt Total Debt service 
payment 
1990 58.4 19.2 83.9 11.9 
1995 61.1 21.4 89.1 11.4 
2000 65.8 23.7 95.6 12.2 
2005 97.9 25.5 130.1 13.6 
2007 103.6 25.1 136.1 14.0 
Source: calculated from data of the Flow of Funds Accounts, FRB 2008. 
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An IMF (2006) study estimated that the house price to income ratio (average house price to 
average incomes) reached a record high, at approximately 14% above its 25-year average. 
It meant that what had underpinned ever-increasing house prices were ever-expanding 
household debts, not increasing household incomes. Indeed, as Table 7.10 shows, in 2005, 
the ratio of total outstanding debt (mortgage plus consumer debt) to individual disposable 
income reached an unprecedented level of 130.1%, up from 95.6% in 2000 and 89.1% in 
1995. The trend accelerated because of the greater expansion in mortgage lending to low 
income borrowers (e.g. subprime loans expanded more than twice as much as prime loans 
did between 2002 and 2005) (Mian and Sufi 2009, p.1449). In 2006, with little or no 
income growth among wage earners American households were spending as much as 14.5% 
of their disposable income solely on servicing debts (Iley and Lewis 2007, p.10).  
 
For a while, the increasing debt service burden of homeowners was able to be offset by 
gains from rising house prices, that is, the practices of ‘equity extraction’ using second 
mortgages. In other words, there was little or no correlation between debt burden and 
house prices thanks to a growing number of new homebuyers induced by easier access to 
mortgages. The underlying simple problem was that the pace of house price growth was 
certain to slow down due to the limited number of prospective homebuyers (US residents 
who need houses to live) in the context of the unlimited supply of new homes, and thus at 
some point the growing debt service burden would not be able to be covered by equity 
extraction. From that point, the existing debt-ridden homeowners would begin to sell off 
their homes, triggering a plunge in the market, in order to sustain their living standards, 
that is, to pay interest. Ultimately, without a rise in incomes, at some point house prices 
inflated by debt expansion were destined to plummet with the flood of defaults bursting 
forth as banks would all begin rushing to repossess collateral. 
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Source: FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis:  
    http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/DRCRELEXFACBS (accessed Jan 10, 2013). 
 
Despite Greenspan (2005a) alleging that conditions in the housing market were 
“encouraging”, and the new Fed chairman Ben Bernanke (2006) arguing that “lending 
standards are generally sound ... real estate appraisal practices have improved”, already by 
the end of 2006 the growth of household debt fell more than 30% while house prices 
stopped soaring and, as a result the delinquency rate and foreclosures were increasing 
dramatically (Forster and Magdoff, 2009, p.51). The bursting of housing bubbles would 
not be a problem only for debt-ridden households and banks. Considering low income 
borrowers had long been supported by government sponsored agencies (e.g. they were 
estimated to be exposed to about $2.7 trillion or 59% of total subprime loans in 2007), the 
government was also to get into financial trouble while the overall economy would face a 
plummeting aggregate effective demand so far underpinned by housing bubbles. At this 
point, injecting liquidity, i.e. increasing the supply of credit money, would be a 
meaningless attempt to defer a crisis unless real interest rates fell significantly below zero.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has explored the contradictory development of the US economic growth, with 
special attention to the causes and effects of economic policies, between the mid-1990s and 
the mid-2000s during which it emerged as the debt-ridden ‘world consumer of last resort’. 
As discussed, since the 1970s, the US economy had been under growing pressure of over-
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accumulated capital. The pressure, revealing itself at every recurrent deep recession, 
pushed the state to make its inefficient producers and workers pay for ‘excesses’ the 
economy had built up by accepting bankruptcies, lower wages, longer and more intense 
work, and widespread poverty at any political costs. The existence of this crisis of 
accumulation has been empirically proved in this chapter with the economic indicators 
such as the steadily falling capacity utilization rates, unemployment/underemployment 
rates remaining exceptionally high, and increasing absolute/relative poverty rates coupled 
with continuously falling real wages until the mid-1990s. Faced with possibilities of a 
serious crisis, however, state policy makers chose to sustain existing levels of production 
and employment, and thus placating rising social tensions, by means of credit-expansion 
based on asset market booms.  
 
While the government and monetary authority actively created an environment favourable 
to investment in asset markets (i.e. stock markets in the second half of the 1990s, and then 
housing markets in the 2000s) through specific monetary-fiscal policies coupled with 
international policy cooperation, capitals (at home and abroad) liberating themselves from 
the worsening ‘real’ economy where profits through expanded production were less and 
less guaranteed were increasingly finding their way into the attractive asset market, in turn 
boosting the prices of assets. The soaring asset prices then made the investors: firms and 
individual households ever richer on paper, thus enabling them to borrow more and spend 
more. Stimulated by the growing consumption demand, more jobs were created in sectors 
such as financial services, commercial trade, real estate, leisure, insurance, with the 
tendency of declining wages to stop, which, along with other rosy aspects of the powerful 
boom, in turn justified the ever-rising prices of assets. The economic boom based on the 
debt-driven asset market bubble has been empirically examined with the relatively high 
unit labour costs (upward pressures on the overall trade-weighted real value of the dollar), 
rapidly shrinking world market shares for manufacturers operating in the US, and the 
changing national industrial structure in favour of non-tradable service-finance sectors. The 
contradiction of the boom was that the asset prices were rising regardless of, or more 
exactly, at the costs of the real economy (i.e. profitability of productive investments). In 
fact, the more prosperity sustained by the debt-financed asset market booms, the worse the 
condition of production (due to the increased relative costs of production in the US coupled 
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with the enhanced productive capacity abroad), and the less the capability to service debts. 
In other words, the boom was a fictitious prosperity based on the growing separation 
between financial accumulation and productive accumulation. This has been demonstrated 
with the empirical data showing the ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratios, in particular the 
growing household debt and debt-service payment as a percentage of disposable income 
until the year 2007.  
 
Over a couple of decades in the US, as Harman put it, “credit expansion acted like a drug 
for the system, seeming to give it great energy and creating a sense of euphoria, with each 
brief hangover being followed by a further dose until the metabolism as a whole suddenly 
found itself being poisoned” (Harman, 2009, p.280). The US’ ever-rising current-account 
deficits and the growing reliance on cheap imports and credits made in China were an 
expression of this contradictory development of the debt-ridden bubble economy. Based on 
the findings of this chapter and those of the previous chapter on China’s growth, the 
following chapter will finally attempt to interpret the emergence of Sino-American global 
imbalance itself from a Marxist perspective.  
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Chapter 8. Understanding of the nature of the Sino-American imbalance 
 
By drawing on the findings of chapters 6 and 7, this chapter provides a Marxist 
interpretation of the Sino-American imbalance that is distinct from existing views. In the 
course of developing a comprehensive interpretation, this chapter explores three main 
points essential to understanding the nature of the Sino-American imbalance: the 
fundamental cause of the imbalance, the way in which the imbalance was sustained, and 
the consequences the imbalance entailed. Each point will be explained in the form of a 
counter-argument against the conventional interpretations that were introduced in chapters 
2 and 3.  
 
This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section looks at the Keynesian 
argument that attributes the imbalance solely to the pursuit of the ‘wrong’ policies. Against 
this view, it is argued that these so-called ‘misguided’ policies amounted in fact to rational 
economic policy decisions by the states in the face of a crisis of accumulation and social 
strife. Thus, it is argued in this chapter, the root cause of the imbalance should be located in 
the crisis-tendency inherent in the capitalist mode of production rather than in the conduct 
of economic policy. This argument is laid out with an examination of the political 
economic context in which the imbalance-inducing policies were first employed and then 
adhered to for so long in spite of the growing instability caused by the macroeconomic 
imbalances. It is argued, in the second section, that critical IPE’s notion of structural 
monetary power does not fully explain the character of the Sino-American global 
imbalance, nor does the concept of hegemonic transition suggested by World System 
analysis. In distinction to those approaches tied to the concept of inter-state rivalry, it is 
argued here, that the imbalance was a manifestation of the crisis-ridden character of 
capitalist social relations. Specifically, this thesis sees it as a form of international 
cooperation between the global centre of production (China) and the global centre of 
circulation (the US), which were mutually dependent on each other for sustaining 
accumulation within their own territories. This argument is underpinned by an exploration 
of the manner in which a potential global crisis following the burst of the US stock market 
price bubble in 2000 was managed and overcome through de-facto policy cooperation 
between China and the US. The third section of this chapter argues that the cooperation in 
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the perverse form of a deepening imbalance was fraught with contradictions. Rather than 
being a process of efficient resource allocation through the integrated global financial 
markets promising an ‘inter-temporal utility maximization’, as argued by neoclassical 
approaches, the imbalance fed into itself with potentially disastrous consequences. The 
section explores the inexorable problems of a world economy founded upon the sustained 
imbalanced growth that manifests itself as overinvestment and overproduction in China 
and overextension of credits in the US.  
 
Combining the three points explained together, this chapter concludes by arguing that, at 
its foundation, the Sino-American global imbalance was an expression of the tendency to 
overaccumulation and crisis inherent in the capitalist mode of production, mediated and 
reinforced by mutually complementary economic policies of the US and China, each 
seeking to sustain domestic accumulation and social reproduction.  
 
1. The socio-economic context of the Sino-American imbalance 
 
Analysing the Sino-American global imbalance, Keynesian-inspired economists focus 
attention on each government’s ‘misguided’ policies that caused domestic imbalances 
between aggregate consumption demand and productive capacity. Specifically, they point 
to the Chinese government’s absurd pursuit of export-investment-led growth that had long 
repressed the households’ disposable income growth while criticizing the US government 
and the monetary authority’s reckless sticking to expansionary policies leaving the 
excessive debt-financed spending sprees to take their own course. Their focus on the 
imbalance-causing ‘misguided’ policies is accompanied by an emphasis on ‘appropriate’ 
rebalancing policies aimed at realigning national consumption demands to productive 
capacities. By means of a set of rebalancing policies (e.g. monetary-fiscal policies coupled 
with demand exchange rate adjustments) they assume that the crisis-ridden imbalanced 
growth could be adjusted leading to a more stable balanced economic growth both in China 
and the US.  
 
The merits of this perspective are that it well recognizes the possibility of crisis involved in 
the development of the imbalance and the specific role of government policies in forming 
the domestic imbalances. The limitation of Keynesian perspectives is that they do not 
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seriously explore the question of why each government adopted such ‘imbalance-inducing’ 
policies in the first place and why there had been no serious attempts by the states at 
rebalancing the economic structure in spite of the growing possibility of a future crisis. 
Instead of raising the question of a wider political economic context, Keynesians simply 
attribute the ‘misguided’ policies to the policy markers’ misjudgement or myopia, and then 
assume that a certain combination of policy instruments, if employed properly as dictated, 
could steer the economy back into balanced growth free from crisis.  
 
Exploring the historical-social context in which such policies were employed, it is revealed 
that what made each government employ the policies was not policymakers’ recklessness 
but the necessity of sustaining accumulation in the face of an imminent crisis. Likewise, 
rebalancing policies were evaded not because of short-sightedness of the governments but 
because they as such would inevitably provoke a destructive economic crisis (due to a 
devaluation of capital so far accumulated in the form of productive capacity or credits), 
rather than ‘preventing’ a crisis. Consequently, the fact that the imbalance was formed and 
developed by state policies does not mean that the cause of the imbalance was the policies 
as such; the real cause was the crisis-tendency inherent in the capitalist mode of production 
to which states had to respond with what Keynesians call ‘misguided’ policies.  
 
1.1. The socio-economic context of China’s imbalanced growth 
 
A set of market-oriented restructuring policies radicalized from the early 1990s was the 
Chinese state’s response to the failure of so-called ‘state capitalism’ that existed from the 
Maoist era until the late 1980s. Under state capitalism, the party-state as the sole owner of 
means of production was given the power to directly impose work on the whole working 
population in the country according to a central plan. But there was a price to pay for the 
state’s direct control over the workers: the direct responsibility for the subsistence of all 
workers, which turned out increasingly difficult for the state to bear. As more and more 
workers were employed, the party-state had to accordingly ensure higher labour 
productivity to prevent a drop in living standards of workers, while there were little means 
to do so without directly confronting workers and thus risking political instability. The 
state was on the horns of a dilemma; it had to either let productivity growth remain low 
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and real wages continue to fall or escalate bureaucratic repression for higher productivity 
growth. Whatever way taken, of course, growing political tension over the existing system 
of class dominance was unavoidable. It was this crisis of accumulation that forced the 
government to embark on a radical reform, making itself free from the direct responsibility 
for workers’ subsistence by relinquishing direct control over them. Indeed, the core of the 
restructuring process ranging from dissolution of work units (danwei), privatization of 
state-owned firms, and commercialization of banks to liberalization of trade was imposing 
the freedom of liquidation and redundancy upon inefficient firms and workers by severing 
their financial relations with the state. It was a governing strategy of depoliticisation, 
making class relations of production private relations between employers and employees 
rather than a political matter that the party-state must take direct responsibility for. 
  
With the reform process on track, there emerged two contrasting economic trends: on the 
one side, there was a growing reserve army of labour due to the mass-layoffs of SOEs and 
tens of millions of migrant workers being set free from the rural collective economy and 
basic public services; on the other side, there was a phenomenal investment boom 
including FDI influx induced by the world’s most favourable conditions of exploitation and 
the resultant opportunity for surplus profits (a large difference between the cost of 
production in China and the selling prices on the world market). These dual trends, by 
deepening the imbalances between consumption demand and productive capacity, 
transformed the economy into a typical export-investment oriented one (see Table 2.1). 
Indeed, while the dual trends generated a downward tendency of domestic price levels1, 
economic growth as a whole became more and more dependent upon exports and 
investment closely linked to export sectors. For example, in 1997 a 21% year-on-year 
growth in exports accounted for about one-third of real GDP growth in that year; a 38% 
jump in exports accounted for nearly four-fifths of China’s economic growth in 2000. 
According to some estimates, while the share of exports in GDP was 26% in 2002, roughly 
74% of China’s real GDP growth that year was attributable to exports with the remaining 
                                         
1 The stagnation of mass working-class income and consumption demands relative to the vastly 
expanded productive capacity generated a steady downward trend in domestic prices. Indeed, the 
inflation rate steadily declined from 24% in 1994 to 8.3% in 1996, and further down to -1.4% in 
1998. From 1998 the rate remained below zero until the mid-2000s (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett 
2005, p.72). 
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26% was indirectly due to state spending and FDI inflows (Roach 2003 cited in Hart-
Landsberg and Burkett 2005, p.74).   
 
Having doubts as to the sustainability of such precarious unbalanced growth, Keynesian-
inspired economists have argued that the state was required to employ policies countering 
the trend, lowering investment and net exports to more ‘sustainable’ levels (about 30-35% 
of GDP and 0-5% of GDP respectively) at the same time as raising the share of final 
consumption in the economy by about 20% (to 65% of GDP) (Lardy 2012, p.51). 
Specifically, rather than expecting the so-called trickle down effects that the latter trend 
(rapid growth driven by soaring exports and investments) would sooner or later counter the 
former trend (growing unemployment and dampened real wages), they have emphasised 
the importance of a package of policies aimed at rebalancing the economic structure 
towards a more domestic-consumption-based economy, including active income 
redistribution (from the sector of large exporters to the household sector), a substantial 
appreciation of the renminbi, and enforcement of stricter regulations on the labour market 
etc. 
 
Considering that the possibility of an economic crisis was indeed growing along with the 
ever-deepening imbalance, it seems Keynesian economists’ views are not unreasonable. 
But a closer look at the development of the imbalance reveals what they did not see: the 
simple fact that such policies, by raising costs of exploitation, would put pressure on the 
profitability of capitals operating in export-related sectors (the growth engine of the 
economy) and thus on the existing level of national income itself that is supposed to be 
distributed. In response to any pressures on existing profit rates, some capitals in the sector 
would struggle to boost productivity growth, and thus preserve their own value, by 
discharging workers (i.e. replacing workers with new machines) or by increasing offshore 
outsourcing, while others would increasingly transfer funds into speculative financial 
markets, leading to an asset market bubble. Whatever the form of response taken, thus, the 
pressure of devaluation on the growth engine of the economy would repress the productive 
activities of the economy as a whole. In that case, with a diminishing source of national 
income (productive accumulation), it would be inevitable that growth of household and 
government incomes necessary for stimulating domestic-consumption-based industrial 
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growth is necessarily largely reliant upon public or private debt expansion rather than 
‘distributed-income’. For this reason, it can be said that Keynesian rebalancing 
interventions are likely to cause economic growth based on potentially irremediable debt 
accumulation or a crisis-ridden ‘bubble’ as seen in East Asian NICs on the way to the 
financial crisis of 1997, rather than leading to what they call ‘an inward oriented balanced 
economic growth’.  
 
Indeed, the Chinese economy from the early-2000s, along with growing pressure on profits 
due to the rising wages forced by intensifying workers resistance2 and ever-falling prices 
on the world market, was already witnessing a bourgeoning speculative boom in the real 
estate sector, acceleration of mechanization processes along with a series of moves of 
labour-intensive production lines to South Asian countries where wages were even lower 
than in China, and a precarious expansion of public and private debts without concomitant 
income (wage and tax) growth. These trends pressurized the government to promote 
policies compensating the falling profits of the growth engine (exporters) through such 
means as provision of preferential tax/tariff rates, continued devaluation of the renminbi, 
and further privatization and liberalization of SOEs along with the entry into the WTO, 
rather than an active adoption of rebalancing policies that could repress profits even further 
and thus precipitate the trends toward a bubble economy. In this sense, the Chinese 
government’s maintaining export-led growth was not due to the absurdity of policy-makers; 
it was a rational response to the absurd capitalist mode of production.  
 
1.2. The socio-economic context of the US’ imbalanced growth 
 
The two factors Keynesian economists identify as the cause of imbalanced growth in the 
                                         
2 Chinese workers, especially those of the so-called “new generation of migrant workers” (China 
Labour Bulletin 2011, p.13), began to refuse to be docile any longer; they began to actively require 
‘just’ and ‘fair’ wage relations in their favour. Through waves of strikes and mass demonstrations, 
challenges to growing income inequality were growing in size and radicalizing in form, becoming 
an important part of social unrests. Under the pressure of intensified workers resistance, the CCP 
leadership had no choice but to employ more accommodative labour policies (so-called policies for 
‘harmonious development’) including those allowing minimum wages to increase faster than 
before. For examples and statistical data on labour disputes see CLB Research Report No.5 (2007, 
pp.15-24) and Cai and Wang (2012, pp. 11-17). 
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US from the mid-1990s – the American government policy combination of the strong 
dollar and low interest rates – were first adopted as a response to the deepening crisis 
affecting both the US and other countries across the world at the time. By the early 1990s, 
the US economy was still under the influence of the late-80s’ stock market crash. With the 
consumption boom underpinned by the debt-financed asset market bubble absent, the 
vastly expanded industrial base created by the previous boom was rendered excessive. 
While heavily exposed and inefficient firms were forced into liquidation, other firms 
continued to discharge ‘excess’ workers in order to preserve their own value, further 
augmenting the decline in overall economic activity. With unemployment and poverty rates 
ever-increasing, social unrest was worsening and became uncontrollable as seen in the 
1992 LA riots. Meanwhile, the steady fall of the dollar vis-à-vis other major currencies, the 
tendency first promoted by the Plaza Accord of 1985 and then accelerated by the outflow 
of funds following the burst of the bubble in the late 1980s, was hardly hitting the then 
leading exporter Japan, encouraging the Japanese investors to sell-off their accumulated 
dollar assets. It was in this context of an inextricable crisis of accumulation growing at 
home and abroad that the US government made a policy turnaround in the direction of an 
unbalanced but growth-oriented environment marked by a strong dollar and low interest 
rates.  
 
Initiated by the reverse Plaza Accord of 1995 and accelerated by the large transfer of 
capitals seeking a ‘safe haven’ away from developing countries’ currency risks in the mid-
1990s, the financial environment of the strong dollar and low interest rates brought about 
two contrasting macroeconomic trends characterizing the US economy’s structure as a 
debt-financed consumption-demand-reliant economy. First, it accelerated the trend of 
deindustrialization as the strong dollar significantly eroded the price competitiveness and 
market share of US-based producers.3 In response to the pressure on the market share and 
profit rates, some capitals, by means of debt-expansion, struggled to increase productivity 
by replacing workers with more advanced means of production, while others began 
                                         
3 Due to the high rates of labour productivity growth along with the long-stagnated wage growth, 
the US’ unit labour costs rapidly fell during the period. In spite of such falling costs, however, the 
US unit labour costs relative to other countries’ rose by approximately 20% because of the high 
dollar value (Brenner 2009). As a result, between 1997 and 2007 the US share of world exports fell 
4.3% point from 12.6% to 8.3% in a steady trend of decline since 1980 (Gatto et al 2011, p.2). 
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moving production lines to low-wage developing countries, notably Maquiladora 
sweatshops. In other cases, productive capitals turned themselves into a sort of financier 
dealing with consumer finance in response to rising demand for credits4 (Blackburn 2006). 
As a result of such responses, the share of manufacturing in the economy continuously fell 
with the pool of unemployed or underemployed low-wage workers in the service sector 
amplified. For instance, the share of manufacturing in terms of GDP continued to fall from 
23.4% in 1990 to 18.4% in 2000 and further to 17% in 2007, while more than 90% of 
domestic investment was in non-traded goods sectors (BEA). In line with this trend, the 
share of manufacturing sectors in total employment also fell from about 17% in 1990 to 13% 
in 2000 and further to 10% in 2007, while the share of the service and construction sectors 
rose from 83% to 89% over the same period (Mishel et al 2007, p.169).  
 
Second, the environment of the strong dollar and low interest rates coupled with the US’ 
highly developed financial markets induced surplus capital (i.e. capital that could not be 
reinvested in the increasingly unprofitable production process both in the US and abroad) 
to be invested in American asset markets (shares and houses etc.). While the resultant 
higher prices of assets made the cash-stripped wage-earners (who had assets) more willing 
and capable to expand borrowing and spending despite stagnating income growth,5 the 
growing consumption spending drove a boom across the economy. The change in the 
components of GDP clearly illustrates the trend of the brisk debt-financed consumption 
boom coupled with deindustrialization. While the investment to GDP ratio rose only 1% 
from 18.1% to 19.1%, the final consumption to GDP ratio surged from 83% in 1995 to 86% 
in 2007 (BEA). This consumption-led growth resulted in the biggest economic imbalances 
in American history, allowing current account deficits as a share of GDP to surge from 1.2% 
in 1995 to 5.1% in 2007 (see Table 2.3). 
                                         
4 In addition to banks, hedge funds, and fund managers, many large companies such as GE, Enron, 
and GM etc. also created subsidiaries dealing with consumer credits, which made a large 
contribution to their profits. As a result, the share of financial-sector profits in total US corporate 
profits rose from 14% in 1981 to 39% in 2001. For a more detailed account for this trend of 
financialisation see Brenner (2004); Krippner (2003). 
5 The expanding household consumption was not induced by a rising household disposable income 
as a share of GDP (e.g. from 2001 to 2005, personal income fell from 86% of GDP to 82%) but by 
the household’s increasing propensity to consume (lower savings rate) along with higher 
indebtedness. 
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Diagnosing those crisis-ridden dual trends as a result of the Fed’s monetary myopia fueling  
asset market bubbles along with the government’s reckless expansionary fiscal policies, 
Keynesian economists have argued that the government was required to employ 
rebalancing policies including contractionary monetary-fiscal policies, stricter regulations 
over financial markets, and a devaluation of the dollar at a substantial rate. They assume 
that such policies could smoothly dampen the debt-financed consumption boom at the 
same time as stimulating tradable sectors of the economy and thus resulting in balanced 
growth free from crisis. 
 
Although Keynesian accounts of the role of these policies in inducing the crisis-ridden 
imbalanced growth are not incorrect, there is no ground for their assumption that 
rebalancing policies could lead to balanced growth. Indeed, unlike the economists’ 
optimistic assumption, it was highly likely that such policies would be followed by a 
destructive crisis because pressure on the debt-financed consumption boom would 
inevitably entail the same weight of pressure on the ability of debtors to service 
accumulated debts. More specifically, such policies would precipitate an outflow of funds 
from asset markets turning ‘wealthy debtors’ into ‘poor debtors’, while falling 
consumption demands coupled with a growing burden of debts would force firms in 
domestic consumption-reliant sectors to reduce employment and wages or to liquidate 
themselves. With debtors’ ability to pay interest and rollover existing debts increasingly 
undermined, the rising volume of bad debt would put growing pressure on the banking 
system, leading to a further tightening of credits in an uncontrollable vicious circle. 
Considering that the majority of the working population’s reproduction has come to be 
dependent upon employment in consumption-reliant services sectors, the impact would be 
huge enough to risk the whole US economy and political stability (Rajan 2010, p.39; 
Ivanova 2011, p.862). In this regard, the US’ economic growth based on a debt-financed 
asset market boom was like a bicycle that must be kept moving forward in order to merely 
avoid collapse. Indeed, as Greenspan admitted6, it was the possibility of such kinds of 
crisis that had confined the Fed’s ability and willingness to raise interest rates to 
                                         
6  Employing excessively expansionary policies, then Fed Chairman Alan Grrenspan (2005) 
confessed, “given the potentially severe consequences of deflation, the expected benefits of the 
unusual policy action were judged to outweigh its expected costs”.  
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sufficiently encounter the asset price inflation between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s.7  
 
Furthermore, factors constituting the rebalancing policies such as reduction in final 
consumption rates, a fall in the value of dollars, and a rise in interest rates in the US are all 
factors that are highly likely to provoke financial crises in other countries, in particular 
export-reliant developing economies, and any serious crisis in those countries would 
trigger a massive transfer of capital to the safe haven, that is, US financial markets.8 Let 
alone the negative impact on the US’ export sectors (i.e. the shrinking effective demand for 
US exports in those crisis-stricken countries), the huge influx of funds to the US following 
a crisis would possibly nullify the effects of rebalancing policies shortly after without 
attainting the desired end. After all, the feasibility of US’ rebalancing policy is confined not 
only to a possible domestic debt problem but also by the ripple effects on the rest of the 
world. As long as the US’ attempts at rebalancing are not compatible with the well-being of 
international capital relations as a whole, the following global flows of money would soon 
thwart such an attempt.  
 
In this sense, it cannot be said that the US government and the Fed’s continuous support 
for the debt-financed consumption boom was due to the misjudgements of policy-makers. 
By the same token, it is wrong to assume that a certain combination of policy instruments, 
if used properly, could avoid imbalanced growth and steer the economy towards a path of 
crisis-free balanced growth. As the support for the imbalanced growth was a desperate 
struggle of the state to sustain accumulation and secure the reproduction of social relations, 
rebalancing policies countering the struggle may well result in a different form of crisis-
ridden imbalances rather than a balanced economic structure.   
 
1.3. Conclusion  
 
Although there is good evidence to argue that the global imbalance was formed and 
                                         
7 In fact, the Fed’s limited ability was an open secret. It in turn encouraged investors (in 
expectation that the Fed would not dare increase interest rates further) to continue to invest in asset 
markets (long-term debt instruments) in spite of the Fed’s inching up short-term interest rates, 
creating a phenomenon then called ‘Greenspan conundrum’.  
8 This was exactly the case in the wake of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis.  
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sustained by contradictory and crisis-ridden economic policies of each country, it is wrong 
to see these policies as the root cause of the imbalances. In fact, these policies were 
responses to the manner in which the contradiction inherent in the capitalist mode of 
production manifests itself. As discussed in this section, imbalanced growth was promoted 
by both governments as a way of escaping from an imminent crisis of accumulation 
experienced in the early 1990s. Rebalancing policies were not actively employed because 
they would inevitably entail a destructive crisis by putting pressures of devaluation on the 
capital so far accumulated in the form of productive capacity (in the case of China) or 
credit-sustained assets (in the case of the US). Emphasising the importance of ‘appropriate’ 
policies for a stable balanced growth without understanding the underlying causes of the 
imbalance, thus, cannot but either end in empty talk or contradict itself.  
 
2. The Sino-American imbalance as a form of international cooperation  
 
Analyses of ‘domestic’ contexts of China and the US are not enough for a comprehensive 
understanding of the Sino-American imbalance. It also requires an international 
perspective through which the peculiar relations between China and the US can be grasped. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, approaches of critical IPE and World System analysis are two 
such international perspectives, explaining the global imbalance at the level of the 
international ‘system’. Specifically, critical IPE theories explain the global imbalance by 
focusing on the deficient contemporary international monetary order in which the US, the 
issuer of de-facto global money, is given a prerogative of a de-facto world state or what 
they call ‘structural monetary power’ capable of financing any expensive self-centred 
policies by exploiting the world’s surplus savings deposited in dollar-assets. They point out 
that, in this order, other states including China are forced to provide the US with cheap 
credits (i.e. building up dollar-reserves) because of their own stake in a stable dollar as well 
as financial vulnerability in the increasingly crisis-ridden global financial system. In short, 
from this perspective, the Sino-American imbalance was an expression of this unequal US-
cantered international monetary system. On the other hand, World System theories argue 
that the US’ imperialistic exploitation of its dollar privileges is a reflection of its declining 
economic power in production, and thus declining American hegemony. They also argue 
that the declining US power has been accompanied by a rising new centre of global 
production: China, a pioneer of what they call the ‘non-capitalist market economy’. They 
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expect, in the long run, China’s rise as a new centre of the global economy and the 
promotion of the Beijing Consensus to replace the Washington Consensus will provide 
system-level solutions to the system-level problems left behind by American hegemony. 
Consequently, for them, the global imbalance was one of the by-products or symptoms of 
this historical process of hegemonic shift.    
 
It is true that they both have their own merits in explaining some important aspects of the 
imbalance from international political viewpoints. But they both overlook or cannot 
explain the most defining aspect constituting the nature of the Sino-American relations: 
mutual dependence. Indeed, despite the apparent conflicts and rivalry, China was as 
dependent upon the US as the US was dependent upon China in forming the imbalance. 
For example, the imbalanced economic growth of China following the reform process 
would have been impossible at the outset without the US’ booming consumption markets 
and the influx of FDI from the US, offsetting the deflationary pressure in China. Likewise, 
the imbalanced growth of the US led by the consumption boom from the mid-1990s would 
have been impossible in the first place without the rise of China sending cheap credits as 
well as cheap commodities, thus countering the inflationary pressure in the US. Both 
critical IPE and World System theories pay little attention to this point because their 
analytical frameworks, despite the emphases on the ‘system’, are still tied to the traditional 
realist IR approach that tends to interpret global economic affairs as a power relation 
between independent individual states imposing external constraints on each other. Based 
on this realist framework, the Sino-American imbalance may well be seen either as a 
reflection of the US’ superior economic power subjecting China (if the source of the state 
power is considered to lie in the ability of financing its national spending) or as an outcome 
of China’s rising economic power surpassing the US (if state power is considered to be 
represented by national production capacity). Such a view emphasizing inter-state rivalry 
conceals the fact that accumulation of capital takes place only as a unity of production and 
circulation, and thus sustaining accumulation within the US as a global centre of 
circulation inevitably requires the existence of China as a global centre of production and 
vice versa. In other words, each state should be seen not as compartmentalized units 
externally related to each other, but as regional parts of one unified global process of 
capital accumulation.  
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Recognizing this fact, the Sino-American imbalance can be understood as a form of 
international cooperation of the two countries complementing each other in order to sustain 
accumulation and secure domestic reproduction of social relations. The following section 
will underpin this argument by analysing the process in which the possibility of a serious 
crisis of accumulation following the burst of the US stock market bubble in 2000 was 
managed and then bridged to another period of imbalanced but rapid growth by the two 
states.  
 
2.1. The process of Sino-American cooperation for sustaining accumulation 
 
The stock market boom was the main engine driving the US economy forward during the 
second half of the 1990s. Correspondingly, the bursting of the bubble in 2000 immediately 
weakened the economy during the early 2000s. As the collapse of stock prices abruptly 
turned wealthy debtors into poor debtors, the debt-financed consumption boom also 
collapsed, leaving most US-based firms (reliant on domestic consumption demands) 
excessive and inefficient if not insolvent. The situation was not unlike that of the early 
1990s; the period between 2001 and 2002 was the moment when the US economy once 
again faced the grim reality that its prosperity had long been resting on the basis of 
imaginary wealth that now had to be paid for with ‘real’ wealth: surplus value created in 
profitable exploitation of labour.  
 
Between 2000 and 2002, while the average utility capitalization rates were rapidly falling 
from 79.3% to 72.4%, unemployment soared from 4.0% to 5.8% during the same short 
period as the firms reacted to falling productivity with mass-layoffs even if it would 
worsen the recession (FRED). In response to the downward spiral of recession and the 
growing possibility of sweeping crisis, the Fed employed drastic expansionary policies 
while the administration rapidly expanded debt-financed spending. One of the immediate 
and inevitable problems of such a rescue policy pack was the downward pressure placed on 
the dollar. Responding to the tumbling stock market and the falling interest rates, private 
investors in particular European institutions began rapidly withdrawing their funds from 
US markets. For example, having peaked in the year ending in October 2000 at $115.6 
billion, Eurozone purchases of US equities collapsed to just $4.9 billion in the year ending 
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in April 2003 (FRED). As a result, between early 2001 and the middle of 2003, the dollar 
fell by 37% against the euro, 27% alone in the year ending June 2003 (Chavez 2003). 
Whilst the decline of the dollar did not bring about immediate growth of US export 
industries (partly because of the worsening recession overshadowing the global economy 
as a whole), the pessimistic view of the future dollar value made it even less attractive to 
hold US stocks and bonds. There was a growing fear of the possibility of massive capital 
flight and further collapse of asset markets. At that time, some even warned the dollar 
could fall by as much as the Mexican peso did in 1995 (Tabb 2001). The fall of the dollar 
was driving the monetary authority to a deadlock; if it allowed the dollar to continue to fall, 
then there would be a wholesale liquidation of US assets by foreign investors (worth $7 
trillion by the end of 2001); if it raised interest rates to support the dollar, then the 
recession would be accelerated (Brenner 2004, p.86-87). It was evident that the US 
economy was falling into a crisis that could not be avoided by the state’s own policies.     
 
Meanwhile, the impact of the bursting of the stock market bubble was not limited to the 
US economy; it affected the world economy in particular major exporters including China.9 
There were two channels through which the stock market crash in the US impacted upon 
the Chinese economy. First, the sudden fall in export demand in the world market rendered 
a large number of the existing factories and workers in the export sectors excessive and 
thus subject to being eliminated. For instance, capitals in export sectors in China saw 
capacity utilization rates rapidly fall from 82.1 to 79.8% between 2000 and 2002 (it was 
the steepest decline China had seen since the early 1990s). As they reacted to the falling 
productivity and profit rates with acceleration of layoffs, the unemployment rates soared 
from 3.1% (5.95 million) to 4.0% (7.70 million) during the same period. Measured with 
ILO standards, the rates were 13.1% in 2002 compared to 11.5% in 2000 (Giles et al 2005, 
p.53).  
 
Second, there was a sudden surge in inflows of speculative capital from 2001. This trend 
was proved by the dramatic change in China’s non-FDI capital account balance (including 
                                         
9 In the case of China, the largest exporter in the world, during 2001−08, net exports and the 
investment closely linked to building capacity in tradable sectors accounted for over 60% of its 
economic growth, up from 40% in the 1990s, and the share of the US in China’s total exports 
accounted for more than 30% during the period (Guo and N’Diaye 2009, p.4). 
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errors and omissions); the annual average balance that had remained at $-54.4 billion 
between 1998 and 2000 went $23.6 billion into the black between 2001 and 2004 (Prasad 
2008, p.85)10. The so-called hot money inflows from abroad were accelerated because the 
large quantity of funds released from US financial markets took their course towards the 
renminbi assets in anticipation of the currency’s appreciation either in nominal or real 
terms (i.e. higher price inflation in China than other countries) (Lardy 2012, p.99). These 
foreign investor expectations of the speculative gains had a self-fulfilling character in that 
the more inflows of funds, the more upward pressure either on the nominal renminbi value 
or on the asset market inflation. For the Chinese government, both of the expected results 
(real or nominal appreciation of the currency) were options unacceptable as it would 
directly put further pressure on the profitability of the main growth engine of the economy: 
export sectors by either increasing costs of production (in the case of real appreciation) or 
by lowering selling prices in renminbi terms (in the case of nominal appreciation). Also, 
any appreciation of the renminbi vis-à-vis other currencies would cause a direct loss in 
terms of the value of previously accumulated foreign exchange reserves (the so-called 
negative ‘valuation effects’), which would significantly deteriorate the capital base and 
balance sheets of the monetary authority.   
 
The central bank reacted to the problem by means of the famous double intervention 
policies (Frankel and Wei 2007, p.576; Husted and Melvin 2007, p. 443). On the one side, 
it directly repressed the nominal value of the renminbi by buying up the dollars in foreign 
exchange markets (i.e. building up dollar-reserves). On the other side, it ‘sterilised’ the 
additional money supply (inflationary pressures) resulted from the intervention in the 
exchange market by selling central bank bills and raising the required reserve ratio.11 One 
                                         
10 Because China’s capital account was only partially liberalized, in theory, international capital 
flows into and out of China are only allowed via the form of FDI, official borrowing, and portfolio 
investment by a few qualified institutional investors. However, there are lots of loopholes in the 
controls such as transactions via underground exchange houses, and under or over-invoicing of 
exports and imports (Yu 2008). As a result, despite controls over capital account, pro-cyclical 
international capital flows have been a major destabilizing factor in the economy. The magnitude of 
such a speculative capital flows can be measured either by checking the item “errors and omissions” 
in the balance of payments or by calculating the so-called unexplained capital flows (the change in 
foreign exchange reserves minus FDI and trade surplus) (Prasad, 2008).  
11 Since 2002, the monetary authority has sterilized around 70% of the additional supply of money 
that resulted from net foreign exchange reserve growths (Bottelier 2008). 
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of the critical limitations of this double intervention policy is that the sterilization process 
tends to raise interest rates in proportion to the magnitude and duration of the intervention 
(Lardy 2012, p.97). If interest rates are allowed to rise, then it will induce more capital 
inflows while escalating the cost of sterilization operations (the central bank’s debt burden) 
in an upward spiral.  
 
The Chinese monetary authority managed this problem by means of administrative 
controls over interest rates; on the one hand, the monetary authority forced the state-owned 
commercial banks to buy the sterilization bonds and to place an increasing amount of funds 
in accounts at the central bank at very low rates; on the other hand, the authority, by setting 
a low ceiling on deposit rates but floor on lending rates (guaranteeing generous spread- 
profitability of banks), allowed the banks to offset the costs of forced participation in the 
sterilization operations. Considering the biggest net depositors were low-income 
households, the policies that would often impose even negative real interest rates on 
deposits were in effect policies sterilizing working populations’ income growth. In other 
words, the cost of sterilization policies was ultimately paid by low-income workers who 
had no choice but to raise savings in the absence of secure employment and any 
meaningful public safety net12. Indeed, according to one estimation, more than one-fifth of 
the fall in household disposable income during the first half of the 2000s was due to the 
low or negative real deposit rates enforced by the central bank (Lardy 2012, pp.58-9). 
While the burden of the sterilization process was being passed on to the working 
population, the monetary authority was able to actively intervene in the exchange markets 
(i.e. purchase of dollars) without worry of inflation.  
 
Meanwhile, the purchased dollars were not held by the central bank in the form of cash. 
The central bank and the government were eager to reinvest those incoming dollars (both 
trade surpluses and hot money inflows) back into US government/agency bonds, which in 
turn played a critical role in stopping the trend of the falling dollar and rising interest rates 
in the US. Indeed, from 2000 the pace of China’s foreign reserve accumulation started to 
                                         
12 Lardy (2012, p.135) argues that the dramatically reduced real return on savings motivated 
households to increase savings further as households, deprived of public a safety net, had to 
achieve a target level of savings.  
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skyrocket (between 1997 and 2000 the ratio of foreign reserves in GDP remained constant 
at around 14%, then it soared to 16.5% in 2001 and 20.3% in 2002, and further to 25.1% in 
2003), and near 70-80% of the reserve was used in buying Treasury bills and US agency 
securities (Morrison and Lbonte, 2009). Because of these massive purchases of US 
securities offsetting the outflow of European private funds, the value of the dollar fell only 
5.9% vis-à-vis the currencies of a broad group of major US trading partners (in terms of 
real trade weighted rates) while it declined by more than 13% vis-à-vis major advanced 
countries’ currencies between 2001 and the end of 2002 (FRED 2012)13. While the limited 
fall of the dollar and bond prices began inducing the global flow of speculative capitals to 
return to the US asset markets from around 2003 (see Table 7.9), the US authority was able 
to react to the recession with exceptionally expansionary fiscal-monetary policies without 
worries over the dollar’s stability. As a result, while the US current account deficit began to 
expand at a historically unprecedented pace with a rapid resurrection of the consumption 
boom, China in turn was able to withstand recessionary pressure and keep the export-
investment boom unhampered.   
 
It should be noted that such cooperative relations would have been more difficult if it were 
not for the medium of the financial relations: the highly developed US financial 
infrastructure, in particular the mortgage financial markets, enabling its people to be more 
easily indebted and spend more than their incomes by attracting the world’s pool of savings. 
The US mortgage financial market had been developed by the US government in tandem 
with Wall Street since the mid-1990s. Governments both the Democrats and the 
Republican were eager to expand homeownership by broadening access to easy housing 
credit because it was considered a cure-all addressing political-economic problems 
deriving from low-real wages, high unemployment, growing poverty and economic 
inequality (Rajan 2010, p.39). Providing debt-financed housing was also considered an 
effective tool for transforming the poor working class into individuals who are responsible 
for debt-repayment or afraid of losing their wealth, rather than allowing them to constitute 
an uncontrollable mass without any responsibility for society or anything to lose.  
                                         
13 During the same period, the dollar was actually appreciated by about 3.5% vis-à-vis currencies 
of developing countries including Mexico, China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Argentina, Venezuela, 
Chile and Colombia (FRED 2012).  
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The task was implemented through the operations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), which bought up mortgages from banks and 
then sold mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) on credit markets. With an implicit 
government guarantee attached, the high risk and high return securities were transformed 
into a financial product bearing low-risk relative to stocks/corporate bonds and high-
returns relative to Treasury bonds. This attractiveness of MBSs significantly extended 
foreign demand for them,14 which in turn enabled low-income households in the US to 
borrow at lower costs against growing housing wealth.  
 
While the mortgage market was further sophisticated and deepened by Wall Street,15 what 
actually drove its boom was the massive inflow of Chinese funds from the early 2000s. For 
the Chinese monetary authority which was under the pressure of having to work the huge 
quantity of foreign exchange reserves both securely and profitably (at an earning rate 
higher than domestic interest rates), the US’ MBSs were a more than attractive investment 
vehicle. Indeed, while China’s holdings of US securities more than quadrupled from $181 
billion in 2002 to $922 billion in 2007 becoming the second largest foreign holder of US 
securities after Japan, approximately 41% (or $ 376 billion) of the funds were invested in 
long-term agency securities most of which is estimated to be debt issued by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. By 2007 China was the world’s largest holder of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac MBSs, holding more than 30% of the total securities issued by them 
(Morrison and Labonte 2009, pp.4-6). In this regard, the accumulation of surplus capital in 
China and credit expansion, financial innovation and speculative boom in the US were two 
                                         
14 Since the mid-1990s the growth in foreign purchases of US mortgage-securitized bonds was 
exceptional; an IMF (2006) study estimates that MBSs held by foreigners were worth near $1 
trillion by March 2006, representing more than 30% of the growth in net foreign savings inflows 
since the mid-1980s. The trend was led by foreign official institutions which rapidly increased their 
holdings of asset-backed securities during the first half of the 2000s. Indeed, in 2005, such assets 
came to account for close to 9% of all the foreign official holdings of US debt securities (IMF 2006, 
p.8). 
15 Massive amounts of cross-border capital inflows into the US financial market, a large portion of 
which were from China, significantly reduced long-term rates in the US. This fall in long-term 
rates, in turn, compressed the spread between long and short rates that has traditionally constituted 
an important source of banks’ earnings. The pressure on profitability of banks, in turn, encouraged 
banks to develop even riskier and higher-yielding financial products. This request for riskier 
products of banks was accompanied with the government’s policies promoting brisk mortgage 
borrowings. For more discussion on this see Lardy (2012), p.135.  
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sides of the same coin (Ivanova 2011, p.868).  
 
2.2. Conclusion  
 
Consequently, what was behind the escape from the early-2000s recession and rapid return 
to growth until 2007 was not a rivalry between two independent superpowers; it was 
neither China’s rise at the expense of US hegemony nor the US’ exploitation of its dollar 
status vis-à-vis China, but de-facto cooperation between the two mutually dependent states 
(just like the Plaza accord of 1985 and reverse Plaza accord of 1995) for dealing with a 
crisis of accumulation overshadowing both of them at the same time. Indeed, the 
imbalanced growth during the period would have been impossible without mutually 
complementing policy actions: China’s financial support for the dollar and US assets, 
coupled with the US’ provision of expanding export demands and its role as a profitable 
absorbent of Chinese surplus savings. Focusing on this nature of the imbalance, it can be 
summarised that the Sino-American global imbalance was a form of international 
cooperation for sustaining accumulation in the face of an imminent crisis that each state 
faced, or cooperation for resisting devaluation pressures on existing capitals in both states.   
 
3. The Sino-American Imbalance as a perverted form of capital accumulation  
 
Neoclassical approaches to the Sino-American imbalance capture well the fact that the 
imbalance was formed by international cooperative financial relations based on mutual 
interests. Examining demographic features, productivity growth and the financial 
infrastructure of the two countries, they see the Sino-American imbalance as an outcome of 
international cooperation between Chinese savers (i.e. the central bank) and American 
borrowers who are considered ‘rational’ in terms of inter-temporal utility maximization. In 
other words, in this perspective the imbalance was an event that should be seen as the 
windfall gain of free flows of money in the era of globalization and thus any efforts to 
counter it should be judged to be misguided. These arguments proceed upon the optimistic 
assumption that, in the long run, as the US’ rapid productivity growth bears fruit and 
China’s financial system reaches maturity (as well as changes in the two states’ 
demographic profiles), the bilateral imbalance would gradually disappear or even a new 
form of imbalance would emerge with the position of China and the US exchanged. For 
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such a process of automatic rebalancing, they argue that what is needed is not a Keynesian 
distortion of markets that sacrifices rational Chinese savers and US borrowers, but a further 
promotion of globalization and integration of financial markets through which international 
cooperation for efficient resource allocation can be maximized.    
 
The obvious limitation of this kind of argument is that it focuses only on some beneficial 
aspects of the cooperative relations related to the deepening imbalance; no attempt is made 
to explain the increasingly manifest fallouts of the imbalanced growth such as 
overinvestment in China and overextension of credit in the US, let alone the inner relations 
of such fallouts with the beneficial aspects. This limitation derives from their blind 
reasoning that rational activities for minimizing costs in a given economic situation may 
well bring about the concomitant rational outcomes. In other words, they, in a manner 
comparable to Keynesian perspectives which blindly endorse ‘correct’ policies as a 
panacea, do not grasp the fact that any individual rational economic decisions inevitably 
entail irrational outcomes because irrationality is inherent in the capitalist economy itself.  
 
With the help of the Marxist concept of overaccumulation crisis, this thesis elucidates that 
rather than a process of efficient resource allocation promising an ‘inter-temporal utility 
maximization’ for all, the cooperative international relations conducive to sustaining 
imbalanced growth were fundamentally contradictory relations amplifying the necessity of 
a crisis involving a devaluation or destruction of capital so far accumulated. Specifically, in 
return for the fruit of rapid growth, it drove productive forces in China to maximize 
themselves without regard for the limitations of markets, and at the same time it allowed 
credit in the US to expand regardless of the ability of debtors to service debts, both of 
which can only be solved by a crisis which would remove the excess. In this regard, the 
Sino-American imbalance was not an ordinary benign form of cooperation for mutual 
benefit but a perverted form of international cooperation undermining its own foundations. 
 
3.1. China’s imbalanced growth on the way to a crisis 
 
While Keynesian rebalancing policies (raising costs of production) were not actively 
employed, the Chinese government, by the help of the expanding consumption boom in the 
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US, continued trying to keep the conditions of production favourable to exporters in the 
hope that a sustaining export-investment oriented growth would ultimately bear ‘trickle 
down effects’. In spite of some fruits of such efforts in the form of rapid expansion of 
exports and investment, the economy was however facing increasingly inexorable 
problems such as worsening overcapacity, high unemployment, and rising bad debt loads 
in the banking system coupled with a speculative real-estate market boom. Those problems 
were indeed inexorable because it was the rapid expansion of exports and investment itself 
that caused the problems.  
 
Armed with the world’s lowest unit labour costs (the world’s most efficient system of 
extracting surplus labour) capitals operating in China were able to rapidly expand their 
share of world markets. Adding to FDI funds that rushed in, the huge surplus profits 
(deriving from the difference between world prices of commodities and the Chinese costs 
of production) earned from exports were eagerly reinvested in production, facilitating ever 
greater levels of capital accumulation. The rapid accumulation, however, was itself 
building up barriers to further accumulation by maximizing productive forces and throwing 
an increasing mass of commodities onto the world market without regard to demand16. 
Close to the point where the supply of Chinese goods exceeds what is needed to meet final 
demand on the world market, a growing amount of unsold goods began to put pressure on 
the existing price levels (i.e. a fall of world prices towards the Chinese price) and thus 
existing profit rates. Faced with the barrier of the limited market and falling rate of profits, 
individual firms did not tamely withdraw from the markets (submitting to considerable loss 
of value in the form of huge illiquid physical, human, and organizational assets) but tried to 
overcome the barrier by cutting unit costs of production further. These rational efforts by 
individual capitals for ever-higher productivity growth served to compound the original 
                                         
16 While ultra-cheap Chinese-made commodities in almost all sectors of industry (including 
intermediary goods) were flooding the world market, firms producing tradable goods in other 
countries were put under growing pressure of having to restructure themselves by discharging 
‘surplus’ workers or forcing workers to accept lower wage. It follows that the working population 
across the world was placed in competition with Chinese workers in the race to the bottom; they 
were increasingly pressurized to abandon existing levels of living standards that now turned out to 
be undeserved and unsustainable. This trend checked the growth of effective demands for Chinese 
commodities. For examples of how such trends influenced East Asian countries see Hart-Landsberg 
and Burkett (2006, pp.9-11) and Fernald and Loungani (2004, p.2).  
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problem of overproduction and falling profitability. The ever-falling average capacity 
unitization rates (which declined from 82.6% in 1999 to 77.1% in 2003 and then further 
fell to 75.8% in 2006) were one of the symptoms of these trends (China Statistical 
Yearbook 2012).  
 
The worsening overcapacity and overproduction brought about three interrelated problems 
in the Chinese economy. First and maybe the most serious problem was that 
unemployment remained persistently high for a long time. According to official statistics, 
urban unemployment in China stayed below 3% throughout the 1990s and the 2000s. 
However, if the ILO definition of unemployment is applied, urban unemployment rate rose 
over the 1990s, from 4.2% in 1990 to 5.6% in 1995 to 11.5% in 2000 and further to 15.2% 
in 2005 (Knight and Xue, 2003, 2005). It should be noted that the unemployment was 
rising in spite of the high rate of investment. Indeed, from the early 2000s while investment 
was growing by almost 20% per annum, employment grew only by 1% a year (Harman 
2009, p.248). This was because of the competitive race to higher productivity growth 
referred to above; more and more new industrial investments tended to take the form of 
high-tech new machinery, more advanced technologies and labour management skills, 
enabling firms to produce a greater quantity of final products with a smaller number of 
workers (i.e. to reduce labour time necessary to produce each unit of the product).17 
Considering the enforcement of insurance reforms largely remained ineffective (as of 2000, 
only 63% of total urban workers were covered), such a high unemployment was to bring 
about problems of poverty 18  as well as growing inequality/social unrest directly 
undermining the legitimacy of the CCP leadership (China Labour Watch 2004).  
 
Second, the overcapacity and overproduction brought about problems of burgeoning bad 
debt loads in the banking system as the profitability and cash income flows of firms (the 
ability to pay interest) were on the steady decline. While the actual scale of the non-
                                         
17 Another reason for the trend of growing investment without large employment growth was the 
changing of the production structure in China toward more capital-intensive and technologically 
advanced products and away from labour-intensive consumer goods. For statistical data showing 
the change see Cui (2007).  
18 Indeed, the World Bank pointed out already in the early 2000s that around 200 million people or 
one in six of the population was living in poverty on less than $1 a day (quoted by Harman 2009, 
p.245).   
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performing loans (NPLs) in China’s banking system is still unclear, it is estimated on the 
basis of government data that by the year 2006 nearly 10% of the total loans of state-
owned banks were non-performing (Matthews, et al 2008, p.5). It appears that given the 
trend of the NPLs ratio of the SOBs falling from around 50% in the late 1990s the banking 
system has been getting healthier. But such a trend was entirely due to a series of the 
government’s recapitalization programmes,19 of which the growing cost reached about $4 
trillion by the mid-2000s (Ma 2006). In reality, the problem of bad debt in the banking 
system was ever-worsening as the root of the problem was in production where the 
overcapacity and overproduction persisted, and the falling NPLs ratio meant nothing but 
the growth of NPLs in different forms, that is, quasi-fiscal deficits. This extra public 
spending made it increasingly difficult for the government to actively react to the growing 
problems of unemployment and social instability (Bonin and Huang, 2001, p.201).    
 
Third, a speculative boom or a ‘bubble’ began to rapidly emerge in real estate-construction 
sectors. For instance, investment in real estate soared by nearly 20% per year from 2001 to 
2005 and reached 11% of GDP in 2005, boosting housing prices up by more than 50-60% 
in almost every major city between 2001 to 2007 (Barnet and Brooks 2006, p.17). Coupled 
with less and less profitable investment opportunities in production, the low deposit rates 
set by the monetary authority in favour of the sterilization policies precipitated the flow of 
surplus capital into the real estate market.20 Despite the precarious ballooning of the 
housing bubble that would hit the whole financial system hard if allowed to continue, the 
monetary authority could not react to it by raising interest rates and tightening monetary 
policy because such a response would not only make it hard for the central bank to sustain 
the sterilized intervention of exchange rates, but would also make the bad debt problems of 
                                         
19 In 1999, the Chinese government set up state-owned asset management companies (AMCs) to 
clear the bad debts of the big four state banks. The sources of AMC financing were the Ministry of 
Finance (MoF), the People’s Bank of China (PBC), and AMC bonds. The role of the AMCs was to 
dispose of the bad debts bought from banks through loan sales, auctions, debt restructuring, 
foreclosures, litigation, and liquidations etc. The problem was that the poor cash recovery rate (that 
remained below 20%) and the substantial AMC losses turned AMC bonds themselves into bad 
debts while the financial burden of the government and the PBC was ever-increasing. For a more 
detailed discussion of the problem of these measures see Ma (2006). 
20 These investments mainly took place outside the regulated banking system, i.e. through so-
called ‘shadow banking’ such as the wealth management products and the trust products traded by 
banks and trust companies.   
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the banking system even worse (let alone the negative effects on employment growth).  
 
In sum, China was on a typical trajectory of overaccumulation crisis: the formation of 
surplus capital relative to the opportunities for productive employment. It was expressed in 
the form of falling profits in production due to overcapacity and overproduction, which 
were accompanied with a growing mass of unemployed money and unemployed workers. 
The future of these trends would not be a gradual return to balanced economy; it was the 
sustained growth that caused the problem and there seems to be no way out but a 
destructive crisis shaking off the overaccumulated capital.  
 
3.2. US’ imbalanced growth on the way to a crisis 
 
As noted, without the Chinese authorities’ financial support, the hyper-expansionary 
policies pursued by the Fed and the Bush Administration would, almost certainly, have 
issued in a major fall in the dollar, leading to declining asset prices and rising borrowing 
costs that could have plunged the US, China and the rest of the world economy back into 
deep recession. However, such policy cooperation of dollar-debt recycling, in return for a 
temporary aversion of crisis, paved the way for more extensive and more destructive crises 
by expanding debts without the concomitant expansion of ability to pay the debts.  
 
Through cooperation with China, what the US imported was not only cheap credit 
available to support the value of the dollar, but also the growing mass of ultra-cheap 
Chinese commodities that exposed US-based productive capitals to increasingly fierce 
competitive pressure. Business Week well described the pressure on the US-based firms: 
“‘the China price.’ They are the three scariest words in US industry. In general, it means 30% 
to 50% less than what you can possibly make something for in the US. In the worst cases, 
it means below your cost of materials. Makers of apparel, footwear, electric appliances, 
and plastics products, which have been shutting US factories for decades, know well the 
futility of trying to match the China price” (Business Week 2004, quoted by Burkett and 
Hart-Landsberg 2006, p.33). To make matters worse, partly because of the sizable FDI 
flows from ‘advanced’ countries to China21 and partly because of the rapid growth of 
                                         
21 In some sectors, such as electronics and machineries, foreign direct investment (FDI) has also 
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China’s R&D expenditures, the impact of the ‘China price’ was expanding to markets for 
high-technology items. Indeed, since the mid-1990s the share of capital goods (the US’ 
traditional area of strength such as computers, peripherals, and parts) in China’s total 
exports had increased 25-30%, accounting for more than 40% in 2006 (Cui 2007, chart 3).    
 
For many US-based firms in tradable sectors, the imperative imposed by the ‘China price’ 
was clear; they had to urgently cheapen their own commodities in order to preserve at least 
existing market shares and profit rates (Brenner 2009). The struggle to withstand growing 
competitive pressures was realized as an acceleration of productivity growth (e.g. the 
productivity in US manufacturing grew by 4% per annum between 1995-2000, and from 
2000 to 2006 accelerated to 5.1% per annum) and the resultant rapid fall in unit labour 
costs and selling prices (The Economist 2006, p.62). But such a fall in prices was not 
enough compared to the fall in the price of imports, partly because the value of the dollar 
remained relatively high in particular vis-à-vis the Chinese renminbi and the currencies of 
other emerging exporters in East Asia. Indeed, as presented by the steady upward tendency 
of the US terms of trade (the ratio of export to import prices) in capital goods (it had risen 
by 27.5% between 1995 and 2005 despite the US export prices falling by about 6%), the 
US-based producers’ price competitiveness on the world market was continuously 
weakened (Iley and Lewis 2007, pp.23-24). In line with declining competitiveness, the 
market share of the US also constantly declined. For example, between 1995 and 2008 the 
US share of capital goods exports fell from 21% to 14%, while China's share soared from 6% 
to 20% over the same period. As a reflection of the trend, the pace of de-industrialization 
accelerated compared to the 1990s. While the share of manufacturing sectors in total 
employment  declined from 13.1% 2000 to 10.7% in 2005, the proportion of service and 
construction sectors continued to grow from 86.5% in 2000 to 88.9% in 2005 (Mishel et al 
2007, p.169).  
 
Ironically, while the Chinese cheap imports pushed American workers into low-wage, 
precarious and domestic-consumption-dependent jobs in service and construction sectors, 
                                                                                                                           
played an important role, mirroring a major change in the global production network as more stages 
of production shift to China. For example, FDI flows into the electronics sector from Taiwan alone 
increased from $538 million in 1999 to $2.4 billion in 2005 (Cui 2007).  
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the influx of Chinese funds made them wealthier than before by inflating asset prices, in 
particular, the price of houses. The growing wealth, in turn, made it possible for the 
working population to borrow more and spend more despite the stagnating income growth. 
As a result, the overall American economy rapidly grew on the basis of the growth of 
domestic consumption-reliant industries (finance, retail, construction etc.). The 
consumption-led economic growth based on debt expansion and the concomitant growth in 
housing wealth seemed non-problematic in an economic sense (i.e. debtors were all 
apparently wealthy) and would last indefinitely as long as China and other surplus running 
countries continue to recycle dollar debts and underpin the price of houses. Indeed, during 
the boom optimism prevailed as it benefited both Chinese exporters and American 
consumers, while also making both Chinese creditors and American borrowers all wealthy. 
But the seemingly endless upward spiral of economic growth was a mere illusion because 
there was not enough real income growth required for servicing the growing amount of 
debt. In other words, the wealth being accumulated by means of debt expansion was not 
real but fictitious wealth that could only be proved to be ‘real’ when a presupposed rise of 
wages is realized.  
 
This unhappy truth was becoming obvious as the boom continued with the real wage 
growth left stagnated for a long period (mainly due to the deindustrialization trends). With 
little or no income growth among wage earners, the ratio of total outstanding debt to 
individual disposable income reached a historically unprecedented level, making the 
burden of debt service payment increasingly erode the share of income for preserving 
existing levels of living standard22. For instance, by 2006, American households were 
spending as much as 14.5% of their disposable income solely on servicing debt (Iley and 
Lewis 2007, p.10). They had become wealthier than ever, but the wealth existed only in the 
form of houses and not cash in hand. As an ultimate result, already by the end of 2006 the 
                                         
22 For a while, the increasing debt service burden of homeowners was able to be offset by gains 
from rising house prices, that is, the practices of ‘equity extraction’ using second mortgages. In 
other words, there was little or no correlation between debt burden and house prices thanks to a 
growing number of new homebuyers induced by easier access to mortgages. The underlying 
problem was that the pace of house price growth was certain to slow down due to the limited 
number of prospective homebuyers (US residents who need houses to live) in the context of the 
unlimited supply of new homes, and thus from some point the growing debt service burden would 
not be able to be covered by equity extraction. 
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growth of household debt began falling while house prices stopped soaring. While an 
increasing number of ‘wealthy debtors’ were sliding down to become ‘poor debtors’ who 
cannot rollover existing debt any longer, delinquency rate and foreclosures began to 
dramatically increase (Forster and Magdoff 2006, p.51).  
 
In sum, the escape from the recession in the early 2000s and the following rapid economic 
growth were itself building up barriers to further growth by allowing China to continue to 
produce ultra-cheap commodities and thus undermining the profitability of US-based 
productive activities. With the source of income deriving from productive accumulation 
remaining stagnant, the brisk consumption-led economic growth based on ever-growing 
debt-financed housing wealth was becoming ever more precarious like an increasingly 
upside down pyramid. It was certain that the ultimate future of these developments would 
not be a gradual return to a balanced economy but a large scale economic crisis through 
which the huge mass of fictitious wealth, that is, the overextended credit would be 
devalued or destroyed.  
 
3.3. Conclusion  
 
The Sino-American imbalance was a form of international cooperation through which the 
two states exchanged a means of sustaining accumulation. China provided the US with 
cheap dollar credits and cheap commodities making it possible for the US to keep 
employing expansionary policies, while at the same time the US provided China with 
outlets for commodities and surplus savings making it possible for the Chinese state to 
keep pursuing the export/investment-led growth. The contradiction was that by doing so 
they were actually reinforcing the tendency to overaccumulation of capital and thus paving 
the way for more extensive and more destructive crises. Specifically, in China the 
environment set by the two states to lessen the pressure of devaluation on the capital 
accumulated in the form of productive capacity ended up amplifying the very pressure by 
allowing productive forces to grow without regard to the limited demand for products. 
Likewise, in the US the condition made by the cooperative relations favourable to reduce 
the devaluation pressure on the dollar and credit-sustained assets turned out to be a factor 
making the pressure increasingly heavier by allowing credit to expand without regard for 
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the limited ability (productive accumulation) to honour those obligations. This is the 
reason why the Sino-American imbalance should be seen not just as a form of international 
cooperation for mutual benefit but as a ‘perverted form’ of international cooperation whose 
means contradict the goal.   
 
4. Conclusion  
 
While pointing out the limitations of existing approaches, this chapter has explored three 
questions related to the Sino-American imbalance: why the imbalance was promoted by 
the states, how it was sustained by the states, and what their contradictory consequences 
entailed for the world economy. The findings discussed above can be briefly summarized 
as follows.  
First, the imbalanced economic growth was promoted by the states as a strategy of 
escaping from the imminent crisis of accumulation and reproduction of social relations. A 
rebalancing was not promoted by the states as it in effect meant a return to the crisis they 
had escaped from. Second, the imbalanced growth was developed and sustained through 
mutually complementing relations between China and the US. Thus, the Sino-American 
imbalance was a form of international cooperation for sustaining accumulation. Third, the 
cooperative relations, by helping capitals to overcome the immediate barriers to 
accumulation, drove the overaccumulation of capital on the world market to an extreme 
limit with the necessity of a destructive crisis amplified. For this reason, it was a perverted 
form of international cooperation contradicting itself.   
 
Synthesizing the three dimensions of the Sino-American global imbalance, this chapter 
argues that the Sino-American global imbalance was a perverted form of international 
cooperation for reproducing capitalist social relations in the face of accumulation crisis; or 
expressed another way, it is argued that the imbalance was an expression of the tendency to 
overaccumulation and crisis inherent in the capitalist mode of production, mediated and 
reinforced by mutually complementary economic policies of the US and China seeking to 
sustain accumulation within their countries. It is believed that, by developing this argument, 
this chapter has contributed to the aim of this thesis: providing a comprehensive 
explanation for the Sino-American imbalance and overcoming the limitations of existing 
perspectives.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the Chino-
American global imbalance that deepened from the mid-1990s onwards. This thesis has 
argued that the Chino-Amercian global imbalance was an expression of the tendency to 
overaccumulation and crisis inherent in the capitalist mode of production, mediated and 
reinforced by complementary economic policies of the US and China seeking to sustain 
accumulation.  
 
This account is quite different from arguments laid out by mainstream economists and 
international political economy theorists. Some economists have explained the event as a 
problem of each government’s macroeconomic policies, while others have seen it as an 
outcome of the rational choices of economic agents in the given market situation. Focusing 
attention on the international political context of the event, critical IPE theorists have 
emphasised the politics of the dollar as the global money to show how the US had been 
able to exploit other countries savings, while the World Systems analysts have seen it as a 
symptom of the long-term historic pattern of world capitalist evolution and the hegemonic 
transition: the decline of the American-led capitalist world system and the rise of a 
Chinese-led new global accumulation regime. While the existing approaches to the 
imbalance offer some useful analyses of specific aspects of the event, it is clear that their 
explanatory power remains confined within the narrowly fragmented analytical frames and 
angles set by themselves in the first place. They all can be criticized for cutting some 
specific part of the event in order to fit it into their own theoretical concepts rather than 
providing a means of conceptualizing the event as a whole. 
  
This thesis has argued that the lack of comprehensiveness of the existing approaches 
principally derives from its restricted methodology, taking the starting point for analysis to 
be the phenomenally separate and autonomous ‘spheres’ or ‘forms’ of society such as the 
state and the economy (and the subsequent external/functional relations between them) 
instead of beginning with a study of society itself from which different constituent parts are 
derived. In other words, the existing views are treating particular categories of social 
organization as an established ‘fact’ and proceed to construct its relation to society 
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externally, as if each of them exists with its own law of development and the intent of 
existence independent from the underlying relations between people. This thesis has 
attempted to overcome such a deficiency by means of a Marxist, in particular an open 
Marxist methodology, which begins a social study with the question of society itself, that is, 
the way in which human labour power is organized in the process of social production, and 
then seeks to understand how its various component parts are derived from this. From this 
perspective, the various elements of which society appears to be constructed are not seen 
as independently existing things that haphazardly collide with each other, but are instead 
seen as integral parts of the process of social production. As such, a study based on this 
methodology is able to offer a means of conceptualizing any social event in the context of 
a wider social theory. Out of this consideration, this thesis has argued that an analysis of 
the global imbalances should be based on an understanding of the struggle of reproducing 
capitalist social relations, that is, the process of capital accumulation which manifests itself 
in various patterns of state policies, market transactions, the expansion of finance, and 
interstate relations.  
 
With the help of Marx’s theory of accumualtion and crisis, this thesis first analysed the 
contradictory rise of China as a surplus running ‘factory of the world’. The dramatic 
growth of China from the early 1990s was a reflection of the drastic reform process 
undertaken by the party-state in response to the crisis of class dominance during the pre-
reform era. Central to the restructuring process was depoliticizing the social relations of 
production by displacing the direct state-plan with the rule of law and money as an 
organizational principle of social production. By severing the financial relations with the 
state and production units, the responsibility for productivity growth was transmitted from 
the state to individual firms and workers who were now put under constant pressures of 
liquidation and redundancy. The result of the aggressive reforms coupled with the Maoist 
legacy of strict social discipline and the import of advanced methods of production (with 
FDI inflows) was the advent of the world’s most efficient system of extracting surplus 
labour. While the global market share for products made in China was rapidly enlarging, 
the huge profits earned from exports were eagerly reinvested in production, facilitating 
even greater levels of capital accumulation. The rapid accumulation, however, was setting 
its own barriers to further accumulation: the pressure derived from an ever-growing 
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amount of commodities thrown onto the market where effective demand for them was not 
unlimited. Faced with the limits of the market and falling profitability, individual capitals 
tried to overcome the barrier by introducing more advanced means of production, further 
laying off ‘excess’ workers, and intensifying work for remaining workers rather than 
tamely withdrawing their production. Now the state was facing another form of 
contradiction: on the one hand, rising unemployment and growing workers’ resistance 
made it necessary to pursue more accommodating policies to deal with potentially serious 
political unrest, while on the other hand, rising costs of production were making productive 
investment in China less and less profitable with emerging bad debt problems ever-
deepening. It was in this context that the state began eagerly supporting the credit-
sustained market expansion in the US by pouring trillions of dollars into the American debt 
markets.   
 
Meanwhile, the dramatic expansion of China’s global market share pressurized other states 
to recompose class relations in line with the Chinese developments in order to let 
progressive capital accumulation go on in their territories. While the pressure eventually 
erupted as successive balance of payment/financial crises in developing countries from the 
mid-1990s, the worsening overproduction on the world market also turned the nature of the 
US investment boom based on the expansionary monetary policy coupled with the 
productivity growth into precarious growth based on the speculative stock market bubble. 
With productive investment remaining unprofitable despite the productivity growth, the 
easy credit made available by the expansionary monetary policy was employed to fuel the 
boom in stock markets where claims of future profit were speculatively traded regardless 
of the underlying production of surplus value. While the increasing prices of assets were 
making everyone look increasingly wealthier, the economy as a whole enjoyed a period of 
prosperity based on the credit-sustained consumption boom. In fact, such a mechanism of 
fictitious accumulation had been frequently pursued by the US and other states since the 
1980s in the face of the crisis of accumulation, and after the bursting of the stock market 
bubble in 2000 the state once again decided to sustain the existing level of accumulation, 
that is, to stave off a sweeping crisis, by means of expanded credit. With the reproduction 
of the majority of the working population having become dependent upon employment in 
consumption-reliant service sectors, sustaining or reigniting a credit-sustained 
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consumption boom might have been considered a lifeline of the US’ economy and political 
stability, which had to take precedence over any other government policy. It should be 
noted that the inflation of the infamous housing market bubble, however, would have been 
impossible without the support of China which, also in the face of an imminent crisis of 
overproduction, eagerly recycled the massive quantity of dollars (inflows of hot money as 
well as those earned from exports) into the US financial markets almost free of charge, 
thus making it easier for the US monetary authority to employ expansionary policies. It 
follows that the bubble was an outcome of de-facto international policy cooperation 
enabling the surplus workers to be more easily indebted, and thus to spend more than their 
incomes, by mobilizing surplus capital through the highly developed international financial 
system.    
 
Based on the findings of analyses of the contradictory rise of China as a surplus-running 
‘factory of the world’ together with the contradictory rise of the US as a debt-ridden 
‘consumption market of the world’ from the mid-1990s, this thesis has presented three 
arguments about the nature of the Sino-American imbalance that are distinct from existing 
approaches. First, refuting the Keynesian approach which attributes the imbalanced growth 
both in China and the US to the ‘wrong’ policies employed by misguided policy makers, 
this thesis has found that the ‘wrong’ policies were the states’ strategies for managing an 
imminent crisis of accumulation and securing reproduction of social relations. In this sense, 
the root cause of the imbalance should be located not in the policies or policy makers but 
in the crisis-tendency inherent in the capitalist mode of production. Second, by exploring 
the de-facto policy cooperation between the US and China through which the crisis 
following the burst of the US stock market bubble in 2000 was managed and overcome, it 
was found that the imbalance was a form of international cooperation between the global 
centre of production (China) and the global centre of circulation (the US) which were 
mutually dependent in sustaining accumulation within their own territories. This view 
overcomes the limitation of the approaches of critical IPE and World System analysis 
which confine their analyses to the framework of hegemonic relations. Third, in contrast to 
neoclassical approaches which see the imbalance as a process of efficient resource 
allocation promising an ‘inter-temporal utility maximization’ for all participants, this thesis 
has found that the cooperative relations conducive to sustaining imbalanced yet rapid 
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growth were self-undermining relations that ended up amplifying overaccumulation of 
capital and the necessity of a destructive crisis in the world market by driving 
overproduction of commodities and overextension of credit to the extreme limit. It follows 
that the Sino-American imbalances were an outcome of states’ speculative deferral of an 
economic crisis on a global scale. For this reason, the thesis argues that the Sino-American 
imbalance was not merely a case of benign cooperation through financial markets for 
achieving mutual benefit but a self-contradictory and perverted form of international 
cooperation. Aggregating these three arguments, consequently, this thesis argues that the 
Sino-American global imbalance was a perverted form of international cooperation for 
securing reproduction of capitalist social relations in the face of accumulation crisis; or 
expressed another way, the Sino-American imbalance was an expression of the tendency to 
overaccumulation and crisis inherent in the capitalist mode of production, managed and 
reinforced by mutually complementary economic policies of the US and China.  
 
I have employed diverse macroeconomic data in an attempt to empirically demonstrate the 
argument of this thesis. First of all, the argument that both the US and China were under 
growing pressure of an accumulation crisis prior to the mid-1990s has been demonstrated 
with empirical material showing on the one hand the stagnating productivity growth, low 
real wage growth, and hyper-inflation rates coupled with growing socio-political tensions 
in China, and, on the other hand, those showing steadily falling capacity utilization rates, 
and exceptionally high unemployment rates and poverty rates coupled with steadily falling 
real wages in the US until the mid-1990s.  
In response to those crises, as argued here, the Chinese employed policies mainly aimed at 
cheapening the labour force while depoliticizing the class relations of production, and the 
American state employed a set of policies lowering interest rates and inducing a stronger 
dollar with a view to encouraging investment as well as consumption based on easy credit. 
In China, the policies transformed the economy into a surplus-running ‘factory of the 
world’ from the mid-1990s, which I have empirically demonstrated, with the world’s 
lowest unit labour cost and increasingly larger market shares for capital operating in China 
coupled with the unprecedented influx of FDI as well as the ever-rising current account 
surpluses. In the US, on the other hand, the policies boosted the economic boom making 
the economy a world consumption market based on debt expansion, which I have 
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demonstrated with the relatively high unit labour cost (rising overall trade weighted real 
value of the dollar), rapidly shrinking market shares for capital operating in the US, and the 
changing industrial structure towards non-tradable service sectors along with the 
cumulative current account deficits.  
 
As I have argued, the immediate limits of the imbalanced growth, the lack of effective 
domestic consumption demands in China and the inflationary pressure (downward pressure 
on the dollar) in the US, were managed and overcome through the de-facto cooperation 
between the two states. This thesis empirically demonstrated this argument by means of the 
data showing the growing level of US debt (especially that issued by the government and 
government-backed agencies such as MBSs) purchased by the Chinese state along with the 
growing share of Chinese goods in US consumer markets, which formed and sustained the 
Sino-American imbalance, in particular from the early 2000s. 
Furthermore, as argued in this thesis, while the de-facto policy cooperation made it 
possible for both states to continue their rapid economic growth without a serious open 
economic crisis, it ended up intensifying, rather than countering, the tendency towards 
overaccumulation crisis in both countries. I have empirically supported this argument with 
some economic indicators showing, on the side of China, the ever-falling average capacity 
utilization rates, chronically high unemployment, increasing cases of serious industrial 
action, and growing bad-debt loads in the banking system during the mid-2000s, and, on 
the side of the US, the ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratios, in particular the precariously rising 
household debt and debt-service payment as a share of household disposable income until 
the year 2007.   
 
It is believed that interpreting the Sino-American global imbalance in this way overcomes 
the deficiency of the fragmmented understanding of the existing approaches in terms of its 
illumination of the broader political economic context (constraints and complusions 
derived from the process of capital accumulation and crisis) in which the specific state 
policies, the pattern of market transcations, and the unique inter-state relations were 
developed, ultimately constituting the complex phenomena of the global imbalance. 
Understanding the Sino-American imbalances in this way may also lay the foundation for a 
more comprehensive understanding of the 2007 global financial crisis and the distresses 
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the US and China have experienced since 2007, because it is believed that the crisis and its 
fallout are a magnification of the imbalance as a perverted form of capital accumulation on 
the world market.  
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